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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation traces the emergence between World War I and World War II of a state-
skeptical, court-centered, and content-neutral model of civil liberties in America.  It argues that 
the new understanding drew from competing traditions of progressive reformism and 
conservative legalism. The American Civil Liberties Union reformulated those competing 
traditions, primarily through efforts to resist the cooptation and coercion of the working class by 
the capitalist state.  More broadly, the dissertation suggests that the interwar civil liberties 
movement was an important architect of the post-New Deal constitutional order, which paired 
congressional regulation of the economy with judicial enforcement of state neutrality in the 
democratic decision-making process. 
The ACLU’s initial theory of civil liberties derived from the principles of labor 
voluntarism.  Its central commitment was to a “right of agitation,” bound up with the rights to 
picket, organize, and strike. In the early 1920s, however, economic prosperity and the resulting 
decline in industrial conflict opened space for the organization to venture into new fields and 
form new partnerships without reassessing its underlying commitment to radical laborite ideals.  
Although ACLU lawyers were initially skeptical of rights-based litigation, which they associated 
with the substantive due process decisions of the Lochner era, their successes in such areas as 
academic freedom and sex education attracted conservative proponents of individual rights and 
helped to rehabilitate the judiciary as a forum for progressive reform.   
Over the course of the 1930s, a broad range of actors sought to define and mobilize civil 
liberties claims, including the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee, the American Bar 
Association’s Committee on the Bill of Rights, and the Civil Liberties Unit within the 
iv 
 
Department of Justice.  The ACLU clashed with its labor and administration allies over New 
Deal labor legislation, the judiciary reorganization plan, and “employer free speech.”  
Conservatives, in turn, adopted the ACLU’s civil liberties rhetoric in support of their own 
agenda.  By the late 1930s, the ACLU had traded in its open endorsement of radical social 
change for a politically neutral commitment to the Bill of Rights, embraced by the legal 
establishment and enforced by the federal courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1945, the American Civil Liberties Union issued a statement defining the category of 
rights to which the organization was dedicated.1 Civil liberties, it explained, were “guarantees to 
citizens” pertaining primarily, though not exclusively, to their relationship with government. 
They were essential to “democratic procedures” and flowed from the precepts of “a political 
democracy in which ultimate power rests in the people, and in which minority rights are as 
essential as majority rule.”  They derived from the federal Bill of Rights and its state 
counterparts, and they encompassed the “freedom from governmental interference with citizens’ 
liberties, of protection of those liberties where necessary by government itself, and of the 
equality of all citizens in the exercise of rights.”  According to the ACLU, the state had a role to 
play in providing and protecting a forum for public debate, but it was never justified in curtailing 
disfavored views, “however radical or reactionary.”2
The ACLU’s postwar vision of civil liberties was colored by international events, 
organizational politics, and a quarter-century of steady gains in the courts and in public opinion.  
More than anything, however, it was shaped by federal labor policy.  When the ACLU was 
founded in the aftermath of the First World War, it declared itself an adjunct of the radical labor 
movement.  Its defense of free speech was motivated by a deep-seated distrust of state power, 
  
                                                          
1 It is often difficult to distinguish the institutional voice of the ACLU from that of its various constituents.  Where 
possible, I designate the particular speaker or group of speakers.   
2 Civil Liberty: A Statement Defining the Position of the American Civil Liberties Union (New York: ACLU, 1945). 
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stemming from decades of hostile government policy.3  That concern persisted until the early 
New Deal.  As ACLU co-founder Roger Baldwin recalled decades later, the organization’s 
leaders were concerned that the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt would bleed 
into a “centralized Fascist state,” but the National Labor Relations Board convinced them 
otherwise. They had feared that the NLRB would decline to protect the rights of labor, but in 
practice “it served as one of the most impressive landmark agencies in civil liberties and 
industrial peace.”4
The ACLU’s acceptance of central state authority went hand in hand with a new and 
lasting deference to the federal courts.  During the 1920s, faced with the federal judiciary’s 
eagerness to protect property rights against encroachment by state and federal legislation, the 
ACLU had been reluctant to invite judicial intervention on behalf of individual rights.  By the 
1940s, the organization’s “battleground [was] chiefly in the courts.”
   
5  Its volunteer attorneys had 
carried “scores of civil liberties issues” to the United States Supreme Court, “where decisions in 
case after case [had] firmly established the interpretations of the Bill of Rights which the Union 
supports.”6
                                                          
3 “Free speech” and “civil liberties” are not synonymous.  Rather, free speech is a subset or component of a broader 
category captured by the latter term. Although both ideas were in flux during this period, free speech was more 
stable and entailed, at the minimum, a commitment to public discussion of lawful political decisions.  
  Over the following decades, the ACLU would continue to pursue such non-judicial 
methods as lobbying, grass-roots organizing, and cooperation with administrative agencies.  At 
4 Roger Baldwin, introduction to American Civil Liberties Union Annual Reports, vol. 1 (New York: Arno Press and 
the New York Times, 1970), iii; American Civil Liberties Union, Eternal Vigilance!: The Story of Civil Liberty, 
1937–1938 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1938), 25–26 (“Only those familiar with the violations of 
labor’s rights can appreciate the enormous change which has taken place in industrial conflict since the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in the spring of 1937 sustaining the National Labor Relations Act. . . . The National Labor 
Relations Act is in substance a civil liberties document.”).  
5 American Civil Liberties Union, Presenting the American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., November 1941 (New York: 
American Civil Liberties Union, 1941). 
6 American Civil Liberties Union, Presenting the American Civil Liberties Union, April 1947 (New York: American 
Civil Liberties Union, 1947), 5. 
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times, when the courts seemed unusually unfriendly to civil liberties claims, it would emphasize 
legislation or education.  Still, the organization’s mature view was unmistakable: “the whole 
courts system, top to bottom, federal and state, is the proper and natural ally of citizen’s rights, 
and for the ACLU, with its appeal to law, it is the essential forum.”7
The ACLU’s twin commitments to a robust federal government and to strong federal 
courts reflected a distinctly modern approach to civil liberties.  The ACLU, like the liberalism of 
which its “card-carrying members” were emblematic, had come to accept as necessary and 
desirable the New Deal expansion of central state authority over vast swaths of social and 
economic relations.  The rights it championed—expressive freedom, but also sexual autonomy, 
personal privacy, and procedural protections for criminal defendants—were articulated not in 
opposition to state power, but as its natural complements. In the ACLU’s conception, these 
protections were crucial because they ensured that democratic government would reflect the 
diversity of human viewpoints and experiences, making the legitimate exercise of federal power 
possible.   
  
By conventional accounts, the new arrangement—judicial deference to state economic 
policy coupled with strong safeguards against government interference as that policy was 
formulated and enacted—was heralded by the Supreme Court’s fourth footnote of Carolene 
Products.  This dissertation suggests that the theory of government embedded in footnote four 
was not a spontaneous solution by federal judges struggling to balance political will against 
minority rights.  Nor was it, as some have suggested, primarily a response to fears stemming 
                                                          
7 Baldwin, “Introduction,” xii. 
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from the rise of totalitarianism in Europe.8
In short, the dissertation argues that the ACLU—guided by the lessons and ambitions, if 
not always the tenets, of the radical labor movement—was an unsung architect of the post-New 
Deal constitutional order.
  Rather, it was the articulation of two decades of 
negotiations between state-centered progressive reformism (with its attendant distrust of the 
Constitution and the courts) on the one hand, and conservative legalism (friendly to both industry 
and individual autonomy) on the other. Crucially, the compromise approach was brokered by the 
ACLU in its effort to resist the cooptation and coercion of the working class by the capitalist 
state.   
9  Its early theory of civil liberties derived from the principles of labor 
voluntarism, and during the 1920s, its rejection of state intervention in the context of labor 
disputes paradoxically allied it to conservative proponents of individual rights.10
                                                          
8 E.g., Edward Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973); Richard Primus, The American Language of Rights (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); William Edward Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology 
in New York, 1920–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
  For the most 
part, representatives of the early ACLU defended labor radicals and political dissenters by 
reference to constitutional rights because rights-based litigation proved effective. They believed 
in “agitation,” not individual liberty.  Over time, however, many (though not all) internalized 
their commitment to free speech as an abstract value; their insistence in public communications 
9 While legal histories, as well as constitutional law casebooks, have largely ignored the ACLU’s role in these 
developments, the ACLU’s public literature and institutional history has claimed a foundational role for the 
organization in the rise of modern American governance, albeit in a celebratory mode.  See, e.g., American Civil 
Liberties Union, “ACLU History,” Web. 1 February 2011 <http://www.aclu.org/aclu-history> (“The advancement 
of civil liberties over the past century represents one of the most significant developments in American history, and 
the ACLU has been integral to this process.”). 
10 On the conservative civil libertarian tradition, see Kenneth I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities 
in the Development of American Constitutional Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); David 
Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progressive Reform (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, in press). Although conservative jurists occasionally upheld the contractual rights of minorities, they 
rarely if ever defended the rights of workers to organize or picket or the rights of radicals to promote their ideas.  
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that their defense of radicals’ right to speak did not imply agreement with their underlying views 
rang increasingly true.  As early as October 1928, Arthur Garfield Hays, general counsel for the 
ACLU and a committed civil libertarian, argued that radicalism was ill-advised and that “the 
solution of our economic problems must be accomplished by education and law, not by 
revolution.”11
The narrative that unfolds in these pages is not the one that I expected to find.  Today, the 
ACLU’s Web page recounts that “the ACLU was founded to defend and secure [constitutional] 
rights and to extend them to people who have been excluded from their protection—Native 
Americans and other people of color; lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender people; 
women; mental patients; prisoners; people with disabilities; and the poor.”
  Though for a time they remained fellow travelers, the leadership of the ACLU 
clashed with their radical allies.  Over the course of the 1930s, they unhooked their leftist 
ambition for substantive equality from the freedom to espouse it.  By the late New Deal, the 
ACLU had traded in its open endorsement of radical social change for a politically neutral 
commitment to the Bill of Rights. 
12
                                                          
11 Advertisement for Ford Hall Forum, n.d., in Covel, Betsy B., ed., Women’s Studies Manuscript Collections from 
the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Series 3: Sexuality, Sex Education, and Reproductive Rights, Part B: 
Papers of Mary Ware Dennett and the Voluntary Parenthood League (Bethesda: University Publications of 
America, 1994) (hereafter Dennett Papers), reel 22, file 477. 
  When I came to the 
project, I was searching for the voices of women, of immigrants, of African Americans, of the 
disenfranchised.  All were there.  But in their conversations with and on behalf of the ACLU, 
they did not advocate for their rights as individuals, or even (at first) of minorities.  A year after 
the ACLU was founded, its statement on lynching neatly summed up the organization’s 
approach: “We publish the pamphlet in the belief that only by frankly recognizing the economic 
12 American Civil Liberties Union, “Guardians of Freedom,” Web. 1 February 2011 
<http://www.aclu.org/guardians-freedom>. 
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basis of lynching can we even begin to solve the problem. . . . Its solution is obviously bound up 
with the cause of exploited labor—white and black alike. And that solution will become possible 
only as the black and white workers of the South both achieve the right to meet, speak freely, 
organize and strike.”13
The American Civil Liberties Union is at the heart of this story. But this project is not a 
history of the ACLU; it is a history through the ACLU. Between World War I and World War II, 
no organization or individual was as instrumental in shaping contemporary understandings of 
civil liberties.  The ACLU was deeply connected to the foundational social movements of the 
interwar period, and it was involved in virtually every important free speech case in the federal 
courts between its founding in 1920 and the Second World War.
 During the 1920s and 1930s, the ACLU fought the deportation of aliens 
and the suppression of religious fringe groups.  It defended the advocacy of birth control and of 
racially integrated public school.  But its primary goal was always to secure labor’s rights.  
14 According to Roger Baldwin, 
the ACLU was the first American organization to incorporate the phrase “civil liberties” into its 
title, thereby bringing it “into a wider public vocabulary.”15
                                                          
13 William Pickens, Lynching and Debt Slavery (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1921), 1. See also 
Roger Baldwin, Memorandum on the South as Observed in a Trip in May and June 1920, in American Civil 
Liberties Union Records, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917–1950, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Public Policy 
Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. (hereafter ACLU Papers), reel 23, vol. 166, p. 5 (“The race issue at 
bottom is the labor issue, and the master class of the south knows it.”). 
 Indeed, when conservative lawyers 
sought to reclaim civil liberties as an “American value” in the late 1930s, they acknowledged 
14 Many of the connections were fostered through Baldwin’s role as organizer and administrator of the American 
Fund for Public Service, or Garland Fund. See generally Gloria Garrett Samson, The American Fund for Public 
Service: Charles Garland and Radical Philanthropy, 1922-1941 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996). 
15 Baldwin, “Introduction,” iii. According to Baldwin, the incorporation of “civil liberties” into the title of the 
AUAM’s Civil Liberties Bureau in 1917 was borrowed from “a British war-time Council for Civil Liberties whose 
leaders we knew.” Ibid., viii. After the war, that organization was disbanded.  A new National Council for Civil 
Liberties was organized in 1934. On the British civil liberties movement during and between the world wars, see K. 
D. Ewing and C. A. Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain, 
1914–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
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their own absence from the field for the previous decades, and they attributed it to the dominant 
influence of the ACLU.16
 Almost all of the significant figures in the interwar effort to define and promote civil 
liberties were affiliated, in some capacity, with the ACLU. Between 1920 and 1940, the ACLU’s 
governing bodies—its National Committee and, after incorporation, its National and Executive 
Boards—resembled a who’s who list of influential public figures.
  
17
                                                          
16 Grenville Clark, “Conservatism and Civil Liberty,” Address at Annual Meeting of the Nassau County Bar 
Association, 11 June 1938, in Arthur T. Vanderbilt Political, Professional, and Judicial Papers, Wesleyan University 
Collection on Legal Change, Middletown, Conn. (hereafter Vanderbilt Papers), box 127, folder Civil Liberties; 
“Freedom of Speech: Whose Concern?” New Northwest (Portland, Oregon), 14 March 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 5, 
vol. 41 (“The defense of free speech has become in this country almost a monopoly of the radicals. The conservative 
classes, with a few honorable exceptions in congress and in the press, have put away the ancient American faith in 
freedom. . . . The conservative leaders of the American bar, men like Root and Hughes and Parker, have discreetly 
remained out of sight.”). 
  They included 
representatives of the radical and mainstream labor movements (for example, James H. Maurer, 
Powers Hapgood, Andrew Furuseth, and Rose Schneiderman), the NAACP (James Weldon 
Johnson, Charles Hamilton Houston, and future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall), and 
major religious denominations (John Haynes Holmes, Rev. John A. Ryan, Rabbi Abba Hillel 
Silver). They attracted distinguished activists and reformers (Jane Addams, Hellen Keller, and 
Amos Pinchot), well known lawyers (Clarence Darrow and Dorothy Kenyon), and prominent 
publishers, writers, and intellectuals (B. W. Huebsch, Pearl Buck, Heywood Broun, John Dos 
Passos, and Upton Sinclair). They boasted high-level government officials (Frank P. Walsh and 
Lloyd K. Garrison), as well as eminent former and future federal judges (Charles F. Amidon, 
George W. Anderson, and Felix Frankfurter).  Politically, they brought together leading 
Socialists (including Morris Hillquit, Norman Thomas, and Eugene V. Debs), Communists 
17 Its state and local affiliates also featured a distinguished leadership.  See generally Judy Kutulas, The American 
Civil Liberties Union and the Making of Modern Liberalism, 1930-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006).  
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(William Z. Foster), liberal Republicans (Jeanette Rankin), and even, for a time, a segregationist 
Southern Democrat (Thomas W. Hardwick).  Many others who never joined the organization 
turned to it for legal representation or closely allied with it in pursuit of common goals.  
In addition, the vast majority of the important theorists—legal, social, and political—who 
thought and wrote about free speech and its relationship to American democracy were connected 
with the organization.  Ernst Freund and Harold Laski were founding members of the National 
Committee, and John Dewey and Alexander Meiklejohn both subsequently joined. Charles 
Beard participated in ACLU-sponsored special projects. Zechariah Chafee declined to sit on the 
National Committee because he believed it would compromise his perceived scholarly 
objectivity, but he made donations, worked closely with the ACLU leadership, and guided the 
activities of the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts.18
 The ACLU’s allies and constituents during the interwar years had more disagreements 
than commonalities, and they arrived at civil liberties advocacy from widely divergent paths.  
Most, however, took up the cause during or immediately after World War I.
  
19
                                                          
18 Zechariah Chafee to Roger Baldwin, 17 January 1929, ACLU Papers, reel 63, vol. 360; Donald L. Smith, 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr.: Defender of Liberty and Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 9. 
  In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the threat to democratic progress had taken the form of 
“individual rights”; invoking them, courts repeatedly (albeit infrequently, relative to their 
dockets) undermined government efforts to temper economic injustice.  During the war, 
conversely, “the state” was aligned with the majority in suppressing unpopular views.  This new 
lineup encouraged a new way of thinking about rights.  Prior critics of monopoly capitalism had 
19 The ACLU’s own publications consistently cited World War I as the impetus for the leadership’s interest in civil 
liberties. E.g., Osmond K. Fraenkel, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties (New York: American Civil Liberties 
Union, 1949), 20 (“The most important issues in modern civil liberties grew out of the First World War. Then for 
the first time the Court was called upon to consider the meaning of freedom of speech and of the press.”). 
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framed American politics as a pitched battle between corporations and constitutional 
conservatism on the one hand and the will of the people on the other.  Wartime reformers, faced 
with the failings of democratic majorities and government officials, were forced to reassess their 
political understandings.  Some turned more radical, emphasizing false consciousness, the 
insidious influence of the industrial lobby, and administrative capture.  Others clung to their 
confidence in progressive governance but called upon legislators and administrators to provide 
space for dissent. Still others adopted a liberal ideal remarkably similar to that of the Lochner 
Court, albeit toward different ends, reimagining the Constitution as a guarantor of individual 
rights as against the authoritarian excesses of the state.20
 The most familiar strain of interwar civil libertarianism was the progressive version 
espoused by civil liberties theoreticians (including Zechariah Chafee, Felix Frankfurter, John 
Dewey, and Alexander Meilkejohn) and by a few sympathetic jurists (most famously Judge 
Learned Hand and Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes). To varying degrees, 
these figures emphasized the capacity of free speech to inform democratic decision-making or to 
flush out political truth.  Although they harbored serious reservations about the underlying 
beliefs of the wartime dissenters, they regarded civil liberties as fundamental to the rule of law.  
During the 1920s, they appreciated the dangers of excessive emphasis on the public interest, 
  All were disillusioned by the 
government’s failure to uphold democratic values. The mobilization of state actors and offices in 
the service of domestic repression taught them just how fickle and oppressive administrative 
governance can be.   
                                                          
20 Early civil libertarians imagined rights against popular pressures (for example, mob violence) and private actors 
(most notably employers) as well as state power.  On the importance of mob violence to the World War I civil 
liberties movement, see Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern 
American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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majority will, and administrative consensus.  Moreover, they knew that social science solutions 
were only ever as good as the research and theory on which they relied, and they understood that 
accepted methods were always evolving and incomplete.  They acknowledged the coercive 
power of the state—even, or particularly, a popularly elected one—to reinforce dominant 
narratives.   
Most, however, accepted the administrative state as an abiding feature of modernity.  
Some fretted about “bigness” in government as an analog to the industrial consolidation of 
wealth, but they never made a concerted effort to turn the tide of central state growth.21  Instead, 
they sought to introduce protections for inadequately represented groups into the exercise of 
federal power (though not, primarily, through the courts22
                                                          
21 ACLU attorney Morris Ernst’s 1940 book Too Big was planned in conversation with Louis Brandeis and was 
intended as an update to the well-known volume of the latter’s assembled works, The Curse of Bigness (1934), 
which was edited by another influential ACLU lawyer, Osmond Fraenkel. Morris Ernst, Too Big (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1940); Louis Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness: Miscellaneous Papers of Louis D. Brandeis, edited by 
Osmond K. Fraenkel (New York: Viking Press, 1934). Ernst’s friends and colleagues within the New Deal 
administration were skeptical of his critique of bigness, including, most notably, Jerome Frank, who took him to task 
for undervaluing New Deal efficiency and for celebrating states’ rights, among other positions. Jerome Frank to 
Morris Ernst, 25 September 1939, in Morris Leopold Ernst Papers, 1888–1976, Harry Ransom Humanities Research 
Center, University of Texas at Austin (hereafter Ernst Papers), box 10, folder 4. On the other hand, Ernst’s distrust 
of the new, vast bureaucracy was shared by many former Progressives, including John Dewey and Zechariah 
Chafee—and, of course, by Brandeis. See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of 
Civil Libertarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 81, 135. 
).  The prewar progressives had 
celebrated bureaucrats for their insulation from political will, but it had since become evident 
that neutrality was illusory—industrial interests had consistently managed to assert their 
influence—and ill-advised.  Their interwar counterparts instead called for accountability to a 
broad range of public voices.  They sought to ensure that the state, despite and because of its 
22 For example, Zechariah Chafee sought to persuade Congress and the people that free speech served the public 
interest but, like many of his Progressive colleagues, questioned the authority of the courts to override explicit 
legislative policy prohibiting speech. In his later years, however, Chafee came to doubt whether Congress was as 
capable as the courts were of safeguarding individual liberties. Jonathan Prude, “Portrait of a Civil Libertarian: The 
Faith and Fear of Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,” Journal of American History 60 (1973): 652–54. 
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unprecedented reach, would be responsive to new ideas and interests: accessible, mutable, and 
open to democratic change.   
Like their prewar precursors, the progressive civil libertarians imagined a theory of rights 
that facilitated tolerance and diversity not because of the inherent autonomy and dignity of 
individuals, but because entrenched government interests stifle difference and progress.  
Zechariah Chafee explained in his seminal work on civil liberties that “the rights and powers of 
the Constitution . . . are largely means of protecting important individual and social interests.” 
The crucial part, he explained, was finding the balance between the two.23  The solution to the 
growth of central state authority was not to reverse it, as conservatives and anarchists both 
claimed.  On the contrary, it was the necessity and permanence of the wartime expansion of 
administrative authority that made a broader commitment to civil liberties important.24  As 
British civil libertarian Norman Angell observed, “The need of individuality in thought increases 
in direct ratio to the increasing complexity of our social arrangements. The very fact that we do 
need more and more unity of ACTION—regimentation, regulation—in order to make a large 
population with many needs possible at all, is the reason mainly which makes it so important to 
preserve variety and freedom of individual thought.”25
                                                          
23 Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920), 32–35. See also Zechariah 
Chafee, “Freedom of Speech in War Time,” Harvard Law Review 32 (1919): 932–73. 
  The surrender to government of authority 
24 Reuel Schiller describes a similar process but locates the transformation in the postwar period, after “the 
prescriptive beliefs of prewar reformers [had been] destroyed during the Second World War.” Reuel Schiller, “Free 
Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment,” University of 
Virginia Law Review 86 (2000): 3–4.  By contrast, I argue that civil libertarians’ distrust of the administrative 
regulation of expression was, by the mid-1940s, already well established. Indeed, it was their interwar interrogation 
of administrative authority that laid the foundation for a broader postwar indictment of the New Deal regulatory 
state. 
25 Norman Angell, Why Freedom Matters (London: National Council for Civil Liberties, 1918), 29. 
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over the minutiae of daily life made the open and ongoing discussion of social priorities 
imperative.    
The ACLU made liberal use of such arguments, whose most prominent proponents 
collaborated actively with the organization in authoring pamphlets and drafting legal briefs.26 In 
fact, an ACLU-commissioned treatise on civil liberties reflected in 1928 that the courts of the 
United States had only recently abandoned their outmoded reliance on “natural rights” for the 
“modern idea that grants liberty to men . . . for the sake of the state.”27
The project for the interwar ACLU was to link the right of agitation to the American 
constitutional tradition, both normatively and doctrinally. And in that venture, the ACLU parted 
company from progressives and turned, ironically, to the counter-majoritarian tradition its 
  For the ACLU’s core 
leadership, however, the most important lesson of the government’s wartime policy was not 
about pluralism or public welfare. In the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, Roger Baldwin, 
Norman Thomas, Albert DeSilver, Walter Nelles, and the other members of the ACLU inner 
circle believed that the downfall of the American economic system was imminent, and desirable, 
in America.  Although they too began as progressive reformers, they sympathized with the 
radicals imprisoned under the 1917 Espionage Act and had come to share the views of the 
dissenters.  For them, the relevant civil liberty was the “right of agitation,” which encompassed 
the rights to picket, boycott, and strike.  In their new vision, which grew out of the radical labor 
movement, the state was a tool of capital and inherently inimical to the public good.   
                                                          
26 For example, Zechariah Chafee was the stated author of a pamphlet actually authored by Roger Baldwin, which 
argued against censorship in typical progressive terms. Zechariah Chafee, The Censorship in Boston (Boston: The 
Civil Liberties Committee of Massachusetts, 1929); on authorship, see Samuel Walker, In Defense of American 
Liberties: A History of the ACLU, 2d ed. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999), 83. 
27 Leon Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties: The Story of the Origin and Meaning of Civil and Religious Liberty in the 
United States (1927; reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1972). 
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founders had most despised. The organization took up such quintessentially progressive ventures 
as academic freedom, but it sought to infuse them with the authority of anti-state individualism. 
In the process, it reached out to conservatives, particularly lawyers, for whom individual rights 
were the umbrella category from which Lochner-era autonomy derived. And while few 
conservatives articulated civil libertarian arguments explicitly during this period, ACLU lawyers 
were borrowing their language and learning their tactics.28
As the New Deal unfolded, however, the broad-based civil liberties coalition began to 
break down.   During the 1920s, when there was no realistic possibility of state protection for 
labor’s rights, anti-state radicals, moderate socialists, progressive reformers and conservative 
lawyers could all sit comfortably in the same tent.  In the 1930s, the prospect of state-centered 
reform forced civil liberties advocates within and outside the ACLU to take sides.  Progressive 
reformers and organized labor went one way; conservative legalists the other.  The ACLU’s core 
leadership—still hostile to the capitalist system but still fearful of state power—was reluctant to 
choose.  Progressives dismissed what John Dewey derisively called “the individualist and 
laissez-faire conception of civil liberties,” but the ACLU’s leftists were not so sure.
  In so doing, they achieved 
remarkable success where the progressives had long failed, in the most inhospitable of forums: 
the federal courts.  
29
                                                          
28 Robert Gordon, “The Legal Profession,” in Looking Back at Law’s Century, ed. Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth and 
Robert A. Kagan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 288–336. 
  Although 
29 Voicing the standard progressive line, John Dewey concluded in 1936 (with credit to Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis) that “the only hope for liberalism is to surrender, in theory and practice, the doctrine that liberty is a full-
fledged ready-made possession of individuals independent of social institutions and arrangements, and to realize that 
social control, especially of economic forces, is necessary in order to render secure the liberties of the individual, 
including civil liberties.” John Dewey, “Liberalism and Civil Liberties,” The Social Frontier (February 1936), 137. 
See also ibid. (“Holmes and Brandeis are notable not only for their sturdy defense of civil liberties but even more for 
the fact that they based their defense on the indispensable value of free inquiry and free discussion to the normal 
development of public welfare, not upon anything inherent in the individual as such.”). 
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they rejected the “right to contract,” their insistence that civil liberties were pre-political checks 
on a coercive state was not so different from the Right’s—a kinship that their critics within the 
New Deal and the organized labor movement were quick to point out.  In fact, the ACLU board 
initially opposed New Deal labor legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act.  
Eventually, the organization accepted and even celebrated state control in the economic sphere.  
It also accepted a role for government in promoting public debate and in ensuring that the 
channels of communication would remain open.  But when it came to the content of speech, it 
steadfastly opposed government intervention—even when muting privileged voices or 
amplifying those of the disenfranchised promised to serve the interests of organized labor.  
For their part, conservative groups proved just as adaptive as the early ACLU. Over the 
course of two decades, the ACLU had helped to move the courts from the defense of property to 
the defense of “personal rights.”  Its lawyers cast free speech as a right against excessive 
administrative intrusion into private behavior and choices30
                                                          
30 For example, Rev. John A. Ryan, a member of the ACLU’s National Committee, thought the purpose of the 
ACLU was “the preservation of the constitutional rights of the individual against arbitrary exercise of officials.” 
John A. Ryan to Roger Baldwin, 15 December 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 80, vol. 451. 
—a framing that was compatible with 
conservative reliance on individual rights.  They also rehabilitated the federal courts as a vehicle 
for securing individual justice and minority rights against the improper exercise of state power.  
In the face of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization plan, conservative groups, 
including the American Bar Association and even the American Liberty League, touted the 
ACLU-sponsored civil liberties victories of the early 1930s as evidence of the necessity for 
judicial review.  With the “constitutional revolution,” the transition was complete.  Corporate 
lawyers exchanged the discredited rhetoric of Lochner-era due process for the very language that 
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the ACLU had supplied.  Henceforth, the dominant conservative tactic would be to influence 
legislation rather than ask courts to overturn it.  The ACLU had succeeded in making civil 
liberties a neutral commitment, not an adjunct of economic rights. In the process, it had made 
free speech a powerful tool for the Right. 
Looking backward from 1940, Constance L. Todd, a radical journalist who was married 
for two decades to the ACLU’s early representative and press correspondent in Washington, 
D.C., reflected nostalgically on the organization’s origins: “Twenty years ago,” she wrote to 
Baldwin, “you . . . showed such diabolical ingenuity in devising an organization which would 
compel (and I use the word advisedly) the comfortable intelligent to work for socialism in the 
name of Consistency and the Bill of Rights.” According to Todd, the genius of the ACLU was its 
eclecticism, its ability to entertain competing theories while committing to none.  “You 
obviously enjoyed practicing and demonstrating your skill as a tight-rope walker, balancing on 
two ropes and drawing together strange bedfellows,” she recalled. “In actuality it worked for us, 
and against them; though before 1914, the Bill of Rights had worked for them and against us.”31
And yet, in Todd’s view, the ACLU’s success was also its downfall.  The machinery of 
the New Deal state had sought to preserve labor’s rights at the expense of employers’ liberties. 
“For the first time,” presented with that trade-off, Baldwin had been forced to “choose between 
two sets of colleagues.”
 
32
                                                          
31 Constance L. Todd to Roger Baldwin, 7 May 1940, ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 11.  
  With Baldwin still at the helm, the ACLU had attained respectability, 
and it had disavowed its radical past. To Todd, who had once counted Baldwin as a close friend 
as well as a political ally, the new direction was a betrayal of the organization’s underlying 
ideals. Baldwin’s response was characteristically cryptic: “I am not aware of any change 
32 Ibid. 
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whatever,” he told Todd.  “Your arguments are not a bit impressive, for they are all based upon 
the assumption that somehow or other I have changed my ‘spots.’”33
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
  
This dissertation endeavors to contribute to historical scholarship on civil liberties, the 
labor movement, and court-based constitutionalism, as well as theoretical discussion of the 
meaning and purpose of free speech.  First, it addresses the origins of the distinctively legal 
conception of civil liberties in America.  Despite a longstanding assumption that the early civil 
liberties movement was antagonistic to the courts, no historian has explained the interwar turn to 
the judicial forum.34
Understanding this transformation casts light on the broader embrace of legalism in mid-
twentieth century political culture.  During World War I, efforts to preserve civil liberties 
through litigation were resoundingly unsuccessful. Over the course of the 1920s, however, a 
 By examining how and why civil liberties advocates settled upon their 
litigation strategy, the dissertation demonstrates that protecting civil liberties need not have 
become a constitutional project.  In the years after World War I, most proponents of free speech 
were hostile to Lochner-era legalism and preferred to pursue free speech through other channels; 
when they did bring their cases to court, they made common law and statutory claims.  By the 
mid-1930s, the free speech fight was squarely on judicial terrain, and civil liberties were 
thoroughly constitutionalized.  
                                                          
33 Roger Baldwin to Constance L. Todd, 15 May 1940, ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 11. 
34 For a political science approach to this problem, see Emily Zackin, “Popular Constitutionalism’s Hard When 
You’re Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to the Courts,” Law and Society Review 42 (2008): 367–96. 
17 
 
combination of labor quiescence, popular indifference, and judicial successes made reliance on 
judicially enforceable rights, especially constitutional ones, increasingly appealing.  Civil 
liberties lawyers—ACLU attorneys, but also firm lawyers on behalf of corporate clients, as well 
as the ABA—were instrumental in this transition.  Whereas many free speech advocates 
remained deeply skeptical of constitutional litigation and its language of rights, the lawyers 
forcefully, if sometimes reluctantly, adopted a court-based and constitutional approach that 
would shortly become the signature of the civil liberties movement.35
Second, the dissertation highlights the historical specificity of the content-neutral 
conception of free speech. Even the most nuanced histories have assumed that “civil liberties” 
inevitably entailed the freedom to voice unpopular views, and they have measured the successes 
of advocacy groups, including the ACLU, by their adherence to that vision.
 They selected test cases 
carefully, working in areas where public opinion was favorable, such as academic freedom and 
sex education.  In contrast to their initial defense of anarchists and communists, these cases 
pushed courts toward a more libertarian stance without triggering public outrage.     
36  Civil liberties, 
however, is a dynamic concept.  It was during the 1920s and 1930s, decades largely neglected by 
historians of free speech,37
                                                          
35 The lawyer reformers who reached maturity around the turn of the twentieth century faced a particularly 
unyielding dilemma. Like their colleagues, they had viewed judicial overreaching as the central impediment to the 
progressive reform agenda. And yet, as classically trained lawyers, they were best equipped to achieve social change 
through judicial channels. 
 that the modern understanding of civil liberties took shape.  In 1917, 
36 E.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and the New Deal (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1966); Kutulas, Modern Liberalism.  
37 Paul L. Murphy, The Meaning of Freedom of Speech: First Amendment Freedoms from Wilson to FDR (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Pub. Co., 1972) is the principal resource on the civil liberties movement during the 1920s.  
Murphy’s history captures the competing advocates and theories of free speech during the 1920s but fails to explain 
why some were ultimately successful. Ibid., 92 (“In a general way, the rapid public reversal on the free-speech issue 
was due to a reevaluation of national trends by many people who came to the conclusion that liberty was in 
jeopardy. This was of necessity a very personal process, and the cumulative reaction was the sum of individual 
shocks at the realization that each man’s livelihood and life style might well be threatened unless events were 
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few Americans would have agreed upon the meaning of the term, much less endorsed free 
speech for dissenters.  By 1940, most Americans believed that individuals were entitled to 
engage in any expression that did not jeopardize the immediate health or safety of others.38
Beginning with World War I, civil libertarians slowly divorced the free speech rights they 
advocated from the underlying political views of the speakers they defended.  They also began to 
articulate a distinction between “civil liberties” and other social causes they deemed worthy, like 
“civil rights” and “labor rights.”  In formulating their theory of free speech, they reacted to 
government accusations of radicalism and Soviet collaboration; the success of rights-based 
litigation and the corresponding failure of both direct action and of legislative and regulatory 
efforts; the professionalization of civil liberties advocacy; and the rise of totalitarianism abroad 
and administrative governance at home, among other factors.  The state-skeptical, content-
neutral concept of civil liberties (and, by extension, a distinctively American devotion to free 
speech absolutism) developed piecemeal, and as late as 1940 important government actors 
retained a very different understanding of the term.  By teasing out the many early approaches, 
  The 
popularization of civil liberties over the course of the 1920s and 1930s—their transformation in 
just two decades into a defining feature of American democracy—was a remarkable 
achievement.  But it was not a revolution plotted out in advance by libertarian theorists. In fact, it 
was a function of tactics and institutional maneuvering as much as politics and ideology.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
quickly reversed.”). A number of studies consider civil liberties during or beginning with the New Deal.  E.g., 
Cletus E. Daniel, The ACLU and the Wagner Act: An Inquiry into the Depression-Era Crisis of American 
Liberalism (Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1980); Kutulas, Modern Liberalism; 
Auerbach, Labor and Liberty.  
38 On the popularity of civil liberties by the late 1930s, see John W. Wertheimer, “A ‘Switch in Time’ Beyond the 
Nine: Historical Memory and the Constitutional Revolution of the 1930s,” in Studies in Law, Politics and Society 53 
(2010): 3–34.  
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the dissertation emphasizes the accidents, inconsistencies, and idiosyncrasies through which the 
contending meanings of civil liberties were winnowed down. 
Finally, and most important, the dissertation introduces labor radicalism as a 
determinative factor in the formulation of popular and judicial understandings of civil liberties 
during the first half of the twentieth century.  Labor historians have acknowledged the use of 
civil liberties rhetoric as a tool, particularly in the context of the IWW’s prewar free speech 
fights,39 the 1910s and 1920s boycott and picket cases,40 and the 1930s Senate Civil Liberties 
Committee.41
Meanwhile, historians of civil liberties have largely accepted the ACLU’s explanation of 
its disproportionate involvement in the defense of radicals, proffered since the organization’s 
founding: repression primarily affected anarchists, socialists, and Communists, and so those were 
the constituencies whom the ACLU was most likely to serve.
  They have assumed, however, that “free speech” was a pre-existing category and 
that labor leaders simply used it as they found it.  
42
                                                          
39 Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1969); Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement, vol. 9, The T.U.E.L. to The End of the Gompers Era 
(New York: International Publishers, 1991); Philip S. Foner, ed., Fellow Workers and Friends: I.W.W. Free Speech 
Fights as Told by Participants (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981);  Glen J. Broyles, “The Spokane Free-
Speech Fight, 1909–1910: A Study in IWW Tactics,” Labor History 19 (Spring 1978): 238–52; Stewart Bird, Dan 
Georgakas, and Deborah Shaffer, Solidarity Forever: An Oral History of the IWW (Chicago: Lake View Press, 
1985). 
 Accounts of the prewar free 
40 Daniel Ernst, Lawyers Against Labor: From Individual Rights to Corporate Liberalism (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1995); William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991); Philip Taft, The A.F. of L. in the Time of Gompers (New York: Harper, 1957); 
Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in 
America, 1880–1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
41 Daniel, ACLU and the Wagner Act; Auerbach, Labor and Liberty. 
42 Some of the ACLU’s important allies, including Zechariah Chafee, expressly disclaimed radical goals. E.g., 
Chafee, Freedom of Speech, 2. Even Paul Murphy, who painstakingly documented the ACLU’s involvement with 
labor cases in his history of civil liberties between 1918 and 1933, underestimated the organization’s radical 
motivations and ideology.  Curiously, although he acknowledged the importance of labor in his early work, he wrote 
in a subsequent book that Baldwin “was in many ways a classic nineteenth-century liberal embracing many of the 
values which shaped Chafee’s position” and that Walter Nelles “shared many of Chafee’s views.” Murphy, 
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speech movement have richly documented the relationship between radicals and civil liberties 
during the early twentieth century, but they have not connected the “radical libertarian” tradition 
to the modern civil liberties movement.43 Histories of the ACLU have acknowledged the 
founders’ radicalism but have dismissed it as youthful flirtation—an impetus for involvement in 
civil liberties work, perhaps, but extraneous to the process through which civil liberties were 
defined.44  Conservative legal and political theorists have emphasized the ACLU’s leftist roots to 
discredit its “neutrality” even while they have accepted the organization’s mature concept of 
civil liberties as the appropriate and inevitable understanding.45
The records of the interwar civil liberties movement suggest that organized labor was 
more than a client or beneficiary of its services. During the 1920s and 1930s, the ACLU 
leadership regarded civil liberties as an instrument of working class power, indeed, as a gateway 
  On the whole, historians have 
not examined the role of class conflict in the ACLU’s selection of test-cases, choice of allies, and 
ideological commitments. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Meaning; Paul Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: Norton, 
1979), 262–63. 
43David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, 1870-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997).  In his dissertation on the pre-World War I history of free speech, John Wertheimer identifies socialists’ free 
speech fights as the source of later commitments to open-air speaking.  John Wertheimer, “Free Speech Fights: The 
Roots of Modern Free-Expression Litigation in the United States” (Ph.D, diss., Princeton University, 1992).  
44 E.g., Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American Freedoms: World War I and the Rise of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1963). Robert Cottrell focuses on Baldwin’s radicalism 
but views it as aberrant within the broader civil liberties movement and a pitfall for the popularization of the ACLU. 
Robert C. Cottrell, in Roger Nash Baldwin and the American Civil Liberties Union (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000). Peggy Lamson similarly regards Baldwin’s commitments as competing rather than 
mutually reinforcing.  Peggy Lamson, Roger Baldwin, Founder of the American Civil Liberties Union: A Portrait 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976).  Samuel Walker’s encyclopedic history of the ACLU describes Baldwin’s 
wartime radicalism and reports his self-description as a “philosophical anarchist” but concludes that his “approach to 
civil liberties was more a matter of temperament than ideology, a gut-level passion for justice, and a bottomless 
‘capacity for indignation.’” Walker, American Liberties, 53.  Still, Walker is attentive to the influence of Baldwin’s 
radicalism on the ACLU’s changing relationship to state power.  See Samuel Walker, review of The Politics of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, by William A. Donahue, American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 11 (Summer 
1986): 547–55. 
45 E.g., William A. Donohue, Politics of the American Civil Liberties Union (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 
1985) (suggesting that the ACLU did not adhere to its “nonpartisan” commitments). 
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to the general strike.  It brought that understanding to the seminal civil liberties cases of the 
1920s (not only such obvious candidates as Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California, but 
also controversies over compulsory public schooling and evolution, including Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters and Scopes v. Tennessee46
Bringing labor back into the history of civil liberties in America helps explain an 
apparent discrepancy between free speech theory and its implementation in the courts. The 
progressive theory of civil liberties, whether premised on truth seeking or on the integrity of 
democratic processes, was the one expressed in the foundational free speech dissents of the 
1920s.  Since that time, it has been the leading model in law schools and political science 
departments, where scholars have long advocated public regulation designed to increase the 
quality and range of public debate.  And yet, while judges have dutifully echoed the progressive 
rationales, they have consistently refused to restrict hateful and abusive speech, even where it 
degrades the quality of conversation and discourages broad participation.  They have also 
).  Labor radicalism guided the organization’s approach to 
litigation and its connection with the progressive and legal establishments through which the 
values of civil liberties were promoted and institutionalized.  During the 1930s, even as civil 
liberties advocacy moved from the fringes to the mainstream, the principal actors within the 
ACLU retained a state-skeptical relationship to state power, indelibly stamped with the 
experiences and disappointments of the previous half-century.  Persuaded by two decades of civil 
liberties advocacy on behalf of silenced workers, the Roosevelt administration introduced 
protections for labor’s rights and sought to correct power imbalances in the marketplace of ideas. 
In the end, however, it was the ACLU’s vision of state neutrality that prevailed. 
                                                          
46 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Scopes v. Tennessee, 152 Tenn. 424 (Tenn. 1925). 
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declined to curb dominating or repetitious speech, despite its tendency to drown out the 
“competition.” They have studiously disregarded the tendency of state neutrality to perpetuate 
existing power disparities and forestall social change.47
Revisiting the interwar period from the perspective of civil liberties advocacy reveals that 
the progressive understanding—though it found adherents within the New Deal administration as 
well as the ACLU—remained a marginal view among free speech practitioners, radical and 
conservative.  At the same time, the vision of free speech espoused in 1940 by both the ACLU 
leadership and the ABA was a substantial departure from the atomistic individualism of 
substantive due process.  Both groups came to believe that government should secure a forum for 
public debate—that it should actively promote speech, not merely tolerate it.  They urged the 
state to prosecute hecklers and to open up street corners, meeting halls, and radio bandwidth for 
political discussion.  In the end, their goal was not to preserve individual autonomy; they 
imagined a state that was nonpartisan as opposed to laissez-faire.  But they were determined to 
ensure government neutrality in the contest between workers and industry over public opinion 
and public policy.  That contest, in 1940, both labor and capital believed that they could win.  
  
Exploring the tensions among the various actors agitating for free speech in this early 
period reveals the hidden costs of the state-skeptical, content-neutral notion of civil liberties that 
                                                          
47 See Robert Post, “Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,” California Law Review 
88 (Dec. 2000): 2369–70 (“American courts have consistently opted to protect individual autonomy against 
regulations of public discourse designed to maintain the integrity of collective thinking processes. In the area of 
campaign finance reform, for example, the Supreme Court has forcefully asserted that ‘the concept that government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others’ should be 
repudiated as ‘wholly foreign to the First Amendment.’ In contexts ranging from restrictions on pornography and 
hate speech to ‘right-of-reply’ statutes applicable to newspapers, contemporary advocates of the Meiklejohnian 
position have sharply and continuously complained of the tendency of courts to extend constitutional protection to 
individual rights even when the exercise of such rights ‘distorts’ public discussion by perpetuating imbalances of 
social and economic power. This commitment to individual rights is one of the hallmarks of our distinctively 
American free-speech jurisprudence.”). See also Graber, Transforming Free Speech.   
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remains dominant today.  The reformers-turned-radicals who ran the interwar movement 
imagined civil liberties as a backdoor approach to a just society.  They reluctantly defended the 
speech of racists and reactionaries, but they regarded substantive equality as part and parcel of 
the civil liberties agenda.  Moreover, they feared oppression by corporations and private citizens 
just as much as government censorship.  For a variety of reasons—some institutional and 
strategic, others political and theoretical—the leaders of the civil liberties movement disclaimed 
these early ambitions by the eve of World War II.  The champions of neutrality were not 
heedless of the consequences.  They understood that unrestrained expression could undermine 
such competing ideals as civil, political, and economic rights, and they urged careful 
consideration in difficult cases.  In the end, however, they trusted that in the absence of state 
coercion, the principles of justice would prevail. Whatever its benefits, the new approach 
supplanted an open commitment to economic security and social equality, within and outside the 
civil liberties movement.48
 
   
*   *   *   *   * 
 
The dissertation is divided into six chapters.  The first two focus on World War I and the 
Red Scare and introduce the characters and concepts that drive the larger story.  Chapter 1 
reviews the various prewar efforts to defend free speech and describes the dominant political and 
intellectual climate at the outbreak of war, including the progressive ambivalence toward civil 
liberties claims. It also reconstructs the central engagements of the ACLU leadership during the 
                                                          
48 The same trade-off is at the heart of such seemingly intractable contemporary dilemmas as the regulation of hate 
speech, media consolidation, and campaign finance reform. 
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two years prior to the organization’s founding, when it operated as the National Civil Liberties 
Bureau (first as an arm of the American Union Against Militarism, and beginning in 1918 as an 
independent body). The founders of the ACLU were concerned not only with government 
repression, but also with the suppression of speech by non-state entities and individuals, 
including employers. In some cases, they sought to use government affirmatively to restrain 
private interference with expression. Limited successes coupled with concerns about majoritarian 
abuses and unchecked bureaucratic authority shook their confidence in state solutions. At the 
same time, however, judicial hostility to labor, manifest in anti-labor convictions under the 
Espionage Act as well as older methods like labor injunctions, made the courts an unlikely venue 
for social change.   
Chapter 2 explores the origins of what the ACLU called a “right of agitation” against 
entrenched industrial interests, bound up with the rights to picket, organize, and strike.  The 
impetus for the new approach was the NCLB’s involvement with the wartime prosecution and 
conviction of the IWW leadership.  By the end of the IWW trial, the NCLB leadership was 
thoroughly disillusioned with progressive reform and had come to share the IWW’s belief that 
the state inevitably served the interests of capital.  When the ACLU was founded in 1920, it 
declared itself to be a frank advocate of the labor cause, and it adopted direct action as its 
principal mechanism for protecting civil liberties.   
Chapter 3 traces the development of the ACLU’s agenda during a period when industrial 
conflict and direct government involvement in labor relations were at an ebb.  In the early 1920s, 
economic prosperity and the resulting decline in industrial conflict opened space for the 
organization to venture into new fields and form new partnerships without reassessing its 
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underlying commitment to radical ideals.  The ACLU’s first new project was academic freedom.  
Although its initial focus was the defense of radical teachers and educational institutions (in 
particular, the Rand School of Social Science), progressive support for academic freedom pushed 
the ACLU toward a more general program.  By subsequently expanding its agenda to include 
“non-political” speech—first sex education, followed by artistic freedom and birth control—the 
ACLU shed much of its radical stigma and attracted significant popular support for civil 
liberties.  In such cases as the Scopes trial, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and United States v. 
Dennett, the ACLU invoked anti-state claims of individual rights on behalf of, and sometimes 
even in contravention of, progressive ends.  In the process, it began to rehabilitate the judiciary 
as a tool for protecting non-economic rights. This program helped the organization to build a 
broad alliance in favor of civil liberties, although fundamental tensions among the various 
contingents remained unresolved.   
The last three chapters take up the New Deal.  Chapter 4 examines the ACLU’s attitude 
toward seminal New Deal labor policy, including the National Labor Relations Act, and its 
enforcement in the federal courts.  The ACLU divided over the Wagner Act because its radical 
leadership considered it a dangerous extension of federal authority (many voiced standard 
Communist arguments about the path to fascism; some would have countenanced state authority 
in a proletarian state).  Within a year of its passage, the left within the ACLU, as outside it, had 
rallied behind the NLRB.  Nonetheless, doubts about administrative authority, fueled by the 
ACLU’s extension into nonpolitical fields as well as a decade of hostile labor policy, persisted.  
Meanwhile, the Senate’s Civil Liberties Committee, organized by Robert La Follette, envisioned 
civil liberties as substantive labor rights, now secured by (not against) the state and codified as 
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federal law.  President Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization plan was also divisive. This time, 
however, the left and labor lined up behind Roosevelt, while the liberals worried about the effect 
of a weakened judiciary on recent civil liberties gains.  Many within the ACLU felt that an 
independent court was necessary to protect minority rights from majority power, and the ACLU 
Board ultimately chose not to take a position on the issue.  At the same time, conservative groups 
ranging from the American Bar Association to the American Liberty League seized upon the 
Supreme Court’s new civil liberties decisions as a justification for judicial review.   
Chapter 5 describes an episode that served as a testing ground for the competing 
understandings of civil liberties on the eve of the Second World War.  In the late 1930s, Mayor 
Frank Hague’s tyrannical suppression of CIO meetings in Jersey City prompted civil liberties 
advocates from across the political spectrum to act on their convictions and, in the process, to 
build their constituencies.  In 1938, the ACLU and CIO sued in federal court to enjoin Hague’s 
repressive practices.  For the ACLU, Mayor Hague’s policies were equally menacing whether 
they targeted Nazi sympathizers or the CIO.  For the CIO, by contrast, the relevant right was 
labor’s right to organize.  In 1938, the ABA formed a Committee on the Bill of Rights and, 
working with the ACLU, filed amicus briefs on behalf of free speech in the Court of Appeals and 
the Supreme Court.  A few months later, citing circumstances in Jersey City, Frank Murphy 
organized a Civil Liberties Division within the Department of Justice to facilitate the active 
prosecution of civil liberties violations by local officials.  The Supreme Court’s speech-
protective decision in Hague v. CIO enjoyed near universal support.     
The final chapter describes the collapse of the short-lived consensus in Hague.  In the 
run-up to the 1940 purge of communists from its board, the ACLU split over an NLRB order 
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prohibiting the Ford Motor Company from distributing literature hostile to organized labor.  In 
the end, the advocates of “employer free speech” won out.  Although the board squarely 
condemned Ford’s unlawful labor practices, it joined the ABA and industry in advocating the 
unrestricted right of employers to disseminate their anti-union views.  When the ACLU’s former 
labor allies charged that it had turned against them, Roger Baldwin insisted that the best 
protection for workers was a strong union, not the state.  Publicly, the leaders of the ACLU 
denied concern for labor’s substantive goals, repudiating two decades of explicit statements to 
the contrary. Although they privately hoped that labor would prevail in the marketplace of ideas, 
they championed a value-neutral Bill of Rights.  
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CHAPTER 1: PRECEDENTS IN THE FREE SPEECH FIGHT 
 
When the Civil Liberties Bureau of the American Union Against Militarism opened shop 
in 1917, it was venturing onto a lonely field.  As factories retooled for war production and troops 
readied for combat overseas, free speech had few outspoken advocates.  Many progressives 
dismissed dissent as self-indulgent; whatever their individual views concerning militarism, they 
insisted, citizens were duty-bound to conform to the outcome of majoritarian consensus.  Rule-
of-law conservatives who might have been moved by appeals to fundamental American liberties 
were consumed with patriotic fervor. As the Department of Justice would conclude over the 
course of the following year, the abstract defense of free speech, while not strictly treasonous, 
was a backhanded assault on the state.  
Historians have generally regarded the First World War as the central impetus for the 
modern civil liberties movement.1  Before it, there was no general commitment to civil liberties 
under federal constitutional law.  Although free speech was regularly touted as a central feature 
of American democracy, it was subject to significant limitations in the courtroom and in popular 
understandings.2
                                                          
1 Murphy, Origin of Civil Liberties, 18–21, contains a useful review of the literature prior to 1980.  More recent 
accounts include Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You; Kutulas, Modern Liberalism; Graber, Transforming Free 
Speech; Rabban, Forgotten Years; John Fabian Witt, Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of American 
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
  State constitutions often protected personal liberties, but enforcement was a 
matter of local discretion, and there was little tolerance for expression that threatened polite 
society, let alone the security of the state.  For most Americans, the right to speak freely was 
conditioned on the speaker’s civilized conduct and compliance with social norms.     
2 Rabban, Forgotten Years; Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1985); William J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” American Historical Review 113 (June 2008): 
752–72. 
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In the conventional understanding, World War I generated a new and potentially 
powerful alliance between progressives and liberal lawyers on behalf of expressive freedom.  
Although their defense of free speech produced few concrete gains during the war, it laid the 
groundwork for the emergence of a true civil liberties commitment after the armistice.  
Disillusioned by the failure of the war to make the world safe for democracy and distressed by 
the unprecedented extent of the postwar repression, they reinvented free speech as a means of 
advancing the public interest and defusing social conflict.  For the first time, the argument goes, 
scholars, judges, and public officials imagined a marketplace of ideas, where theories and 
thinkers would battle it out and the best one would be the last to remain standing.   
This conventional story is only partly true.  It is certainly the case that legal claims to free 
speech premised on the First Amendment rarely succeeded in the federal courts in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.   During that period, some lawyers defended radical expression in 
a language that mobilized the Constitution and that resembled, anachronistically, the 
understanding of civil liberties that emerged after World War I, but these efforts made little 
headway in the courts.3
What most of these figures demanded in the realm of free speech was, however, little 
more than a return to normalcy.  The proponents of free speech during and immediately after the 
war were borrowing from tropes and tactics developed by progressives over the previous two 
  It is also undeniable that the war and the ensuing Red Scare prompted 
reevaluation of the importance of free speech.  Organization and advocacy on behalf of civil 
liberties were in shambles at the close of the war, but as the wartime exigencies dissipated and 
repression continued, many Americans within and outside the political and legal establishments 
began to espouse greater tolerance for dissent and stronger adherence to the rule of law. 
                                                          
3 See generally Rabban, Forgotten Years; Wertheimer, “Free Speech Fights.”  
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decades.  To be sure, they readjusted the rank of expressive freedom in the hierarchy of 
progressive values; the specter of mob violence and mass hysteria had emphasized the high toll 
of enforced uniformity on public wellbeing.  Moreover, a substantial number of the interwar civil 
liberties advocates—including some very important ones, like Oliver Wendell Holmes—came to 
recognize free speech as indispensible to democratic progress only after the war.  Finally, many 
were motivated by new concerns, including the rapid expansion of the administrative state.  
Nonetheless, the dominant theories of civil liberties in 1920 were not new in any significant way.   
The ACLU’s vision of civil liberties was an exception.  During World War I, its 
precursor, the National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB), actively defended radical dissenters.  For 
approximately six months, between the summer of 1917 and the following January, the 
leadership of that organization tested the full panoply of prewar civil libertarian arguments in 
defense of dissenting speech.  Under the conditions of war, the individualist rhetoric of 
anarchists and free-lovers, the classical liberal language of individual rights, and the progressive 
commitment to robust public discussion of social problems were all inadequate to disrupt the 
forces of repression.  In the progressive calculus, free speech was valuable only insofar as it 
served the broader public welfare—and during wartime, immediate national interests seemed to 
outweigh theoretical considerations.  Government officials were unreceptive to outmoded 
notions of natural rights and too preoccupied with wartime economic production to risk its 
disruption by radical labor.  The federal courts, though ostensibly committed to individual 
autonomy, were too protective of private property and too deferential to military necessity to 
countenance agitation.  And the emerging civil liberties advocates were themselves uneasy about 
their path.  As veteran progressive reformers, they resented the judiciary’s intervention with the 
products of democratic consensus; as advocates of radical labor, they confronted the majoritarian 
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distaste for the unpredictable and the unknown.  At the end of the war, the NCLB was still 
formally intact, but its co-founder was in prison and its wartime policies had proven almost 
entirely ineffectual.   
When they founded the ACLU in 1920, the veterans of the NCLB would seek out new 
solutions for protecting unpopular minorities, consistent with their underlying objective of 
fundamental social change.  They would formulate a theory of civil liberties that melded 
progressive confidence in deliberative democracy with labor radicals’ skepticism toward the 
machinery of the state.  Ultimately, their efforts would render free speech a fundamental 
American value, respected by government actors and upheld in the courts.  In 1917, however, all 
that was in the future.  The wartime agenda of the NCLB was not the beginning of a new era in 
civil liberties advocacy.  It was the end of the old.  
 
The AUAM 
In the fall of 1914, as Europe reverberated with the clamor of artillery fire, a group of 
self-described progressives in New York City gathered informally to discuss strategies for 
keeping America out of war.  Although they came to few definite conclusions, they sensed a 
need for an organization uniting the various forces opposed to American military intervention 
abroad.  Known initially as the Henry Street Group, the new body went by a variety of names 
over the coming years, but its best known, the American Union Against Militarism, reflected its 
underlying objective: to “guard against militarism” and to “build toward world federation.”4
In 1915, despite early assurances that he would avoid military engagement, President 
Woodrow Wilson embraced the mounting demand for preparedness.  In December, as Wilson’s 
 
                                                          
4 AUAM Pamphlet, in American Union Against Militarism Records, 1915–1922, Swarthmore College Peace 
Collection, Swarthmore, Penn. (hereafter AUAM Papers), reel 10-1.  
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proposal for a federal militia was debated in Congress, the Henry Street Group convened a 
national conference.  Out of that meeting, the “Anti-Preparedness Committee” was born. In the 
spring of 1916, the APC became the AUAM.  And within a year, it was a sprawling organization 
with branch offices throughout the United States and fifteen hundred active members.5
The makeup of the group was uncontroversial. Its principal constituency was social 
workers, but it also included academics, clergy members, writers, and newspaper editors.  
Notable members included Lillian Wald, director of New York’s Henry Street Settlement House; 
Paul Kellogg, editor of a social work periodical called the Survey; Jane Addams, founder of Hull 
House in Chicago; Rabbi Stephen Wise; Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes; Oswald 
Garrison Villard, publisher of the New York Evening Post and The Nation; and Crystal Eastman, 
a leader of the Woman’s Peace Party and future co-founder of the NCLB.  The organization’s 
message, while by no means universally endorsed, was a respectable one, and it attracted 
considerable support within and outside government.
  
6
For the next year, the AUAM generated popular enthusiasm for the anti-preparedness 
cause. Mass meetings throughout the country drew huge crowds. Organizers lambasted 
preparedness but were careful not to criticize the President.
  
7
                                                          
5 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 5. 
  Moreover, the AUAM exercised 
considerable influence with both the Administration and Congress. Jane Addams (officially on 
behalf of the Woman’s Peace Party) was invited to address the House Committee on Military 
Affairs, and Wilson received an AUAM delegation and assured it that preparedness would keep 
the country out of war.  In June, Wilson signed the National Defense Act.  Although it provided 
for a significant expansion of the National Guard, it was limited in scope, and the AUAM was 
6 Its supporters included William Jennings Bryan, Wilson’s Secretary of State until June 1915, and former President 
William Howard Taft.  Ibid., 5.  
7 Ibid., 7.  
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gratified that it did not authorize conscription.  Meanwhile, diplomatic developments were 
promising.  In May 1916, Germany pledged to provide adequate warning before attacking 
merchant and passenger vessels.  By the summer of 1916, the AUAM was satisfied with its 
successes and considered its work largely accomplished.8
All that changed with Germany’s decision in February 1917 to reinstate its policy of 
unrestricted submarine warfare on vessels carrying supplies to its enemy, Britain. Within a 
matter of days, the AUAM’s earlier gains were all but irrelevant. The nation was marching 
swiftly toward war, and the AUAM was powerless to stop it. Indeed, many within the AUAM 
had no interest in doing so.  
 
Over the ensuing weeks, the members of the AUAM scrambled desperately and 
divisively to redefine their position.  Some, like Rabbi Stephen Wise and Oswald Garrison 
Villard, thought the change of circumstances warranted reconsideration of the desirability of war.  
Others, though horrified at the new German policy, were resolutely against a military solution.  
Norman Thomas, the Presbyterian minister who would go on to lead the Socialist Party, 
proposed a possible strategy.  Falling back on a time-worn progressive tactic, he urged the 
AUAM to organize a campaign for a “war referendum” in order to persuade government officials 
that ordinary Americans continued to oppose intervention.  As with the suffrage and Prohibition 
movements, the “combination of agitation with direction” would arouse the people to action.9
                                                          
8 In fall 1916, the Board considered disbanding. Ibid., 8.  
 
The AUAM adopted the suggestion, apparently unconcerned that popular support might be 
mobilized in favor of nationalist militancy. Later that month, the executive committee discussed 
the agenda for its upcoming meeting with President Wilson. In addition to soliciting his support 
for a national referendum, the AUAM delegation would fight another losing battle: they would 
9 Norman Thomas to the Executive Committee of the AUAM, AUAM Minutes, 10 February 1917, AUAM Papers, 
reel 10-1. 
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seek to persuade him that conscription was a threat to the national interest.10
One month before the impending declaration of war, the AUAM board recruited a new 
member. Roger Baldwin, at that time a prominent St. Louis reformer, quickly assumed a leading 
role in framing the organization’s wartime policy. By June, the AUAM was ready to announce 
its “war time program.” Its second objective, “a just and lasting peace,” was the organization’s 
standard fare.  It involved working toward a clear statement of America’s peace terms, demand 
for publication of international agreements, and laying the foundation for “world federation” at 
the end of the war.  Baldwin, however, had a different and more immediate program in mind. His 
project, developed in cooperation with Crystal Eastman, fell under the heading “work against 
militarism.” It entailed opposition to the permanent establishment of conscription, legal advice to 
conscientious objectors, and, most important, the maintenance of “civil liberty in war time.”
  These efforts were 
fruitless. War was declared on April 6, 1917, and conscription was established six weeks later. 
11
 
 
Liberty in the Progressive Era 
The decision to reorganize as a civil liberties bureau was not an obvious one for the 
AUAM.   The problem lay not so much in conservative opposition, though government hawks 
and self-styled patriotic groups did indeed regard the strategy as a cover for subversive activity.12
                                                          
10 AUAM Minutes, 27 February 1917, AUAM Papers, reel 10-1. 
  
Rather, the central obstacle was an internal one.  At the outset of World War I, the defense of 
dissenters had few progressive champions. Even progressive lawyers subjected civil liberties to a 
demanding balancing test.  Roscoe Pound, the architect of sociological jurisprudence, declared 
11 “Past Programs of the American Union Against Militarism (for reference),” AUAM Papers, reel 10-1. 
12 Theodore Schroeder, head of the Free Speech League, found conservatives receptive to “unabridged freedom of 
utterance as a matter of acknowledged natural right.” Quoted in Rabban, Forgotten Years, 61. Actual  conservative 
support was, however, rather limited. See Charles L. Barzun, “Politics or Principle? Zechariah Chafee and the Social 
Interest in Free Speech,” Brigham Young University Law Review (2007): 259–325. 
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that “in jurisprudence . . . the whole doctrine of natural rights has been definitively 
abandoned”13; free speech warranted protection only to the extent that it promoted the public 
welfare.14
Between the turn of the century and the outbreak of World War I, Americans who 
regarded themselves as progressives were an odd assortment.  Their agenda encompassed such 
far-ranging projects as tenement housing laws, food and water safety, municipal ownership of 
public utilities, the income tax, women’s suffrage, eugenics, and prohibition.  And the 
differences among them on these and many other issues were sufficiently fundamental to render 
the label “progressive” confusing, if not meaningless.
  To a coalition of progressive reformers, endorsing a right to wartime dissent risked a 
costly miscalculation of public benefits and harms. 
15 Despite their many disagreements, 
however, the progressives shared a distinct lack of enthusiasm for federal courts and for 
constitutional rights-based claims, which together had operated to defeat many of the most 
important progressive initiatives. Indeed, the rejection of the autonomous individual was one of 
the few threads unifying progressive thought.16
                                                          
13 Quoted in David Wigdor, Roscoe Pound: Philosophy of Law (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press), 276. Pound 
believed that the crucial task of legal doctrine was to “free individual capacities in such a way as to make them 
available for the development of the general happiness or common good.” Roscoe Pound, “Interests of Personality,” 
Harvard Law Review 28 (1915): 347. 
  
14 Pound wrote: “[W]e have been accustomed to treat the matter [of free speech] from the standpoint of the 
individual interest. Undoubtedly there is such an interest, and there is the same social interest in securing it as in 
securing other individual interests of personality. . . . But this feeling may have an important social interest behind it.  
For the individual interest in free belief and opinion must always be balanced with the social interest in the security 
of social institutions and the interest of the state in its personality. These interests may or may seem to require 
repression of forms of belief which threaten to overturn vital social institutions or to weaken the power of the state.” 
According to Pound, if individual expression would trigger a disturbance in public peace or shock to “the moral 
feelings of the community,” the social interest could be judged to outweigh the individual interest.  Moreover, “the 
danger of mobs, which are controlled by suggestion, may require confining of free expression of political opinions 
on certain subjects to times and places where such things may be discussed without grave danger of violence and 
disorder.” Roscoe Pound, “Interests of Personality [Concluded],” Harvard Law Review 28 (1915): 445–456. 
15 See Peter Filene, “An Obituary for the Progressive Movement,” American Quarterly 22 (1970): 20–34; Daniel T. 
Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10 (Dec. 1982): 113–32. 
16 Rodgers, “Progressivism.”  
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In its place, the progressives championed the common good.  Under peacetime 
conditions, most progressives favored robust public discussion.  After all, the progressive era had 
witnessed a rapid transformation of social, scientific, and cultural values.  Many widely accepted 
theories in the 1910s had been marginal, if not repressed, a few decades earlier.  Social progress 
was fundamentally dependent on the formulation and expression of new ideas.   Leon Whipple, 
in a 1927 history of civil liberties commissioned by the ACLU, identified a new interest in free 
speech during the progressive period, arising “partly out of a new realization of its essential 
value in our complex industrial age; partly out of the common experiences of the social 
reformers; partly because of the increased number of cases in which liberty was sacrificed to the 
interests of powerful conservative groups.”17
When war was declared, however, their broad commitment to social welfare and their 
corresponding support for President Wilson led many progressives to condemn dissent—or at 
least to support the authority of a majoritarian government to quash it.
   
18
                                                          
17 Leon Whipple, The Story of Civil Liberty in the United States (New York: Vanguard Press, 1927), 327. Signs of 
increased interest in civil liberties, according to Whipple, included the incorporation of new guarantees into state 
constitutions, the organization of the American Association of University Professors, the formation of various 
groups for the protection of free speech, the focus of an annual meeting of the American Sociological Society on 
“Freedom of Discussion,” and the attention devoted to free speech and assemblage by the Commission on Industrial 
Relations.  Notably, Whipple rejected John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle” as inconsistent with modern social 
understandings. According to Whipple, Mill’s notion that interference with the liberty of others could be justified 
only for “self protection” was incompatible with “the revelations of science and psychology,” which had “proved 
how few acts there are that do not work at the expense of some one else, even if the someone is anonymous.” 
Whipple, Ancient Liberties, 10. For Whipple, there was no such thing as an atomistic individual; all rights were 
relational. 
  Joseph Byers, the 
General Secretary of the American Prison Association, was typical: “It would be a good thing for 
all of us if we emphasized a little more our duties as citizens and were less concerned about 
insisting upon our ‘rights,’” he wrote to Baldwin. “Personally, I am perfectly willing to have the 
Government suspend whatever may be necessary of my own civil rights during the period of the 
18 Not all progressives were majoritarian.  In fact, many advocated the expansion of the regulatory state precisely 
because the efficiency and autonomy of administrative agencies were shielded from popular influence.  For them, 
the postwar turn to civil liberties meant shifting their confidence from agencies—which, they discovered, were more 
prone to political influence than they had believed—to the courts.  
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war, if it will help win the war, and I have no fear whatever but that when Germany and her 
Allies have been licked to a frazzle that I shall be restored to the full enjoyment of all the civil 
rights I am capable of appreciating.”19
For the AUAM leadership and many other progressives, aversion to rights-based 
individualism was fundamentally bound up with the struggle between labor and capital. Classical 
legal thinkers and, more to the point, judges, had defended private property by reference to 
natural rights.  This abstraction had led modern society astray.  In reality, the progressives 
argued, the allocation of wealth was founded on shared social norms; property was private only 
because the community had seen fit to make it that way.
   
20  The notion that property owners 
enjoyed a negative right to use their wealth without regard to the public welfare was repugnant to 
progressive ideology.  On the contrary, defensible economic rights, like a living wage, facilitated 
greater participation in democratic society.21 In support of labor unions, Herbert Croly 
characteristically argued that the social web of industrial organization would turn individual 
workers into “enlightened, competent, and loyal citizens of an industrial commonwealth.”22
The widespread desire to moderate the class struggle and promote social harmony was a 
central motivation for progressive reform.
  
23
                                                          
19 Joseph Byers to Roger Baldwin, 25 June 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 26, p. 151. 
  By 1900, the free labor ideology that had dominated 
American political thought for much of the nineteenth century was broken.  In an era of 
industrialization, the notion that workers could parlay their surplus wages into independent 
capitalist ventures was hopelessly anachronistic. Nor were political movements like populism a 
credible alternative; the establishment was too powerful and the middle class too numerous to 
20 Eldon J. Eisenach, The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 187.   
21 Ibid., 193.  
22 Herbert David Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914), 379. 
23 See Shelton Stromquist, Re-inventing “The People”: The Progressive Movement, the Class Problem, and the 
Origins of Modern Liberalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006). 
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permit displacement of the dominant institutions and parties.  Class antagonism was an 
inescapable reality, however, and the labor vote was a force to be taken seriously. The solution 
embraced by the legislative and executive branches at the end of the tumultuous 1890s was 
incremental adjustments to the existing capitalist system. The Industrial Commission, created in 
1898 and comprising congressional and executive appointees, issued a report in 1902 that largely 
set the agenda for labor reform in the Progressive Era: the enactment of state laws dictating 
tolerable labor conditions, the curtailment of labor injunctions, the elimination of yellow-dog 
contracts, and the federal regulation of railroad work.24
With respect to the first item on the agenda, progressivism was a substantial success. The 
years before the First World War were witness to a remarkable explosion of protective labor 
legislation at the state and, in some cases, federal level.  Fueled by workplace tragedies like the 
Monongah Mining disaster and the Triangle Shirtwaist fire, progressive coalitions pushed 
through workplace safety laws affecting factories, railroads, mines, and other industries; 
minimum wage and maximum hour laws; employers’ liability and workers compensation 
reforms; elimination or regulation of convict labor; public ownership of utilities; restrictions on 
child labor; and laws regulating company stores and private employment agencies.  
  
Progress was more equivocal when it came to collective bargaining—which, to the 
members of the AUAM and other labor sympathizers, was the only tenable foundation for 
industrial peace.  The Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, convened by Theodore Roosevelt to 
mediate a strike orchestrated by the United Mine Workers, made modest concessions to labor in 
the form of increased wages and shorter hours, as well as a mechanism for arbitrating worker 
grievances. But it did not require employers to recognize unions, much less the closed shop. And 
                                                          
24 Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1994), 35. 
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Roosevelt’s cooperation was conditioned on the unions’ good behavior. Only peaceful picketers 
who respected private property were deemed deserving of federal help.  In short, Roosevelt 
acknowledged that the prevailing labor conditions were unsustainable even as he inveighed 
against class-consciousness. When he mobilized the state to mitigate the worst abuses, his goal 
was to preserve the sanctity of private property and, in large measure, the existing allocation of 
wealth.25
Under Wilson, however, the tables began to turn.  In the run-up to war, administrative 
support for labor was stronger than it had ever been. Wilson opposed interference with the 
issuance of labor injunctions, and the 1914 Clayton Act, which he signed, was more symbolic 
than substantive.
  
26
                                                          
25 His concessions satisfied moderate labor leaders like John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers of 
America, who came to regard the state as an essential tool of labor reform. Marc Karson, American Labor Unions 
and Politics (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1958), 90. Labor radicals, the subject of the next 
chapter, were not so easily appeased. 
  Still, his many pro-labor appointees ensured union representation in 
policymaking and in the resolution of particular labor disputes.  Most notably, the majority report 
of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, issued in the summer of 1915, 
wholeheartedly endorsed labor’s position on controversial issues. The Commission, initiated 
under Taft but executed under Wilson, included representatives of capital and the public in 
addition to labor.  Its overall composition, however, skewed left; it was chaired by the pro-labor 
attorney Frank P. Walsh, and its two years of hearings were far friendlier to labor than industry. 
Each camp issued its own findings, but the majority report was strongly pro-labor and called for 
“drastic” changes in the allocation of wealth and federal protection of unions’ right to collective 
bargaining as well as federal provisions for social insurance.  Walsh boasted that it was “more 
26 By most accounts, Wilson abandoned his earlier anti-union sentiments in the interest of political expediency. See, 
e.g., Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern 
American Labor Relations, 1912–1921 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 14–15; Kathleen M. 
Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002); Arthur S. Link, Wilson, vol. 1, 
The Road to the White House (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).  
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radical than any report upon industrial subjects ever made by any government agency.”27 Among 
those who provided testimony were ACLU co-founder Crystal Eastman, who appeared in her 
capacity as an executive board member of the Congressional Union for Woman’s Suffrage.28 She 
considered the vote to be an essential tool in the labor struggle, but she told the Commission that 
women “must raise their wages as men have raised their wages, by organization.”29
The modest improvements for labor enacted by state legislatures and negotiated at the 
federal level by the Wilson Administration ameliorated the conditions of American workers. 
Even some unions were persuaded that federal intervention on behalf of labor was worth 
pursuing.  Although the American Federation of Labor publicly championed “voluntarism”—the 
notion that labor activity should and did take place outside the realm of state power
  
30—labor 
historians have demonstrated that Samuel Gompers and his cohort used government adeptly 
when it suited their agenda.31
                                                          
27 Quoted in Dubofsky, State and Labor, 55. On the tensions within progressivism between class-conscious labor 
advocates like Walsh and advocates of class reconciliation, see Stromquist, Re-Inventing ‘The People’.  On the 
Commission on Industrial Relations, see Graham Adams, Jr., Age of Industrial Violence, 1910–15: The Activities 
and Findings of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1966).  
  Despite fears that protective labor laws and state intervention in 
28 Wilson’s endorsement of the Adamson Act, which mandated an eight-hour day for interstate railroad workers, 
ensured even closer ties between labor and the Democratic establishment.  The act was one component of Wilson’s 
response to a 1916 dispute between the railroad brotherhoods and the railroads. Another, significantly, was his 
request for authorization in cases of military necessity of presidential seizure of the railroads. Although the latter 
never passed, it was a measure of Wilson’s growing support for administrative intervention on behalf of labor. 
Organized labor rewarded Wilson’s new cooperative attitude with enthusiastic support for his 1916 reelection 
campaign. 
29 United States Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the 
Commission on Industrial Relations, 11 vols., 64th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1916), vol. 11, 10781. 
30 Kathryn Kish Sklar explains, “The power of the courts to block prolabor legislation steered Gompers and other 
labor leaders into strategies that avoided political solutions for labor problems.” Kathryn Kish Sklar, “The Historical 
Foundations of Women’s Power in the Creation of the American Welfare State, 1830–1930,” in Mothers of a New 
World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States, ed. Seth Koven & Sonya Michel (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 57.   
31 Nick Salvatore, introduction to Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An Autobiography, by Samuel Gompers (Ithaca: 
ILR Press, 1984).  Notably, Salvatore argues that Gompers’s endorsement of Wilson’s pro-war policies was not 
mere politicking but rather reflected Gompers’s heartfelt philosophy. 
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labor disputes would undermine union power,32 the AFL cultivated deep ties with President 
Wilson and the Democratic Party.33
One branch of government, however, consistently stood in the way of reform: again and 
again, labor’s most significant gains were undercut by the judiciary. And the justification for 
judicial action was a theory of individual rights based on the sanctity of private property.  The 
most notorious example, and a powerful progressive rallying cry, was the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lochner v. New York, which invalidated a New York maximum-hours law because it 
interfered with an implicit constitutional “right to free contract.”
  
34  Pet progressive projects like 
the minimum wage, the eight-hour day, and workers compensation all died at judicial hands.35
But the invalidation of state legislative protections was neither the most pervasive judicial 
device nor the most damaging to the labor cause.  In the decades before World War I, employers 
(and organizations of employers, such as the National Association of Manufacturers) justified 
their open shop policies by reference to individual rights; closed shops, they argued, abridged 
workers’ freedom by conditioning employment on their obligation to join the union.  Moreover, 
they argued that yellow-dog contracts prohibiting workers from joining unions protected 
  
                                                          
32Nelson Lichtenstein. State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002), 12.  
33 See David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor 
Activism, 1865-1925 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate 
Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United 
States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Indeed, Wilson’s secretary of labor was a former official of 
the UMW and openly favored the cause of labor.   
34 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Notwithstanding revisionist claims about popular reaction to Lochner 
in the immediate aftermath of the case, see, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner, it is clear that by the 
1910s progressive antipathy toward the case had crystallized. 
35 The Commission on Industrial Relations assembled a long list of statutes invalidated by courts on constitutional 
grounds. Representative examples include statutes requiring statement of cause of discharge, prohibiting 
blacklisting, protecting members of labor unions, restricting the power of courts to grant injunctions, setting wages 
in public works, fixing time for payment of wages, and prohibiting or regulating company stores.  “Report of Basil 
M. Manly,” in Final Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations (hereafter, Manly Report), 44.   
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individual rights by linking workers’ duties to those which they had voluntarily assumed.  Courts 
agreed on both fronts.   
By the early 1890s, the federal courts had decisively established their willingness and 
authority to suppress “coercive” labor practices—particularly the right of workers to conduct 
boycotts or to dissuade strike-breakers—through use of the labor injunction. During the first 
decades of the twentieth century, the pursuit of labor injunctions became the first line of defense 
for beleaguered employers.36 Although some judges exercised restraint, even expressed union 
sympathies, most were quick to comply with employers’ requests, often issuing ex parte 
restraining orders unsupported by evidence of illegal behavior. Meanwhile, in Gompers v. Buck’s 
Stove,37 the United States Supreme Court held the boycott to be an enjoinable offense under the 
Sherman Act.  This ruling came just three years after the Court struck down the Erdman Act’s 
prohibition on yellow-dog contracts as a constitutional infringement on workers’ freedom of 
contract under the Fifth Amendment,38 a holding that it applied to state anti-yellow-dog laws in 
1915.39
President Taft’s judicial appointments, including five to the Supreme Court, ensured that 
the judiciary would not be swayed by rising public antipathy.  Indeed, in the spring of 1917, the 
Supreme Court extended its anti-labor reasoning. In Hitchman Coal v. Mitchell, a six-justice 
majority upheld an injunction against the UMW for attempting to recruit non-union workers.
   
40
                                                          
36 See Forbath, American Labor Movement; Ernst, Lawyers Against Labor.   
 
37 Gompers v. Buck’s Stove, 221 U.S. 418 (1911). 
38 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).  The Commission on Industrial relations noted the “inconsistency 
between the decisions in the Debs case, wherein it is held that the control of Congress over interstate commerce is so 
complete that it may regulate the conduct of the employees engaged therein to the extent of enjoining them from 
going on a sympathetic strike, and the decision in the Adair case, where it is held that Congress has so little power 
over the conduct of those engaged in interstate commerce that it can not constitutionally forbid employers engaged 
therein discharging their employees merely because of membership in a labor union.” Manly Report, 45.  
39 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
40 Hitchman Coal v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). Justice Brandeis wrote a dissent, in which Justices Holmes and 
Clarke joined. 
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Those workers had signed yellow-dog contracts consistently with “the constitutional right of 
personal liberty and private property,” and any effort to organize them was consequently 
unlawful.  For labor, this judicial invocation of workers’ autonomy in support of the yellow-dog 
contract was infuriating. As labor lawyer (and future ACLU member) Clarence Darrow told the 
Commission on Industrial Relations: “They talk about the inalienable right of a man to work; he 
has no such right; no one has a right to work, and the man who stands for the open shop does not 
care for anybody’s rights to work, except the nonunion man, and they only care for him because 
they can use him. If a man has a constitutional right to work he ought to have some legal way of 
getting work.”41
The Supreme Court’s obstinacy on these issues, and its broader hostility to public 
regulation, threatened to undermine the progressive reform agenda—and so progressives railed 
against the judicial construction of the autonomous individual.
  
42  The freedom of a single worker 
to bargain for the conditions of his (or, increasingly, her43) labor was an obvious fiction in the 
context of modern labor conditions.  Collective bargaining restored a measure of reality, as well 
as social consciousness, to the field of labor relations.  By resting on merely formal rights, by 
contrast, classical legalism exacerbated social tensions.44  The problem with the Lochner-era 
judiciary was its tendency to “exaggerate private right at the expense of public interest,”45
                                                          
41 CIR Final Report, vol. 11, 10806. 
 
42 The phenomenon was not limited to cases affecting labor disputes and labor protections.  Indeed, the judiciary in 
the United States “was notorious as a graveyard for social-political initiatives.” Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic 
Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 58. 
43 The Supreme Court declined to extend that right to women in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in which it 
upheld a maximum hour law applicable to women. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), however, 
the Court struck down federal minimum wage legislation for women as an unconstitutional infringement on liberty 
of contract. 
44 In their influential Ethics, John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts explained: “It is the possession by the more 
favored individuals in society of an effectual freedom to do and to enjoy things with respect to which the masses 
have only a formal and legal freedom, that arouses a sense of inequity.” John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics 
(New York: H. Holt and company, 1908), 439. 
45 Roscoe Pound, “Liberty of Contract,” Yale Law Journal 18 (1909): 461. 
44 
 
without taking social circumstances into account. The progressives believed that “the strong 
social interest in the moral and social life of the individual” outweighed the cost to autonomy of 
an aggressively interventionist judicial system.46
These developments were a central presence in the lives and careers of the members of 
the AUAM.  Most were actively involved in some aspect of improving workers’ lives. Jane 
Addams, of course, worked tirelessly to relieve class injustice through legislation, social work, 
and occasionally union activity.  Lillian Wald (along with Addams) helped to found the 
Women’s Trade Union League, which sought to increase women’s participation in organized 
labor.  Florence Kelley founded the anti-sweatshop National Consumers’ League and assisted in 
drafting the influential “Brandeis Brief” in Muller v. Oregon, one of the few Supreme Court 
decisions to uphold a protective labor law (setting maximum hours for women workers).  The list 
went on and on.  All were attentive to the advantages of state cooperation and the pitfalls of 
judicial intervention.  Probably, all were skeptical of individual rights.  
     
The experiences of Crystal Eastman, the organization’s executive secretary, are 
illustrative. A reformist by upbringing, Eastman was trained as a lawyer but unable, as a woman, 
to find work as a practicing attorney. Instead, she devoted her early career to sociological 
research. She had studied political economy at Columbia before switching to law, and between 
1908 and 1910 she applied both sets of skills in her evaluation of industrial accidents in New 
York.47
                                                          
46 Roscoe Pound, “The Administration of Justice in the Modern City,” Harvard Law Review 26 (1913): 315. 
  Her analysis as secretary of the Wainwright Commission, which was created by the 
New York legislature to study the law of workplace accidents, guided that state’s legislative 
effort to replace outmoded tort rules of employers’ liability with a new no-fault compensatory 
system. As she feared, however, the high court of New York struck down the workers’ 
47 Witt, Patriots and Cosmopolitans, 170. 
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compensation law she helped craft, calling it a violation of employers’ property rights.48
For Eastman and her colleagues, the decision to resist militarism by invoking judicial 
review of regulatory power was a strange turn of events—one that warrants considerably more 
attention than the historical scholarship has afforded it.  The majority of the organization 
regarded the state as an ally in the struggle to achieve industrial harmony, and prior to America’s 
entry into the war, they extended their optimism to their fight against militarism as well.  Within 
a matter of months, however, the civil liberties bureau was the most visible face of the AUAM.  
Who were the actors responsible for its creation? How did they conceive the idea, and what did 
they intend would fall within its sweep?  The story, predictably, is one of conflict and confusion. 
And it begins long before the war.   
 
Although the decision was countered by a state constitutional amendment, the legal defeat was a 
powerful lesson. 
 
Free Speech before the War 
Whatever the framers of the First Amendment intended to accomplish when they forbade 
Congress from “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble,”49
                                                          
48 Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Company, 201 N.Y. 271 (N.Y. 1911). 
 judicial interpretation of those words prior to World War I was 
consistently tepid.  The contrast with the expansive protection for liberty of contract and the 
sanctity of private property, allegedly enshrined within the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, was particularly stark. When the Supreme Court deemed boycotts 
unlawful under the Sherman Act in Gompers v. Buck’s Stove, it rejected the AFL’s argument that 
49 Leonard Levy argued in his early work that the Framers intended only to codify the common law prohibition on 
prior restraints. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).  In response to criticism, he subsequently qualified his view. Levy, 
Emergence of a Free Press. 
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its list of unfriendly employers was protected by the Constitution, reasoning that it was speech in 
furtherance of an illegal purpose and therefore outside the First Amendment’s purview.50
 Labor, however, was not the only casualty of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Beginning with the infamous 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, which punished 
language that was “false, scandalous, or malicious,” the federal courts had more or less steered 
clear of controversies over free speech.
   
51  Over the following decades, many southern states 
prohibited speech likely to incite slaves to insurrection, and the mounting national crisis only 
exacerbated repressive tendencies.  Abraham Lincoln declined to advocate a sedition act during 
the Civil War, but he was complicit in the arrest of political dissidents.  One such arrest nearly 
cost him reelection and prompted him to issue a public statement on the matter.  Wartime speech 
is permissible, he explained, if it is merely critical of the government; but a speaker may be 
arrested for “laboring . . . to prevent the raising of troops; to encourage desertions from the army; 
and to leave the Rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it.”52
While the worst repression almost invariably came at times of war,
 
53 the regulation of 
expression was a routine affair in nineteenth century America.  Although many state 
constitutions protected free speech, state law and city ordinances made frequent interventions.54
                                                          
50 In 1914, Samuel Gompers laid out the AFL’s position on civil liberties: “The American Federation of Labor looks 
askance upon any effort to curb the inherent, as well as the constitutional rights of free press and free speech and 
free assemblage, and holds that, though these rights may be perverted . . . the right of expression through speech or 
press must be untrammeled if we are going to have a republican form of government with freedom.”  “Mr. Gompers 
and Civil Rights,” New York Call, 19 March 1919.  During World War I, however, the AFL largely accepted the 
government’s speech-repressive measures. 
 
51 The Sedition Act prosecutions were popularly denounced and are regarded as a critical factor in the Republican 
electoral gains in the 1800 elections, including Jefferson’s presidential victory. 
52 Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others, 12 June 1863, in Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. 2, ed. 
John G. Nicolay and John Hay (New York: The Century Company, 1894), 349. As during World War I, repression 
found popular as well as political channels.  During the Civil War, mobs routinely attacked print shops that 
published literature inconsistent with local sentiments. 
53 Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on 
Terrorism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2004). 
54 On pervasive state regulation during the nineteenth century, see William Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and 
Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); on pornography 
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Few prewar cases examined free speech issues in detail, but courts periodically considered 
whether crimes and torts violated the First Amendment or its state constitutional analogs. On all 
but a few occasions they rejected such claims out of hand.  
Restrictions existed on the federal level as well. The Comstock Act of 1873 prohibited 
distribution of obscene materials—broadly defined to include not only pornography, but also 
medical, scientific, and social literature pertaining to birth control, free love, and sexually 
transmitted diseases—through the interstate mail.55
Meanwhile, before the 1910s, consideration of civil liberties within the legal academy 
was sparse. Thomas Cooley
  An 1876 statute precluded financial 
contributions by federal employees to political campaigns, and the Alien Immigration Act of 
1903 provided for the exclusion of political radicals.  In addition, legislation intended for 
relatively narrow purposes often took on broader meaning in the hands of the Department of 
Justice.  For instance, the Roosevelt Administration used obscenity laws to exclude anti-
American literature from the mail.     
56 and Ernst Freund57 touched upon the topic, but neither engaged in 
sustained discussion.58
Although groups occasionally organized to defend free speech against governmental 
incursions—sometimes to protect business interests and occasionally on ideological grounds—
  For the most part, prewar scholarship focused on Blackstone’s account 
of the common law, noting that restraints on expression helped precipitate the American 
Revolution and debating whether the First Amendment had therefore extended protections for 
free speech.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regulation, see Donna I. Dennis, “Obscenity Regulation, New York City, and the Creation of American Erotica, 
1820–1880” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2005). 
55 See Chapter 4.  
56 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the 
States of the American Union (Boston: Little, Brown: 1868). 
57 Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights (Chicago: Callaghan, 1904). 
58 Barzun, “Politics or Principle?”; Rabban, Forgotten Years, 177–210.  
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none made much headway in the courts.  One, however, attracted considerable attention.  The 
Free Speech League, founded in 1902 and nurtured for twenty years by Theodore Schroeder, 
never won a significant judicial victory.  But it generated significant support for free speech at 
the level of local policy, and it made many progressives question whether a trump on legislative 
enactments—in the form of the First Amendment—might, under certain circumstances, be made 
to serve desirable ends. 
The Free Speech League came together in reaction to the suppression of dissent in the 
colonies acquired during the Spanish-American War, along with the increased targeting of 
anarchist speech in the wake of President William McKinley’s assassination in 1901.59  The 
founders of the League and its principal beneficiaries were radicals, but the organization 
garnered mainstream approval as well.  What was distinctive about the Free Speech League was 
its commitment to defending all speech, regardless of viewpoint or subject matter.60  “By 
freedom of speech,” Schroeder explained, “I do not mean the right to agree with the majority, but 
the right to say with impunity anything and everything which any one chooses to say, and to 
speak it with impunity so long as no actual material injury results to any one, and when it results 
then to punish only for the contribution to that material injury and not for the mere speech as 
such.”61
                                                          
59 On the League, see Rabban, Forgotten Years; Clyde Spillenger, “David M. Rabban and the Libertarian Tradition 
That Time Forgot,” Law & Social Inquiry 26 (2001): 209–42.   
  Although much of its work took place in the courts, the League used every strategy at 
60 The articles of incorporation of the Free Speech League articulated the organization’s objectives as follows: “By 
all lawful means to promote such judicial construction of the Constitution of the United States, and of the several 
states, and of the statutes passed in conformity therewith, as will secure to every person the greatest liberty 
consistent with the equal liberty of all others, and especially to preclude the punishment of any mere psychological 
offense; and, to that end, by all lawful means to oppose every form of governmental censorship over any method for 
the expression, communication or transmission of ideas, whether by use of previous inhibition or subsequent 
punishment; and to promote such legislative enactments and constitutional amendments, state and national, as will 
secure these ends.” Theodore Schroeder, Constitutional Free Speech Defined and Defended (New York: Free 
Speech League, 1919), iv. 
61 Ibid., 20.  Schroeder retreated from this radical stance later in his career. 
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its disposal, including publicity for legal and other disputes, academic and professional 
advocacy, mass meetings and demonstrations, and correspondence with government officials.62
Inspired by the individualist rhetoric of philosophical anarchism, freethought, radical 
abolitionism, and the women’s movement, the Free Speech League celebrated individual 
autonomy and regarded it as the appropriate foundation for civil liberties claims.
  
63 Like the 
National Defense Association before it,64 the Free Speech League devoted considerable 
resources to the defense of “obscene” literature. The League’s commitment to personal freedom 
was a perfect complement to the bohemian culture of early-twentieth century Manhattan. Its 
frequent and noteworthy clients included Emma Goldman and Margaret Sanger, for whom free 
speech was not just a platform for legal reform and social change, but a way of life.65
Much of the League’s energy, however, was consumed by defending the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW)—which, in the first two decades of the twentieth century, was 
engaged in a series of highly publicized “free speech fights.”  The IWW sought to organize 
unskilled workers who were neglected by mainstream labor organizations, like the AFL, which 
organized workers by craft.  The organization’s goal was framed by syndicalist ideology.  The 
preamble to the IWW Constitution proclaimed a commitment to “abolition of the wage system”; 
between the working class and the employing class, it announced, “a struggle must go on until 
the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of 
 Free love, 
birth control, and radical politics were all part of the same civil liberties package.     
                                                          
62 Rabban, Forgotten Years, 47. 
63 Ibid., 23. Cf. Murphy, Meaning, 20 (“Schroeder and his cohorts were remnants of nineteenth-century liberal 
thought. Optimistic individualists themselves, they believed that man’s basic problem was unwarranted restraint.”).  
64 The National Defense Association (NDA) was created in 1878 to oppose the Comstock Act and assist defendants 
prosecuted under it.  It was active for several decades. 
65 See Christine Stansell, American Moderns: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New Century (New York: 
Henry Holt, 2000), 74 (“Free speech was self-conscious, flashy, daring, ostentatiously honest and sexual.  Shot 
through with a bohemian fondness for self-dramatizing, it flitted from poetry to birth control to the situation of the 
garment workers.”).  
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production, and abolish the wage system.”66
The League’s services were not universally popular within the IWW.  Despite their 
patriotic rhetoric, most Wobblies regarded the courts as unalloyed tools of capital and scoffed at 
the notion of constitutional protection for disempowered minorities.
  The free speech fights grew out of efforts to attract 
members to the “One Big Union” through public speaking and literature distribution.  Municipal 
efforts to shut the IWW out led to widespread arrests and prosecutions, and the “Wobblies” 
defended their recruitment campaigns on First Amendment grounds.  The Free Speech League 
was an indispensible ally in formulating a strategy for challenging IWW prosecutions in the 
courtroom and for promoting tolerance at the level of official enforcement and public opinion.  
67 Still, soapbox recruitment 
in urban centers was a crucial tool for the IWW. They saw the city employment agencies, or 
“sharks,” as the central obstacle to organizing migratory workers.  By connecting workers to 
short-term jobs, these agencies ensured a steady supply of transient labor; if the IWW could 
succeed in breaking them, they could force employers to solicit labor through IWW hiring halls 
instead.  The architects of the free speech fights hoped that their rare courtroom successes would 
open space for soliciting members on street corners, outside of the watchful gaze of employers.  
Failing that, the partiality of local government and judges would expose American constitutional 
liberties as fraudulent, generating sympathy and attracting adherents indirectly to their cause.68
 In practice, the free speech fights met with mixed success.  In Spokane, the first target, 
IWW organizing efforts prompted the city council to enact an ordinance that prohibited street 
speaking by the IWW and other “revolutionists.” The Wobblies resolved to continue speaking in 
  
                                                          
66 CIR Final Report, vol. 11, 10599. 
67 See, e.g, “Why Free Speech is Denied the IWW,” Industrial Worker, 17 November 1909, 4, quoted in Rabban, 
Forgotten Years, 86 (claiming that courts were “but the mirrors reflecting the prevailing mode of ownership in the 
means of production.”). Some Wobblies claimed that free speech had been meaningfully enforced during the early 
republic and only subsequently curtailed by the capitalists (and the judges who implemented their will). Rabban, 
Forgotten Years, 84. Few, however, genuinely believed that robust First Amendment protection was either possible 
or altogether advisable. 
68 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 174. 
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a peaceable and orderly fashion (despite violent harassment from local spectators as well as the 
police), unless the ordinance was made applicable to all organizations on a non-discriminatory 
basis.  Often they read aloud from the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution.  What 
followed was a wave of arrests that flooded the city’s jails, consuming substantial time and 
resources on the part of law enforcement, the courts, and the correctional system.  
Reinforcements—most notably, founding ACLU board member Elizabeth Gurley Flynn—
flooded in from around the country. Eventually, when the struggle had all but exhausted 
everyone involved, negotiations with the city produced a significant IWW victory.  The 
organization was given access to indoor meeting places and the freedom to sell its newspaper, 
the Industrial Worker, on the city streets. It also achieved its substantive goal, reform of the 
employment agency system, in Spokane and much of the Northwest.69
 The outcomes of subsequent fights were, however, more equivocal.  In Fresno, after 
months of passively withstanding torture from mobs on the street and from prison guards, the 
IWW secured release of all its jailed members and authorization of its right to speak on the city 
streets.
  Perhaps most important, 
the idealism, perseverance, and resolute non-violence of the Wobbly speakers generated 
sympathy for the IWW cause.  
70
                                                          
69 Ibid., 183. 
 Increasingly, however, these formal victories seemed inadequate to the task of 
organizing the workers. The notorious San Diego fight of 1912, which initially garnered support 
from a range of organizations, led to horrific police and vigilante violence against IWW 
participants, with little concrete gain.  Public opinion, on the whole, was stacked against the 
IWW.  The Free Speech League was heavily involved in the San Diego fight and provided 
financial and organizational support.  Gilbert Roe and Emma Goldman visited the site of 
70 Ibid., 188.   
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conflict, and Schroeder corresponded with local attorneys and coordinated efforts to establish a 
local branch of the league.  These interventions may have tempered popular hostility to the 
IWW, but their influence was limited.  Many commentators celebrated the fundamental 
American values enshrined in the Bill of Rights but carved out radical agitation from the 
intended scope of the First Amendment.71
The IWW leadership was never content with its modest achievements in the realm of free 
speech.  Rather, it interpreted its successful battles as an indication of what true struggle could 
achieve.  As the IWW organ Solidarity proclaimed with respect to the Spokane fight: “By use of 
its weakest weapon—passive resistance—labor forced civic authorities to recognize a power 
equal to the state.”  Given that success, the organization ought to consider what would happen 
“when an industrially organized working class stands forth prepared to seize, operate, and 
control the machinery of production and distribution.”
 
72 The free speech fights were an exercise 
in direct action, and a prelude to the true struggle for industrial democracy.  Over time, many 
Wobblies rejected the fights as even an interim strategy.73
                                                          
71 Rabban, Forgotten Years, 96–99.  
  Indeed, many eschewed the use of the 
courts altogether.  As one syndicalist publication put it at mid-decade: “The law strike is crude, 
uncouth, and primitive. As a means to an end for stiffening the ranks of militant labor it has 
about run its course. What is the law strike? A law strike is a defense of labor in a capitalist 
court, a case wherein Labor has hired counsel to defend prisoners accused of labor ‘crimes.’ . . . 
When Labor shall have strongly organized on an industrial basis, free from parliamentary law, 
72 Quoted in Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 105.  
73 The legacy of the free speech fights with respect to the IWW’s wartime strategy is the subject of the next chapter. 
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legal claptrap, judicial fakery, and capitalistic confidence methods there will be no need of hiring 
lawyers.”74
Whatever their effect on the labor struggle, the free speech fights were instrumental in 
generating broader interest in civil liberties.  Efforts on behalf of the IWW by the Free Speech 
League resonated with progressive intellectuals.
 
75  Although courts upheld the constitutionality 
of restrictive ordinances, they sometimes reversed convictions as discriminatory in their 
application, unsupported by the evidence, or inconsistent with statutory intent.76  In consultation 
with the League, New York City Police Commissioner Arthur Woods openly defended free 
speech rights in public places; he instructed police officers to protect speakers from unruly 
crowds and to prohibit only incitement of immediate violence.77  Similarly, Attorney General 
George Wickersham resisted encouragement from local law enforcement and President Taft to 
prosecute the IWW under federal law.78  Socialists generally supported the IWW’s free speech 
claims, though they increasingly condemned the organization’s tactics.79
                                                          
74 Additional Statement of Theodore Schroeder, in CIR Final Report, vol. 11, 10896 (quoting recent article in 
syndicalist newspaper). 
  And progressive 
officials, activists, and academics began to mobilize for free speech.  The free speech fights 
prompted Edward Ross, president of the American Sociological Society, to organize the 
Society’s 1914 annual meeting on the subject of “Freedom of Communication.” Ross situated 
free speech within the progressive commitment to public welfare, lamenting that the suppression 
75 Rabban, Forgotten Years, 90–94.  
76 Rabban 115–20.  On one occasion, a police court judge in Spokane declared an ordi nance unconstitutional 
because it permitted street speaking by some groups and not others (he did not object to a blanket restriction). Ibid., 
116.  This decision was, however, anomalous.  
77 Ibid., 101–02.  
78 At the request of the San Diego superintendent of police, Attorney General George Wickersham entertained an 
investigation by United States Attorney John McCormick, who sought an indictment of the IWW for criminal 
conspiracy to “overthrow the government and take possession of all things.”  Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 195.  
Wickersham, despite pressure from President Taft, was unimpressed by the evidence and ordered the charges 
dropped.  Federal indictment of the IWW would wait another half-decade. 
79 Rabban, Forgotten Years, 88, 93. See Wertheimer, “Free Speech Fights,” on free speech fights by Socialists.  
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of labor advocacy “depriv[ed] the weak of the chief weapon by which they may achieve common 
economic action.”80
Significantly, the free speech fights figured prominently in the proceedings of the 
Commission on Industrial Relations.  Woods told the Commission that his efforts to protect free 
speech for IWW organizers in New York City had drastically reduced conflict there.
  
81 Darrow 
(who had argued a Supreme Court case on behalf of the Free Speech League in 1903), 
Schroeder,82 and many others testified about the importance of free speech to the broader success 
of the labor movement. All of these free speech advocates insisted that the courts were stacked 
against labor. All questioned whether constitutional interpretation was the best means of 
protecting civil liberties.  Gilbert Roe thought the Supreme Court had gotten the basic 
constitutional balance wrong, and he advocated “changes in personnel.”83
                                                          
80 Edward A. Ross, “Freedom of Communication and the Struggle for Right: Presidential Address,” in American 
Sociological Society, Publications of the American Sociological Society: Papers and Proceedings, Ninth Annual 
Meeting, vol. ix (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1915), 5.  
 He was skeptical that 
courts ought to be “passing upon the validity of statutes at all,” but he reasoned that “if they are 
going to declare statutes unconstitutional that relate to property when they are in conflict with the 
Constitution, it would seem that they ought to apply the same principle to statutes which invade 
personal rights,” by which he meant those constitutional rights protecting privacy, bodily 
81 Woods testified to the Commission that labor unions and employers were both responsible for violence in 
industrial disputes but that strikers, not employers, resorted to hiring gunmen. Testimony of Arthur Woods, 12 May 
1915, in CIR Final Report, vol. 11, 10896. 
82 Testimony of Theodore Schroeder, 27 May 1915, in CIR Final Report, vol. 11. Schroeder told the commission 
that he was “working at law problems all the time” but did not accept pay and did not practice in court. Ibid., 10841. 
Schroeder’s testimony laid out two basic propositions: “first, the absolute incapacity of any judge in the United 
States to understand what free speech means in light of the historical controversy which resulted in the adoption of 
our free-speech clauses of the Constitution,” and second, the “utter incapacity on the part of the courts, except when 
dealing with problems of property, to understand what law and the due process of law clause of the Federal and 
State Constitutions mean.” His conclusion, after careful study, was that “we have less conceded and protected 
freedom of speech and of the press in the United States than in any country in the world at any time in the history of 
the world.” Ibid. 
83 Testimony of Gilbert Roe, 10 May 1915, in CIR Final Report, vol. 11, 10473.  
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integrity, and expressive freedom.84 Even Schroeder advocated the “recall of all judges, and the 
recall of all judicial decisions on constitutional questions.”85  He worried, however, that 
legislation invariably served the interests of property.  He offered no concrete mechanism for 
achieving social justice but believed the first step was “freedom of speech, for [Bill] Haywood 
and the rest, to defend their dreams.”86
The Commission was persuaded that civil liberties warranted further protection.  Its 
members did not condone the IWW’s tactics, of course.  Harris Weinstock, one of the 
Commission’s employer representatives, was appointed to investigate the Free Speech Fights. He 
concluded that the Wobbly initiative was deceptive and dangerous, aimed at overwhelming the 
machinery of justice and only incidentally concerned with First Amendment rights. A staff 
investigator noted that IWW organizers (like their Communist counterparts of the next decade) 
were inconsistent in their defense of free speech and broke up meetings of religious groups with 
whom they disagreed.
 
87
                                                          
84 Ibid., 10474. 
  Nonetheless, the Commission was univocal in denouncing vigilantism, 
particularly in contrast to the passive and nonviolent resistance exercised by the IWW.  
Moreover, the Commission’s staff was greatly troubled by the brutality of state and local law 
enforcement in suppressing strikers as well as soapbox speakers. Accordingly, it advised against 
85 Testimony of Theodore Schroeder, 27 May 1915, in CIR Final Report, vol. 11, 10845. He continued, “If the 
people are credited with the right to make constitutions they should be allowed to say what they mean after being 
framed.”  Ibid.  Asked what was responsible for the “two distinct mental attitudes of the judges, with reference to 
property right and free speech,” Schroeder fell back on judges’ unconscious psychology. Most judges, he explained, 
have an aversion “to the criticism that comes from them that are down and out.” At the same time, they are 
predisposed to promote the interests of the rich, with whom they identify.  They interpret the constitution in 
accordance with their emotional sympathies. Interestingly, Schroeder felt this tendency would only be exacerbated 
in the case of Progressive judges, who were themselves subject to suspicion and would therefore worry that deciding 
a case in favor of a radical defendant would cast aspersion on their own motivations and beliefs. Ibid., 10851. 
86 Ibid., 10850. Bill Haywood was head of the IWW.  
87 Rabban, Forgotten Years, 106–07.  
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police discretion in enforcing free speech and called for greater protection of First Amendment 
rights.88
Integrating these various concerns, the Commission’s final report devoted a section to 
free speech. The suppression of public speaking, it declared, was “one of the greatest sources of 
social unrest.”
   
89  Police interference with such important “personal rights,” even when exercised 
in good faith, “strikes at the very foundation of Government.”90  The Commission’s reasoning 
succinctly laid out the progressive case for free speech: “[I]t is the lesson of history that attempts 
to suppress ideas result[] only in their more rapid propagation.  Not only should every barrier to 
the freedom of speech be removed, as long as it is kept within the bounds of decency and as long 
as the penalties for libel can be invoked, but every reasonable opportunity should be afforded for 
the expression of ideas and the public criticism of social institutions.”91
                                                          
88 Ibid., 108. Much of the criticism stemmed from the conflict in Paterson, New Jersey, though it was not formally a 
free speech fight.  In his report on behalf of a California commission to investigate the San Diego events, Weinstock 
concluded that the police should not be permitted to curtail free speech on the grounds of anticipated abuse.  Ibid., 
107.  
 The report then 
recommended measures, modeled in large part on Woods’s experiences in New York City, to 
discourage violence and promote police impartiality.  Characteristically, most were designed to 
encourage good governance. Whereas the Commission sought to cabin the detrimental exercise 
of administrative discretion, most of the mechanisms it specified were advisory and regulatory—
for example, congressional legislation prohibiting the transportation of armed gunmen and non-
personal weapons across state lines, the regulation of private detective agencies, and enactment 
by the states of a uniform code governing the militia, limiting military detainment, and ensuring 
that a proclamation by a Governor of martial law would have no effect on constitutional 
89 Manly Report, 98.   
90 Ibid., 99. 
91 Ibid.  
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guarantees.92 In response to concerns about the effects of street speaking on congestion and 
commerce, the Commission urged states and municipalities to open up the schools and other 
public buildings for lectures and public meetings.93
The bolder suggestions fell under the heading “Causes of Industrial Unrest.” In that 
section, the commissioners stated their deep conviction, based on the evidence submitted to 
them, that that workers had been “denied justice in the enactment, adjudication, and 
administration of law.”
  
94 Not only had the courts proven far more sympathetic to employers than 
to labor in the resolution of particular disputes, but they had construed the sections of the 
Constitution designed to protect “human rights” and “perverted [them] to protect property rights 
only,” often in contravention of state statutes specifically drafted to protect workers.95  
Meanwhile, they had interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate only property rights, 
not personal rights, and had thereby rendered workers helpless against encroachment by the 
states.  To eradicate the “evils” of the situation and to introduce “justice and liberty” in their 
place—and, in the process, to avert the “grave danger that, if the workers assert their collective 
power and secure the control of government by the massing of their numbers, the scales may 
swing equally far in the other direction”96
                                                          
92 While the latter provision sought to preserve civil jurisdiction and to discourage courts martial and military 
detention, it was framed as a state statute presumably enforceable through state rather than federal courts. 
—the Commission recommended decisive action.  
“Personal rights must be recognized as supreme and of unalterable ascendency over property 
rights,” the report concluded.  The proposed solution? “That Congress forthwith initiate an 
amendment to the Constitution providing in specific terms for the protection of the personal 
rights of every person in the United States from encroachment by the Federal and State 
93 Ibid., 100.   
94 Ibid., 38.  
95 Ibid., 47.  
96 Ibid., 59. 
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Governments and by private individuals, associations, and corporations.”97
The Commission’s report reflected a sincere commitment to free speech within the left of 
the progressive establishment.  Perhaps, if the First World War had not intruded, the new 
indulgence of unpopular viewpoints might have picked up momentum. As it happened, the 
perceived need for patriotic uniformity quelled the prewar awakening of pluralistic tolerance. 
Still, the free speech fights brought civil liberties into the purview of some progressives’ 
consciousness.  At the outbreak of war, when dissenters were faced with aggressive state and 
private repression, they had a vocabulary to draw on.   
  Presumably, this 
constitutional right would have been protected outside the courts, as the Commission urged 
Congress by statute or constitutional amendment to withdraw the judicial power to declare 
legislative acts unconstitutional. 
If the IWW supplied a rallying point for free speech, it was the Free Speech League that 
provided the model for civil liberties advocacy.  League lawyers were the first to espouse a 
generalized defense of free speech based on First Amendment values.98  Schroeder was careful to 
maintain a theoretical and organizational distance between the League and the groups it 
represented, in order to prevent it from becoming “the tail of the kite of some other 
propagandist.” He explained, “Every time that it creates in the public mind the impression of 
being subordinate to the interests of the IWW’s or of anti-Catholic agitators; of Free Thinkers; or 
of Socialists, then, it is impairing its efficiency in subsequent activities.”99
                                                          
97 Ibid., 61. The report continued, “The principal rights which should be thus specifically protected by the power of 
the Federal Government are the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to jury trial, to free speech, to 
peaceable assemblage, to keep and bear arms, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to speedy public 
trial, and to freedom from excessive bail and from cruel and unusual punishment.” 
 Its abstract embrace 
of individual freedom gave the League credibility when it defended unpopular causes like labor 
98 In Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), they sought unsuccessfully to undermine the common law “bad 
tendency” test. 
99 Quoted in Rabban, Forgotten Years, 63. 
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radicalism—which, at the time, was less reputable than free love.100  Schroeder denounced those 
New York bohemians who supported the League’s position on obscenity but countenanced the 
censorship of Anarchist literature.  “Herein they are more reactionary than the conservatives who 
framed our charters of liberty and those of us who still rely upon constitutions,” he explained, 
“because these documents recognize no such exception to our guaranteed freedom of speech and 
press.”101 By the beginning of the war, the Free Speech League, as an organization, was on the 
decline.102
Roger Baldwin would later recall that the IWW wrote a crucial “chapter in the history of 
American liberties.” Between 1908 and 1918, he reflected, “the little minority of the working 
class represented in the IWW blazed the trail . . . for free speech which the entire American 
working class must in some fashion follow.”
 Schroeder had always been the glue that held it together, and he was increasingly 
drawn to other interests.  Nonetheless, many of the League’s most prominent members and 
allies, including Gilbert Roe, Harry Weinberger, and Schroeder, supplied the fledgling NCLB 
with crucial materials and assistance. 
103
 
  In 1917, as Baldwin and the AUAM leadership 
were casting about for a solution to the wartime repression of radical dissenters, the free speech 
fights were at the forefront of their minds.  
The Bureau for the Protection of Conscientious Objectors 
When Roger Nash Baldwin arrived in New York City in March 1917, Crystal Eastman 
was taking a hiatus from the AUAM.  She was convalescing after a difficult pregnancy that led 
                                                          
100 There were, however, marked boundaries of respectability.  Christine Stansell notes that progressive free speech 
sympathizers were alienated by the bohemian slippage from free speech to free love. Stansell, American Moderns, 
79–80. 
101 Theodore Schroeder, “On Suppressing the Advocacy of Crime,” Mother Earth 1 (January 1907), 16.   
102 Rabban, Forgotten Years, 309. 
103 Quoted in Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 173. 
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to chronic kidney disease, and she was unable to keep up with her organizational duties.  
Baldwin seemed an ideal substitute. Like Eastman’s, his early career involved domestic policy; 
he had run a settlement house and worked to reform the St. Louis criminal courts, and he had 
advocated a social science approach to legal problems.  
Baldwin was born in 1884 to an affluent family of New England reformers.  After an 
uneventful and rather indulgent childhood in Wellesley, Massachusetts, he matriculated at 
Harvard, where he excelled socially if not academically. After graduation, he met with his 
father’s attorney to solicit some career advice. The future Supreme Court justice and prominent 
progressive, Louis Brandeis, encouraged the young Baldwin to pursue public service. He also 
urged him to start his career where Brandeis had started his own: in St. Louis, Missouri.  
Baldwin heeded Brandeis’s recommendation.  For the next ten years he devoted himself 
to progressive reform in St. Louis. He was invited to establish a department of sociology at 
Washington University, despite never having taken a course in the new discipline (he did enroll 
in a summer course after graduating and before moving to St. Louis), and he built a strong 
foundation before resigning from that position in the summer of 1909.  At the same time, he 
headed a settlement house founded by the St. Louis Ethical Society.  He quickly became active 
in municipal reforms, and he helped establish the St. Louis Committee for Social Service Among 
Colored People, the city’s first interracial organization.104 In 1907, he became the first chief 
probation officer for the juvenile court of St. Louis, and he was a founder and secretary of the 
National Probation Officers Association.  He soon became an authority on juvenile justice and 
authored a famous textbook on the subject.105
                                                          
104 On Baldwin’s early life, see Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 1–30.  
  Within a few years, he was heavily involved in 
105 Despite their antipathy to Lochner-era constitutionalism, Pound and the Progressives never altogether eschewed 
the judicial form. As Michael Willrich and Jonathan Simon have argued, the juvenile court movement was a 
thoroughly Progressive program that grew directly out of sociological jurisprudence. Michael Willrich, City of 
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the Council of Social Agencies and the Civic League, which he would later head.  He helped 
write Missouri’s first civil service regulations, became legal guardian of two orphan boys, and 
beginning in 1910 served as president of the State Conference for Social Welfare. He became 
friendly with the prominent national social workers who would attract him to the AUAM, like 
Jane Addams, Paul Kellogg, and Lillian Wald.  He was, in short, the consummate progressive: 
committed to the existing political and economic systems but determined to help them run as 
fairly and smoothly as possible.  
During his time in St. Louis, two matters stand out as a prelude to Baldwin’s future 
career. In 1909, Baldwin began a lifetime correspondence with Emma Goldman, who had met 
Baldwin during speaking engagements in St. Louis. Baldwin declined Goldman’s first request of 
him—to secure the Ethical Society’s Self-Cultural Hall for a public address—because he thought 
it would alienate donors.  The following year, however, he assisted in finding a venue for her 
after Washington University denied her access to campus.  Baldwin was dismissive of socialists 
and labor leaders, but anarchism piqued his interest. Years later, he explained that he was 
sympathetic to “their goal of a society with a minimum of compulsion, a maximum of individual 
freedom and of voluntary association, and the abolition of exploitation and poverty.”106
Equally important, Baldwin’s involvement in a campaign to revise St. Louis’s city charter 
taught him the pitfalls of progressive reform.  The new charter, passed in 1914 due largely to 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jonathan 
Simon, “Visions of Self-Control: Fashioning a Liberal Approach to Crime and Punishment in the Twentieth 
Century,” in Looking Back at Law’s Century, ed. Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth, and Robert A. Kagan (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 109–50.  What the Progressives rejected was not law per se, but a particular style of 
common law legalism (as well as a certain constitutional understanding)—what Morton Horwitz has called classical 
legal thought—which denied law’s political underpinnings and understood all litigants as equal and autonomous 
legal actors.  Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). The two approaches grew out of fundamentally different conceptions 
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106 Quoted in Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 31.  
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Baldwin’s activities for the Civic League, instituted the initiative, referendum and recall, as well 
as municipal ownership of public utilities and a smaller city council.  Soon after it was enacted, 
voters introduced an initiative to mandate segregated housing.  Despite Baldwin’s best efforts, 
working in conjunction with the NAACP, the measure passed by overwhelming margins.  
For the first time, Baldwin was wrestling with the basic tension between majoritarian 
democracy and minority rights that would dominate the rest of his professional life. On behalf of 
the Civic League, he participated in a federal test case challenging the constitutionality of the 
ordinance.  The district court granted a temporary injunction and made it permanent after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Buchanan v. Warley,107 which invalidated a Louisville, Kentucky 
ordinance on constitutional grounds.  Ironically, the basis for the decision was the very provision 
that progressive reformers so despised—the ordinance, held the unanimous Court (including the 
newly appointed Justice Brandeis), was a violation of the seller’s Fourteenth Amendment right to 
dispose of his private property in a manner of his choosing.108  Baldwin was clearly troubled by 
this turn of events, and he assured local citizens that “in the long run the control of legislation by 
the whole people is best for all of us, white and colored.” He confidently concluded that “a vote 
of the people” would produce the right result “on almost any other question but one involving 
race prejudice.”109
By mid-decade, Baldwin had begun to flirt with a more radical approach to social ills. He 
was reading the Masses, and he was sufficiently impressed by interactions with visiting 
  As he would shortly discover, however, popular majorities were liable to get 
it wrong far more often than that.  
                                                          
107 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
108 On the implications of Buchanan, see Richard A. Epstein, “Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the ‘Progressive Era,’” Vanderbilt Law Review 51 (May 1998): 787–96; David E. 
Bernstein, “Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective,” Vanderbilt Law 
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Wobblies to spearhead a new project to open municipal lodging and a soup kitchen in St. 
Louis.110 When the Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations came out in 1915, Baldwin 
wrote to Frank Walsh, whom he had befriended through his work on juvenile justice.  He told 
Walsh that the report would “do more to educate public opinion to the truth of existing 
conditions than any other one document in existence.”111
His new awareness of industrial conflict predisposed Baldwin to the anti-militarism of the 
AUAM.  Like many of its members, he was persuaded that economic interests were largely 
responsible for the war.  Without the profit motive, American industry would be far less invested 
in militarism.
 He was especially impressed by the 
testimony of Theodore Schroeder with respect to the suppression of workers’ speech.  
112
As the death toll in Europe steadily rose, the cost of capitalistic greed seemed to Baldwin 
increasingly unjustifiable.  The leaders of the AUAM first approached Baldwin in 1915, when 
they invited him to become the organization’s secretary.  Although he rejected the offer, he did 
take charge of the local St. Louis branch.  As war loomed closer, however, Baldwin rightly 
sensed that local reform work would surrender the stage to national activity. When he received a 
telegram in March 1917 asking him to take over Eastman’s duties, he packed his bags and left 
for New York.
 Significantly, one of the AUAM’s first initiatives was a call for public 
ownership of munitions factories. The government, it reasoned, would be less prone to economic 
incentives than the capitalists.   
113
Baldwin arrived at the AUAM when the organization’s mission was most in flux.  When 
it became clear that a draft was inevitable, he organized efforts to persuade President Wilson to 
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include a provision for conscientious objectors in the Selective Service Act.  Norman Thomas 
wrote an article, which was representative of the AUAM’s position, explaining that objectors 
ought to be classified according to their attitudes toward service—that is, whether a given 
objector was willing to provide non-combatant service or no service at all—rather than by 
motivation, be it religious, economic, or anything else.114 Thomas met with Newton D. Baker, 
Wilson’s secretary of war, who courteously requested a memorandum explaining the AUAM’s 
position.115
In the end, at Baker’s urging, the Selective Service Act included an exemption from 
combatant service for clergy and for members of well-recognized religious sects, like the 
Mennonites, opposed to participation in war. When it came to so-called “political objectors,” 
Baker would not budge, though he promised the AUAM administrative moderation.
  Baldwin followed up with a defense of those objectors, like Socialists and German 
Americans, who were not unequivocally opposed to violence but were unwilling to serve in the 
present war.   
116
                                                          
114 On the Protestant roots of Thomas’s commitment to individual conscience, see Louisa Thomas, Conscience: Two 
Soldiers, Two Pacifists, One Family: A Test of Will and Faith in World War I (London: Penguin Press, in press), 
163–78. 
  Congress 
overwhelmingly rejected amendments proposed by Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette and 
Colorado Representative Edward Keating to broaden the class of objectors.  While the bills were 
in conference, Baldwin tried again, citing British legislation that made the distinction he 
115 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 16.  
116 Ibid., 17–18. Baldwin sent a telegram to Jane Addams advising her, the “amendment providing for conscientious 
objectors will be defeated unless Baker specifically requests its inclusion.” Telegram from Roger Baldwin to Jane 
Addams, 27 April 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 16.  At Baldwin’s request, Addams sent Baker a telegram urging 
him to act.  Baker told Addams that a legislative exemption was unlikely, though he promised to express her view to 
the Conference Committee.  The alternative he proposed was administrative moderation of the law.  Jane Addams to 
Roger Baldwin, 5 May 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 16, p. 254. 
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recommended. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful, and on May 18 Congress easily passed 
the Wilson administration’s proposed bill.117
The next day, Baldwin convened a conference of pacifists to present his proposal for a 
“Bureau for Conscientious Objectors.” With their wholehearted support, he organized the new 
Bureau within the AUAM and agreed to serve as its director.  Its board attracted radical pacifists 
like Quaker activist L. Hollingsworth Wood, Norman Thomas, socialist union organizer Joseph 
D. Cannon, and Scott Nearing, a radical economist and activist who would shortly join the 
Socialist Party and found the People’s Council of America for Democracy and Peace. Baldwin 
also recruited Quaker attorney Edmund Evans, social worker Alice Lewisohn, and Oswald 
Garrison Villard.  The new bureau resolved to do whatever possible to assist inductees whose 
anti-war commitments prevented them from registering for the draft.   
  
Although there was significant enthusiasm for the new bureau, some of the most 
established AUAM members, including Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg, objected to the extension 
of the organization’s activity.  Lewisohn supported the endeavor but thought it better to establish 
an independent body, formally distinct from the AUAM.  The social workers’ concerns about the 
organization’s good will and respectability were well founded.  Within a few days, one AUAM 
member announced that the organization’s popularity had “hit bedrock.”118
                                                          
117 Selective Service Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76 (1917). The act provided for three kinds of exemptions: absolute 
exemption for certain government officials, ministers, divinity students, and persons already in the military; non-
combatant for members of well-recognized religious sects forbidding participation in war; and a large class who 
could be exempted by the president or assigned to “partial military service.” The law set up local and district boards 
to hear claims and appeals. 
  On June 4 a majority 
of the directing committee voted to endorse Baldwin’s Bureau.  The vote, however, did not settle 
the matter, and Wald and Kellogg were considering whether to resign from the organization they 
had founded.   
118 C. T. Hale to the Members of the Executive Committee, 6 May 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 16, p. 284. 
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The loss of Wald and Kellogg was bound to be a significant blow to the AUAM, and 
Eastman was determined to prevent it.  In a letter to the board, she recounted the concerns Wald 
and Kellogg had conveyed to her and did her best to address them.  Wald felt that the Bureau’s 
new ventures “must inevitably lead to a radical change in the policy of the Union” and would 
jeopardize the AUAM’s friendly relationship with the administration.  In fact, she thought it 
consigned the AUAM to “drift into being a party of opposition to the government.”119  Eastman 
responded that the bureau’s position was liberal, not “extreme radical,” and that the President’s 
appointments to the War Department betokened a commitment to prudent enforcement of the 
Conscription Act.120  Her own progressive confidence convinced her that administrative 
insulation and bureaucratic expertise would lead to the just execution of the law; she believed 
that the bureau could in fact serve to help the President execute his plan of lenience and 
deference to individual conscience.121 Meanwhile, Kellogg worried that “an aggressive policy 
against prosecution of the war” was incompatible with “an aggressive policy for settling it 
through negotiation and organizing the world for democracy.”122
                                                          
119 Crystal Eastman to the Executive Committee, 14 June 1917, AUAM Papers, reel 10-1 (quoting Lillian Wald).  
  Eastman acknowledged that a 
campaign against all recruitment would undermine the Union’s influence but denied that 
assistance to conscientious objectors was inconsistent with support for the administration’s goals. 
Indeed, she countered that Republican opposition to the administration was more obstructionist 
than the AUAM’s own policy. The Bureau’s ambition, she concluded, was the same as 
Kellogg’s: “to enlist the rank and file of the people, who make for progressivism the country 
120 In particular, Eastman mentioned Newton Baker, Frederick Keppel, and Walter Lippmann. Ibid. 
121 Eastman acknowledged her feeling that if it became clear that Wilson’s underlying intentions were militaristic, 
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over, in a movement for a civil solution of this world-wide conflict and fire them with a vision of 
the beginnings of the U.S. of the World.”123
Despite her strong support for the defense of conscientious objectors, Eastman 
acknowledged that if public identification of that work with the AUAM were too complete, the 
Union might lose its efficacy as an organization “to lead the liberal sentiment for peace.” She 
therefore proposed a structural reorganization, “making one legal bureau for the maintenance of 
fundamental rights in war time—free press, free speech, freedom of assembly, and liberty of 
conscience.”
 
124
It is worth pausing to consider why Wald and Kellogg objected to the organization’s 
defense of conscientious objectors.  At first blush, the new policy would appear to flow directly 
from the AUAM’s opposition to war.  For committed progressives, however, the purported right 
to withhold service to one’s country at wartime was dubious.  In defending objectors, the AUAM 
embraced a concept of “liberty of conscience”—and conscience, they insisted, “is nothing if it is 
not individual”—as an “Anglo-Saxon tradition for which our ancestors fought and died.”
  Eastman’s plan entailed a change in nomenclature.  Rather than a Conscientious 
Objectors’ Bureau, which suggested opposition to the administration’s war policy, she suggested 
a “Bureau for the Maintenance of Civil Liberties.”  The reorganization also involved a shift in 
the bureau’s emphasis: the new bureau would protect conscientious objectors, but it would 
situate that project within a broader and more established commitment to civil liberties.  This 
move temporarily appeased the dissenters, and the new bureau was formally announced on July 
2, 1917.   
125
                                                          
123 Ibid.  
  For 
the progressives, however, democratic citizenship was a collective endeavor, and society could 
124 Ibid. 
125 American Union Against Militarism, Conscription and the Conscientious Objector to War, May 1917, AUAM 
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not afford to countenance the selfish exercise of individual rights. As theologian Samuel Zane 
Batten explained matters, “True liberty means the voluntary sacrifice of self for the common 
life.”126 This outlook made conscientious objection to war a difficult proposition to defend.  The 
best the AUAM could do was to counsel compliance with the law.  Over the opposition of 
several members, it advised objectors to register and to specify their grounds for requesting 
exemption. “Obedience to law, to the utmost limit of conscience,” it concluded somewhat 
equivocally, “is the basis of good citizenship.”127 The bureau also claimed that “liberty of 
conscience” was a means toward “social progress,” but it never had much luck in explaining 
how.128
Although the AUAM’s efforts on behalf of conscientious objectors were a core element 
of the organization’s activity throughout the war, their feasibility was limited from the outset.  At 
first, Baldwin hoped to convince the War Department to construe the conscientious objector 
clause to include political objectors, and he had reason to believe that War Department officials 
might be receptive to his advice.   Baldwin told Frederick Keppel—a past dean of Columbia 
College, unofficial adviser to the Secretary of War, and friend of L. Hollingsworth Wood’s
 
129—
that the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau would consult with the Department on all matters.  
Keppel, for his part, assured Baldwin that the Department appreciated the AUAM’s “spirit of 
cooperation.”130
                                                          
126 Quoted in Eisanach, Lost Promise of Progressivism, 189.  
  And Baker himself acknowledged Baldwin’s “thoughtful consideration” and 
127 AUAM Statement, 23 May 1917, AUAM Papers, reel 10-1. 
128 Norman Thomas and Roger Baldwin to the Conference Committee on the Army Bill, 1 May 1917, ACLU 
Papers, reel 3, vol. 16, p. 263.  
129 He was subsequently named Third Assistant Secretary of War.  In congratulating him on his appointment, 
Baldwin thanked him for his “unfailing tolerance and understanding.” Roger Baldwin to Frederick Keppel, 8 April 
1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. 
130 Frederick Keppel to Roger Baldwin, 24 May 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 47. 
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promised to give weight to his suggestions when formulating the Department’s policy.131  By 
fall, however, it seemed clear that no official accommodation would be made.132
What was left for the AUAM was to see that individual cantonments treated objectors 
humanely.  Baker’s policy left immense discretion to the camp commanders, some of whom 
were torturing objectors and allowing other inductees to beat them.  Baldwin positioned the 
Bureau as a watchdog group that would communicate with objectors and report abusive 
treatment to the War Department.  In this endeavor too he was eventually stymied.  Still, despite 
early assurances to the contrary, Baldwin proved markedly unwilling to challenge the War 
Department head on.  
  Although 
Baker’s September instructions to camp commanders did not explicitly distinguish between 
religious and nonreligious objectors—for the time being, all were to be segregated and put to 
work—Baker was adamant that recognition of so-called political objectors would be unlawful 
and unwise.   
A September letter to Felix Frankfurter, then special assistant to the Secretary of War, 
captures Baldwin’s basic strategy.133
                                                          
131 Newton Baker to Roger Baldwin, 7 July 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. Baldwin’s proposed solution was to 
confine objectors who refused all service to detention for the duration of the war; those men willing to accept non-
combatant service should be assigned to such service without courtmartial. Roger Baldwin to Newton Baker, 15 July 
1917, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. It was crucial to Baldwin’s approach that the War Department publicize 
whatever policy it adopted in order to “promote a more orderly solution of the problem.” 
 Baldwin emphasized the enthusiasm for cooperation on the 
part of the Civil Liberties Bureau and his own fear that “the rumors that are coming from the 
cantonments [would] give rise to an unfortunate propaganda from several points in the country.” 
In other words, the NCLB would not itself generate publicity on behalf of the objectors, nor 
132 See Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 31–32. Baldwin and his allies credited the War Department with 
liberal intentions and disingenuously blamed the “narrow and arbitrary definition of conscience in the Selective 
Service Act.” National Civil Liberties Bureau, Confidential Bulletin on the Conscientious Objector, 16 January 
1918, AUAM Papers, reel 10-1.  
133 Roger Baldwin to Felix Frankfurter, 29 September 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. 
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would it openly criticize the camps for known abuses.134 Rather, Baldwin raised the specter of 
damaging propaganda as an incentive to temper abuses and formulate a more generous policy.  
The War Department, in turn, agreed to monitor enforcement of the policy and ensure its liberal 
execution.135  Baldwin believed his approach would yield results. “We are getting much more 
liberal treatment from the War Department,” he wrote, “than we could possibly expect by 
throwing the issue into the public press, and into the hands of the patriotic organizations who are 
anxious to shoot or export all the objectors.”136
 This plan was not uniformly popular with Baldwin’s allies. In fact, the threat of imminent 
agitation was real, and Baldwin was constantly holding his more radical correspondents at bay. 
In the same September letter, he told Frankfurter: “I have been putting off all inquirers with my 
confident assertion that the War Department had the matter well in hand, and would doubtless 
arrive at some conclusion in a few days. We cannot hold out against that pressure very much 
longer.”
 
137 Impending loss of control became a permanent state of affairs.  Baldwin knew that 
cruel punishments, including manacling and solitary confinement, were rampant in the 
cantonments.138
                                                          
134 See, e.g., Roger Baldwin to Gilson Gardner, 1 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 18 (“Secretary Baker 
has made a special request of us not to give publicity to the matter of the conscientious objector now, for the sake of 
an orderly solution of the whole matter. The War Department is handling the problem so liberally and 
sympathetically, even though there are some cases of brutality, that we are of course complying with that request. 
Therefore, I will have to hold up the story I had hoped to send you last week.”). 
  Matters worsened when reports emerged that the army was court-martialing 
135 E.g., Secretary of War to Roger Baldwin, October 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 47. 
136 Roger Baldwin to John Codman, 19 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25. 
137 Roger Baldwin to Felix Frankfurter, 29 September 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. 
138 Gradually, Baldwin began to lose patience. Roger Baldwin to Newton Baker, 8 November 1917, ACLU Papers, 
reel 2, vol. 15 (“It is perfectly obvious from the reports we are getting that there continues to be a serious 
misunderstanding of your orders in regard to conscientious objectors.”).  Roger Baldwin to Newton Baker, 22 
November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15 (“The reports which we have been getting about the treatment of 
conscientious objectors at various cantonments show an alarming increase in the number of cases of brutality and 
injustice.”). 
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political objectors and meting out excessive sentences.139  Baker did not condone the practice but 
continued to dodge Baldwin’s requests for investigation and clarification.140
By March 1918, with no evident resolution in sight, Baldwin’s decision to tolerate the 
situation quietly seemed naïve, if not hypocritical.  Lenetta Cooper of the American Liberty 
Defense League, based in Chicago, had complied with Baldwin’s earlier requests to refrain from 
publicity.  Now she accused his organization of failure and, worse, of abandoning its 
constituency. After ten months of work, the conscientious objector was “still considered a 
slacker by practically every one.”
   
141 She reminded Baldwin that her own group had wanted “to 
appeal to the people to demand a liberal solution of the problem”; he had begged them not to act, 
claiming that publicity would precipitate a broad-based attack on pacifists by the press and 
would undercut their aims.142  Cooper acknowledged that popular mobilization would have been 
slow and open criticism of Baker futile, but she felt that behind-the-scenes negotiations stood no 
chance of success without broad popular support. Even then, Baldwin stood his ground: “I have 
felt right along that in the uncertainty of a definite policy by the government, the best thing we 
could do was just to bide our time, and make the whole issue clear when the government’s policy 
is announced. That I understand from advices received today will be in the very near future.”143
Sure enough, less than two weeks later President Wilson issued an executive order 
permitting objectors to elect non-combatant service. For a moment, Baldwin felt vindicated.
  
144
                                                          
139 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 33. One objector was sentenced to death, but his sentence was 
subsequently commuted.  
  
140 Johnson reports that a confidential War Department order, unknown to Baldwin, instructed commanders to treat 
those with “personal scruples against war . . . in the same manner as other ‘conscientious objectors.’”  Ibid., 33.  
141 Lenetta Cooper (American Liberty Defense League) to Roger Baldwin, 12 March 1918, reel 4, vol. 16. 
142 Ibid.; Roger Baldwin to Lenetta Cooper, 17 December 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 17. 
143 Roger Baldwin to Lenetta Cooper, 14 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 16. 
144 John Codman to Roger Baldwin, 27 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25, p. 22 (“If this is the result of 
your negotiations with the War Department, it certainly shows the wisdom of the policy which you have adopted of 
trusting to the Administration’s liberality rather than trying to force anything through publicity.”). In April 1918, the 
Adjutant General, on behalf of the Secretary of War, issued an order to all commanding officers that “no punitive 
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The new policy, however, proved subject to widespread abuse, and Baldwin’s initial enthusiasm 
quickly soured.145  Despite a series of clarifying orders from Baker, objectors who refused non-
combatant service out of absolutist convictions were worse off than before.146  A Board of 
Inquiry appointed by Baker to examine the sincerity of objectors, though initially promising, 
consistently declared political objectors “insincere.”147 Meanwhile, in the spring of 1918, official 
dealings with Baldwin and his organization (by then known as the National Civil Liberties 
Bureau) became a liability for the War Department.148  Military officials were critical of the 
NCLB’s attitude toward conscientious objectors, and the office of military intelligence launched 
an investigation.  Although the NCLB’s activity was eventually deemed lawful, War Department 
officials severed their ties with the group.149
Even then, Baldwin sought desperately to salvage the relationship.  In correspondence 
with Keppel, he emphasized that the NCLB was “acting wholly within the letter of the law and 
within the spirit of the Secretary’s policy.”
   
150 He professed the organization’s willingness “to 
discontinue any practices” that the War Department deemed objectionable.151
                                                                                                                                                                                           
hardship of any kind be imposed upon conscientious objectors who do not accept assignment to noncombatant 
service before their cases shall have been submitted to the Secretary of War.” H. G. Leonard to Commanding 
Generals of All Departments, 18 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15, p. 170.  
 Shut out of the 
inner circles of the War Department, Baldwin grew increasingly frustrated.  To the last, he 
145 In fact, Baldwin asked Keppel to suspend the order in lieu of its implementation. Telegram from Roger Baldwin 
to Frederick Keppel, 11 June 11 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15.  
146 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 35.  
147 Ibid., 39.  The AUAM was understandably optimistic about the selections. The three board members were Major 
Walter G. Kellogg for the army, Judge Julian M. Mack (an AUAM supporter before the war), and Columbia dean 
Harlan F. Stone.   
148 Frederick Keppel to Roger Baldwin, 26 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15 (“We are getting into an 
embarrassing situation through the belief of many of the Secretary’s military associates that the activities of the 
National Civil Liberties Bureau are of a character which will shortly bring that organization into direct conflict with 
the Government.”).  
149 Frederick Keppel to Roger Baldwin, 19 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. 
150 Roger Baldwin to Nicholas Biddle, 8 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15, p 316–17. 
151 Roger Baldwin to Nicholas Biddle, 8 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15; Roger Baldwin to Frederick 
Keppel, 13 March 1918, ACLU papers, reel 2, vol. 15;  Roger Baldwin to Frederick Keppel, 1 March 1918, ACLU 
Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. 
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assured the War Department that he stood ready “now, as at any time, to discontinue efforts 
which the Secretary of War may not think to be helpful”—lest the breakdown in communication 
“throw the whole matter into the field of public controversy and . . . undo much of the quiet and 
effective work toward a satisfactory solution.”152
In the end, however, the NCLB’s demands with respect to conscientious objectors 
deviated too fundamentally from the government’s position.  Baker was committed to the fair 
and humane treatment of prisoners in the military and elsewhere, and he was genuinely 
concerned by reports of discrepancies and injustices in the execution of War Department policies 
by individual commanders.  The NCLB quickly picked up on these cues, and the repressive 
potential of administrative discretion would become a central theme of the civil liberties 
campaign.  More than anything else, though, the organization’s leadership objected to the War 
Department’s failure to recognize those objectors who might “take part in some wars, as for 
example social revolutions.”
  
153 Conscience, they explained in a September 1918 letter, is a 
purely individual matter.  Whether the political objectors were correct was irrelevant; the 
important point was that they were sincere. Recognition of “the value of the individual” was 
what differentiated American democracy from the “Prussian doctrine of the total subordination 
of the individual to the state.”154
                                                          
152 Roger Baldwin to Col. R. VanDeman, Military Intelligence Branch, War Department, 17 August 1918, ACLU 
Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. 
  Keppel, answering for the War Department, was dismissive. 
“To admit such an exemption as that for which you contend,” he argued, “would be to admit the 
right of every man to set himself up as judge of the wisdom of our Government in engaging in 
153 L. Hollingsworth Wood, Norman Thomas, John Haynes Holmes, and John Lovejoy Elliott to Newton Baker, 14 
September 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 47; see also Roger Baldwin to Newton Baker, 30 June 1917, ACLU 
Papers, reel 2, vol. 15 (noting undue limitation of religious exemption). 
154 L. Hollingsworth Wood, Norman Thomas, John Haynes Holmes, and John Lovejoy Elliott to Newton Baker, 14 
September 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 47. The letter also touted the importance of “heretics” and other 
minorities to “sound social progress,” and it noted that the “minority of today may be the majority of tomorrow.” 
This argument was not spelled out, however, and was clearly a secondary point.  
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the present war; it would be to acknowledge that the Selective Service Law is binding upon the 
drafted man only so far as he sees fit to object it.” Such a theory was incompatible with 
progressive values. “What your proposal comes to,” Keppel concluded, “is the negation of law, 
of authority, of government when the individual is prepared to assert that these collide with his 
conscience.”155 Any concession to such arguments, Keppel insisted, would jeopardize the “safety 
of the State.”156
The Bureau’s particular concern for political objectors bears emphasis. Given the 
Bureau’s origins in the AUAM, the existing scholarship on civil liberties has assumed that its 
primary motivation was pacifist.  That is true in a sense.  The goal of the Conscientious 
Objectors’ Bureau was to provide support for individuals who were deeply opposed to war.  But 
religious objectors, who were expressly exempted under the Conscription Act, were of secondary 
concern.  From the outset, the Bureau’s constituency was a radical one: those objectors who were 
motivated by class sentiments to resist a capitalist war.  Labor radicalism was not an accident or 
byproduct of the wartime experience. It was the underlying purpose of the Union’s wartime 
activity. 
   
 
The Civil Liberties Bureau 
The Civil Liberties Bureau was more than a continuation of the Conscientious Objectors’ 
Bureau. It was a change in tack. In defending the rights of conscientious objectors, the AUAM 
had celebrated individual conscience, a negative right against state coercion.  Its reasoning 
                                                          
155 Frederick Keppel to L. Hollingsworth Wood, Norman Thomas, John Haynes Holmes, and John Lovejoy Elliott, 2 
October 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 47. 
156 Ibid. Although the letter was not actually written by Keppel, it evidently captured his attitude.  Frederick Keppel 
to L. Hollingsworth Wood, 9 October 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 47. See also Newton Baker to L. 
Hollingsworth Wood, 15 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 47 (“I make a sharp distinction in my mind between 
the men whose fundamental difficulty is the taking of human life, and the man who stands merely in political 
opposition to the program which our government is now carrying out.”).  
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sounded more like that of the Free Speech League than of the early ACLU.  In fact, it would be 
decades before the ACLU so directly took up the banner of personal freedom.  Free speech, as 
the AUAM would discover over the wartime years, was more easily reconcilable than 
conscientious objection to the progressive tropes of public welfare and social responsibility.  
Although there was no national clamoring for free speech in July 1917, moderates within 
the AUAM were right to regard the new body as more palatable than the Bureau for 
Conscientious Objectors that preceded it. As the free speech fights and the Commission on 
Industrial Relations had proven, there was a space for progressive discussion about the desirable 
parameters of free speech.  Baldwin sought to recruit pro-war attorneys and supporters who 
would buttress the Bureau’s credibility.157 One AUAM member thought it would be treasonous 
to maintain opposition to war once the majority, through its representatives in Congress, had 
spoken. “As units of democracy we are bound by the national decision,” he explained to Baldwin 
in the dominant progressive fashion.158 Baldwin responded that the best engine of peace was the 
“tremendous growth of the liberal and radical movement among the peoples of all the 
country.”159 And to facilitate this new flowering of radical sentiment, “it is necessary that public 
discussion should be unfettered.”  In an August letter to the New York Tribune, the Bureau 
assured readers that “in a war for democracy there is no more patriotic duty than to keep 
democracy alive at home.”160  The best way to promote the public interest was to foster open 
discussion even for those with whom one disagreed.161
                                                          
157 E.g., Roger Baldwin to Austin Lewis, July 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 39; Roger Baldwin to William 
Woerner, 6 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 39. 
 
158 Philip Willett to Roger Baldwin, 21 August 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 35. 
159 Roger Baldwin to Philip Willett, 22 August 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 35 
160 Civil Liberties Bureau to the Editor of the New York Tribune, 28 August 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 18. 
161 Charles Eldwood, Professor of Sociology at the University of Missouri, was typical of this constituency.  He 
agreed to endorse a meeting on behalf of civil liberties if its goal was “to secure free and adequate public discussion 
of every public policy before a decision is reached on that policy, so that the decision shall represent the 
untrammeled expression of rational public opinion.”  Charles Ellwood to Roger Baldwin, 8 January 1918, ACLU 
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No doubt part of the impetus for the AUAM’s approach was the congressional and public 
debate over the Espionage Act, passed on June 15.  Adopted at Wilson’s prompting, the statute 
made it unlawful to interfere with the recruitment of troops or to disclose information damaging 
to the military effort.  Violations of the Act were punishable by twenty years’ imprisonment and 
a fine of ten thousand dollars.  A broad interpretation of the statute’s prohibitions led to two 
thousand prosecutions, over a thousand convictions, and the banning of one hundred publications 
from the mails.162
The vast majority of prosecutions arose under title 1, section 3—a section, ironically, that 
garnered little attention during debate over the bill because its repressive applications were not 
readily apparent.
   
163  In assessing whether targeted speech violated the Espionage Act, judges 
applied the common law “bad tendency” test, according to which speech was punishable if it 
tended to produce unlawful consequences, such as draft evasion.  Because actors intend the 
natural and usual consequences of their acts, reasoned the courts, speech is punishable if it tends 
to incite illegal action.  Nearly all anti-government speech was thus prone to prosecution, 
regardless of whether the speaker advocated illegal conduct, on the theory that an inductee was 
more likely to evade the draft if he believed the war to be unjust.  Meanwhile, in the hysteria of 
World War I the jury system was no help to defendants.  The only way for jurors to prove their 
loyalty was to convict.164
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Papers, reel 1, vol. 3.  See also Angell, Why Freedom Matters (“By suppressing the free dissemination of unpopular 
ideas, we render ourselves incapable of governing ourselves to our own advantage and we shall perpetuate that 
condition of helplessness and slavery for the mass which all our history so far has shown.”).  
  Defendants were sentenced to prison for an immense range of 
offenses, from expressing sympathy for the Kaiser to stray remarks about the inadequacies of the 
162 Murphy, Origin of Civil Liberties, 80.  
163 Cf. Walter Nelles, Seeing Red: Civil Liberty and Law in the Period Following the War (New York: American 
Civil Liberties Union, 1920) (“There was never any serious question of the constitutional validity of the Espionage 
Law as originally enacted.”). 
164 Murphy, Origin of Civil Liberties.  
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war effort. Most of the notable wartime defendants—including Charles Schenck,165 Jacob 
Abrams,166 and Eugene V. Debs167
It was the postal provision of the Espionage Act, however, that first provoked progressive 
criticism.  That section declared nonmailable any communication that violated the Act or 
advocated resistance to any law of the United States.  The post office was given unilateral 
authority to determine which materials qualified, and Postmaster General Albert Burleson, along 
with the department’s solicitor, William H. Lamar, proved willing and enthusiastic censors.
—were indicted under this section.  
168
More than any other wartime law, the postal censorship provision of the Espionage Act—
supplemented in October by the Trading with the Enemy Act, which gave the President and the 
postmaster even more censorship power—raised the specter of administrative discretion as a 
threat to democratic values.
  
Their determinations forced many leftist and antiwar publications to shut down.   
169  When Baldwin asked Gilbert Roe whether the statute was likely 
to have a “direct bearing” upon the rights of free speech, press, and assemblage,170 Roe replied 
that the nonmailability provision “establishe[d] a censorship of the worst kind.”  So much power 
in the hands of unaccountable bureaucrats, he feared, would be disastrous for American 
freedoms.171
                                                          
165 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  
 This view was shared by many figures with closer ties to the administration.  Frank 
166 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
167 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
168 See Murphy, Origin of Civil Liberties, 98–103; Harry Scheiber, The Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960).  
169 The Trading with the Enemy Act gave the president authority over international communications; foreign 
language newspapers were required to submit literal translations of news articles to the president, who delegated to 
Burleson his authority to monitor and approve them.  The NCLB sent a telegram to President Wilson to protest the 
press censorship provision of the Trading with the Enemy Act, which it claimed would make “possible the 
practicable wiping out of a free press in the United States and completely set[] aside established constitutional 
rights.” Telegram from NCLB to Woodrow Wilson, 26 September 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 26.  
170 Roger Baldwin to Gilbert E. Roe, 28 June 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 26. 
171 Gilbert Roe to Roger Baldwin, 30 June 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 26, p. 91. Foreshadowing the ACLU’s 
sponsorship of Senator Cutting’s customs censorship provision a decade later, Roe told Baldwin “the law should be 
amended so as to provide that there must be first a judicial determination of the nonmailable character of the matter, 
before the matter is excluded from the mails.” Ibid. 
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Walsh, no stranger to administrative power, decried the postmaster’s “ultra-bureaucratic method” 
for restricting the circulation of adverse views.172
In the months after passage of the Espionage act, the Department of Justice and the 
federal courts would adopt an expansive interpretation of its scope.  While the bill was under 
consideration, however, some members of Congress expressed considerable awareness of the 
bill’s implications for free speech.
  Postal censorship was not the only 
development to push the limits of progressive confidence in bureaucratic expertise. World War I 
precipitated an unprecedented expansion of national power, and the dark side of state-building 
would be the leitmotif of the NCLB’s wartime civil liberties program.  Most progressives 
accepted that the intricacies of modern life made administrative expansion necessary, even 
desirable—but the NCLB could plausibly argue that new growth required new accountability.   
173  The limits they suggested, on the whole, were policy-
oriented rather than constitutional, but they evinced discomfort with the dangers of censorship 
and administration discretion.174
More concretely, the organization of the CLB was almost certainly influenced by 
discussions between Baldwin and Harry Weinberger, an attorney who worked closely with the 
Free Speech League and would soon represent the defendant in Abrams v. United States.
  When the Act was passed without addressing those concerns, 
an organization committed to ensuring maximum freedom within the scope of the law may have 
seemed both essential and popularly defensible. 
175
                                                          
172 Quoted in Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 59.  
  
Weinberger was a single-taxer as well as a radical individualist who opposed all state 
interference with personal liberties.  He had fought against compulsory vaccination in the early 
173 Congress defeated or amended several particularly pernicious provisions—including a section that would have 
given the president tremendous powers of censorship—despite Wilson’s pleas. 
174 Geoffrey R. Stone, “The Origins of the Bad Tendency Test: Free Speech in Wartime,” Supreme Court Review 
(2002): 411–53; Rabban, Forgotten Years, 250–55. 
175 Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech (New York: Viking, 
1987), 75–78.  
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1910s, and he considered the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the practice to be on a par 
with Dred Scott.176
At the outbreak of the war, Weinberger had sensed a need for a new organization to 
protect civil liberties. In April 1917, he shared with Roger Baldwin his idea for an American 
Legal Defense League that would “fight all cases in the United States where free speech, free 
press or the right peaceably to assemble or to petition the government is invaded.”
  He was a stalwart opponent of the draft on grounds of individual conscience.  
When Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were indicted under the Selective Service Act in 
June, he agreed to defend them.  He argued unsuccessfully that conscription constituted 
involuntary servitude under the 13th Amendment and that the provision for religious exemption 
was an unconstitutional infringement on religious liberty. 
177  Baldwin 
had already expressed interest in civil liberties.  On April 14, less than two weeks after the 
declaration of war, he had begun soliciting prominent signatories to a request for an official 
statement of Wilson’s “views on free speech, free press and assemblage during the war.”178
                                                          
176 Ibid., 78.  
  But 
he had no concrete program for vindicating those freedoms.  Weinberger suggested that the 
AUAM could assist him with his plan for a civil liberties organization by referring cases to him 
through its local branches, and he proposed a constitutional test case of the Conscription Act in 
the event of its passage. He also offered his opinions on the constitutional status of dissenting 
speech for inclusion in an AUAM pamphlet.  Weinberger advised Baldwin that open 
disagreement with government and military practices, including the publication and distribution 
of pamphlets on the war, was protected by the First Amendment, and he was adamant that “any 
177 Harry Weinberger to Roger Baldwin, 28 April 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 35. 
178 Quoted in Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 52.  
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Espionage Bill Congress may pass cannot repeal the United States Constitution.”179  By May, he 
was outraged at the Administration’s efforts to quash public opposition to military bills and 
concluded “that we must re-educate the people, that they have the right to discuss and the right to 
oppose conscription and ask for its repeal.”180  Advocacy of a change in law, he insisted, could 
not qualify as treasonable or seditious.181
At first, Baldwin was supportive of Weinberger’s organizational ambitions.  A pamphlet 
issued in May by the Bureau’s short-lived Committee on Constitutional Rights did precisely 
what Weinberger advised.  It declared that “constitutional rights are being seriously invaded 
throughout the United States under pressure of war,” blaming the abuse on “petty officials who 
would compel conformity.”
   
182 And it referred victims of this unconstitutional abuse to the 
American Legal Defense League.183
                                                          
179 Harry Weinberger to Roger Baldwin, 29 April 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 35, p. 188. Baldwin was more 
cautious.  He told Weinberger, “We will include your statement about the spy bill in relation to constitutional rights, 
but I am sure our friends will want a more explicit statement of the practical effects of this legislation later. Most of 
them don’t want to go to jail or to suffer an expensive trial and they want advice as to how far they can go without 
getting into trouble with the Federal authorities.” Roger Baldwin to Harry Weinberger, 3 May 1918, ACLU Papers, 
reel 5, vol. 35, p. 190. 
 In a move he would repeat often during his ACLU career, 
however, Baldwin subsequently maneuvered to protect and expand his own organization’s turf.  
At a May 11 meeting, Weinberger agreed that all cases involving conscientious objectors would 
be left to the Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau—a course that seemed advisable since much of 
Weinberger’s advisory committee was interested only in the rights of speech, press, and 
assembly.  But Baldwin also secured a commitment that the American Legal Defense League 
180 Harry Weinberger to Joy Young (AUAM), 2 May 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 35, p. 189. 
181 Harry Weinberger to Roger Baldwin, 8 May 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 35, p. 192. 
182 American Union Against Militarism, Constitutional Rights in War Time (New York: American Union Against 
Militarism, May 1917), available in ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43.  The committee members were Amos Pinchot, 
Max Eastman, Agnes Leach, Stephen Wise, Herbert Bigelow, Scott Nearing, and William Cochran. With respect to 
the pending Espionage Act, the committee advised that “much will depend on how such war-time legislation is 
administered. The administration at Washington professes a desire to be liberal, and it is to be hoped that the federal 
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would leave any legal test of the Conscription or Espionage Act to the AUAM.184  In June, he 
went further. He acknowledged in a letter that Weinberger “must have felt in the uncertainty of 
the past few weeks, that the American Union was very poorly standing by you and the American 
Legal Defense League.”185 Blaming the AUAM’s internal debate for the change in policy and 
circumstances, he reneged on an earlier promise of financial assistance. More important, he told 
Weinberger: “We have decided now to take hold of the work of organizing legal defense 
throughout the country under a bureau of the Union, and including conscientious objectors.”186  
The new Civil Liberties Bureau swallowed the American Legal Defense League’s entire 
program.  Its goal, according to the press release announcing its formation, was to unite the 
various groups and individuals committed to maintaining “constitutional liberties” in wartime 
against government interference.187 In a second edition of the pamphlet on constitutional rights, 
published in July, all references to the American Legal Defense League were gone.188
To be sure, the Civil Liberties Bureau did not entirely abandon the AUAM’s standard 
tactics. When the CLB was first announced, Baldwin emphasized that the board expected to 
cooperate closely with federal officials in preserving constitutional freedom.  Throughout the 
war, it would cultivate relationships with public officials and lean heavily on well-connected 
members—most notably John Nevin Sayre, the brother of President Wilson’s son-in-law.
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CLB’s first major initiative was characteristic of this approach. In mid-July, the CLB organized 
an emergency conference to address the Post Office’s suppression of seventeen radical 
publications.190  Once the attendees had reached consensus that immediate action against the 
Espionage Act was necessary, it was an easy matter to settle on a plan of action. The participants 
voted unanimously to send a delegation of lawyers, including Clarence Darrow and Frank 
Walsh, to discuss the matter with the President, the Postmaster General, and the Department of 
Justice.  Burleson, however, rebuffed their overtures; indeed, he refused even to issue guidelines 
or explanations of his censorship criteria.  If the publishers disagreed with his decisions, he said, 
they could take up the matter in court.191
That, of course, is precisely what the CLB resolved to do.  Over the coming months, the 
new bureau would try its hand at lobbying, propaganda, and grass-roots organizing in addition to 
negotiation.  Its initial focus, however, would be constitutional litigation, just as Weinberger had 
proposed.  In this endeavor, the CLB drew heavily on the experiences of the Free Speech 
League.  Weinberger’s plans for an independent wartime civil liberties body were themselves 
modeled on the older organization.  In addition, Theodore Schroeder sent background materials 
on free speech to the Bureau’s Lawyers Advisory Council early on.
 
192  He also provided Baldwin 
with a complete set of the League’s published pamphlets.193
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  Gilbert Roe was actively involved 
in the new organization and provided frequent legal advice.  Drawing on these resources, 
Baldwin formulated a plan of action.  The new bureau would operate nationally as a 
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clearinghouse for information and legal aid, providing assistance and legal representation to 
those individuals whose constitutional rights were violated.  Indeed, when the Civil Liberties 
Bureau took its name, it was invoking a tradition of legal aid bureaus, including the Bureau of 
Legal Defense with which it worked closely during the war.  Baldwin envisioned the CLB as a 
means of helping dissenters to “get their legal rights before the courts.”194
The choice to operate through the courts may seem a curious one for an organization 
steeped in a legal culture dominated by labor injunctions and Lochner-era constitutionalism. In 
later years, the ACLU would achieve real successes in the courts, and despite its continuing 
distrust of judicial power, it would embrace legalism as a strategy. In fact, in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, the ACLU coached labor lawyers to ignore ideological reservations and secure anti-
employer injunctions whenever possible.  During World War I, however, the CLB’s relationship 
to the courts was murky.  There is no evidence that Baldwin or anyone else within the CLB 
struggled philosophically with the question at this stage.  Baldwin knew through his experience 
with the St. Louis housing ordinance that courts would occasionally act against repressive 
legislation.  Moreover, the Free Speech League had unabashedly pursued constitutional litigation 
as a check on repressive state action.  Although it had rarely won its cases, the wartime 
prosecutions were better candidates; picketing and boycotts could be dismissed as conduct rather 
than expression, but state and federal statutes during World War I clearly abridged public 
discussion of controversial issues. The decision of the CLB leadership to try its hand in the 
courts, it seems, was a simple matter of strategy. 
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A few successful court challenges in the summer of 1917 encouraged pursuit of the legal 
program, and by September, Baldwin was urging local correspondents to challenge offensive 
ordinances through litigation.195  By November, the organization reported that its 120 
cooperating attorneys were assisting in an average 125 cases per week throughout the United 
States.196  At that time, a number of important prosecutions under the Espionage and Trading 
with the Enemy Acts were coming to the organization’s attention as a result of the “activity of 
government agents,” and its staff was helping to facilitate “test cases under the new legislation 
which must be carried to the higher courts for final decision on constitutional points.”197  Cases 
were proliferating at every level, from local to federal, and under local ordinances and state laws 
in addition to federal legislation.  The bureau was supplying legal and financial aid to needy 
defendants, as well as to local defense committees incapable of funding the “local fight for 
constitutional liberties.” Attorneys provided legal references and assisted in drafting briefs. 
Finally, the group was handling trial publicity to “show up miscarriage of justice.”198  Although 
the CLB operated primarily to redress repression after the fact, its long-term hope was to 
discourage unlawful interference in the first place by reminding officials that their actions were 
being scrutinized by a national body.199
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passion, trample upon the rights of free speech, free press and public assembly during war-
time.”200
  
   
The National Civil Liberties Bureau 
Whatever its early achievements in the courts, the new bureau failed to accomplish its 
original purpose: smoothing over differences within the organization.  Although its program was 
meant to be respectable, announcement of the Civil Liberties Bureau triggered immediate public 
condemnation.  A July 4 editorial in the New York Times declared that a line must be drawn 
between “liberty” and “license,” and “just where it shall be drawn is and must be determined, in 
countries properly called free, by public sentiment as formally expressed by majorities through 
their voluntarily chosen representatives.” It lambasted the “little group of malcontents who for 
present purposes have chosen to call themselves ‘The National Civil Liberties Bureau,’” whose 
task, it claimed, was to gain “for themselves immunity from the application of laws to which 
good citizens willingly submit as essential to the national existence and welfare.”201
To make matters worse, the majority of the NCLB leadership openly supported radical 
causes.  In August, the board voted to send delegates to a conference organized by the People’s 
Council, a radical anti-war group to which many AUAM board members belonged.  The 
People’s Council was regarded as dangerous by President Wilson. Even the liberals within the 
administration, like Frank Walsh, thought it threatened national interests.
 
202
                                                          
200 “Civil Liberties Bureau,” New York Evening Post, 17 October 1917. 
  Lilian Wald worried 
that the decision to participate in the conference would destroy the AUAM’s reputation and 
undermine its broader program.  The AUAM had “stood before the public as a group of 
201 “Topics of the Times: Freedom of Speech,” New York Times, 4 July 1917. 
202 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 22.  
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reflective liberals,” she said. In cooperating with the People’s Council, it was embracing 
“impulsive radicalism.”203 Nonetheless, the board voted to hold its course.204
 Wald was not the only AUAM board member recommending a more conservative 
approach.  Oswald Garrison Villard felt that the Administration’s conscription policy had 
accommodated the Union’s legitimate requests, and he wanted the organization to withdraw all 
objectionable materials from the mail, disband its Publicity Department and Washington office, 
and retreat from public view.
 
205 H. R. Mussey thought the current radical policy unwise and 
unlikely to hasten international peace, and he intended to leave the AUAM if the Civil Liberties 
Bureau continued to dominate its program.206
By late summer, Wald was determined to resign. Although she professed a strong desire 
to hold the organization together, she thought the “cleavage” in the board insurmountable.
 
207 In a 
desperate bid to keep her, Eastman recommended severing the Civil Liberties Bureau from the 
larger AUAM.208  The radicals, she urged, should “leave the more conservative minority to 
continue the work of the organization.”209 And after a long and painful debate, the Board voted 
to implement her proposal.  Formal separation was recorded in the AUAM’s minutes on 
September 28.210
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organization.  In October, it changed its name to the American Union for a Democratic Peace. 
Shortly thereafter, it suspended operations.211
For the newly independent Civil Liberties Bureau, on the other hand, the path forward 
was clear.  Thomas told Eastman that the sort of liberal organization advocated by Villard and 
Wald would “have to originate, if at all, with those who have not been so deeply tarred with 
uncompromising pacifism as all our present members.”
  
212  The new group would serve the 
public best by continuing to focus on civil liberties, a specialization that distinguished it from the 
People’s Council.  He believed that the preservation of civil liberties was essential to “reasonable 
social progress” and argued that there was no other organization poised to take over the fight.213  
The rest of the board agreed, and on October 17 the National Civil Liberties Bureau was 
announced. Publicly, the board attributed the split to the rapid expansion of civil liberties work 
and the need for an independent supervisory committee.214  A statement to AUAM members 
insisted that the work of the new organization would be “exactly the same.”215  The NCLB was 
committed to the “maintenance in war time of the rights of free press, free speech, peaceful 
assembly, liberty of conscience, and freedom from unlawful search and seizure.”216
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investigation of Civil Liberties Bureau pamphlets held up in the mail, the NCLB would work to 
preserve constitutional rights through government channels.  “The War Department [was] 
evidently doing its best under the present law,” and the new organization, like the Civil Liberties 
Bureau before it, would publicly support the administration.217
Still, the description of the NCLB’s activity hinted at its future direction.  Unencumbered 
by its conservative constituents, the organization was finally free to focus on the issue to which 
its board was most strongly committed: the “cause of labor.”
   
218  Since the summer, supporters of 
the Civil Liberties Bureau had alerted the board to the suppression of the labor movement in the 
name of patriotism.  Socialist lawyer Arthur LeSueur, who agreed to serve as a cooperating 
attorney for the Bureau, noted the “apparently concerted attack” against labor organizations in 
the west. “Wherever there is any protest or rebellion on the part of wage workers,” he explained, 
“the organization is immediately attacked on the ground that it is in conspiracy with the German 
Government in some traitorous enterprise, or is in league with German spies.”219 Austin Lewis, 
also a socialist lawyer and labor activist, told Baldwin he supported the war but opposed the “use 
of the war for class purposes,” to “put down labor organizations and to endeavor to destroy the 
right of peaceable economic agitation.”220
Baldwin was a savvy organizer, and he was careful to differentiate the NCLB from more 
frankly radical groups.  In October, he wrote Scott Nearing to propose a division of 
responsibilities between the NCLB and the People’s Council.  Baldwin’s organization would 
  These were the sorts of concerns that that the NCLB 
board, drawing on personal experience with the Commission on Industrial Relations and other 
prewar gains, thought the administration might be persuaded to address. 
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leave mass meetings and demonstration to the latter group.  Instead, it would work “through 
legal bureaus for the handling of individual cases, through personal work with government 
departments, through special test cases, and through such quiet pressure as it can exert from time 
to time through its scattered membership.”221 The People’s Council, in turn, would refer all 
appropriate cases to the NCLB. Steering clear of propaganda would insulate the NCLB.  Other 
agencies were responsible for mobilizing the masses; the NCLB would protect their right to do 
so.  “Our main job,” he insisted, “is to help keep people’s mouths open, and their printing presses 
free.”222
The NCLB’s role as a legal bureau gave it cover.  As Baldwin emphasized in a 
recruitment letter to John S. Codman, an attorney and prominent Boston businessman who 
supported Wilson’s war policies, lawyers well understood the tendency in the public imagination 
to conflate the defense of unpopular litigants with approval of their illegal conduct.
   
223  The 
NCLB’s advocacy of the right to dissent, he insisted, did not imply agreement with the messages 
voiced by the speakers whom it defended.224  Indeed, Baldwin was anxious to attract members 
who supported the war effort to make the group’s claim to neutrality more credible.225
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financial assistance in employing a Washington representative to monitor federal legislation in 
advance of the coming congressional election, Baldwin declined.  To begin with, the NCLB’s 
existing representative, Laurence Todd, was “a very capable man, a radical, and correspondent 
for a large number of liberal and radical papers, particularly those of the Non-Partisan League.” 
More important, Baldwin told Germer that while “the committee [was] in entire sympathy” with 
the lobbying program of the Socialist Party, the NCLB was a legal defense organization and did 
not engage in active propaganda.226 The sole purpose of the organization, Baldwin insisted, was 
to “maintain[] established constitutional rights.”227
In reality, however, the NCLB’s leaders were heavily invested in labor agitation as a 
substantive good, not merely as an abstract right.  As Baldwin explained to a potential donor, the 
organization had not “taken over the work of the National Labor Defense Council by any 
means,” but attacks on labor constituted the bulk of its work.
  
228 The “underlying purpose” of the 
drive to maintain constitutional rights was to preserve a voice for minorities in the “processes of 
progress,” in which “labor of course must in the future play the biggest part.”229
In that effort, however, the NCLB was soon right back where it started.  For all its early 
enthusiasm about constitutional litigation, the bureau had little success in the courts.  One of its 
first major initiatives was a constitutional challenge to the Draft Act.  In October, Baldwin 
invited Walter Nelles, the law partner of a former Harvard classmate, to become the 
organization’s counsel.  Nelles had read about the Civil Liberties Bureau the day it was reported 
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in the New York Times, and he immediately wrote to offer his services.230  He took charge of the 
Draft Act challenge, and he was adamant that the NCLB center its objection on liberty of 
conscience, not on the less controversial argument that Congress lacked power to raise a draft 
and compel service abroad.231  When the case came before the Supreme Court, Nelles filed an 
amicus brief arguing that the First Amendment’s protection of religious freedom encompassed 
all conscientious objectors, regardless of whether they were members of religious sects or 
organizations opposed to the war.  He criticized the prevailing assumption, espoused by Elihu 
Root, that constitutional protections were subordinate to claims of necessity during times of 
national crisis.232  Nelles’s work proved to be a liability for recruitment as well as a failure in the 
Supreme Court233—which, despite its frequent invocation of individual rights in past cases, 
stressed the broad scope of federal government power.234
The Draft Act challenge, like the NCLB’s broader defense of conscientious objectors, 
rested on a claim to individual conscience that many potential supporters considered spurious 
and antisocial.  By contrast, postal censorship troubled mainstream liberals, lawyers, and 
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politicians, including even President Wilson235—and while the administration proved unwilling 
to abdicate its censorship authority, there was a reasonable chance that the courts would 
constrain the worst abuses.  In the end, however, the NCLB’s participation in the Espionage Act 
cases was also unavailing.  Perhaps its best known effort in this regard was its defense of The 
Masses, a leftist political magazine edited by Max Eastman, Crystal Eastman’s brother.  The 
suppression of The Masses had helped guide the AUAM’s leaders toward civil liberties work 
when the Espionage Act was first passed, and they were heavily invested in the litigation.  The 
CLB organized a defense fund, and Gilbert Roe agreed to represent the publication and its staff.  
Civil liberties advocates were elated in late July when Judge Learned Hand famously decided, as 
a matter of statutory interpretation, that the suppression of The Masses based on its antiwar 
editorials and political cartoons exceeded the authority of the Espionage Act.  But on November 
2, the Second Circuit reversed Hand’s decision. Throughout the country, other courts followed 
suit.236  The Masses, deprived of its second-class mailing privileges, had no choice but to close 
its doors.237
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With the radical press largely out of business and many radical leaders in jail, the futility 
of constitutional litigation was unmistakable. NCLB attorneys and affiliates would continue to 
intervene in appropriate cases throughout and after the war, but it was clear that radical and anti-
war defendants would rarely prevail in court.  Nor was the Department of Justice likely to alter 
its course, despite persistent NCLB pressure.  Increasingly, the broad-based prosecution and 
conviction of left-wing leaders and organizers threatened the future of the radical and anti-war 
movements—which, to Crystal Eastman and others within the NCLB, were one and the same.238
The most plausible remaining strategy was the mobilization of public opinion.  Vivid 
NCLB accounts of lawless brutality and vigilante justice—often committed with official 
encouragement—were troubling to many progressives.  In October, a vicious attack on the 
AUAM’s own Herbert S. Bigelow, a pacifist minister and outspoken opponent of “big 
business,”
   
239 attracted outraged moderates to the organization.240  Capitalizing on this 
condemnation as well as lingering concerns about Postmaster Burleson, the organization decided 
to convene a “mass meeting” in defense of “American Liberties in War Time.”241
                                                          
238 Eastman explained that a liberal anti-war effort was not possible in light of anti-war hysteria and suppression. 
“The only great movement against war,” she told Oswald Garrison Villard, “must be the radical movement.” Crystal 
Eastman to Oswald G. Villard, 16 November 1917, AUAM Papers, reel 10-1. 
  Its central 
purpose was to demonstrate why public protest had become necessary.  To manifest a broad 
consensus on the issue, the organizers wanted to assemble a sponsoring committee whose 
members would be split evenly among pacifists, militarists, and people who regarded the war as 
necessary but deplorable. To that end, they solicited participation from a wide range of groups 
239 “Bigelow Tells of Beating,” New York Times, 14 January 1918; National Civil Liberties Bureau, The Outrage on 
Rev. Herbert S. Bigelow of Cincinnati, Ohio (New York: National Civil Liberties Bureau, 1918), in ACLU Papers, 
reel 5, vol. 43. Bigelow was ostensibly targeted for his pacifism. He publicly endorsed the war effort once war was 
declared, though the Justice Department claimed he continued to make antiwar comments. See Herbert Shapiro, 
“The Herbert Bigelow Case: A Test of Free Speech in Wartime,” Ohio History 81 (Spring 1972): 108–21. 
240 E.g., John Codman to Roger Baldwin, 7 December 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25 (“I have now decided to 
go with you and I think the attack on Bigelow has brought me to that decision. I hope some effort will be made to 
bring his assailants to justice.”). See also Murphy, Origin of Civil Liberty, 165.  
241 Circular, ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3. 
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and individuals, but aside from the radicals, most declined.242  A few accepted at first, expressing 
concern about mobs and vigilantism, and then backed out for lack of a critical mass.243  Many 
invoked the prominent progressive sentiment that “the world will not be safe for free speech until 
it is safe for democracy.”244
In the end, as moderate invitees had feared, the meeting was attended and its agenda 
dominated by pacifists and radicals.  Denied the use of Carnegie Hall, Baldwin opted instead, 
appropriately enough, to hold the conference at the Liberty Theatre.
  
245  The theater was filled to 
capacity.  Speakers included Herbert Bigelow, muckraker and revolutionary enthusiast Lincoln 
Steffens, leftist minister Harry Ward, and Socialists James Maurer and Norman Thomas.246 
Much of the discussion focused on the capitalist underpinnings of the war.  The central theme 
was the unjustified attack on radicalism and the labor movement under the pretext of 
disloyalty.247
                                                          
242 The NAACP declined as an organization to take part in the January conference because it was “so radically 
divided on the question of war.” Mary White Ovington to Roger Baldwin, 19 November 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 1, 
vol. 3. Baldwin clarified that the gathering was not to be “in any sense a pacifist or anti-war meeting.” Rather, “It is 
to talk about the rights of minorities. Certainly the colored people have a grievance which ought to be discussed in 
connection with the grievance of labor, socialist and other radical movements.” Despite his plea, the NAACP board 
chose not to take part. Mary White Ovington to Roger Baldwin, 11 December 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3. 
     
243 Many of the moderate speakers were friends and acquaintances of Mary Wary Dennett, NCLB secretary, from 
her past suffrage work.  Anna Howard Shaw, in declining an invitation to speak, told Dennett that “Capital has the 
country by the throat with one hand and Labor with the other, and between the two we women are getting the small 
end of it all.” More pointedly, she told Dennett that had it not been for Herbert Bigelow and others like him, “We 
would have had the suffrage in Ohio long ago.”  Anna Howard Shaw to Mary Ware Dennett, 19 December 1917, 
ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3. Beatrice Hale rescinded her acceptance due to the high number of pacifists and radicals 
who would be speaking. She explained that the meeting would be futile under the circumstances, and the damage to 
her reputation was therefore unjustifiable. She closed: “You know how we used to feel in Suffrage—until you can 
have an effective affair, don’t have one at all!” Beatrice Hale to Mary Ware Dennett, 9 January 1918, ACLU Papers, 
reel 1, vol. 3.  
244 William English Nalling to L. Hollingsworth Wood, 7 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 24. 
245 C. C. Smith to Mary Ware Dennett, 20 December 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3.  
246 Steffens and Bigelow supported the war once it was declared.  
247 The assumption that attacks on labor were proceeding “under the cloak of patriotism” was central to the NCLB’s 
rhetoric throughout the war.  Roger Baldwin to Fay Lewis, 30 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 39.  In a 
telegram to President Wilson opposing the Trading with the Enemy bill, the NCLB had reported that the “war power 
[was] already being used by authorities to stifle legitimate agitation by labor for better conditions” and cautioned 
that postal censorship would result in the “total abolition during war of [the] entire radical and most of the labor 
press.” Telegram from NCLB to Woodrow Wilson, 26 September 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 26. 
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The NCLB was not invested in presenting the repression of labor as a novel departure or 
in suggesting that its own efforts were innovative or unprecedented.248  On the contrary, for the 
NCLB, the suppression of speech in wartime was simply a new manifestation of a well-
established pattern.  Industry was using all the tools at its disposal to quash the radical labor 
movement, and the government, whether wittingly or not, was playing into its hands.  Thus one 
announcement for the meeting stressed the “charge that business interests are disloyally using 
patriotism to intimidate labor and radical movements.”249
The resolution adopted by the committee and submitted to Congress for consideration 
charged that violations of constitutional liberty were hindering rather than promoting the war 
effort and “menace[d] the whole future of democratic institutions and individual liberties after 
the war.” Mob violence had received the sanction of many public leaders. The espionage act was 
 Many of the NCLB’s supporters in this 
endeavor had been promoting the same message for years. Indeed several, including Clarence 
Darrow and Gilbert Roe, had testified publicly to that effect before the Commission on Industrial 
Relations.  Wartime abuses of personal liberties were worse in degree than their prewar analogs. 
Such methods of repression as postal censorship were more centralized and consequently more 
threatening.  But the basic objectives of the repressors remained the same: to shield the status 
quo from the insidious effects of radical organizing and expression. The Conference on Liberties 
in Wartime, in exposing this secret agenda, was an extension of prewar efforts to protect labor’s 
rights and to preserve American democracy.  Tellingly, the proposed remedy for the mounting 
violations of civil liberties was to bring them to the attention of Congress.   
                                                          
248 In the wake of the war Zechariah Chafee would famously portray the wartime hysteria and the failure of the 
courts to uphold expressive freedom as an aberration in American history, a departure from a longstanding 
commitment to the First Amendment and to the broader tolerance of minority views.  That Chafee had not yet 
written his seminal article was evident from the meeting’s agenda: “Summarize the outrages showing that this 
suppression of liberty is no new affair in American life. Refer to the negro, radical movements and labor in the 
past.” Circular, ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3.  
249 Mary Ware Dennett to Friends, 5 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3. 
96 
 
being manipulated, “in the face of the declared intent of Congress,” to quash dissent and to 
“check radical and labor movements.”  Post office censorship was destroying the free press. And 
“exploiting business interests” were deliberately crushing labor “while robbing the consumer and 
piling up huge war profits.”  These abuses, according to the resolution, were a matter of common 
knowledge.  But it remained unclear precisely which interests were propelling them, and toward 
what end. “The war has only brought to a sharp focus tendencies hostile to our democratic 
institutions which have long been evident in the case of such minority groups as the Negro and 
other races in our national life, as well as many radical and labor movements,” it concluded.  In 
order better to understand that broader repressive trend, the conference committee requested that 
“an immediate Congressional inquiry be made into the actual facts of these violations of 
constitutional right, mob violence and censorship, and particularly the efforts to use the war as a 
means to crush labor.”250
 There was, of course, no realistic prospect of congressional action on this resolution 
during the war.  The press dismissed it as a radical attempt to undermine the war effort.  But the 
conference served a more important function for the NCLB: it marked the organization’s reentry 
into the realm of popular agitation and propaganda.   As Lenetta Cooper advised Baldwin with 
respect to his correspondence with the War Department over its treatment of conscientious 
objectors, government negotiations worked best when buttressed by popular support.
  It was asking, in short, for a wartime equivalent of the Commission on 
Industrial Relations.  
251
                                                          
250 Resolution, ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3. 
 By 
251 See also Roger Baldwin to Scott Nearing, 30 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 35 (“It is our experience 
with the Department of Justice unless you press them pretty hard and go after them through the newspapers at the 
same time, you won’t get action.”).  In this vein, Baldwin wrote to Colonel Edward M. House, a close advisor of 
President Wilson’s who was sympathetic to civil liberties, and warned him that “the suppression of liberal opinion 
by some of the federal departments” threatened to undermine liberal and radical support for the President’s war 
aims. Roger Baldwin to Col. Edward M. House, 22 Jan. 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 26.  House agreed to relay 
an NCLB memorandum to President Wilson, and the NCLB was optimistic about a “big swing leftward” within the 
administration as a result of House’s views.  Laurence Todd to Roger Baldwin, 2 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 
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March, Baldwin was “thoroughly disgusted with the folks at Washington who have given us 
such hearty assurances.” Those assurances, he complained, did not translate into tolerant policy, 
and “the indictments go on merrily.”252
In the weeks after the conference, Baldwin exchanged letters with Arnold Peterson, 
National Secretary of the Socialist Labor Party of America.  Peterson told Baldwin that although 
his party approved the “spirit” of the resolution, it did not believe “that the sending of resolutions 
protesting against outrages committed by the authorities” was worthwhile.  Instead, it was 
committed to reaching out to the working class in an endeavor “to get that class industrially and 
politically organized.” The only way to protect working class rights was to effectuate working 
class power.
 Baldwin thought it time to take a more public stand.  
253  In later years, Baldwin would often make the same claim. As he told Peterson, 
he agreed “about the main line of approach into the solution of the problem of liberty,” and his 
primary goal was “working class and radical organization.”  Nonetheless, there would need to be 
“a lot of fighting along the way,” and in the course of the struggle, he would use “any existing 
agency or means” to accomplish the larger objective.254  He hoped that other groups—to which, 
in some cases, he contributed and belonged—would continue to fight the crucial battles.  The 
NCLB would endeavor to protect their right to continue their work, unmolested by the state and 
without incurring public condemnation.  “The United States Congress isn’t a bad tool for 
purposes of agitation and publicity which is necessary to keep the iron hot.”255
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3, vol. 25; Memorandum for Colonel House, 24 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 26.  In the end, however, 
the President proved unreceptive to this argument.  Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 68–71. 
 Nor, for that 
matter, were the courts.  
252 Roger Baldwin to Edmund Evans, 16 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25. 
253 Arnold Peterson to Roger Baldwin, 31 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 35.  Meanwhile, pacifists 
worried that narrow exceptions for conscientious objectors would serve to “ameliorat[e] the horrors of war, making 
war less unpleasant, more possible and consequently promoting and prolonging” it.  James Warbasse to Roger 
Baldwin, 9 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25. 
254 Roger Baldwin to Arnold Peterson, 2 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 35. 
255 Ibid. 
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Baldwin’s distinguishing characteristic as an administrator was his willingness to adopt 
whatever means he thought most likely to accomplish his overarching program.  Between World 
War I and the New Deal, that program was the preservation of labor’s right to organize, en route 
to a general redistribution of economic resources and political power.  Perhaps more than 
anything it was Baldwin’s flexibility that made the NCLB, and later the ACLU, so much more 
successful than the organizations whose rights it defended.  Baldwin was always keenly aware of 
the prevailing political climate, and he was willing and able to adapt to changing times.  
Moreover, he learned from his failures and capitalized on his successes.  For the duration of the 
war, Baldwin would be honing his skills—building his credibility in radical circles while 
studying the limits of liberal tolerance.  By early 1918, it was clear what constituency the new 
organization would primarily serve. The urgent and unresolved question for the NCLB board 
was a strategic one: how best to protect that constituency from persecution and prosecution in a 
time of national crisis. 
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CHAPTER 2: WORLD WAR I AND THE RIGHT OF AGITATION 
 
At two o’clock central time on the afternoon of September 5, 1917, hundreds of United 
States marshals and their deputies, together with agents of the Department of Justice, descended 
simultaneously on forty-seven IWW halls and offices and the residences of IWW leaders 
throughout the country. Federal officers seized five tons of documents—including literature, 
mailing lists, and financial records—as well as artwork, furniture, and even wastebaskets.  
 The materials and documents confiscated in the September raid served as the basis for the 
federal conspiracy prosecution of the IWW leadership.  The Department of Justice secured 
indictments in areas of significant IWW activity, including Sacramento, Kansas City, and the 
organization’s headquarters in Chicago.  The Chicago conspiracy trial, whose defendants 
included IWW head “Big Bill” Haywood, was the first and most celebrated.  It lasted nearly nine 
months from indictment to verdict.  Its 166 defendants—a number that declined steadily due to 
dozens of dismissals for insufficient evidence—were marched each day from the Cook County 
jail to the federal courthouse, enduring verbal abuse and physical violence along the way.1  The 
record, purported at the time to be the largest ever filed, contained 33,000 typewritten pages and 
10 million words.2
The government’s theory in the Chicago trial was that the IWW, by counseling its 
members not to serve in the military and by organizing strikes in crucial war industries, had 
conspired to undermine America’s war effort.  For the defendants, however, these supposed 
efforts to obstruct recruitment and war production were beside the point.  Flush with the 
  The proceedings were billed by the prosecution and defendants alike as the 
most expansive and most important labor trial in United States history. 
                                                          
1 “Judge Landis Brings Joy to Tobacco-Chewing I.W.W.,” New York Tribune, 4 April 1918. 
2  “Pauper’s Petition To Be Filed in Haywood Case,” New York Tribune, 21 May 1919. 
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optimism of labor’s newfound wartime strength, they embraced the opportunity to state their 
case publicly, once and for all.  In their testimony and in their defense bulletins, the beleaguered 
Wobblies described the suffering of transient and migratory workers. They recounted the living 
conditions in the mines and the lumber camps: the inadequate food and water, the lack of access 
to bathing facilities, the hard straw-covered bunks on which they were expected to sleep. They 
explained the mechanisms used to suppress labor organization, from the rustling card system to 
lynching. The stated goal of the IWW’s defense was to put the industrial system on trial.  
The IWW trial might seem an unusual episode through which to tell the history of civil 
liberties during wartime. It was not, after all, a case about “free speech” as we would recognize 
the term today.  The liberties at issue—the rights of workers to petition, protest, and strike—were 
cast in terms of equality rather than autonomy.  And the NCLB, though deeply involved in 
publicity for the case, did not so much as file a brief in court.  The lawyer for the IWW, himself a 
member of the organization, did raise a First Amendment argument.  But neither the district 
court nor the Court of Appeals entertained it seriously.  The IWW trial produced no noteworthy 
doctrinal precedent on which to base future free speech claims; indeed, the Supreme Court 
denied the defendants’ petition for certiorari, and the appellate court considered itself bound by 
more notable wartime decisions.   
What the IWW case did do was to precipitate a major reconsideration of strategy by the 
labor sympathizers who would lead the modern free speech movement.  The IWW case was 
important because it led to the ACLU’s definitive break with the Wilson administration and its 
loss of confidence in its ability to work within, rather than against, the existing machinery of the 
state.3
                                                          
3 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, contains a helpful account of the NCLB’s involvement with the IWW 
litigation.  Johnson regards the case as one of the NCLB’s major wartime endeavors, but he does not situate it in the 
 When it first arose, the NCLB treated the case as a new permutation of the great free 
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speech fights the IWW had pioneered a decade earlier.  It cast the Wobblies as patriotic citizens 
and called on the government to observe rule of law and uphold fundamental American 
principles.  In past labor struggles, when local law enforcement rushed to the assistance of 
beleaguered employers, the federal government had shown restraint.  Wilson’s wartime 
administration included many officials who had endorsed the findings of the Commission on 
Industrial Relations, with its robust support for labor’s free speech.  Now, the capitalists had 
introduced a new twist: they had accused the IWW of fighting for the Kaiser in exchange for 
German gold.  And so the NCLB leadership set out to prove that the IWW was a labor 
organization, pure and simple—that its enemy was capitalist exploitation, not the United States.  
They believed that once they made their case, they could persuade administration officials to stay 
out.  In historical memory, the hysteria of the First World War bleeds into the Red Scare of 1919 
and 1920.  It is difficult to fathom that the prosecution of radicals might have triggered concern 
among the same progressives who accepted the suppression of anti-war propaganda as a social 
necessity.  But such was the situation in 1917, when the NCLB was born.4
This time, however, it was the federal government that had initiated charges.  The radical 
labor movement was deemed a threat to war production as well as national unity, and its sacrifice 
was justified in the public interest.  In a climate of jingoistic war frenzy marked by public 
hostility, mob violence, and police brutality against dissenters, the NCLB was naïve to expect a 
continuation of the reasonably sympathetic public reception that labor’s prewar confrontations 
with the law had engendered.  As events unfolded, support for the IWW brought down the wrath 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
context of the broader agenda or future program of the ACLU, nor does he emphasize the influence of the IWW’s 
activities and beliefs on the NCLB’s evolving theory of free speech. His discussion of the trial itself, including the 
legal arguments raised, is minimal. One of the defendants published an account of the trial shortly after the verdict 
was returned.  Harrison George, The IWW Trial: Story of the Greatest Trial in Labor’s History by One of the 
Defendants (Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, 1918). 
4 See, e.g., McCartin, Labor’s Great War, 3 (“Perhaps at no time in American history did radical ideas penetrate the 
mainstream consciousness more deeply than in this era.”).  
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of the war department and led to spying on the NCLB by the Department of Justice and by 
United States Military Intelligence.5
 
  The conviction of the IWW defendants emphasized the 
limits of progressivism as a basis for free speech.  It also strengthened existing connections 
between the radical labor movement and the NCLB leadership.  Eventually, it generated a new 
and radical model of civil liberties—a “right of agitation”—premised neither on individual 
autonomy nor on the discursive production of truth, but on the frank mobilization of working-
class power.   
The IWW and the War 
Of the many government abridgments of labor’s right to organize over the course of the 
First World War, the most troubling to the NCLB was the Chicago IWW trial.  Many labor 
leaders, including Eugene V. Debs, were prosecuted and convicted under the Espionage Act for 
purported anti-war activity.  The IWW indictments, however, were particularly egregious.  
Citing evidence of the usual radical antagonism toward capitalist war, the government was 
threatening to send the entire organizational leadership to jail.  
By the time the IWW indictments were pending, the Free Speech League had disbanded, 
and the IWW was more interested in using the trial as a forum for educating the masses than in 
expanding constitutional liberties. Still, the defense committee reached out broadly to socialists 
and liberals sympathetic to its cause, and the NCLB proved particularly receptive. It was clear to 
the NCLB that the goal of the prosecution was to destroy the IWW. The colossal trial was widely 
followed, and the eventual convictions of Big Bill Haywood and many of the organization’s 
other leaders precipitated the decline of the IWW as a major force in the American labor 
                                                          
5 Walker, American Liberties, 25.  
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movement.  In January 1918, the NCLB could declare without undue hyperbole that “the 
government’s indictments against the Industrial Workers of the World constitute what is 
probably the most important labor case in history.”6
The government had its reasons for targeting the IWW.  The wartime economy produced 
a temporary shift in the balance of power between workers and employers. Increased domestic 
production in the face of a sharp reduction in immigration from Europe meant that 
unemployment plummeted.  And yet, though workers were in short supply, their wages did not 
rise in step with their employers’ profit margins. Samuel Gompers and other labor leaders 
pledged that their unions would not strike while the United States was at war, but they were 
unable to enforce their promises on the ground. On the contrary, the early months of the war 
witnessed a steep rise in union organizing and a wave of strikes across all industries. Employers, 
in turn, brutally shut down organizing efforts by unions determined to reap their share of wartime 
economic profits.   
 
 It was during this moment that the IWW formulated its own wartime labor policy. Unlike 
its more conservative counterparts, the IWW leadership explicitly called for an escalation of the 
class war while the Great War waged abroad.  IWW recruitment skyrocketed during the spring 
and summer of 1917.  Strikes in war industries like logging and copper mining were responsible 
for precipitous drops in production and seemingly threatened the prosecution of the war.7
Industry was incensed at the IWW’s successes, and local United States Attorneys, who 
were hostile to organized labor in general and to the IWW in particular, relayed to their superiors 
the demands of industrial leaders for a federal crackdown.  Some went so far as to advocate 
 
                                                          
6 NCLB circular announcing conference on the IWW case, 3 January 1918, ACLU Papers, Reel 4, Vol. 27. 
7 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 376–97. 
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military detention of recalcitrant agitators.8 At first, Attorney General Thomas Gregory 
considered the strikes legal and had no plan to file charges.9  Unlike the career employees in the 
Department of Justice, Gregory showed a measure of restraint in filing Espionage Act cases; he 
felt that many U.S. Attorneys had unduly succumbed to local pressures, and he instituted a policy 
requiring all cases under the act to be cleared in Washington before filing.  By late summer, 
however, the situation had worsened in western states, largely as a result of violent resistance to 
IWW strikes by western mine owners—and increasingly, some form of federal intervention 
appeared advisable.  State and local police launched their own investigations in an effort to 
uncover evidence of espionage and disloyalty.  Some states enacted criminal syndicalism laws, 
which made IWW ideology illegal on its own terms.  But state law enforcement was unable to 
break the strikes, and state militias were federalized in the summer of 1917.  Meanwhile, 
vigilante violence was rampant, and IWW pleas for federal protection were curtly dismissed.10
The best known example of the last phenomenon was the July deportation of twelve 
hundred miners from Bisbee, Arizona. In Bisbee, the county sheriff’s department, the mayor, the 
city council, the local mine operator, and executives of other area businesses formulated a plan 
for ridding the town of its IWW problem. The sheriff deputized two thousand townspeople, who 
rounded up twelve hundred alleged Wobblies (supposedly Mexicans, German agents, and 
subversives
  
Loyalty leagues and similar groups comprising off-duty soldiers and angry citizens stormed 
IWW headquarters, and mobs beat, tarred and feathered, and deported unwanted Wobblies.   
11
                                                          
8 Ibid., 380.  
), packed them into cattle cars supplied by the El Paso and Southwestern Railroad, 
9 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 89.  
10 Haywood sent a delegation to Washington to request federal assistance.  Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 383–84.  
11 Opposition to the IWW often capitalized on mounting anti-immigrant sentiments. For example, the government’s 
opening statement in the Chicago trial commended America for “open[ing] up this country as a refuge to people 
who had suffered under oppression in the old country.” These ungrateful arrivals, however, had “repa[id] the 
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and shipped them out of state.  Many had families who were stranded in Bisbee without support. 
A significant portion had never belonged to the IWW, and some were members of the AFL—
though the ordeal increased the IWW’s share.  The deportees were housed in an army camp in 
New Mexico, where they received minimal rations.  Requests for federal assistance—including 
an offer to return to work if the federal government assumed operation of the mines—were 
consistently rejected. Most of the deportees eventually gave up their efforts to return to Bisbee, 
though A.S. Embree, who would serve as secretary of the defense committee, returned home to 
his wife and children only to be imprisoned by the local authorities.12
The Bisbee affair was sufficiently flagrant to generate concern among moderate groups.  
Labor Department mediators and the AFL demanded federal action against the ringleaders, and 
the Justice Department reluctantly filed charges on the theory that deportation of men legally 
registered for the draft violated the Conscription Act. The district court, predictably, dismissed 
the indictments.  In a decision eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court, it held that the Draft 
Act did not require registrants to remain within their state of residence, and the deportation of the 
victims across state lines was otherwise insufficient to implicate federally cognizable rights; the 
unlawful behavior of the vigilantes fell within the jurisdiction of state law (which, as a matter of 
politics, meant there was no case at all).
   
13
                                                                                                                                                                                           
kindness of the land that has welcomed them to its shores by pouring the insidious poison of IWW doctrine into the 
ears and minds of these poor, ignorant people that come to this country and locate in these various centers.” Quoted 
in Appellants’ Brief, Seventh Circuit, 8–9.  
  It would be two decades before the federal 
12 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 385–88.  
13 United States v. Wheeler, 254 F. 611 (D. Ariz. 1918), affirmed, United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920); 
Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 391. Charges were filed under Section 19 of the Criminal Code, later recodified at 18 
U.S.C.A. § 241. See generally Christopher Capozzola, “The Only Badge Needed Is Your Patriotic Fervor: 
Vigilance, Coercion, and the Law in World War I America,” Journal of American History 88 (March 2002): 1364–
70. 
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government, at the strong urging of the ACLU, would seek to remedy this federalism loophole, 
which served so often to immunize employers and their collaborators from prosecution.14
Employers’ associations and state governments were more successful than the IWW in 
soliciting federal assistance.  In July, western governors appealed directly to the President’s 
Council on National Defense, which was responsible for regulating the national wartime 
economy.
 
15  Federal troops were dispatched to IWW strongholds like Washington, Oregon, and 
Arizona to ward off disturbances in wartime production; despite orders to remain neutral in local 
conflicts, they generally served employers’ interests. They did so, notably, with substantial 
support from the AFL leadership, which believed (wrongly, it turned out) that restraint of the 
IWW would facilitate competing efforts by the AFL to organize the same workers.16
In July 1917, the Department of Justice distributed a circular to all of its attorneys in 
which it laid the groundwork for legal action against the IWW.  The circular urged its recipients 
to collect evidence against the IWW, including its income stream, its publications, and 
descriptions of its leaders. At roughly the same time, on the orders of President Wilson, a federal 
judge initiated an investigation designed to assemble evidence to support an indictment. Justice 
agents monitored every IWW move, scouring all of its published circulars and trailing Haywood 
and other office holders in their daily business. In early September, the department launched 
raids in every city where the IWW had an office.
 Gompers’s 
vocal call for the suppression of the IWW and other labor radicals helped to spur the ensuing 
witch hunt. Federal prosecution emerged as a more moderate solution to the IWW problem than 
active military suppression.  
17
                                                          
14 See Chapter 5.  
  They constituted, according to the New York 
15 Dubofsky, State and Labor, 67. 
16 Ibid., 68.  
17 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 405–06.  
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Times, the “biggest round-up ever made by the Secret Service forces.”18  The government went 
on to indict 166 labor leaders, some of whom were not actually members of the IWW, on over 
one thousand counts.19
When the IWW prosecution was first announced, it was justified by rumors that the 
organization was fighting for the enemy in exchange for “German gold.” In August 1917, 
Arizona Senator Henry Ashurst announced on the Senate floor that IWW stood for “Imperial 
Wilhelm’s Warriors.”
 According to the indictment, the IWW defendants had conspired to 
violate the Espionage Act, the Conscription Act, and other federal laws.  The organizational 
leadership, inexplicably confident that a jury trial would vindicate them, counseled the 
defendants to turn themselves in.  
20
                                                          
18 “103 I.W.W. Leaders Face Judge Landis,” New York Times, 16 December 1917. 
 Incredibly, despite the organization’s outspoken opposition to war, 
administration officials seem to have believed the allegations that the IWW was working for the 
Germans.  It quickly became evident, however, that the charges of espionage and treason were 
baseless.  Nor had the IWW officially counseled resistance of the draft once the Conscription Act 
was passed.  Certainly, it had been staunchly opposed to intervention in the prewar years.  As 
late as March 24, 1917, it explicitly contrasted its own declaration against war with the AFL’s 
pledge to serve the country with patriotic fervor in case of American entry into the conflict.  
Even after April, IWW publications implicitly criticized conscription, and some of the 
organization’s most militant organizers went further, advising members to claim exemption on 
their registration cards based on opposition to war (the same procedure that the NCLB 
recommended to political objectors).  But the organization itself walked a careful line, leaving 
19 National Civil Liberties Bureau, “The Need of a National Defense Fund,” 15 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 
3, vol. 26. 
20 Quoted in Dubofsky, We Shall be All, 376.  
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the decision to individual members.  Ninety-five percent of Wobblies who were eligible for the 
draft chose to register.21
Caution on this score by the IWW leadership did not, however, insulate the organization 
from public hostility, nor from prosecution under the Espionage Act. The NCLB, which 
immediately offered its assistance in the IWW defense, was quick to explain why.  “The 
government is attacking primarily not the war-time activities of the organization, but the 
organization per se,” it explained.
 
22  The Department of Justice seemingly agreed.  Within days 
of the raid, one United States attorney conveyed to Gregory his understanding that the purpose of 
the department’s operation was “very largely to put the IWW out of business.”23
The IWW indictments, in this respect, were much like the other Espionage Act 
prosecutions challenged by the NCLB during the war.  The IWW threatened the interests of the 
industrialists on whom the federal government relied for successful prosecution of the war.  The 
administration was hesitant to quash the radical labor movement outright.  But on the pretext of 
military necessity, the Department of Justice was threatening to prosecute it out of existence.  In 
its November call for contributions, the NCLB articulated the concern at the core of the IWW 
case and of its own broader agenda during the war years and afterwards. “In this prosecution,” it 
declared, “is involved the whole question of the right of agitation by a radical labor body.”
   
24
                                                          
21 See ibid., 354–58.  Most of those who registered served when called, though some declined because of allegiance 
to their countries of heritage (primarily Finns and Scandinavians), and some apparently hoped to bring their anti-
militarist message to the armed forces.  
 
22 National Civil Liberties Bureau, “The Need of a National Defense Fund,” 15 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 
3, vol. 26. 
23 Quoted in Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 407. The NCLB later noted that the persecution of the Farmers’ Non-
Partisan League, a radical but pro-war organization, proved that the prosecution “was not due to anti-war activities” 
but rather a function of “the favorable opportunity offered to business interests by the war to crush their greatest foes 
at home.”  NCLB, Memorandum Regarding the Persecution of the Radical Labor Movement in the United States 
(undated), ACLU Papers, reel 7, vol. 69. 
24 National Civil Liberties Bureau, “The Need of a National Defense Fund,” 15 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 
3, vol. 26. 
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The NCLB never defined this so-called right of agitation precisely, but the ACLU 
espoused it regularly until the Second World War.  It was clearly much broader than the 
conventional understanding among progressives of free speech or free press, which was 
premised on ensuring robust public conversation as a prerequisite for democratic deliberation 
and decisionmaking.  Later proponents of free speech, like the Communist Party, claimed a right 
to advocate revolutionary violence. For the IWW, however, speech was not a means of 
promoting its program; it was its program. In a nutshell, the right of agitation was a right to 
improve the situation of labor by any available non-violent means.25 Organizing workers, 
protesting employer abuses, and dissuading strike-breakers were fundamental weapons in the 
labor struggle. In the words of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the prosecution of the IWW for 
participation in the labor struggle “involved the right to strike, organize, and publish the labor 
press.” Like the NCLB, Flynn regarded the IWW prosecutions as a labor case rather than a war 
case and emphasized that the “war atmosphere [was] being exploited by large capital and the 
press to create bitter prejudice against radical and militant labor unions.”  She continued, “It is a 
fundamental and epoch-making trial of labor, its struggles and aspirations.”26
After the war, Roger Baldwin would frankly declare the right of agitation to be a natural 
right, “prior to and independent of constitutions.”
 
27
                                                          
25 In this respect, the NCLB’s view clashed head on with that of the legal establishment. The position of Archibald 
Stevenson, then chair of the National Civic Federation’s Committee on Free Speech, was typical.  It was 
permissible, according to Stevenson, for a citizen to advocate the lawful amendment of the United States 
Constitution to establish in America a soviet form of government.  By contrast, the advocacy of a change in 
government through such means as violence or the general strike, far from deserving constitutional protection, 
would “constitute[] the highest crime against the principles of civil liberty and democratic governance.”  Archibald 
E. Stevenson, Chairman of the Committee on Free Speech, National Civic Federation, circular responding to an 
editorial on the Gitlow case appearing in The Independent, 20 June 1925. 
  Like his allies in the radical labor 
26 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, A. Giovannitti, and Carlo Tresca to Roger Baldwin, undated,  ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 
27. 
27 American Civil Liberties Union, The Fight for Free Speech (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1921), 
5.  By contrast, “the demand for ‘rights’ [was] couched usually in an appeal to free speech traditions and 
constitutional guarantees.” 
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movement, he would come to believe that “causes get that natural right in proportion to their 
power to take and hold it.”28  In other words, he would understand power as a prerequisite for 
freedom, rather than the other way around.  For the time being, however, the NCLB was more 
cautious in its rhetoric, if not in its underlying beliefs.  Even while it invoked the right of 
agitation, the NCLB emphasized to its contributors that the IWW deserved a fair trial.  It 
requested assistance in bringing the IWW’s case to the public as a matter of “law and public 
policy, and of course as protagonists only of American constitutional rights.”29
In short, Baldwin and the NCLB were speaking in two voices. To their radical labor 
allies, they promised the substantive rights crucial to organizing marginalized workers, that is, 
rights against interference with organizing, picketing, and boycotting. To the progressives in 
power, they spoke in conventional reformist terms. Free speech was just the sort of incremental 
adjustment in the system that would quell widespread social conflict.  
   
As with the conscientious objectors, the first recourse of the NCLB leadership was to 
connections within the administration. By contrast with early optimism about judicial vindication 
of freedom of press in the postal censorship cases, the likelihood of success in the courts for the 
IWW was markedly dim, and the NCLB hoped that trial could be avoided.  Its goal was a 
“dismissal outright of the IWW cases, so that the whole matter might be turned over to the 
Department of Labor as an administrative problem.”30
                                                          
28 Ibid.  
 This may seem an ironic ambition for a 
civil liberties group organized to combat the abuses of administrative discretion through recourse 
to the courts, but Baldwin agreed with the attorney for the IWW that “the problems presented by 
29 National Civil Liberties Bureau, “The Need of a National Defense Fund,” 15 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 
3, vol. 26. 
30 Roger Baldwin to Laurence Todd, 26 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25. 
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this situation [were] diplomatic and administrative rather than judicial.”31  He asked sympathetic 
insiders to correct common misapprehensions about the IWW and to discourage prosecution.32  
He argued that conviction would only exacerbate labor unrest in the United States by arousing 
greater enmity toward government and employers.33
This position met with mixed success in the administration.  Many of Wilson’s 
advisors—including Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, a former Secretary-Treasurer of the 
UMW—were generally supportive of organized labor.  But pro-unionism did not necessarily 
translate into sympathy for labor radicalism, and other members of the administration, such as 
Postmaster General Burleson, were openly hostile.  President Wilson was reluctant to take a 
strong stand.  In August 1917, largely in response to the Bisbee deportations, he had appointed a 
Mediation Commission to evaluate the wartime labor situation and to formulate 
recommendations when particular disputes jeopardized the war effort.  The Commission was 
chaired by William B. Wilson and included two labor representatives, both AFL, and two 
moderate employers. Its secretary, Felix Frankfurter, was initially skeptical of the AFL’s 
dominance. In the course of his investigations, however, he came to agree with Gompers that the 
best path to industrial peace was to mandate employer negotiation with AFL unions while 
officially repudiating radical alternatives like the IWW.
   
34
                                                          
31 George Vanderveer to Roger Baldwin, 6 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
  Although the Commission’s report on 
the Arizona copper strike absolved the strikers of intent to undermine the war effort and instead 
traced labor unrest to poor working conditions and low wages, its broader condemnation of 
32 Baldwin to Carlton Parker, University of Washington, 8 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
33 Roger Baldwin to E. M. House, Memorandum on the IWW Prosecutions, 9 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, 
vol. 27; George Vanderveer to Woodrow Wilson, 1 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27; Roger Baldwin to 
E. M. House, 9 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27 (“We are considerably concerned over the industrial 
effect of the pending prosecution of the IWW. The results from the point of view of labor unrest are likely to be 
exceedingly serious.”). 
34 The Commission’s report, issued in January 1918, called for government recognition of collective bargaining as 
well as a nationally mandated 8-hour-day.  “Find Many Causes for Labor Unrest,” New York Times, 10 February 
1918.   
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radical tactics undercut the organization’s standing in negotiations over the indictment.35  Baker, 
Secretary Wilson, George Creel, and Colonel House were all disposed to dismiss the 
prosecution, but none was willing to take a firm stand.36  In late February, Baldwin appealed 
directly to President Wilson, stressing again the propriety of an administrative resolution of labor 
conflict.37 Wilson, however, had concluded that the IWW was “worthy of being suppressed.” 38
As late as March 1918, Baldwin sensed a “disposition of the Department of Justice not to 
try this case,” and Vanderveer expected the charges to be dismissed.
 
39 If there was hesitation, 
however, it was not at the level of administration policy.  In fact, the government was turning 
ever more surely away from the NCLB’s proposed course.  In May, President Wilson endorsed 
the “Sedition Act” amendments to the Espionage Act, which explicitly authorized the censorship 
that had been sanctioned under the existing act as a matter of statutory interpretation.  The 
measure, pushed by western senators, was based on a Montana statute targeting the IWW.40
                                                          
35 Baldwin was nonetheless confident that the Mediation Commission, if asked, would counsel dismissal and 
resolution of the issue by the Department of Labor instead. Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 93.  
  The 
NCLB cautioned against the increased censorship authority that the bill conferred on the 
Postmaster General, explaining that “[s]uch arbitrary power in the hands of a single appointed 
officer has never before existed in the history of this republic, nor of any other nation under a 
36 Ibid.; George Vanderveer to Roger Baldwin, 6 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27 (reporting that Baker 
supported dismissal and had suggested conferring with William B. Wilson); Roger Baldwin to Carlton Parker, 8 
February 1918, reel 4, vol. 27. In late February, Laurence Todd told Baldwin that the new Labor Board, which was 
controlled on the labor end by the “anti-Gompers element,” would demonstrate that “a new regime is coming to the 
front in the labor movement—a sort of coalition government by the heads of big unions, and this coalition will stand 
for civil liberty to a far higher degree than has the old regime.” Laurence Todd to Roger Baldwin, 27 February 1918, 
ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25. Baldwin considered Todd’s assessment “exceedingly significant” and hoped it would 
lead to favorable resolution of the IWW case. Roger Baldwin to Laurence Todd, 26 February 1918, ACLU Papers, 
reel 3, vol. 25. 
37 Roger Baldwin to Woodrow Wilson, 27 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27.  
38 Quoted in Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 93.  
39 Roger Baldwin to John Graham Brooks, 14 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27; George Vanderveer to 
Roger Baldwin, 20 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27 (predicting that the case would be dismissed as a 
result of the government’s fear of losing the case “and thereby rehabilitat[e] the IWW in the public mind”). 
40 Murphy, Meaning, 22.  
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democratic constitution.” 41  A handful of senators voiced concerns about suppression of speech 
in general and bureaucratic censorship in particular, though none actually advocated or desired 
free speech for radicals.  Republicans saw the act as a potential vulnerability for the Wilson 
administration, and Theodore Roosevelt openly attacked the administration for its silencing of 
opposition views.42  In the Senate, Joseph France proposed amending the measure to protect the 
right of individuals to “publish or speak what is true, with good motives, and for justifiable 
ends.” 43  Although the France amendment received considerable congressional support, 
Attorney General Gregory opposed it, and it was overwhelmingly voted down.44  The original 
bill passed handily in both houses of Congress, and on May 16, President Wilson signed it into 
law.  The implications of the act for the future of IWW organizing were clear.  It forbade all 
“disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United 
States,” the Constitution, the armed forces, and the American flag. More pointedly, it expressly 
prohibited advocacy of “any curtailment of production in this country” of anything “necessary 
. . . to the prosecution of the war.”45
                                                          
41 “Gives Power to Stop Mail Delivery,” New York Evening Post, 30 April 1918. 
  The act also approved the post office’s practice of refusing 
42 E.g., “Senators Flay Gag Bill as Hit at U.S. Liberties,” clipping, 5 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 53; 
“Johnson and Free Speech,” New York Evening Call, 26 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 54 (“Many 
Republican politicians and a few Democratic ones have suddenly awakened to the fact that freedom of speech has 
gone glimmering and that there is danger in the future that they themselves may be punished for exercising the rights 
given in the constitution to every citizen.”);  “Colonel’s Attitude Toward Spy Bills,” clipping, 6 April 1918, ACLU 
Papers, reel 6, vol. 53.  The bill was purportedly altered to “aid honest critics” and meet “gag law charges.” 
“Sedition Bill Altered to Aid Honest Critics,” Washington Tribune, 9 April 1918.  But the New York Call dismissed 
the modifications (the introduction into the text of “willful” before “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive 
language”) as superfluous. “Senate Makes Slight Change in Gagging Bill,” New York Call, 9 April 1918.  
43 See “Senators Oppose Sedition Bill as Gag on Free Speech,” New York Tribune, 1 May 1918; Murphy, Origin of 
Civil Liberties, 82.  
44 “Spy Act Change Draws Protest,” New York Call, 1 June 1918 (noting that the Department of Justice maintained 
that the amendment would introduce a requirement of proof of motive and decrease the value of the Espionage Act). 
The NCLB urged senators to support the France amendment and to give the postmaster general discretionary power 
to block the mail.  E.g., Telegram from NCLB to Senator Warren G. Harding, 29 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, 
vol. 26. 
45 Lenetta Cooper expressed concern that the new law would be enforced against civil liberties groups and 
considered disbanding the American Liberty Defense League.  Lenetta Cooper to NCLB, 13 May 1918, ACLU 
Papers, reel 3, vol. 26.  L. Hollingsworth Wood responded for the NCLB: “Being satisfied that our work is entirely 
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to deliver mail to and from the IWW, a policy that made it virtually impossible for the defense 
team to raise funds and generate public support.46 In fact, Senator William King of Utah 
specifically justified the provision as a measure to prevent Haywood and the IWW from 
receiving contributions by mail.47
In June, Montana Senator Thomas Walsh introduced a bill that would have explicitly 
prohibited the brand of labor radicalism espoused by the IWW and was expressly designed to 
“outlaw the entire organization.”
  
48  Haywood wired Baldwin for assistance in defeating the 
measure.  He believed that even if the IWW leadership was lucky enough to escape conviction 
under the existing war statutes, there was no way the organization could withstand the proposed 
bill, which even criminalized speech advocating threats of injury to property as a means of 
bringing about economic change.  Baldwin recognized that the bill’s language would sweep in 
labor activity far less radical than the IWW’s, and he fought desperately for its defeat.  The 
NCLB’s Washington correspondent, Laurence Todd, told Baldwin that the bill likely would pass 
without a roll call.  There was no sign of opposition “from any quarter,” and the Department of 
Labor was keeping quiet.49
                                                                                                                                                                                           
legal, we have no intentions of dissolving or making any changes.” Telegram from L. Hollingsworth Wood to 
Lenetta Cooper, 14 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 26.  
 Even Senator Borah, who often had spoken out for civil liberties, had 
voiced support for the measure.  He invoked it as justification for his opposition to the press 
46 Sedition Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). Section 4 of the Act provided: “When the United States is at war, the 
Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or concern is using the mails in violation 
of any of the provisions of this Act, instruct the postmaster at any post office at which mail is received addressed to 
such person or concern to return to the postmaster at the office at which they were originally mailed all letters or 
other matter so addressed.” 
47 Open Letter from the NCLB to President Wilson, 27 September 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43. Because its 
passage came so late in the war, it did not produce many prosecutions. 
48 Quoted in Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 98. The bill defined as unlawful any association, “one of 
whose purposes or professed purposes is to bring about any Governmental, social, industrial, or economic change 
within the United States, by the use, without authority of law, of force, violence, or physical injury to person or 
property, or by threats of such injury, or which [advocates such activity] to accomplish such change.”  Members of 
such associations, or individuals advocating their doctrine or circulating their literature, would have been subject to 
ten years imprisonment and a fine. “Drafts Bill to Curb IWW,” New York Times, 30 April 1918.  
49 Laurence Todd to Roger Baldwin, 3 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25. 
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censorship provision of the Sedition Act, explaining that if the Walsh bill were passed, “there 
will not be any IWW organization left to send mail.”50 The measure passed the Senate but 
encountered more difficulty in the House due to opposition from a single representative, Meyer 
London of New York.  By the end of July, the bill had stalled due to the Wilson administration’s 
lack of support.51
 
  The administration had decided to leave the question of the IWW’s survival to 
the courts.  
Legal Strategy and Publicity Campaign 
 While the NCLB’s Washington insiders were endeavoring to persuade administration 
officials to drop the indictments, the IWW was working on its backup plan.  In the early fall, 
Chicago headquarters organized a general defense committee, which began preparations for the 
defense. In November, the general executive board ceased publication of Solidarity and 
introduced in its place the Defense News Bulletin, which reported on developments in the case.52
IWW counsel George Vanderveer, who had defended the organization in earlier high-
profile cases, agreed to handle the case.  Vanderveer was not a universally popular choice. In 
December, Lenetta Cooper of the Chicago-based American Liberty Defense League wrote to 
Baldwin that many at IWW headquarters were “much dissatisfied with Vanderveer” and wanted 
to recruit Clarence Darrow and Frank P. Walsh in his place.
  
53
                                                          
50 Ibid.  
 In January, the NCLB convened a 
conference to discuss the pending case. It invited Felix Frankfurter to attend as a “representative 
of the Administration, officially present to hear what is said,” since the situation was too critical 
51 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 97–98.  
52 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 428–29.  
53 Lenetta Cooper to Roger Baldwin, 28 December 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
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“not to have all of the cooperation possible to prevent blunders which might be embarrassing.”54 
The meeting, however, was a disappointment.  Darrow and Walsh, around whose participation it 
was organized, failed to show up.  Baldwin felt that it would be impossible to proceed without 
them and adjourned the deliberations.  As he explained to Walsh, “We all felt that it is 
imperative that this greatest labor case in our history should be handled by you two gentlemen. 
There are no other lawyers in the country who can make the fight effectively. You can put the 
whole industrial system on trial.”55
 Baldwin’s ambitions on this front were thwarted, however.  Darrow was preoccupied 
with other legal matters and unable to travel to Washington.  For his part, Walsh was 
sympathetic to the IWW and opposed the prosecutions, but he was serving an important 
moderating influence within the administration and was unwilling to jeopardize that role by 
public participation in the case.
  
56 The IWW’s Jack Law told Baldwin in mid-January that Walsh 
had offered his “unqualified support and endorsement” but that it was “utterly impossible for 
Frank P. to get in the case.”57
With the composition of the defense team settled, the IWW and NCLB both turned to 
legal strategy.  Much of the early debate centered on the blanket indictment of the IWW 
defendants.  Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was indicted for her translation of Emile Pouget’s classic 
tract on sabotage, and she solicited the NCLB’s assistance in contesting the government’s theory 
that an author could be held accountable for a pamphlet written before the illegal conduct alleged 
  Walsh vouched for Vanderveer, however, which was enough to 
satisfy the dissenters.   
                                                          
54 Roger Baldwin to Felix Frankfurter, 5 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
55 Roger Baldwin to Frank Walsh, 10 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
56 Walsh’s prudence was rewarded. In April, he was appointed co-chair of the National War Labor Board.  
57 Jack Law to Roger Baldwin, 15 January 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
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had taken place.58 Along with Carlo Tresca, Arturo Giovannitti, and Joseph Ettor, who were 
indicted on similar charges, she moved for severance of her case, and she urged the other 
defendants to demand their own separate trials.  In a conspiracy case, the prosecution was 
obligated to connect each defendant with the conspiracy charged.59  In Flynn’s view, the 
government would be unable to maintain a case against each of the individual defendants on 
each count and would be forced to drop many of the charges.60 She also believed that the 
government would drop all of the indictments if the defendants would renounce their militancy 
for the duration of the war.61 By contrast, a mass trial would all but guarantee conviction.62
Unlike most of her co-defendants, Flynn was willing to disavow continued support for 
the IWW or its ideology to avoid prosecution. Flynn was still actively involved in the IWW as 
late as August, when she wrote to Solidarity that she remained a member and had “never stated 
otherwise anywhere.”
  
63
                                                          
58 Flynn was denied access to the IWW defense fund and was therefore forced to solicit independent assistance.  
Roger Baldwin to H. L. Rotzel, 18 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
  After the September 28 indictments, however, she severed her ties with 
the organization and pledged her patriotic loyalty in a letter to President Wilson. Even then, the 
Department of Justice did not officially dismiss the indictment against her until March, assuring 
that she would not publicly criticize the department’s proceedings against the other defendants.  
59 Open letter from Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Carlo Tresca and Joseph Ettor to Friends and Sympathizers, ACLU 
Papers, reel 4, vol. 27.  The letter added defensively, “Our decision is not dictated by any lack of consideration for 
the other defendants. In fact, we are not asking for group severance, but for individual trials. We believe that they 
too should follow the same course, as the best legal procedure to protect their interests.” 
60 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, A. Giovannitti, and Carlo Tresca to Roger Baldwin, undated, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 
27.  
61 Flynn’s account was published forty years after the trial, in her autobiography.  Based on his reading of the 
Department of Justice records in the IWW case, Melvyn Dubofsky concluded that Flynn’s optimism about the 
prospects for dismissal was misguided, if not disingenuous; Attorney General Gregory probably dismissed charges 
against Flynn and her co-petitioners in order to create a public appearance of fairness and to avoid negative publicity 
that acquittal in their cases might create.  Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 427.  
62 Open letter from Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Carlo Tresca and Joseph Ettor to Friends and Sympathizers, ACLU 
Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
63 She continued, “I would not have my friends believe me a quitter in a crisis. We have enough ‘slackers’ in the 
class war already.” Quoted in Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 426.  
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Under the circumstances, it is unsurprising that the IWW leadership was unwilling to heed 
Flynn’s advice, despite the NCLB’s endorsement of its legal premise.64
The IWW defense committee was working toward a more sweeping vindication of the 
organization.  The indictment against the IWW contained five counts.  The first alleged a 
conspiracy to hinder the production and transportation of war supplies by means of violent 
strikes, and the second a conspiracy to impede the constitutional and statutory right to execute 
various contracts.
  
65  The third and forth counts charged specific interference with the Selective 
Service Act and the Espionage Act, respectively. And the fifth count alleged that the defendants 
had conspired to use the mails to cheat and defraud employers, by encouraging employees to 
provide their employers with inefficient service.  During the arraignment proceedings in 
December 1917, Vanderveer argued unsuccessfully that the evidence on which the government’s 
case was premised had been seized unlawfully, in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.66  He subsequently filed and lost a motion to quash the 
indictments, in which he argued that acts cited by the government as evidence of conspiracy 
were the ordinary engagements of a labor organization and were directed at profiteering 
employers, not the government.67
While the legal team waited for the government to process evidence and assemble its 
case, IWW headquarters focused on raising defense funds and generating publicity.  In that 
respect, they relied heavily on the assistance of the NCLB.  Although the IWW continued to 
  
                                                          
64 Roger Baldwin to John Lord O’Brian, Department of Justice, 13 December 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
65 More precisely, the first count alleged a conspiracy under Section 6 of the criminal code to interfere by force with 
the execution of eleven statutes and presidential orders pertaining to the Government’s war program and with ten 
additional sections of the criminal code. The second alleged a conspiracy under Section 19 of the criminal code. 
66 Vanderveer subsequently withdrew the pleadings made by his clients upon arraignment and substituted motions 
for bills of particulars in sixty-seven cases, based on the omnibus nature of the indictments, which failed to specify 
dates and offenses.  He entered a demurrer for 83 of the defendants and pleas of abatement for 23. Seattle Daily 
Call, 5 January 1918, clipping, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42. 
67 New York Evening Call, 13 March 1918, clipping, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42. 
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solicit its own contributions, its defense bulletins, requests for donations, and even checks were 
routinely held for months by the post office.  Moreover, IWW publications were closely 
monitored, and the organization’s offices were subject to periodic raids, during which materials, 
stamps, and mailing lists were routinely seized.   
The NCLB was in a better position to organize defense efforts, because its own 
communications, though not immune to postal meddling, were less subject to interference. It 
housed a member of the IWW’s General Defense Committee in the New York office,68 and in 
response to IWW requests, it raised funds for bail and other defense costs, such as the 
transportation of witnesses.69  The NCLB was well equipped to enlist the support of respectable 
liberals. The fundraising committee that it organized was chaired by John A. Fitch, an editor of 
the Survey who taught labor relations at the New York School of Social Work.  Baldwin also 
secured the assistance of John Graham Brooks, a Unitarian minister and labor scholar who had 
written extensively about the IWW.70  In March, the general defense committee complained that 
financial support from the New York area, a mere ten percent of total funds raised, had been 
insufficient in view of the region’s great wealth.71
                                                          
68 Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 73.  
  According to E.S. Rose, “the necessity for 
these things has never been brought concretely and forcibly to the true liberal mediums of the 
population in this region. It has reached them through mediums that have been colored by other 
interests, or that have been too feeble to express the extremity, not only of our own situation, but 
69 E.g., Roger Baldwin to Amos Pinchot, 6 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27 (describing need to raise 
Haywood’s bail and nothing that “the government has been raiding the defense committees and otherwise 
embarrassing them in their efforts to get a fair trial”). 
70 E.g., John Graham Brooks, American Syndicalism: the IWW (New York: Macmillan, 1913). Brooks set up a 
meeting between Baldwin and government officials to discuss the Chicago case. In attendance were David F. 
Houston, who had served as chancellor of Washington University during Baldwin’s tenure there, before leaving to 
become Secretary of Agriculture; Francis G. Caffey, the Federal District Attorney for New York, and a future 
federal judge; and an Assistant United States Attorney.  Baldwin’s efforts to convince the group to push for a 
dismissal or postponement of the case were, however, unsuccessful. Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 74. 
71 E.S. Rose to Roger Baldwin, 11 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27; E.S. Rose to Roger Baldwin, 16 
March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 26 (the amount cited for New York was 37,000 dollars). 
120 
 
of the principles of human rights and liberty.”72  The NCLB had proven adept at arousing public 
sentiment, but less effective in its financial appeals.  Rose asked Baldwin to arrange a meeting 
with influential liberals at a private reception, and he requested letters of introduction to potential 
donors.  Baldwin dutifully complied with both requests.73
In the spring, the NCLB arranged for a call for funds to be printed in The New Republic.  
The advertisement opened with a general appeal to procedural fairness, a technique that would 
serve the organization well in the interwar years. “Never mind what you think about the IWW,” 
it proclaimed, “they are at least entitled to a fair trial and an open-minded hearing.”
     
74  An early 
draft would have accused the government of foul play in its prosecution of the case; it reported 
that the Department of Justice had twice raided defense committee offices and had interfered 
with their fundraising efforts. But reaction to this more contentious claim was decidedly 
negative.  J. G. Phelps Stokes, on the brink of leaving his wife as well as the Socialist Party, 
thought that references to official misconduct would convey to the public “the impression that it 
was drawn in a spirit distinctly hostile to the war policy of our Government.”75 Roscoe Pound, 
though agreeing that the IWW leadership was entitled to a fair trial, considered it unseemly to 
raise such issues as a means of pressuring judicial tribunals.76  The New Republic voiced a 
similar reaction, and it agreed to take the advertisement only if the passage about “interference 
by officials” was deleted.77
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
 The NCLB complied, and the revised version instead emphasized the 
need for “liberal financial support” from those Americans who believed in the “right of a fair 
73 Roger Baldwin to Friends of Liberty in Wartime, 19 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. Baldwin actively 
solicited funds from contacts in New York, Boston, and elsewhere. He also called upon his connections to make 
solicitations of their own. See, e.g., Roger Baldwin to John Graham Brooks, 29 June 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, 
vol. 27. 
74 Draft of New Republic advertisement, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
75 J. G. Phelps Stokes to Roger Baldwin, 19 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
76 Roscoe Pound to George West, 24 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
77 J. E. Dumars to Roger Baldwin, 9 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
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trial” for all parties, even the IWW.78 In its amended form, the advertisement bore the signatures 
of John Dewey, Thorsten Veblen, Charles Beard, and Helen Keller, among other prominent 
individuals.79 Even then, the Department of Justice threatened to revoke The New Republic’s 
second-class mailing privileges if the advertisement were reprinted.80
 In addition to its fundraising efforts, the NCLB coordinated publicity during the trial. 
That was not a task for which the organization had volunteered, but Haywood had failed to make 
his own publicity arrangements.
  
81 Baldwin anticipated that the commercial press would issue 
distorted reports of the trial, and he considered it imperative to communicate a “fair 
interpretation of the facts.”82  He saw the publicity campaign as an opportunity “to get across the 
American public the real issues of our present labor struggle and to put the burden of guilt where 
it belongs, on the shoulders of private capital exploiting the workers.”83 To that end, he agreed to 
assemble a committee of reporters in New York and Washington who would produce balanced 
accounts of the proceedings.84 Baldwin advised Haywood that the NCLB lacked the funds to hire 
a fulltime publicist for the trial, but that he would personally arrange to send a reporter to 
Chicago to set up a system for distribution of “truthful and accurate” accounts of the trial and to 
coordinate publicity from afar.85
                                                          
78 Revised draft of New Republic advertisement, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
 He selected Paul Hanna for the job, a reporter who came highly 
79 Keller sent a check for one hundred dollars and voiced strong support for the NCLB’s efforts. She explained to 
Baldwin her view that “[u]nless all who truly love democracy hold fast to the essential rights guaranteed to all the 
people by the Constitution, there is danger that those rights may be swept away in the torrent of war.” Hellen Keller 
to Roger Baldwin, 13 June 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
80 Roger Baldwin to Robert Hallowell (Treasurer, New Republic), 16 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28; 
Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 96.  
81 Roger Baldwin to Bill Haywood, 27 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Roger Baldwin to Paul Hanna, 1 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28.  
84 Baldwin explained, “I am working on that not on behalf of the Civil Liberties Bureau, but independently on behalf 
of those interested in seeing the issues fairly and squarely put.” Roger Baldwin to Bill Haywood, 27 March 1918, 
ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
85 Roger Baldwin to Paul Hanna, 1 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28.  
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recommended by Socialist journalist Robert Bruere, who was assisting Baldwin with the 
publicity effort.   
 When Hanna arrived in Chicago in early April, he discovered precisely the situation that 
Baldwin had expected.  Newspaper reports of the trial, which was then in the jury selection 
phase, were “generally frivolous, largely malicious, totally ignorant and usually inaccurate.”  
More important, they evinced no understanding of the “vital social and economic issues 
involved.”86  All in all, there was no hope for balanced coverage from the commercial press.  
Reliance on the IWW’s daily report to labor papers would be equally misguided, as those reports 
were reaching only sympathetic audiences and were in any case liable to be intercepted in the 
mail. Hanna, however, offered an alternative avenue for broad publicity: he advised Baldwin to 
encourage supporters throughout the country to submit individual letters to the editor.  Hanna 
recognized that this sort of letter-writing campaign was an untested technique, but he thought it 
had tremendous potential for mobilization of local communities.87
                                                          
86 Paul Hanna, Report to Roger Baldwin, 13 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
 A reporter based in Chicago 
would produce a brief correction of every significant misrepresentation of the trial that appeared 
in print and send it to correspondents in towns throughout the country with instructions to 
forward it, over their own signatures, to their newspapers.  Readers would rethink their 
preconceptions, and newspaper editors would learn to review news agencies’ accounts more 
critically before reprinting them.  “The front door to fair publicity on the IWW trials is shut and 
locked,” Hanna advised Baldwin, “but the side door stands wide open.” Hanna considered his 
plan to be “a sure means of entry by this side door,” and Baldwin, with Haywood’s approval and 
87 So far as he knew, it had only been employed by the Christian Scientists.  For them it had been “enormously 
successful,” and he recommended “a very simple adaptation of their tactics for the advancement of civil liberty.” 
Ibid.  
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the resources of the NCLB, adopted it in toto.88  Judging by press reaction to the defendants’ 
eventual conviction, however, its actual effect was minimal.89
In its fundraising and publicity efforts, the NCLB was honing techniques it had 
developed during its AUAM days and used to good effect in earlier Espionage Act cases.  What 
was distinctive about the NCLB’s involvement in the IWW case was a project at the heart of its 
service to the IWW: its preparation of a pamphlet, The Truth about the IWW, intended to dispel 
misconceptions about the organization’s goals.  The NCLB’s objective was to demonstrate that 
allegations of anti-war activity by the IWW were “part of an organized campaign by war-
profiteers and employing interests to use the war to crush this labor organization.”
 
90  Much of the 
pamphlet consisted of corrective quotations by academics and government officials addressing 
“widespread misrepresentations” of the organization in the commercial press.  Its contributors 
included John Graham Brooks, Robert W. Bruere, George P. West, John A. Fitch, and Professor 
Carlton H. Parker, who was a labor economist as well as a labor representative for the 
Department of War.91
                                                          
88 Ibid; Telegram from Bill Haywood to Roger Baldwin, 1 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28.  Laurence Todd 
also endorsed Hanna’s plan. He wrote to Baldwin that “War conditions make it virtually impossible to get into the 
press with news stories, but the letters he mentions would at least bear fruit in many places now sterile.”  Laurence 
Todd to Roger Baldwin, 18 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25. See sample circular letter in ACLU Papers, 
reel 4, vol. 28. 
  
89 Baldwin had difficulty finding someone to produce the letters.  The first person assigned the task, Charles Stern, 
left when called to the draft.  Lenetta Cooper to Roger Baldwin, 13 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
Haywood enlisted Harrison George to take over, but Baldwin told him he had chosen his own replacement, Samuel 
Kaplan, the Chicago correspondent for the New York Call.  Bill Haywood to Roger Baldwin, 21 May 1918, ACLU 
Papers, reel 4, vol. 28; Roger Baldwin to Bill Haywood, 27 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. Kaplan in turn 
was forced to abdicate for medical reasons. Samuel Kaplan to Roger Baldwin, undated, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 
28.  Baldwin finally reached an arrangement with Kaplan’s successor from the Call, David Karsner. David Karsner 
to Roger Baldwin, 5 June 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
90 National Civil Liberties Bureau, The Truth about the IWW (New York: National Civil Liberties Bureau, April 
1918), 10. 
91 Ibid., 8. In his closing argument at trial, the prosecutor would dismiss this brand of academic endorsement as 
naïve.  He said:  “I think, sometimes, that a college professor is the most gullible man in the world. He would go up 
here and these men would look him the face, just as they do when they are on the witness stand, and they would 
make him believe that black is white, because a college professor ordinarily has not had the teaching with human 
nature outside of the classroom, that qualifies him to see through a fraud and a sham.” Prosecution Closing 
Argument, 17 August 1918, in Industrial Workers of the World Collection, Series V: Legal Problems, Trials and 
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Citing sociological evidence, the NCLB sought to establish that the radicalism of the 
IWW was a response to the brutalities of industrial capitalism.  Carlton Parker explained that 
migratory laborers had “lost the conventional relationship to women and child life, lost its voting 
franchise, lost its habit of common comfort or dignity, and gradually become consciously a 
social class with fewer legal or social rights than are conventionally ascribed to Americans.”92  
Moreover, the NCLB argued that IWW organizing tactics were no different from those of the 
AFL.  The only thing that differentiated the IWW from other labor unions was its revolutionary 
rhetoric—its determination to claim for labor the power to dictate the terms of production.93  
And the NCLB’s justification of the organization’s revolutionary beliefs came sufficiently close 
to an endorsement to prompt a judge to condemn it for “teach[ing] the doctrine of sabotage and 
industrial terrorism.”94  In fact, when the NCLB issued its pamphlet in May, the government 
moved almost immediately to suppress it.  The Post Office declared it nonmailable, and the 
Department of Justice advised express companies not to deliver it.95
Divorcing support for a speaker’s right to espouse radical doctrine from the underlying 
content of the protected expression would become the hallmark of the ACLU’s free speech 
program.  Certainly in its advertisement for The New Republic and in other communications to 
liberals and progressives, the NCLB emphasized that one could oppose prosecutorial abuses 
without endorsing the program or conduct of the defendants.  During World War I, however, the 
NCLB had not yet wholly embraced this distinction.  In The Truth about the IWW, the NCLB did 
not argue that the IWW was entitled to express its anti-war views, no matter how noxious; 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Defense, US v. Haywood et al, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, Mich., acc. 130 (hereafter IWW Papers), box 118, folder 2, c16h.  
92 NCLB, Truth about the IWW, 11.  
93 Ibid., 31.  
94 C. H. Libby to Walter Nelles, 19 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 36 (reporting that his clients had been 
convicted for distributing the pamphlet).  
95 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 95.  
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indeed, without distinguishing between speech and conduct, it accepted the “full propriety of the 
government in suppressing ruthlessly any interference by the IWW with the war preparation.”  
Nor did it even suggest that the government was running afoul of the First Amendment by 
targeting the IWW’s advocacy of revolution.  The NCLB was arguing that in prosecuting the 
IWW for opposition to the war effort, the government was wrong.96  On the contrary, if there 
was a constitutional guarantee at stake in the government’s treatment of the IWW, it was not the 
liberty to speak, but rather “equality before the law.”97 In short, what the NCLB opposed in the 
IWW case was not the suppression of disfavored speech, but the suppression “of the normal 
economic protest-activities of the IWW.”  The government’s position was objectionable because 
it sought to attack the “symptom” of industrial oppression rather than the disease.98
In the spring of 1918, just as relations were souring between Baldwin and the War 
Department on the matter of conscientious objectors, the NCLB staked its reputation on a robust, 
substantive defense of an organization that was almost universally reviled.  By late March, the 
NCLB had agreed to raise bail for Bill Haywood. It had convened half a dozen conferences to 
generate support and publicity for the IWW’s cause.  It had pushed for a dismissal in 
negotiations with administration officials.  And it had provided legal assistance in preparing the 
defense.  Finally, it was circulating The Truth about the IWW to every individual, group, and 
public official conceivably interested in the case.
   
99
                                                          
96 NCLB, Truth about the IWW, 35 (“The public mind, and that of its agents in office, should open to an unbiased 
examination of the claim of the IWW that it is far from being an organization dominated by purposes that are 
subversive of this country’s purposes in the war, and that all its members want in return for their co-operation is a 
‘square deal.’”). 
 As Baldwin told a potential donor, “I doubt 
97 Robert Bruere, quoted in ibid., 46. 
98 Ibid., 12.  
99 Memorandum on IWW Cases, 14 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27 (noting that the pamphlet would 
be circulated, in addition to the usual NCLB mailing list, to the editors of all U.S. daily and weekly newspapers; to 
all labor and radical papers; to national magazines; to government officials throughout the country, including federal 
district attorneys, federal judges, state governors, and state attorneys general; to labor officials, including the AFL 
and the socialist parties; to university economics and sociology departments and to the national professional 
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whether anything more can be done to aid the IWW from the outside than has been done by this 
committee. We have risked the whole organization on it, for we realize that our motives and our 
work are both open to the most serious misinterpretation.”100 In doing all this, the NCLB spoke 
the language of constitutional liberties. But its true goal was more ambitious.  As Baldwin freely 
admitted, “a fair trial for these men [was] of the greatest public necessity to the industrial future 
of America.”101  Baldwin’s commitment was not limited to the Chicago trial.  By late spring, the 
IWW was under assault on multiple fronts.  With little left to lose, he told Vanderveer that the 
NCLB would provide general support in any case “where the issues of the right of agitation are 
involved.”102
 
 
The IWW Trial 
 The twelve jurors who were responsible for “decid[ing] the fate” of the defendants and 
with it “the future of American Labor organizations” were sworn in on May 1, 1918.103  That the 
trial began on “International Labor Day” was not lost on the defendants, who considered it an 
auspicious sign.104
                                                                                                                                                                                           
organizations of economists, sociologists, historians and political scientists; to the foreign mailing list of the 
International Socialist Party; to Christian socialist clergy; and to all public libraries in larger cities). 
  Indeed, when the proceedings finally began, the defendants were cautiously 
optimistic.  After sitting in their jail cells for months of quiet anticipation, they were excited at 
the opportunity to state their case publicly at last. The trial, in their view, was the “most 
monumental” in the history of the international labor movement, and it involved not only the 
100 Roger Baldwin to Jessie Ashley, 20 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Roger Baldwin to George Vanderveer, 26 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
103 Of the twelve men finally selected from a venire of 410, six were wage workers. The others were professionals 
and farmers. 
104 IWW Defense News Service, 2 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
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rights of the IWW, but the general “right of workingmen to organize and strike.”105 They hoped 
that their performance in the courtroom would “work great changes, not only in public opinion, 
but the general understanding of Labor Unionism and the great issues at stake.” And they were 
confident that “the more the workers of this nation find out about us the more they will like the 
One Big Union and the things it stands for.”106
The presiding judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis,
  
107 was a known conservative, but he 
had established a reputation for fairness after a grueling and contentious month of jury 
selection.108 Over the government’s vociferous objections, Landis had allowed Vanderveer to 
question prospective jurors about their economic views, including their opinions on social 
revolution.  He had conceded a theoretical right to change the existing system through direct 
industrial action, “if you can get enough people together to put it over,”109 and he had dismissed 
for cause those panel members who admitted that bias against the IWW in news accounts 
predisposed them toward conviction.  During the course of the trial, Landis regularly overruled 
the government’s objections to evidence about industrial unrest, blocked attempts to call 
witnesses without adequate notice to the defense,110 chastised reporters for their 
misrepresentations of witnesses’ testimony,111
                                                          
105 IWW Daily Bulletin No. 7, 9 April 1918, IWW papers, box 123, folder 18. 
 and rebuked the prosecution for attempting to 
106 IWW Daily Bulletin No. 2, IWW Papers, box 123, folder 13. 
107 Landis would soon leave the federal bench to become first commissioner of baseball, but not before presiding 
over the Espionage Act conviction of Victor Berger in December 1918.   
108 During that time, the prosecution and defense had wrangled over the class prejudices of potential jurors, and 
Landis had dismissed one venire of 200 based on charges that Socialist volunteers had been directly contacting the 
members of the venire. “200 Veniremen at IWW Trial Are Dismissed,” New York Tribune, 7 April 1918.  These 
allegations were later established to be false. “No Effort to Bribe IWW Jury,” New York Call, 9 April 1918.  The 
Socialist party had, however, agreed to distribute the Defense News Bulletin and IWW leaflets throughout the city.  
“Socialists of Chicago Aiding IWW Defense,” New York Evening Call, 15 March 1918. 
109 “Defense Wins New Point in IWW Case,” New York Call, 19 April 1918;  IWW Defense Bulletin, 18 April 1918, 
ACLU Papers, reel 4 , vol. 28. 
110 “Anti-IWW Witnesses Are Halted by Landis,” New York Evening Call, 29 May 1918. 
111 A Chicago Tribune reporter printed a story containing horrific descriptions of violence by members of the IWW.  
The account was given to him by witnesses outside of the courtroom, but his article implied that they had testified to 
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filter evidence.112  Most important, he openly conceded his belief that industry was guilty of 
“hoggish and unconscionable profiteering.”113
The legal team for the government was dominated by special prosecutors.  The United 
States attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, Charles Clyne, handled the early voir dire.  
He was outmatched by Vanderveer, however, and he soon ceded his role to Frank Nebeker, a 
former district attorney turned corporate lawyer who was a member of the Democratic National 
Committee.  Paul Hanna considered him a “cool and resourceful fighter, seemingly fearless,” and 
“much superior” to Clyne.
  
114 Baldwin thought he was an “honest lawyer,” but “narrow in the 
extreme, utterly without social vision, and with a thoroughly capitalistic” point of view.115 The 
department also enlisted the help of Claude Porter,116 a skilled government lawyer for the 
District of Iowa, and William C. Fitts, Assistant Attorney General of the United States and 
former Attorney General of the State of Alabama.117
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the events he described. Landis publicly rebuked him for his misleading reporting. IWW Bulletin No. 2, ACLU 
Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
  For the defense, Vanderveer was assisted 
by W. B. Cleary, an Arizona attorney who had been deported along with Bisbee strikers; Otto 
Christensen, a Chicago Socialist; and Caroline Lowe, a Socialist organizer and veteran of the 
112 For example, Landis criticized the prosecution for reading the condemnatory portion of a letter to the jury while 
omitting the exculpatory parts. Trial Bulletin 27, 15 May 1918, IWW Papers, Box 123, Folder 37; “Malicious IWW 
Yarn is Scored by Court,” New York Evening Call, 17 May 1918.  He was also attentive to the physical needs of the 
prisoners; he ensured that their food was sufficient and their hygiene adequate, and he went so far as to order the 
provision of cuspidors in the courtroom in deference to the defendants’ “right to chew tobacco.” IWW Daily 
Bulletin 3, 4 April 1918, ACLU Papers, Reel 5, Vol. 42; “I.W.W Like Judge Landis,” New York Tribune, 5 April 
1918, ACLU Papers, Reel 5, Vol. 42.  On the other hand, he scolded the IWW (outside the presence of the jury) for 
an article in the Industrial Worker that implicitly threatened the judge, jurors, and prosecutors with reprisal should a 
guilty verdict be returned. “IWW Threat Draws Warning From Judge at Chicago Trial,” New York Tribune, 8 May 
1918. 
113 IWW Trial Bulletin, 4 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. The quotation referred to the lumber industry.  
114 Paul Hanna to Roger Baldwin, 4 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28.  Oliver E. Pagah, a government 
indictment expert, was also involved. “Dramatic Trial of 125 IWW Begins,” New York Evening Call, 1 April 1918. 
115 Roger Baldwin to Mildred B. Wertheimer, 10 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
116 Porter told David Karsner that he was running for the governorship of Iowa and felt that remaining in Chicago 
and working on the IWW case better served his candidacy than return to Iowa to campaign.  “IWW Hunt on Before 
Draft Act Passed,” New York Evening Call, 14 June 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42.  
117 “W. C. Fitts” to Practice Here,” New York Times, 23 July 1918.  
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IWW’s free speech fights, who enrolled in law school at the age of forty and had recently been 
admitted to the bar. 
The case for the prosecution unfolded through the testimony of 150 witnesses over the 
course of seven weeks.118 It focused on the IWW’s allegedly unlawful methods, particularly 
sabotage, and its opposition to government policies, including conscription.  The government 
had spent months combing through the mass of evidence seized in the raids.  Despite its best 
efforts, it had been unable to substantiate the popular allegations that Germany had been 
financing the IWW.  On the contrary, the government accountant who had inspected the IWW’s 
financial records testified on cross-examination that he had been unable to trace any funds to 
anyone other than usual IWW donors.119  Moreover, only one defendant eligible for the draft had 
failed to register.120  Furloughed soldiers testified that they had maintained their IWW 
memberships until and even after they were drafted and had never been criticized by the 
organization for their military service.121 If the IWW leadership had wanted to halt production in 
crucial industries, Haywood and other witnesses claimed, it could easily have done so.  That the 
war effort was proceeding smoothly was evidence that interference had never been the 
organization’s aim.122
On the other hand, the government’s review of the evidence had uncovered letters, 
bulletins, and official publications expressing dissatisfaction with government policies and 
counseling conduct disruptive of the war effort.  The government introduced evidence that the 
IWW had urged men to “fight for their jobs and class,” that they had organized strikes in war 
 
                                                          
118 The stenographic record of the government’s case came to 13,000 pages. “End of IWW Trial Far Off,” New York 
Evening Post, 24 June 1918.   
119 Cross-examination of F. M. Bailey, IWW Papers, box 11, folder 103, 618. 
120 NCLB, Truth about the IWW, 55. 
121 “Chicago Trial Enters Last Month,” Labor Defender, 20 July 1980, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42. 
122 David Karsner, Bulletin 6, 19 August 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
130 
 
industries, and that they had advocated general strikes and revolution. Although the organization 
had been careful in its official communications, many of its leaders and members had expressed 
strong opposition to capitalist war, and some had even proposed sabotage within the armed 
forces.123 IWW strikers in Butte, Montana had carried a banner reading, “Down with War.”124  
Haywood himself admitted that the IWW had always been “opposed to war,” and that he “would 
have the war stopped today, if it were in [his] power to do it.”125 When pressed, he affirmed his 
belief that “industrial unionism is anti-military propaganda.”126 He seemingly conceded that 
although the IWW had not issued a direct statement urging its members to resist the draft, the 
logical result of proper industrial education would be a stance against participation. Finally, as 
David Karsner put it in his draft letter for the NCLB, it was hard to dispute that “the IWW [had] 
taken an advantage of the war situation” to improve its bargaining situation—though as Karsner 
noted, the Federal Trade Commission had proven that “the packers, the copper kings, and the 
lumber barons” had not hesitated to “reap their profits while the world wallows in blood.”127
The prosecution also devoted considerable attention to the IWW’s use of sabotage, 
ostensibly to hamper preparation for the war. According to the government, it was accepted 
IWW practice to drive spikes into logs, blow up threshing machines, place bombs on haystacks, 
remove machine parts, cut belts, steal freight cars, and destroy food in mills and warehouses.
 
128
                                                          
123 Prosecution Opening Statement, b24h–25h. 
 
But there was no evidence to substantiate these charges in the criminal records of individual 
members, and the department was unable to locate witnesses who could testify to actual 
destructive acts.  In the end, the government relied primarily on “the seditious and disloyal 
124 “Expect U.S. Will Close Its Case Today,” New York Evening Call, 17 June 1918. 
125Testimony, 10 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 117, Folder 2, c35c.  According to Haywood, headquarters had 
ceased to circulate explicitly anti-war material after the declaration of war. He conceded, however, that such 
materials were difficult to suppress immediately. Ibid., c25c–c28c.  
126 Ibid., e26c. 
127 David Karsner, “The IWW Case—An Idea on Trial” (draft), ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
128 “End of IWW Trial Far Off,” New York Evening Post, 24 June 1918. 
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character and teachings of the organization.”129  It quoted extensively in the courtroom from 
IWW poetry and songs, which, according to Vanderveer, merely reflected the organization’s 
utopian spirit.130
According to the defense, the IWW practiced only non-violent sabotage.
  
131  Expert 
witnesses testified that fires in threshing machines were the result of electrical shorts, not foul 
play.132 Government forest supervisors confirmed that the IWW had not started the rash of forest 
fires that had recently ravaged the West, but rather had been the most effective force in fighting 
them, despite long hours and low pay.133 A prosecution witness admitted on cross-examination 
that in his two months as a Montana sheriff during the IWW lumber strikes, he had witnessed no 
violence or destruction of property whatsoever.134  One IWW organizer explained that sabotage, 
in practice, simply meant holding back on the job; an employer could not expect ten dollars 
worth of work for two dollars pay.135 Ralph Chaplin, the editor of Solidarity, agreed.  Sabotage, 
he insisted, meant “good pay or bum work.”136
For Vanderveer, non-violent sabotage was simply one facet of the IWW’s larger strategy 
for shifting the balance of power in labor relations.  Vanderveer’s theory of the defense was 
precisely the same as the one espoused by the NCLB in its pamphlet. The IWW’s strikes and 
organizing campaigns in the summer of 1917 were not intended to thwart the war effort, he 
 
                                                          
129 The quotation is from a summary of the IWW’s criminal record compiled by William Fitts, quoted in Dubofsky, 
We Shall Be All, 433.  
130 “Jurors Hear IWW Songs as Evidence,” New York Evening Call, 10 May 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42. 
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135 Clipping, New York Evening Call, 12 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42 (quoting testimony of James 
Rowan). 
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argued.  They were legitimate responses to workers’ grievances against oppressive employers, 
and they were crucial weapons in a class struggle that was both inevitable and desirable.  As 
Vanderveer told Baldwin in April, “the economic defense” would have great “propaganda value” 
and, in addition, was “peculiarly effective in court.”137
According to the defense it was the brutal suppression of the IWW, not hostility toward 
America’s war aims, that had jumpstarted recruitment in the early months of the war. To prove 
that claim, the defense introduced evidence of the violent anti-IWW episodes of the previous 
summer, over the government’s objections. Witnesses recounted the horrific story of the 
Speculator Mine fire that cost 178 lives and precipitated the IWW’s strike in Butte, Montana, 
which the government alleged was an effort to cripple the wartime production of copper. One 
defendant had visited the morgue in the wake of the fire; he recounted “that the fingers of some 
of the corpses were worn to the second joint, with the bone protruding, as the result of the men 
clawing at the bulkheads.”
 
138  More than a thousand of the striking miners had been deported, 
including members of the AFL.139  Witnesses and perpetrators described the Bisbee deportations, 
the mounted machine guns trained on the men—many of whom owned Liberty Bonds, and 
hundreds of whom were registered for the draft—who were forced into automobiles and loaded 
into cattle cars covered in inches of manure.  The testimony of one defendant, Big Jim 
Thompson, was a rendition of his stump speech in lumber camps and on street corners.140
                                                          
137 George Vanderveer to Roger Baldwin, 1 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
  It 
138 “Court Probes Fire in IWW Case,” New York Evening Call, 3 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42. The 
actual cause of the deaths was more complicated. See Arnon Gutfeld, “The Speculator Disaster in 1917: Labor 
Resurgence at Butte, Montana,” Arizona and the West 11 (Spring 1969): 27–38.  
139 IWW Trial Bulletin No. 2, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
140 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 435.  
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“moved the witness to tears, as well as Vanderveer, several jurors, numerous defendants and 
several spectators.”141
In late July, the government finally halted the flood of heart-wrenching testimony in the 
only way it could.  It admitted that “evil social and economic conditions” had obtained in the 
northwestern lumber camps, in Butte, and in Arizona.
   
142  As for the persecution of the IWW, 
Nebeker argued it was a consequence rather than a cause of the organization’s militancy.  He 
asked the jury to ponder what kind of conduct could be so “exasperating” that “in practically 
every state in this union, these fellows get into trouble.”143  Notably, Nebeker cited the IWW’s 
free speech fights as an example of this phenomenon. By overwhelming the municipal court 
systems and forcing their release, Nebeker argued, the IWW were asking for extralegal justice—
though he was quick to note that he was “simply speaking from human nature” and that 
vigilantes had no “right” to act as they did.144
In the end, Judge Landis allowed the defense to present a robust picture of the abuses that 
the IWW had suffered at the hands of employers.
   
145
                                                          
141 “Nebeker Fails to Stop IWW Recital,” New York Evening Call, 27 June 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42. 
  One evidentiary dispute, however, stood out 
as particularly contentious and especially important.  Vanderveer’s broad ambition, as he and 
Baldwin had been proclaiming for months, was to put the entire industrial system on trial.  In 
furtherance of that goal, he sought to introduce into evidence the report of the Commission on 
Industrial Relations.  The report documented the terrible injustices of the existing industrial 
system, and Vanderveer claimed that it amounted to government affirmation of the IWW’s 
142 It also admitted that there were few purported episodes of sabotage relative to the number of lumber mills in the 
northwest; that IWW members fought forest fires on government preserves; and that farmers in the Dakotas were 
pleased with IWW labor. “U.S. Admits 6 Vital Points in IWW Trial,” New York Call, 24 July 1918. 
143 Prosecution Closing Argument, c9h. 
144 Ibid., c11h. 
145 Initially, the government was successful in excluding The New Freedom. “Landis Bars Wilson’s New Freedom in 
IWW Trial,” New Age (Buffalo), 28 June 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42. Later, however, a witness was 
permitted to read much of it into evidence.  “Wilson’s Book Read into Big IWW Trial,” New York Call, 3 August 
1918. 
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complaints. It was a banner of respectability in the effort to secure labor’s rights, and it was 
among the organization’s most successful recruitment and organizing tools.  In short, it was the 
“Bible of the IWW.”146  After a lengthy and heated argument, Judge Landis decided that the 
report was irrelevant, and he refused to admit it into evidence.147  Later, however, he qualified 
his ruling.  The IWW had published a compendium of the report in pamphlet form, to distribute 
to its members and supporters.  In its abbreviated version, Landis agreed to let it in.148
In his opening statement, Vanderveer recited the report’s most salient findings.  Seventy-
nine percent of working families were unable to support themselves, he said. The working 
people, sixty-five percent of America’s population, owned less than five percent of the nation’s 
wealth.  The wealthiest two percent owned two-thirds of the country’s real and personal 
property.
  
149  Large corporations were earning monopoly profits. Industry was trampling on 
workers’ health as well as public safety.  These conditions were unjust, but they were not 
irremediable. The goal of the IWW was to counter the concentration of industrial strength 
through organization of the workers.150
Nebeker denounced the report as blatantly partisan, a “forum for cranks and fanatics,” 
and he was desperate to keep it out of the trial.  According to Nebeker, “general industrial 
conditions in this country [were] not involved in this case at all.” The appropriate venues for 
redressing unjust conditions, he insisted, were the legislatures and the courts.  Workers had no 
business taking matters into their own hands, particularly in a time of national emergency.
  The capitalists understood the danger that a powerful 
workers’ movement posed, and it was doing everything possible to shut it down. 
151
                                                          
146 Defense Opening Statement, 24 June 1918, IWW Papers, box 108, folder 7, a5h–6h. 
  In 
147 “IWW Can’t Use Industrial Report,” New York Call, 25 June 1918. 
148 “Evidence for Defense Begins at IWW Trial,” New York Weekly People, 13 July 1918.  
149 Defense Opening Statement, a5h–6h. 
150 “Attorney Vanderveer’s Speech for IWW Defense,” New York Weekly People, 25 June 1918. 
151 Defense Opening Statement, a8h.   
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Nebeker’s view (albeit one he backed away from in his closing argument), even a “folded arm 
strike” was unlawful during wartime.152
To Vanderveer, Nebeker’s objection was symptomatic of a deeper misapprehension of 
syndicalist ideology and of the IWW’s goals.
 
153 The organization was not “aimed at the 
government,” he explained, but rather at exploitation.154 Existing wages and working conditions 
were determined by “the organized efforts of employers against the organized or unorganized 
employees.”155  Although Vanderveer understood that the legal system structured and regulated 
economic exchange, he emphasized that there was no law setting wages at any particular level.  
On the contrary, such a law would be struck down as unconstitutional.156  After all, the courts’ 
view was precisely the one that Nebeker had stressed in his own opening statement: that the 
“wage system” was a matter of negotiation between contending parties, a product of that 
“fundamental right,” both natural and constitutional, “of all men to contract with each other.”157
Nebeker believed the IWW wanted to “do away with” that system, but the reality was 
quite the opposite. Just as there was “no law which gives the right to exploit,” there was “no law 
 
Employers appropriated the profits that belonged to the workers because they had the economic 
power to do so.  
                                                          
152 Ibid., F1c–F2c. In his closing argument, Nebeker said that the legality of an ordinary strike during wartime was 
not at issue in the case.  Prosecution Closing Argument, 17 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 118, folder 2, c2c. 
153 Vanderveer explained: “Counsel says he cannot . . . understand what I mean when I say we are not attacking 
political conditions; his mind runs in political groves, mine runs in a social groove. Nothing was ever further from 
the purpose of this organization than to interfere with any established political condition or any established legal 
condition.” Defense Opening Statement, d4h. 
154 Ibid., A9h. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Vanderveer summarized the matter: “The Supreme Court of the United States has said you cannot fix hours of 
labor by law, except in the ten hours women’s case in Oregon, which Justice Brandeis took up; those things are not 
only not required to be settled by law, but cannot be, within the provisions of our constitution. Then how are you 
going to do it? Your honor tried it by twenty-nine million dollar fines. I have not heard that any of it was ever paid. 
It has been tried by trust-busting. It has been tried by this method and the other method. It is all right to try them—
no harm, but this method by which the system itself was established can by employed against it with just as much 
law and just as much right as it was originally employed to establish it.” Ibid., d5h–6h. 
157 Prosecution Opening Statement, b13h. 
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which stays a man in his effort to prevent it.”  The IWW hoped to counter exploitation by the 
only means possible: industrial organization.  Workers and capitalists were locked in simple 
power struggle, and there was no middle ground.  If the workers through organization cut 
employers’ profits low enough, the profit system would fall. On the other hand, if employers “cut 
our wages low enough, then our morals and our civilization will topple and fall.”158 In this 
conflict, labor’s most effective tool was “direct action,” the IWW’s signature method.  For 
example, workers might “bring the strike to the job” by laying down their tools after eight hours 
of labor.159  They might refuse to carry too heavy a load.160  They would use precisely the 
techniques that the government denounced as unlawful sabotage.  The IWW was not opposed to 
democratic processes, Vanderveer clarified.161  In fact, it “believe[ed] so completely and 
absolutely in our form of government, that it want[ed] to extend it to industry.”162  But there was 
no reason to resort to political action to accomplish something non-political.163
 There is, of course, no way of knowing what the jury made of Vanderveer’s arguments 
about the injustices of American capitalism—whether they considered and rejected them, or 
disregarded them altogether. In his closing argument, Nebeker flatly declared that “the industrial 
system of this country is not on trial.”
  
164
                                                          
158 Defense Opening Statement, d5h–6h. 
  He condemned war profiteering, and he acknowledged 
that there were people in the United States who were “living on less than they need for 
159 David Karsner, “The IWW Case—An Idea on Trial” (draft), ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28 (recounting testimony 
on lumber strike).  
160 “Evidence for Defense Begins at IWW Trial,” New York Weekly People, 13 July 1918 (testimony of James P. 
Thompson). 
161 Similarly, Haywood testified that the IWW was non-political rather than anti-political, and that many of its 
members took part in political action.  Testimony of William Haywood, 9 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 116, 
folder 5.  
162 Defense Opening Statement, b3c–5c 
163 Ibid. Haywood also noted that many of the least privileged workers were denied the vote, including migratory 
workers (who did not live in a state long enough to satisfy the residency requirement), black workers, and children. 
Testimony of William Haywood, 9 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 116, folder 5, f3h–f5h.  
164 Prosecution Closing Argument, c5h.  
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wholesome lives.”  These circumstances, however, were “no legal justification” for the attitude 
of the IWW.  The IWW had practiced sabotage, and its militancy ran afoul of the law.165 
Nebeker insisted that the government had no desire to criticize any “honest” and “patriotic” labor 
organization (implicitly, the AFL).166  He conceded that many members of the IWW were 
sincere and hard-working, including the soldiers who had testified on the organization’s behalf.  
But these rank-and-file members did not understand the true purposes of the organization. The 
defendants, with their “soft hands and hard faces,”167 were of a different breed.  In concluding, 
Nebeker explained that during the past twenty-five years a “remarkable change has taken place 
along the lines of progressive legislation for the purposes of equalizing these unequal 
conditions.”168
Judge Landis’s instructions to the jury were accepted by both parties as essentially fair.  
Landis clarified that the defendants were not on trial for having committed sabotage, except 
insofar as its practices were part of a conspiracy to undermine the war effort.
  Refusing to acknowledge the capacity of American political institutions to solve 
inequalities of wealth was in Nebeker’s estimation a declaration that American institutions were 
a “failure”—a charge that he trusted the jury would not make. 
169  On the other 
hand, he echoed Nebeker’s insistence that neither “lawful organized labor” nor “our industrial 
society” were on trial.  Landis accepted Vanderveer’s argument that workers were entitled to 
aggregate their power as a means of improving bargaining position in their negotiations with 
employers.  He even agreed that the rights of workers to organize were “as broad and as 
complete in time of war as they are in time of peace.”170
                                                          
165 Ibid., c4h. 
 If the sole objective of the IWW had 
166 Ibid., c2c. 
167 Ibid., c4h. 
168 Ibid., c6h. 
169 Jury Instructions, IWW Papers, box 118, 24h–25h. 
170 Ibid., 34h–35h.  
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been to secure better labor conditions and higher wages, then they were not guilty of the crimes 
charged—subject to the qualification that individuals are responsible for the natural and 
necessary consequences of their acts. Landis concluded that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the government’s fifth count, conspiracy to violate the postal laws, and he removed it 
from the jury’s consideration.171 The rest he submitted to the jury with “no expression of opinion 
as to the ultimate question of guilt[].”172
Inexplicably, Vanderveer declined to make a closing argument.
 
173  Reporters, observers, 
and historians have debated whether he was overconfident, defeatist, or simply convinced that 
the evidence would speak for itself.  Certainly, many of the defendants expected to be acquitted. 
Throughout the summer, the radical press had reported that the IWW had the stronger case, and 
courtroom spectators agreed.174
On August 17, 1918, the jury in the Chicago trial returned a verdict of guilty on all counts 
and as to all defendants, after half an hour of deliberation. As Vanderveer noted in his 
unsuccessful motion for a new trial, that amounted to five seconds of consideration per 
verdict.
  If Vanderveer found the principles of IWW ideology so 
convincing that he believed a wartime jury could be persuaded to embrace them, the swift and 
unanimous verdict taught him otherwise.   
175 To the defendants, the jury’s decision was “a shock, a thunderbolt from a clear 
sky.”176  Haywood tried to dismiss the judgment as a conviction of individuals rather than the 
IWW as a whole, but it was clear that much more was at stake.177
                                                          
171 Ibid., a2h.  
  Baldwin told Haywood that 
the verdict was a “surprise to every one of us, though in war time we may expect to have just 
172 Ibid., 16h.  
173 Prosecution Closing Argument, c21h. 
174 E.g., Mildred S. Wertheimer to Roger Baldwin, 26 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27 (reporting that she 
had heard “the trial is going to the decided advantage of the IWW”).  
175 Argument on Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial, 27 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 118, folder 4, 12348-9. 
176 Undated bulletin, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
177 “The Closing Chapter,” New Haven Register, 31 August 1918. 
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such results.”178
Despite their disappointment, the defendants pronounced the trial fair.
  Juries in earlier Espionage Act cases had convicted defendants far less reviled 
on evidence far less damning. 
179  Judge Landis, 
they admitted, had “proved himself to be impartial in all respects.”180 Haywood thought that he 
had been “absolutely square throughout the whole trial.”181  Nonetheless, he considered the 
verdict a great mistake, “one of the greatest blunders ever committed in a court of justice.” The 
IWW had acted lawfully and morally, he insisted, and on his release, he would continue to 
advocate and uphold the “principles, aims and purposes of the Industrial Workers of the 
World.”182
For all of Landis’s fairness during trial, the sentences he handed down were harsh.  
Haywood received the legal maximum of twenty years in prison, as did fourteen others in the 
organization’s highest leadership.  Thirty-three received ten-year terms.  All told, ninety-three of 
the defendants were bound for Leavenworth, in what constituted the largest single arrival of 
prisoners in its history.
 
183  In his remarks at the sentencing hearing, Landis expressed his belief 
that the jury’s judgment was correct. He cited internal documents and IWW publications as well 
as letters by Haywood and other IWW leaders professing opposition to the conscription laws.  
He noted that two local branches had gone so far as to advocate a general strike to undermine 
enforcement of the draft.184
                                                          
178 Roger Baldwin to Bill Haywood, 26 August 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
 Notwithstanding the IWW’s stated justifications for its strikes, the 
jury had been justified in inferring that they were “directly and necessarily calculated” to 
179 “Haywood Says Trial Was Fair,” New York Call, 22 August 1918.  
180 Undated bulletin, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
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182 Sentencing, 29 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 118, folder 6, b3m. 
183 Clipping, Weekly People (Chicago), 21 September 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 42. The prisoners were 
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obstruct both the production of war equipment and registration for the draft. In fact, “the jury 
could not have done anything else on this evidence but find a verdict of guilty.”185
Nebeker, of course, celebrated the government’s successful resolution of “America’s 
greatest criminal case.”
   
186 In the wake of the trial, he advised the Department of Labor to devote 
more attention to the problem of migratory and foreign workers—to treat them in a “sympathetic 
way, to the end that they will feel no need for such an organization as the IWW.”  Once that task 
was accomplished, he said, state and national governments “should pass such laws as are 
necessary to prohibit revolutionary movements of all kinds.”  The wartime legislation had 
enabled the government to secure a conviction, but existing laws were “wholly insufficient as a 
means of dealing with such an organization as the IWW during times of peace.”187 The 
overwhelmingly positive public reaction to the verdict suggests that many Americans agreed.188  
Not one AFL affiliate publicly denounced the convictions.189
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Vanderveer made many of the same arguments that he 
had made throughout the proceedings and in his motion for a new trial.
   
190
                                                          
185 Ibid., a35h-36h. He did not think, however, that the IWW was working to further German war aims.  
  First, he claimed that 
the evidence failed to bear out the charge that the members of the IWW had conspired to obstruct 
the war effort or the draft.  Many of the defendants were never connected to the conspiracy 
186 “The Closing Chapter,” New Haven Register, 31 August 1918. 
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reel 5, vol. 42. 
189 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 437.  Haywood blamed Gompers’s anti-IWW propaganda since 1916 for the 
prosecution and conviction. “$374,000 needed to Release Haywood and His Companions in Leavenworth,” New 
York Call, 3 April 1919.   
190 Upon conclusion of the Government’s case, all of the defendants moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on 
count four. Some made a similar request with respect to count three.  These motions were denied, as were 
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141 
 
except by unsupported allegations of membership in the organization.191
Vanderveer also argued that the convictions were constitutionally flawed.  Among other 
theories, he suggested that the government’s confiscation of IWW belongings during the raids 
and the subsequent introduction of the confiscated documents into evidence violated the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
  Some of the defendants 
were opposed to war in general, and the war in Germany, along with conscription, in particular. 
But many had never mentioned the war or conscription in any of their correspondence. And the 
organization’s own position was, at worst, ambivalent. Some of its leaders believed that 
opposition was justified, but others disagreed, and the official correspondence tended to leave the 
decision to individual conscience.  
192 According to Vanderveer, the 
warrants issued before the September 1917 raids were invalid—indeed, he wrote, their invalidity 
would “scarcely be disputed by the Government”—because they failed to recite facts 
establishing probable cause for a search and did not describe the articles to be seized.193 In its 
brief, the government chastised the defendants for attempting “to escape the legal consequences 
of criminal activities because some of the evidence which admittedly showed their guilt was 
obtained by means which they resent.”194
                                                          
191 Ibid., 14. 
 Vanderveer thought those were “strange words by 
which to characterize the conduct of men seeking the preservation of their most fundamental 
192 The defendants (with a handful of exceptions) had moved separately to quash the indictment because the 
evidence upon which it was based had been seized from them illegally. Their motions were denied. On February 1, 
they filed a motion for the return of the papers. While that motion was pending, the Government filed petitions 
requesting that the documents, which were the primary evidentiary basis for the prosecution, be impounded for use 
at trial. Judge Landis denied the defendants’ motions and granted the government’s requests. More than fifteen 
thousand of the seized documents were entered into the record over the defendants’ objections on Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment grounds. Appellants’ Seventh Circuit Brief, 403. 
193 Ibid., 2–3.  
194 Appellees’ Supplemental Reply Brief, 67, Seventh Circuit, IWW Papers, box 122. 
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constitutional liberties,”195 but when the IWW’s appeal was decided in 1920, they aptly reflected 
the legal and political landscape.  The court accepted Vanderveer’s assessment of the warrants 
but concluded that each defendant was seeking the return of property that had never been in his 
individual possession and to which, consequently, he had no right.  It rejected Vanderveer’s 
theory that an unlawful invasion of the privacy of one of the defendants was a constitutional 
breach available to all, finding that the IWW was not a partnership, but a voluntary association, 
and that the defendants had been indicted as individuals, not as members of the organization.196  
In 1923, the American Law Reports would cite the Haywood case for the rule that “an unlawful 
search and seizure of property of a voluntary association does not make the evidence found 
inadmissible against individual members of the association.”197
 Vanderveer raised a final argument during trial and on appeal, but it received no serious 
consideration from the courts. He argued that the defendants’ conviction was unconstitutional 
because the only basis for a finding of illegal activity was the speeches, literature, and private 
correspondence articulating the IWW’s position on militarism and conscription.  Put simply, if 
the defendants had a right to express disapproval of the war, then their speech and writing could 
not be counted as illegal activity in support of the indictment.
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195 He continued, “Such has been the plea of every tyrant from time immemorial; and by this plea one can justify the 
worst form of tyranny that ever existed. But neither the plea of counsel nor the autocratic abuses he seeks to excuse, 
can find favor with any court where constitutional rights and personal liberties are held in proper esteem.” 
Appellants’ Supplemental Reply Brief, 21, IWW Papers, box 122. 
  On that theory, Vanderveer had 
requested an instruction to the jury on “the right of free speech as defined in the First 
196 Osmond Fraenkel, later a prominent ACLU attorney, thought that the court’s rulings on this issue were 
substantially correct, as a matter of existing law. Osmond Fraenkel to Albert DeSilver, 11 November 1920, ACLU 
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Amendment.”199  According to Vanderveer, what the government alleged in the third and fourth 
counts of the indictment was “a conspiracy to abuse the rights of free speech, free press and free 
assemblage,” and there was no way for the jury to determine whether the communications 
ascribed to the defendants exceeded those rights unless they were instructed on the nature of the 
First Amendment.200  Judge Landis, however, submitted no instruction regarding free speech at 
all. In his view, free speech was not an issue in the case. “When the country is at peace it is a 
legal right of free speech to oppose going to war and to oppose even preparation for war,” Landis 
explained, “but when once war is declared, this right ceases.” Similarly, after the declaration of 
war and before passage of the Conscription Act, “it was the legal right of free speech to oppose 
the adaption of the compulsory military service law.”  Once the law was passed, however, free 
speech was an illegitimate basis for continuing to resist it.201
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit did not mention the First Amendment or free speech.  
The closest it came was to consider and reject Vanderveer’s claim that the conviction was 
improperly based on literature produced before American entry into the war.  Some of the 
correspondence and publications, the court explained, evinced a purpose to oppose the war and 
the draft even in the event that legislation was passed, and they were therefore admissible as 
evidence of criminal intent.  Moreover, the defendants had continued to circulate some of the 
unlawful materials once war was declared.  That the expressions of opinion contained in the 
   
                                                          
199 During jury selection, one of Vanderveer’s questions to potential jurors was, “Do you believe in free speech—
that the more important a thing is the more necessary it is to have it well thought over and discussed?” IWW Daily 
Bulletin 20, 26 April 1918, IWW Papers, box 123, folder 30.   
200 Petition for Rehearing, Seventh Circuit, IWW Papers, box 123, folder 2. 
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documents might have been protected under the First Amendment evidently fell in the category 
of claims “of trivial consequence,” not sufficiently plausible to warrant express consideration.202
The court did reverse the defendants’ convictions under the first and second counts, but 
its ruling was based on the redundancy of the charges and the inapplicability of the peacetime 
federal criminal code, not the sufficiency of the evidence or the constitutional grounds that 
Vanderveer had proposed.
   
203
                                                          
202 Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 807 (7th Cir. 1920).  Vanderveer quoted the Supreme Court’s approval in 
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), of the court’s instruction to the jury that it should not find the defendant 
guilty unless the “natural effect” of his words was to obstruct recruitment and “the defendant had the specific intent 
to do so in his mind.” Appellants’ Seventh Circuit Reply Brief, 58. In its brief, the government considered the 
Abrams case to be dispositive of the intent issue. Appellees’ Supplemental Reply Brief, 107. In Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 621 (1919), the Supreme Court had rejected the defendants’ claim that their intent was to 
prevent American interference in the Russian revolution, not to hamper the war effort in Germany, holding that 
“men must be held to have intended, and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce.”   
 Still, that the court affirmed only the convictions under the wartime 
legislation was significant.  The court specifically rejected the theory that the IWW, by 
organizing strikes against producers with whom the government expected to contract, violated 
sections of the penal code prohibiting conspiracies to hinder the execution of United States laws 
or to interfere with the exercise of rights or privileges guaranteed to citizens.  Such an 
interpretation might have rendered all peacetime strikes illegal under federal law, even during 
peacetime, a position that the court was unwilling to endorse.  The court explained: “Defendants’ 
203 With respect to the first count, it held that the penal provisions of the Espionage Act and Selective Service Acts 
“constitute[d] the specific directions of Congress for the punishment of all obstructions, forcible or otherwise, of the 
recruiting and enlistment service.” Haywood, 268 F. at 799. Because Congress would not have intended to impose 
punishment twice for the same offense, those statutes trumped the general provisions of Section 6 of the criminal 
code. As for interference with the operations of suppliers of provisions and munitions to the Government, while 
Congress could have protected and eventually did protect these producers, to some extent, by express legislation, 
Section 6 was not a specific war provision and would continue to apply during peacetime to all entities transacting 
business with the Government.  Given that practically any good might be used in the production of materials 
purchased by the government, the prosecution’s broad construction of Section 6 would have subjected all striking 
workers to punishment. The court explained that “producers, who have contracts to furnish the Government with 
supplies, are not thereby made officials of the Government.”  Ibid., 800. The prima facie meaning of Section 6, the 
court concluded, “condemns force only when a conspiracy exists to use it against some person who has authority to 
execute and who is immediately engaged in executing a law of the United States.”  Ibid. The court disposed 
similarly of the second count, based on Section 19 of the Penal Code, applicable in cases of conspiracy to injure 
citizens of the United States in the exercise of any “right or privilege secured to [them] by the Constitution and laws 
of the United States.” The government alleged that the IWW had run afoul of this provision by preventing producers 
from fulfilling their contracts with the Government for war munitions and supplies. The court stated decisively that 
“to produce, to sell, to contract to sell to any buyer, are not rights or privileges conferred by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.” Ibid., 801.  
145 
 
force was exerted only against producers in various localities. Defendants thereby may have 
violated local laws. With that we have nothing to do. Federal crimes exist only by virtue of 
federal statutes; and the lawmakers owe the duty to citizens and subjects of making unmistakably 
clear those acts for the commission of which the citizen or subject may lose his life or liberty.”204
 Over the coming years, the NCLB would work to ameliorate the situation of the IWW 
defendants in whatever way it could.  Its efforts began in September 1918, with an open letter to 
the president.
 
Notwithstanding this concession, the defense team regarded the appeal as a defeat. The 
defendants would remain in prison. The IWW, with the help of the NCLB, would have to pursue 
non-judicial channels in their attempt to get them out. 
205  By the fall, it was clear that direct appeals to the merits of labor radicalism 
would not persuade the administration or the American public that the IWW prisoners were 
worthy of executive clemency.  The NCLB therefore stressed irregularities in the investigation 
and prosecution of the case, with particular emphasis on administrative abuses.  This was not a 
new strategy.  In a July 1918 Bulletin, the IWW accused the government of “deliberately 
conniving to prevent men from having a fair and impartial trial” by shutting down the 
organization’s newsletters, seizing IWW mail, and preventing fundraising and organizing 
events.206
                                                          
204 Ibid., 800.  
  The NCLB’s involvement, however, brought a measure of authority to these charges.  
Of course, the civil liberties group had been emphasizing the American commitment to judicial 
fairness ever since the indictments were filed in September 1917.  But its previous statements 
were careful not to antagonize the NCLB’s would be allies in the administration.  In The New 
Republic advertisement, for example, cautious supporters had convinced Baldwin to omit 
205 Open Letter from the NCLB to President Wilson, 27 September 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43. 
206 Bulletin, 26 July 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
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allegations of government misconduct.  The revised approach, by contrast, was to accuse the 
Department of Justice of deliberate and lawless interference with the IWW’s defense.   
The letter to Wilson emphasized that federal agents had continued to raid the national and 
local offices of the IWW long after the initial warrant had expired.  They had seized typewriters, 
stationery, cash, and other implements that were obviously irrelevant to the indictments—and 
were never introduced at trial—but were clearly necessary to the defense.  They had arrested but 
failed to prosecute members of IWW defense committees throughout the country.  On 
government orders, defense news literature was returned undelivered by express companies to 
committee headquarters.207  First-class mail from the general defense committee was almost 
always held at Chicago, and registered letters, many containing checks, were held, opened, 
officially re-sealed and delivered only months later. Judge Landis had censured justice agents for 
intimidating defense witnesses.  Even outside attempts to aid the defense were targeted. The 
Department of Justice had warned The New Republic that re-running the NCLB’s advertisement 
would subject the publication to criminal investigation, and it had forbidden circulation of the 
NCLB’s pamphlet without ever declaring it non-mailable. These methods were “unparalleled in 
modern criminal prosecutions” and were “obviously open to the suspicions of being conducted 
not so much to obtain evidence as to embarrass the defense.”208
 The Wilson administration did not acknowledge the NCLB’s letter.  In fact, the 
government’s campaign against the IWW only intensified after the Chicago conviction, even 
while the Department of Justice chose not to pursue other cases under the Espionage Act.
   
209
                                                          
207 Haywood testified that defense literature mailed by the American Express Company was returned with a 
message: “These packages were not delivered on account of orders issued by the government.”  Testimony of 
William Haywood, 10 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 117, folder 2, c10c.  
  In 
Sacramento, twenty members of the IWW arrested in the September raids, along with a second 
208 Open Letter from the NCLB to President Wilson, 27 September 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43. 
209 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 113.  
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contingent arrested at the urging of local enforcement,210 were forced to wait in jail while the 
Department of Justice focused on the Chicago trial.  The defendants spent over a year in prison, 
during which time several died of the flu.  Despite the utter paucity of evidence against them, 
they were indicted in February 1918 on the same charges filed in Chicago.  Unlike their Chicago 
counterparts, they fully expected a conviction, and all but three chose to underscore the injustice 
of the American legal system by making no defense in court. All were convicted by a jury in 
under an hour.211  Another trial took place in Wichita, Kansas, where twenty-seven Wobblies 
arrested in a federal raid had languished in jail for more than two years while indictments were 
periodically filed and then quashed on technicalities.  During this time, the NCLB fought 
publicly against the horrendous conditions at the Wichita jail. After persistent urging, the 
Department of Justice agreed to inspect the jail and eventually ordered the prisoners transferred.  
The defendants finally went to trial in December 1919, and twenty-six were convicted.212  Like 
the Chicago case, the Sacramento and Wichita verdicts were unsuccessfully appealed.213
                                                          
210 The second group was arrested in the wake of an explosion at the California executive mansion in December 
1917.  State authorities pressured Washington to investigate IWW involvement in the case, and though a federal 
agent found no evidence implicating the IWW—years later, federal officials would determine that the episode was a 
reelection ploy by a district attorney—the justice department made more Wobbly arrests.  Dubofsky, We Shall Be 
All, 440.  
 
Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied in all cases.  The estimated cost of litigating the 
211 One of the defendants, a well-connected easterner with little relationship to the rest of the group, rejected the 
“silent defense” strategy and opted to hire a lawyer, which she did with the support and assistance of the NCLB.  
Although she too was convicted, she received no prison term.  Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 438–41; Johnson, 
Challenge to American Freedoms, 101–04.  
212 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 105–09. 
213 The Wichita case charged essentially the same offenses as the Chicago case (substituting in count 2 violation of 
the Food Control, or Lever Act, when the judge dismissed charges under the count equivalent to count 2 of the 
Chicago case).  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the convictions on the first count, the same as 
count 1 in the Chicago case.  Anderson v. United States, 273 F. 20 (8th Cir. 1921); Otto Christensen, Statement 
Submitted to the Attorney General of the United States Concerning the Present Legal Status of the IWW Cases, 22, 
box 131, folder 131-2. See generally Earl Bruce White, “The United States v. C. W. Anderson et al.: The Wichita 
Case, 1917–1919,” in At the Point of Production: The Local History of the IWW, ed. Joseph R. Conlin (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1981), 143–64; Clayton R. Koppes, “The Kansas Trial of the I.W.W., 1917–1919,” Labor History 
16 (1975): 339–58.  The Sacramento case was appealed only by the three defendants who were represented by 
lawyers.  National Civil Liberties Bureau, Memorandum Regarding the Persecution of the Radical Labor Movement 
in the United States (undated), ACLU Papers, reel 7, vol. 69.  
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three federal conspiracy cases to conclusion was $225,000, “a larger sum than ha[d] ever been 
spent by a labor organization in defending itself in a criminal trial.”214 To the end, the NCLB 
assisted in raising funds.215
 While these trials were pending, the NCLB pursued its final strategy for helping the 
beleaguered IWW: it mounted a national amnesty campaign on behalf not only of the IWW 
prisoners, but of all prisoners convicted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts.  At first, the 
organization was optimistic about the prospects for amnesty at the end of the war.
  
216  It 
emphasized that the Department of Justice had targeted only radical labor groups, and that there 
was no evidence of any actual spy convicted under the wartime laws.  Several respected liberals 
were urging better treatment for “political prisoners,”217 and a proposal for amnesty for court-
martialed prisoners attracted broad-based support.218 The NCLB hoped to translate this sentiment 
into a movement for the Espionage Act prisoners’ release. But there was little public enthusiasm 
for the NCLB’s position.  The NCLB’s efforts to create amnesty committees in local 
communities were denounced as unpatriotic, and its attempted mass meetings were sparsely 
attended.219
                                                          
214 Press Release (undated), ACLU Papers, reel 25, vol. 181. 
   
215 Advertisement for the Nation (signed by John Graham Brooks, Ernst Freund, Percy Stickney Grant, Florence 
Kelley, Henry Mussey, Thorstein Veblen, and Harry Ward), ACLU Papers, reel 25, vol. 181 (raising funds for a 
challenge in the Supreme Court, focusing on the illegality of the search warrants); ACLU Press Release, 8 March 
1921, reel 25, vol. 181 (announcing a drive for funds to appeal “the greatest free speech trial of the war”).  
216 Citing Thomas Jefferson’s general amnesty for those convicted under the sedition law of 1798, “a statute far less 
drastic than the Espionage Act,” the NCLB anticipated favorable public response to a postwar amnesty. “Liberties 
Bureau Takes Issue with Gregory” (clipping), ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43. 
217 E.g., Upton Sinclair to Newton Baker, October 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 50 (asking for “enlightened 
humanity” in treatment of those prisoners who were in jail for “carrying on propaganda against the draft or against 
our participation in the war” and whose opposition was “openly and honestly expressed, . . . based upon religious or 
humanitarian grounds”). 
218 Senator Borah and other progressive senators urged general amnesty for those convicted during the war by court-
martial, based on arbitrariness in sentencing. Clipping, New York Call, 28 January 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 
41. 
219 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 109–18.  
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President Wilson was favorably disposed toward a partial amnesty but consistently 
deferred to his advisors, who were staunchly opposed.220 Attorney General Thomas Gregory 
insisted that none of the prisoners had been convicted for merely expressing their opinions.221 To 
Gregory, the Espionage Act defendants were not political prisoners, but criminals and traitors 
who deserved to be in jail.  When the NCLB issued a pamphlet, “Why Should There Be an 
Amnesty,” he dismissed its arguments as “entirely fallacious.”222  A. Mitchell Palmer, who 
replaced Gregory as Attorney General in March 1919, held similar views.  Both men were 
willing to consider leniency in particular cases, and each recommended about fifty 
commutations, but both counseled against further action. The advent of the Red Scare only 
exacerbated matters. In the summer of 1919, Wilson communicated his intention to pardon “all 
American citizens in prison or under arrest on account of anything they have said in speech or in 
print concerning their personal opinions.”  Palmer was adamant that no such cases existed.  He 
told the press that “no men were in prison because of their expression of views on social, 
economic or political questions, including the war,” and he persuaded Wilson to resist mounting 
pressure for the release of Eugene V. Debs, among other prisoners.223
                                                          
220 The NCLB did not endorse the partial amnesty proposals.  It considered a general amnesty to be the “only 
possible solution,” explaining that “any attempt at mere commutation of sentences and pardon in occasional cases 
would only serve to increase the bitterness of the many friends and sympathizers of those who remain in prison, and 
will give color to the charge which will inevitably be made that justice in America is a matter of favor and 
influence.” “Liberties Bureau Takes Issue with Gregory” (clipping), ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43. 
 Within the Department of 
Justice, amnesty for convicted socialists—though not the IWW—was gaining support. Palmer, 
however, would not capitulate even on the most obviously political of prisoners.  In fact, he was 
221 Ibid. 
222 Quoted in Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 112.  
223 “Political Prisoners in U.S. Total 1,500, Estimates Bureau,” New York Tribune, 10 March 1919. 
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initiating new Espionage Act prosecutions for, among other things, the distribution of amnesty 
literature, and he was publicly advocating a peacetime sedition law.224
All told, the amnesty campaign would drag on for fifteen years.  In 1921, President 
Warren G. Harding met with an ACLU delegation and commuted the sentences of Debs and 
twenty-four others, including six members of the IWW.
  
225  But in the face of threats of 
vigilantism by the American Legion and so-called patriotic societies,226 exacerbated by mounting 
industrial unrest, Harding refused to do more.  Internal disagreement among the IWW prisoners, 
many of whom refused to file individual petitions, made action on their behalf even more 
difficult.227  So did the decisions of several of the defendants, including Bill Haywood, to jump 
bail when the Supreme Court declined their request for certiorari—an action that Baldwin 
condemned, to the disappointment of his more radical allies.228
                                                          
224 The new cases included the prosecution of Jacob Isaacson for an editorial opposing Liberty Loans in the April 
1919 issue of Freedom magazine; of the editors of the Seattle Union Record for a wartime article; of three men who 
distributed handbills that urged amnesty and criticized federal prison conditions; and of the editor of the Oakland 
World for criticizing abuses of civil liberties. 
 For the rest of the decade, ACLU 
225 American Civil Liberties Union, A Year’s Fight for Free Speech: The Work of the American Civil Liberties 
Union from Sept. 1921 to Jan. 1923 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1923).  The same year, the ACLU 
submitted a petition to the President signed by recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor, along with other 
veterans. 
226The New York Times reported: “Promising a fight to a finish if Eugene V. Debs and other war prisoners are 
pardoned at this time, John G. Emery, National Commander of the American Legion, today wired President Harding 
that such action would be interpreted as a license to disregard law and order.” “Legion Warns Harding Against 
Freeing Debs,” New York Times, 29 July 1921. Notably, by the end of the war, the activity of private patriotic 
groups—many of which were initially encouraged and even deputized by law enforcement—had prompted rebuke 
from public leaders and government officials. See generally Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You.  On February 1, 
1919, the American Protective League (which was organized during the war under the supervision of the Bureau of 
Investigation) was disbanded at the request of Attorney General Gregory.  A. Mitchell Palmer announced in March 
1919 that the government would have no official or semi-official relationships with the private patriotic 
organizations established during the war to monitor private behavior. He declared that “espionage conducted by 
private individuals or organizations is entirely at variance with our theories of government and its operation in any 
community constitutes a grave menace to that feeling of public choice which is the efficient force making for the 
maintenance of good order.” “Espionage Work in Peace Time by Private Persons Held as Menace,” Clipping, 31 
March 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 53. 
227 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn (for Workers Defense Union), general letter, 30 July 1921, ACLU Papers, reel 25, vol. 
181. 
228 News Release (undated), ACLU Papers, reel 25, vol. 181. The release emphasized that “the Civil Liberties Union 
has no connection with the IWW and is interested in the cases solely because they involve the issues of free speech 
and free press.”  When Baldwin organized a trip to the Midwest in 1921, Carl Haessler of the Milwaukee Leader 
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representatives, along with the Joint Amnesty Committee that the organization helped create, 
exerted quiet pressure on Washington, securing the release of a few prisoners at a time.229
   
  Only 
in 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a blanket Christmas amnesty, were the wartime 
prisoners finally vindicated and their citizenship and voting rights restored.   
Beyond Free Speech 
 In February 1918, an IWW publicity agent wrote to Roger Baldwin that “every right that 
is supposedly guaranteed by the American Constitution to even the humblest citizen or sojourner 
in the land has been completely taken away in instance after instance either by the Federal 
officials themselves or by the various local official and unofficial thugs with the tacit or open 
connivance and encouragement of those Federal officials.”230 By the end of the Chicago IWW 
trial, those complaints appeared to be well founded.  In Chicago, as in other wartime trials under 
the Espionage Act, conviction was all but inevitable.  The great lessons of the IWW trial were, 
first, that “civil rights hardly exist for the IWW,” and second, that the perceived deprivation of 
justice in the courtroom was a powerful mobilizing force.231
Baldwin decried the verdict, but he was adamant that the end of the trial did not mean the 
“end [of] the radical labor movement in America.”  The IWW, he said, would only grow stronger 
“as the forces making for a new world after the war gather for ultimate economic freedom.”
   
232
                                                                                                                                                                                           
told him, “your remarks about Haywood have queered you with the ultra radicals here to some extent.” Carl 
Haessler to Roger Baldwin, 2 May 1921, ACLU Papers, reel 23, vol. 166.  
  
The outrage generated by the perceived injustice of the American legal system would unify an 
229 Baldwin favored direct confrontation and withdrew support from the Amnesty Committee when it insisted on a 
quieter approach.  Walker, American Liberties, 56.  
230 Frederick Esmond to Roger Baldwin, 21 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 30. 
231 American Civil Liberties Union, The Persecution of the I.W.W. (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 
1921). 
232 Roger Baldwin to Bill Haywood, 26 August 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 27. 
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otherwise divided and disorganized constituency.  As Amos Pinchot commented in the wake of 
Debs v. United States,233 the Supreme Court’s decisions upholding the conviction of labor 
leaders only confirmed the judicial tendency to “protect the old order.”  Its contortion of the First 
Amendment, he claimed, was an effort by the Court “to show that in war times and class-war 
times it can do its bit.”234  The solution for the persecution of the radical labor movement was 
“not to be found in written constitutions,” but in the will of the people and in just economic 
relations free from the machinery of the state.235
For leftist critics of the Espionage Act prosecutions, the judiciary was no more 
responsible for suppressing radical agitation than the Wilson administration was. The First 
World War represented a significant expansion of federal power that affected the daily life of 
average citizens in unprecedented ways, but the NCLB’s labor allies were already familiar with 
the coercive potential of federal power.  As witness after witness recounted in the IWW trial, 
unions had regularly experienced the crushing power of the state in the form of compulsory 
arbitration, military intervention, and labor injunctions. That these forces were aligned against 
them contributed to the perceived equivalence of all forms of federal authority.  For the 
 
                                                          
233 Debs’s view was much like that of his erstwhile comrades in the IWW. He too was imprisoned for denouncing 
the war as a creature of capitalist imperialism in violation of the Espionage Act. On the eve of his defeat in the 1920 
presidential election, he announced from prison: “They know where I belong under their criminal and corrupt 
system. It is the only compliment they could pay me.” Quoted in Ernest Freeberg, Democracy’s Prisoner: Eugene V. 
Debs, the Great War, and the Right to Dissent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 2. Like Debs, the 
IWW sought to put “American institutions . . . on trial before a court of American citizens.” Ibid. But while Debs, a 
socialist, garnered widespread support, the IWW did not. Socialism, after all, had much more in common with 
mainstream progressivism than its anti-state, anarchist counterpart did. Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 15. The IWW 
unavailingly criticized the distinction made between Socialist prisoners and the IWW.  Otto Christensen, Statement 
Submitted to the Attorney General of the United States Concerning the Present Legal Status of the IWW Cases, 23, 
IWW Papers, box 131, folder 2. 
234 Amos Pinchot, “Protecting the Old Order,” New York Call, 12 March 1919. Critics noted that the Debs decision 
closely followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), striking down as 
unconstitutional the Keating-Owen Act of 1916, which banned the interstate circulation of the products of child 
labor, as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  A second child labor bill passed in December 
1918, which sought to regulate child labor through Congress’s tax power, was found unconstitutional in Bailey v. 
Drexel Furniture Company, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
235 “Denounce Debs Decision,” New York Call, 12 March 1919. 
153 
 
progressives, “the state” and “the courts” were vastly different creatures.  For the radical labor 
movement, they were faces of the same beast.236
It had a staunch ally, however, in the NCLB.  At the Chicago trial, Vanderveer’s 
exchange with Nebeker over direct versus political action (and the corresponding relevance of 
the Report of the Commission of Industrial Relations) exerted a strong influence on the NCLB 
leadership.  In fact, the organization was so convinced of the inadequacy of political channels 
that it published the entire exchange in pamphlet form.
 Moderate labor unions affiliated with the AFL 
benefited from state policy during the war, and for the time being, the IWW was in the minority 
in its wholesale condemnation of the state.   
237  For Baldwin, the most appealing of 
the IWW’s methods was the free speech fight.  As he reflected years after the war: “Far more 
effective is this direct action of open conflict than all the legal maneuvers in the courts to get 
rights that no government willingly grants. Power wins rights—the power of determination, 
backed by willingness to suffer jail or violence to get them.”238
 Tellingly, the IWW trial coincided with the termination of the War Department’s 
cooperative posture toward the NCLB on the issue of conscientious objectors. Colonel R. H. Van 
Deman, chief of the Intelligence Section of the War College in Washington, D.C., had initiated 
an investigation of Baldwin in December 1917, and by the spring, the NCLB was being closely 
monitored.
 
239
                                                          
236 Testimony of William Haywood, 10 August 1918, IWW Papers, box 117, folder 3, a14h (noting that “all of the 
work that courts do is political”). It is telling that as conservative unions like the AFL began to receive assistance 
from the state, they also minimized the importance of civil liberties. On the other hand, when the NLRB favored the 
CIO during the New Deal, the AFL emphasized the importance of free speech and individual rights. 
 Keppel told Baldwin in late February that many of Newton Baker’s “military 
associates” believed that the NCLB’s activities were verging on “direct conflict with the 
237 National Civil Liberties Bureau, The Meaning of “Industrial Action,” from the Discussion at the Chicago IWW 
Trial Between Judge Landis, Mr. Nebeker for the Government, and Mr. Vanderveer for the Defense (New York: 
National Civil Liberties Bureau, August 1918), in ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43. 
238 Roger Baldwin, “Free Speech Fights of the IWW,” in Twenty-Five Years of Industrial Unionism (Chicago: 
Industrial Workers of the World, 1930).  
239 Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 66–67.  
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government.”240  In response, Baldwin wrote to Major Nicholas Biddle, an intelligence officer, 
and—attaching all of the organization’s printed materials, as well as its mailing list—requested 
that an inquiry be made into the NCLB’s activity to clear the organization’s name.241  Baldwin 
insisted that the NCLB was not doing anything to embarrass the government’s recruitment effort, 
and he wrote Van Deman directly with a promise to cease all potentially objectionable 
activities.242  Van Deman, however, was unimpressed; he recommended that Baldwin be 
prosecuted under the Sedition Act, and Keppel was sufficiently concerned to sever ties with the 
NCLB, despite his personal connections to members of the executive board.243
Other government departments were also gathering information on the NCLB and its 
leadership.  Over the summer, the Post Office declared fourteen NCLB pamphlets non-mailable, 
despite admitting to the Department of Justice that they did not explicitly violate the Espionage 
Act.
   
244  On August 13, after unsuccessful talks with post office officials, Walter Nelles sued in 
federal district court for an injunction directing the New York postmaster to mail them.  The 
Department of Justice considered the NCLB literature legal, but Solicitor General Lamar was 
determined to litigate the matter.  A few weeks later, after the counsel for the government stated 
in court that it did not oppose the NCLB’s application, Judge Augustus Hand ordered the post 
office to deliver the pamphlets.245
                                                          
240 Frederick Keppel to Roger Baldwin, 26 February 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. Baldwin assumed that the 
principal objection was to the conscientious objector work, since the organization’s legal defense work was “directly 
communicated to the Department of Justice.” Roger Baldwin to Frederick Keppel, 1 March 1918, ACLU Papers, 
reel 2, vol. 15.  
  
241 Roger Baldwin to Maj. Nicholas Biddle, 8 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. 
242 Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman to Frederick Keppel, 9 March 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 2, vol. 15. 
243 Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 75. L. Hollingsworth Wood, a personal friend of Keppel’s, met with him for an 
hour and commented that Keppel “seemed a good deal wrought up over the situation.” Memorandum of Conference 
with Third Asst. Secretary of War Keppel, 14 August 1918, AUAM Papers, reel 10-1. 
244 Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 74–75.   
245 NCLB Press Release, 17 October 1918, Records of American Civil Liberties Union, Swarthmore College Peace 
Collection, Swarthmore, Penn., box 1, folder 1918.  
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Meanwhile, in late August, government agents began a series of interviews with Baldwin 
concerning his opinion of the IWW and the funding of the NCLB’s publicity work in the case. A 
few days later, Nicholas Biddle, now a lieutenant colonel in the Office of Military Intelligence, 
sent six agents to the NCLB offices to collect evidence for an Espionage Act prosecution.  In the 
days after the raid, Walter Nelles wrote to the organization’s close associates.  He attributed the 
operation to complaints from local patriotic societies (whose representatives accompanied the 
federal agents during the raid) and from intelligence officers concerned with the organization’s 
work on behalf of conscientious objectors, though he felt that “the investigation doubtless has 
some relation in point of time to the IWW conviction.”246 Although there was significant 
government support for an indictment, the NCLB’s connections, including John Nevin Sayre, 
helped dissuade the Department of Justice from prosecuting.247
 One member of the NCLB leadership, however, was soon to stand trial, albeit on 
different charges.  By August 1918, Roger Baldwin was disillusioned.  He had been confident in 
the ability of his new organization to moderate government policies toward pacifists and radicals.  
When a year of cooperation with various government agencies definitively failed to yield results, 
he was ready to adopt more radical methods.  He had, moreover, discovered the potential of 
courtroom spectacle as a platform for radical propaganda—even, or particularly, when 
conviction seemed certain.   
  
In the summer of 1918, the draft age was raised to forty-five, making Baldwin eligible for 
conscription.  Baldwin announced his intention to resign as director of the NCLB when the new 
                                                          
246 L. Hollingsworth Wood to Friends of the Bureau, 17 September 1918, AUAM Papers, reel 10-1. Wood stated 
that “no change whatever in the operation of the Bureau is contemplated, regardless of the results of the examination 
of our papers.” 
247 Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 82; Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms, 76–77; John Nevin Sayre to 
Albert DeSilver, 18 October 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 47 (noting that he had telephoned his brother, 
President Wilson’s son-in-law, who had agreed to write to Newton Baker to “put in a good word”). 
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Selective Service Act became effective, so that he would be free to take a “personal stand” 
against the draft.248 He initially intended to refuse to register, but the raid on the NCLB offices 
prompted him to delay action until the “critical period” had passed.  In mid-September, when he 
felt that matters were sufficiently settled with respect to the investigation to permit his departure, 
he declined to appear for his physical examination and declared in a written statement that he 
would not “perform any service under compulsion regardless of its character.”249
Baldwin was indicted for violation of the Draft Act, albeit only after a judge and several 
Assistant United States Attorneys tried earnestly to persuade him to take a more moderate 
course. On October 30, 1918, he was tried before Judge Julius Mayer in the Southern District of 
New York. In the interim, he had refused bail on ideological grounds, though he had spent his 
days at the Department of Justice offices helping them to arrange the NCLB files.
  In October, he 
informed the District Attorney and an agent of the Department of Justice that he was refusing to 
appear before his local draft board for an examination, and at Baldwin’s request, a government 
agent was sent to his apartment to arrest him.   
250
In his statement to the court, Baldwin articulated a strong commitment to “individual 
freedom,” distinct from arguments about pluralism, democratic decision-making, and the public 
interest.
  
251
                                                          
248 Roger Baldwin to the Directing Committee, 10 August 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25. 
  Baldwin emphasized that his resistance rested on the precepts of individual 
conscience.  He asserted a right to abide by his internal beliefs, unconstrained by state power. He 
would resist any law, he explained, that attempted to control his “choice of service and ideals.” 
249 Quoted in Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 81.  
250 American Civil Liberties Union, The Individual and the State: The Problem as Presented by the Sentencing of 
Roger N. Baldwin (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, November 1918), 6. 
251 Baldwin continued to justify his resistance on those terms after the war.  See, e.g.,  Letter from Baldwin, undated, 
ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 43 (“We draft act prisoners stood firmly on [the] ancient principle of individual liberty.”). 
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But he was particularly opposed to military conscription because it served the purpose of war, to 
which he was unequivocally opposed.252
Baldwin’s autobiographical narrative, which he prepared in advance and read aloud in the 
courtroom, neatly captured the transformation in his thinking.  Baldwin began by describing his 
upbringing, his education, and his early career as a social worker and progressive reformer in St. 
Louis.  He claimed to have come to New York to work for the AUAM because he had grown 
discouraged by the ineffectiveness of incremental change at the local level and had awakened to 
the cause of labor radicalism.  For six years, he recounted, “I have felt myself heart and soul with 
the world-wide radical movements for industrial and political freedom—wherever and however 
expressed—and more and more impatient with reform.”
 
253  Echoing the claims of the radical 
libertarians and anarchists of the prior decade and, more prominently, of John Stuart Mill, he 
called for a “social order without any external restraints upon the individual, save through public 
opinion and the opinion of friends and neighbors.”  Although he was espousing a minority 
position, he believed himself to be part of a “great revolt surging up from the people—the 
struggle of the masses against the rule of the world.”  In short, he declared, he was engaged in a 
fight against the “political state itself.”254
Judge Mayer was impressed by Baldwin’s sincerity of belief, but he believed that his 
conduct was misguided.  He admonished Baldwin that the republican liberties to which he was 
so committed rested on obedience to law.  Channeling the prevailing progressive understanding, 
he told Baldwin that “the freest discussion” should be permitted and encouraged “in the 
processes that lead up to the enactment of a statute” and, once a statute was passed, “as to the 
methods of [its] administration.”  The democratic process, however, could not countenance 
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disregard for duly enacted laws.  Acknowledging that Baldwin’s position might someday be 
vindicated as the better course, he insisted that “with those possible idealistic and academic 
speculations a Court has nothing to do.”255
Baldwin listened to the Judge with a “friendly smile,” and, when the proceedings were 
over, his friends and supporters streamed past him, one by one, shaking his hand and 
congratulating him: Scott Nearing, Norman Thomas, Rose Pastor Stokes, Rabbi Judah L. 
Magnes, L. Hollingsworth Wood, Albert De Silver, Walter Nelles, William Simpson. In short, 
many of the most notable figures of the American left celebrated Baldwin’s position.
  Accordingly, he pronounced his sentence: one year 
in prison, the maximum provided by law.  
256 Over the 
coming months, they initiated efforts to secure Baldwin an executive pardon, but Baldwin 
insisted that he would leave jail only under a general amnesty.257 He reiterated his opposition to 
state authority and affirmed his commitment to a “social principle more precious . . . than 
personal freedom,” namely, the right to follow the dictates of one’s God and conscience.  “I 
would decline to leave prison as the recipient of a favor obtained by politically influential 
friends,” he told Albert DeSilver, “while hundreds of other men drag out long, lifeless days 
behind bars for precisely the same convictions that brought me here.”258
Notwithstanding his somewhat grandiose declaration of his willingness to suffer for his 
beliefs, Baldwin did very little suffering over the coming months.  After a brief stay in “the 
Tombs,” a lower Manhattan jail, Baldwin was transferred to the Essex County Jail in Newark.  
He was permitted to retain his books and personal belongings, and he spent most of his time 
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reading, writing, conversing with the other inmates, and meeting with his frequent visitors. The 
food was palatable, and he purchased supplementary meals. He also paid to have his cell cleaned 
and his laundry washed.  Baldwin befriended the guards, who left his cell door open at night.  He 
served meals and assisted in the kitchen; given the opportunity to room in the dormitories with 
the kitchen staff, he opted to remain in his cell because of its privacy and authenticity. Most 
striking, he secured the warden’s permission to organize a Prisoners’ Welfare League, which 
held classes and discussion sessions, procured books from the local library, arranged support for 
inmates’ indigent families, and hired an attorney to represent prisoners in appropriate cases.259 
Baldwin’s initiatives angered the Essex County Sherriff, and in May, he was transferred to the 
county prison in Caldwell, New Jersey, a work farm designed for short-term prisoners. Rules 
were lax, and Baldwin again quickly made friends among the staff and inmates. While Baldwin 
was in residence, the warden attended the annual meeting of the National Conference of Social 
Work, where Florence Kelley nominated Baldwin to a committee. Given the circumstances, he 
lost by a margin of 262 to 216, but he won the warden’s vote.260
Baldwin was released from Caldwell on July 19, 1919—almost three months early, as a 
result of a clerical error.  In an interview for the New York Herald-Tribune, he explained that his 
time in jail had been “profitable” and that he was “leaving more of a radical than [he] went 
in.”
  
261
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  He planned to cease all civic participation, including jury duty and the vote.  He 
explained his intention to join the “revolutionary labor movement,” since the world had “passed 
so-called political democracy” by.   
260 Ibid., 99–100.  
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Over the course of the Chicago proceedings Baldwin had made several trips to Chicago 
and developed close relationships with Bill Haywood and other IWW leaders.262 He admired 
their philosophy and determination, and he resolved in jail to join the organization himself.  Scott 
Nearing, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and Bill Haywood all tried to dissuade him; they thought that 
his time and energies could be spent more profitably in convincing liberals and radicals to 
support the defense committee. Baldwin, however, was determined to experience the life of an 
itinerant worker, and Haywood obligingly sponsored him for membership.  He traveled the 
country by hopping railroad trains, and he tried his hand at manual labor.  After a few months, 
satisfied with his new credentials but convinced that he would never rise to prominence in an 
organization for unskilled workers, he returned to New York.263
 
 
The ACLU 
When restrictive measures like the Espionage and Sedition Acts were debated in 
Congress, their advocates and apologists insisted that patriotic consensus was essential to the 
country’s military efforts; the end of the war, they promised, would bring with it a complete 
restoration of civil liberties.  But as the NCLB and other leftist critics had predicted, the 
cessation of hostilities abroad failed to stem the nationalist hysteria.264
The end of the war ushered in a climate of heightened social tensions.  The wartime 
support for AFL unions, driven largely by labor shortages, had empowered labor to make 
   
                                                          
262 Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 73.  
263 Ibid., 108–10.  
264 “Danger Ahead,” Nation, 8 February 1919 (“Thoughtful critics pointed out that the weapon of suppression which 
officials had learned to use against dis-sentiments would almost certainly be employed later by the holders of 
political and economic power against the socialists and other thoroughgoing critics of the existing order. Exactly 
thus has it fallen out. . . . The persecution of the Socialists did not even await the ending of the war. Our jails are full 
of their leaders, and the rank and file believe that they are there because of their protest against economic 
injustice.”). 
161 
 
unprecedented demands. The National War Labor Board, chaired by Frank Walsh and William 
Howard Taft, did more than any other wartime institution to advance the cause of labor, over the 
objections of the five employer representatives on the board (the other five were selected by the 
AFL).265  The NWLB introduced eight-hour days in a variety of industries, as well as wage 
increases, protection of union activities, and other advances.  Although the recommendations of 
the NWLB were ostensibly advisory, President Wilson gave them teeth by seizing or threatening 
to seize the operations of uncooperative employers and to administer them through the 
government.  With official sanction, union membership swelled to unprecedented levels 
(growing almost 70 percent, to over 5 million, between 1917 and 1920).266  By 1919, Samuel 
Gompers was “demand[ing] a voice,” at President Wilson’s First Industrial Conference, in the 
determination of the conditions under which we will give service . . . not only as supplicants but 
by right.”267
 The new optimism was, however, short-lived.  The labor market expanded rapidly with 
the return of soldiers to the civilian workforce and the resumption of immigration. Immigrants, 
popularly denounced as the source of radical agitation, were summarily deported.  At the same 
time, a shortage of civilian goods during the reconversion process led to high inflation and 
increased cost of living, fueling both support for and fear of labor radicalism.  The taste of power 
had emboldened labor, precipitating industrial conflict on a scale previously unimaginable in the 
United States. In the face of race riots and thousands of strikes involving four million workers, it 
  For the first time, industrial democracy of the kind that progressive-era labor 
organizers had demanded emerged as a realistic possibility.  
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seemed that the labor struggle was on the brink of tearing the country apart.  In the spring of 
1919, revolutionary anarchists mailed bombs to prominent politicians and government officials.  
One of the bombs was meant for A. Mitchell Palmer; another, for Frank Nebeker.268
The result was the “wholesale denial of civil rights.”
   
269 The NCLB leadership considered 
the coal and steel strikes of 1919 “the greatest demonstrations of working-class power in the 
history of the country.”270  Wilson, however, deployed federal troops to break the steel strike in 
September 1919.271  Even worse, the administration obtained a federal injunction against striking 
coal miners in November—a move that the NCLB denounced as a “grave blow at the liberties of 
the American workingman, probably without precedent in our history.”272
In addition to suppressing strikes, the Wilson administration did its part to silence those 
advocating and organizing the workers.  In 1919 and early 1920, Congress debated and almost 
passed a peacetime sedition bill.  While awaiting express legislative authority for moving against 
  In fact, ever since 
Republicans had gained control of Congress in 1918, the President had made increasing 
concessions to industry.  He continued to endorse responsible unionism and demanded a 
comprehensive federal reform agenda, but he openly criticized labor radicalism as well as strikes 
by public employees. From the vantage point of the civil liberties movement, industry had 
mobilized its vast resources and connections to quash labor unrest through a combination of 
legislation, administrative action, vigilante lawlessness, injunctions, labor practices and boycotts, 
and “judge-made law.”   
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perceived radical threats, the Department of Justice acted unilaterally.  Between November 1919 
and January 1920, the federal government arrested several thousand suspected radicals and 
deported hundreds of foreign nationals, including Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, in 
the so-called Palmer Raids.  In the mainstream press, reaction to the raids was generally 
favorable.   According to the Washington Post, there was “no time to waste on hairsplitting over 
infringement of liberty when the enemy [was] using liberty’s weapons for the assassination of 
liberty.” 273 Invoking their new mantra, “liberty is not license,” a broad coalition of politicians 
and public figures affirmed their commitment to the American tradition of free speech while 
calling for strict government regulation of radical expression—which, they claimed, threatened 
to undermine the very system that made civil liberties possible.274
These peacetime incursions were sufficiently troublesome to prompt a sizeable minority 
of progressives and liberal intellectuals to reevaluate their deference to the state regulation of 
speech.  Respectable outlets such as The Nation warned that the continued repression was 
“turning the thoughtful working people of the country into dangerous radicals and extreme direct 
actionists”—echoing arguments often invoked during the free speech fights, but largely forgotten 
during the war.
  
275
                                                          
273 “The Red Assassins,” Washington Post, 4 January 1920, 26.  President Wilson voiced a similar sentiment, 
claiming that those who were disloyal to the United States “had sacrificed their right to civil liberties.” Quoted in 
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  Indeed, while reminding readers of The Nation’s longstanding opposition to 
socialism, an editorial espoused the right of every person “to present for public consideration his 
ideas, no matter how erroneous they may appear.”  That right, it claimed, was the basis of 
democracy; and it was the forces denying it, rather than the Socialists or the IWW, who were the 
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“most dangerous enemies of the social order today.”276  Other former supporters of the 
President’s war policy agreed.  Even President Wilson, in a 1919 address to the French Society 
of Political Science, proclaimed that he had always been “among those who believe that the 
greatest freedom of speech was the greatest safety.”277  In March 1919, the socialist New York 
Call ran an article title, “The Liberals Wake Up,” in which it welcomed the news that American 
liberals were finally “organizing to aid in the struggle to restore political democracy in the 
United States.”278
Moderate labor groups, whose own activity was significantly threatened for the first time 
in a decade, also awakened to the dangers of suppression.  In January 1918, Baldwin had 
complained that the NCLB’s efforts to attract labor union support were stymied by Gompers’s 
refusal to “recognize the attacks that are being made upon personal and minority liberties.”
  
279 By 
the following summer, AFL leaders were attacking state sedition laws and pronouncing free 
speech to be the “answer to the Steel Trust,”280 and at their annual convention, they “insist[ed] 
that all restrictions of freedom of speech, press, public assembly, association and travel be 
completely removed.”281
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speech resolutions by dominant labor bodies.282 The next month, labor activists and sympathizers 
from around the country assembled in Chicago for an “American Freedom Convention” to 
discuss the maintenance of American civil and political rights.283  Although the conference was 
dominated by socialists and radical unionists, a number of more moderate labor organizations 
were represented as well.284  The group condemned the convictions of Debs, Victor Berger, and 
the IWW, among many other radical leaders. It demanded amnesty for political prisoners, the 
repeal of anti-sedition legislation, and broad support for free speech and free press.285  For the 
first time, a significant portion of the American labor movement was actively militating for civil 
liberties.  As the NCLB had cautioned in The Truth about the IWW, “Equality before the law is, 
of all our American Constitutional guarantees, the one that the common man holds most 
precious, and nothing will so surely solidify otherwise discordant groups of wage workers as the 
infringement of this guarantee by the constitutional authorities.”286
Roger Baldwin and Albert DeSilver both spoke at the American Freedom Convention, 
and Baldwin was asked to put together a national amnesty group.
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Woman’s Trade Union League, Philadelphia, June 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 7, vol. 69 (urging that “all restraints be 
removed at once so that the rights of the American people to free speech, free press and free assemblage, be restored 
to them”). 
  The NCLB leadership, 
however, sensed a need for the continuation of a New York-based group that could capitalize on 
the connections that it had cultivated during the war. A memorandum on the “proposed 
reorganization of the work for civil liberty” articulated the motivating impetus for the NCLB’s 
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successor: “The industrial struggle is clearly the essential challenge to the cause of civil liberty 
today. No association is organized to deal broadly and generally with these issues in the struggle 
of labor. Each labor group makes its own unaided fight, without relation to the common 
problems they face together. The situation calls for a dramatic campaign of service to labor in the 
areas of conflict, by those who see the vital need of freedom of expression for orderly 
progress.”288  Like the IWW, the NCLB had come to claim that rights could be secured only by 
“ceaseless agitation and sacrifice,” and that they could be maintained only through “organized 
power.”  Every measure to suppress free speech was at its heart an attempt to suppress the 
“revolt of labor.” The targets of such initiatives were not just radicals, but established trade 
unions as well. In the struggle for industrial democracy, “the issues of free speech, free press, 
lawful assemblage, and peaceful picketing are everywhere involved.”289
 The architects of the new endeavor no longer believed that quiet negotiations and 
political pressure could accomplish significant change.  Also absent from the agenda was the 
protection of civil liberties by constitutional adjudication.  The wartime cases had led to 
disillusionment with the legal strategy, driving even Walter Nelles to abandon his commitment to 
the courts.
  
290  The Supreme Court’s wartime speech and labor cases stamped out any hope of 
securing new protections for constitutional rights in the short term; juries continued to return 
convictions, and “the power of injunctions, backed by a propagandized public opinion 
increasingly hostile to all new ideas, assail[ed] civil rights at every point.”291
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productive potential of litigation was its ability to generate attention for the civil liberties cause.  
To that end, the new organization would orchestrate nationwide publicity of noteworthy 
struggles and events.  More important, the memorandum called for “free speech organizers” to 
hold meetings and demonstrations at centers of industrial conflict.  These speakers would 
provoke arrest under local regulations that conflicted with constitutional principles.  There was to 
be no detachment between the advocates of civil liberties and the “struggle in the field.”292
To implement the proposed agenda, the national committee would need “new personnel 
to meet the issues of the industrial struggle,” split evenly among union leaders, activists on 
behalf of labor, and liberals interested in both civil liberties and the industrial struggle.  Half of 
the funding for the organization would be raised from liberal and radical donors; the other half, 
given the close identification between the organization and the “struggle of labor,” would come 
from labor groups “directly served by the work.”  Walter Nelles put the group’s overarching 
objective succinctly: “we are frankly partisans of the labor in the present struggle,” he said, and 
“our place is in the fight.”
  In 
this, of course, the veteran NCLB leadership was borrowing directly from the IWW and its free 
speech fights.  
293
In January 1920, the NCLB leadership adopted the proposed program in its entirety.
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The name of the new organization, the American Civil Liberties Union, was meant to capture its 
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transition from “a bureau of legal defense work to a propaganda organization.”295  As planned, 
the ACLU national committee attracted a mix of labor leaders, advocates, and respectable 
liberals.  Harry Ward chaired the organization and would continue to do so for almost twenty 
years. Duncan McDonald, President of the Illinois State Federation of Labor, agreed to serve as a 
Vice-chair, along with the anti-war activist and former member of Congress Jeannette Rankin.296  
Baldwin and DeSilver were co-directors.  William Foster wrote that the struggle for civil 
liberties was so important that he would make an exception to his general policy of belonging 
only to trade union organizations.297  Arthur LeSeuer also joined, predicting that “the service 
rendered will be a notable and tremendous one, both to the labor movement and the people of the 
United States.”298  Much of the original leadership of the AUAM remained involved, including 
Jane Addams, Florence Kelley, Hebert Bigelow, Crystal Eastman, and Norman Thomas.  Even 
Lillian Wald approved of the reorganization, though she did not join.299 Other notable members 
of the inaugural committee included Harold Laski, Ernst Freund, Clarence Darrow, John Dewey, 
Henry Linville, Helen Keller, and Upton Sinclair.300
Although Baldwin expressed a willingness to include conservatives in pursuit of a “well 
balanced committee,” he did not think it likely that they would join.
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acknowledge the need to tone down the ACLU’s partisan rhetoric, at least in its official 
communications.  In the first year of the ACLU’s existence, the more moderate members urged 
the leadership to restore the neutral posture cultivated by the NCLB.  They noted that radical 
rhetoric would alienate many potential supporters “who might have been willing to go along part 
way.”302  Even Scott Nearing felt that the ACLU should maintain neutrality, explaining that “the 
moment it takes sides it becomes a propaganda movement and thereby loses the one claim to 
support it now has.”303 In response to these criticisms, various modifications were made to the 
ACLU’s publications. In June 1920, the statement of principles was amended to “stat[e] the 
social value of the principle of civil liberty at all times, not only when a class is struggling for 
expression.”304
An illuminating debate arose over the ACLU’s defense of speech advocating violence. 
Although the majority of the organization believed that revolutionary rhetoric should not be 
curtailed even if it endorsed the use of force under some circumstances, there was substantial 
disagreement over the details. Baldwin and other absolutists drew a sharp distinction between 
speech and conduct and believed that only violence itself could be punished.  Norman Thomas 
thought a “direct incitement to violence” might justifiably be regulated, but he was adamant 
about protecting a speaker who “said that revolutionary objects could not be attained without 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
group of people to serve the cause of orderly progress is of course self-evident.”). Correspondence between Baldwin 
and John Codman is characteristic of Baldwin’s pragmatism on this issue.  When Elizabeth Gurley Flynn 
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violent means.”305 Zona Gale, on the other hand, was concerned with “extra-constitutional” and 
“extra-legal” considerations, and she believed there was no “moral right . . . to violent and 
obnoxious speech.”  Even if the ACLU were to insist on legal protection for all speech—on the 
theory, for example, that the authorities would construe all radical doctrine as implicitly 
countenancing force—she wanted the ACLU to condemn the outright espousal of violence, 
whether revolutionary or not.306  Invoking Mahatma Gandhi, she considered the disavowal of 
violence to be an appropriate sacrifice of “personal liberty” in the interest of social welfare, no 
different in kind from the abridgment of personal freedom effected by Prohibition.307  Baldwin 
disagreed.  To him, “political action under representative government . . . [was] the very heart of 
violence.”308  Although he did not say it explicitly, he implied his own active desire for 
revolution, violent or not. Gale resigned over the issue, and in the end, the exchange of views 
precipitated a considerable modification of the ACLU’s stated position.309
What emerged from the discussion was the closest the ACLU would come to a theoretical 
defense of the right of agitation, loosely modeled on a proposal made by Walter Nelles the 
previous year.  According to Nelles, modern workers were alienated in their jobs, and “the fervor 
and extent of consequent discontent” ultimately would be channeled into productive change.  
“When agitation is outlawed,” he reasoned, “the unrest which it might have made a force for 
constructive betterment is diverted in bitterness toward retaliation. Sound political changes can 
be neither formulated nor effected except in freedom.”
  
310
                                                          
305 Norman Thomas to Zona Gale, 10 September 1920, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 120.  
  The ACLU’s first official report on its 
objectives and activities laid out the organization’s “social philosophy” in similar terms.  It 
306 Zona Gale to Roger Baldwin, 25 August 1920, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 120.  
307 Ibid.; Zona Gale to Roger Baldwin, 7 September 1920, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 120.  
308 Roger Baldwin to Zona Gale, 23 August 1920, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 120. 
309 Roger Baldwin to Zona Gale, 5 November 1920, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 120. 
310 Walter Nelles to Roger Baldwin, 11 December 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 120. Nelles considered this his 
attempt to “express the twentieth-century application of the principle of civil liberty.” 
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portrayed the 1919 strikes as the high-water mark of working-class agitation.311  Efforts to 
combat industrial power through the farmer-labor campaigns of the 1920 election cycle had 
“emphasiz[ed] everywhere the issues of civil liberty,” but they were “buried under the 
Republican landslide.” Scattered pockets of resistance persisted,312 but effective opposition had 
become virtually impossible.  As a result, industrial conflict of epic proportions loomed on the 
horizon. A growing contingent of workers had come to believe in the “the ultimate necessity of 
armed resistance.”313
Against this backdrop, the two major goals of the ACLU were, first, “the reorganization 
of our economic and political life,” and second, “the demand for the ‘rights’ of those minorities 
and individuals attacked by the forces of reaction.” Legal rights securing the right to agitation 
would be freely exercised only “when no class conflict threatens the existing order.”
   
314 By 
protecting the rights of the disenfranchised, “the organized effort for civil liberty” sought to 
moderate the inevitable violence ahead.  Although many activists on the left believed that the 
“reactionary forces in power” would yield only to superior force, concerted advocacy on behalf 
of civil liberties would have the effect of “softening the conflict” by weakening the “resistance to 
progress.”315
                                                          
311 ACLU, Fight for Free Speech, 6. 
 “We realize,” the pamphlet concluded, “that these standards of civil liberty cannot 
be attained as abstract principles or as constitutional guarantees. Economic or political power is 
necessary to assert and maintain all ‘rights.’ In the midst of any conflict they are not granted by 
the side holding the economic and political power, except as they may be forced by the strength 
312 Ibid., 7. The report cited continuing armed resistance in some struggles, as well as the “secret organization of the 
Communist Party” and increasing solidarity in trade unions. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid., 5. According to the pamphlet, those who understood and were working to ameliorate the condition of 
industrial tyranny in America were the radicals and a few liberals. “Among other classes more or less conscious of 
the condition but incapable of outspoken resistance are the Negroes, many foreign-born groups and the tenant 
farmers of the west and south.” Ibid. 
315 Ibid. 
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of the opposition. However, the mere public assertion of the principle of freedom of opinion in 
the words or deeds of individuals, or weak minorities, helps win it recognition, and in the long 
run makes for tolerance and against resort to violence.”316
. 
  The resolution of class struggle was 
inevitable; nothing—including free speech rights—had the power to disrupt it.  The protection of 
civil liberties, however, could ensure that the rights of labor were secured with minimal 
bloodshed.  Peaceful agitation might secure economic security for the working class by peaceful 
means.  The only alternative was violent revolution. The civil liberties championed by the early 
ACLU were not legal rights conferred by the state to secure the expression of individual 
conscience, nor did they reflect a policy commitment to rational discussion of optimal social 
conditions in the marketplace of ideas. Rather, civil liberties were a byproduct of group struggle, 
rooted in power and only incidentally inscribed in law. 
Conclusion 
Out of the NCLB’s central engagements in 1917 and 1918 emerged several crucial 
features of the ACLU’s developing relationship to rights, constitutionalism, and legal advocacy.  
Most obviously, the early leadership was fundamentally devoted to economic redistribution of a 
kind more radical than it admitted to liberal members and correspondents. The primary right 
advocated by the leaders of the ACLU was a capacious and malleable right to agitation.  
Although they invoked the rhetoric of constitutional rights from the outset, their early 
correspondence indicates significant ambivalence on this issue.  Baldwin, for one, was far from 
the committed civil libertarian that he would later become. He stated his attitude in a leaked 
                                                          
316 Ibid., 18. 
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letter often quoted by conservative critics: “We want to also look like patriots in everything we 
do. We want to get a lot of good flags, talk a good deal about the Constitution, etc.”317
Baldwin was willing to deploy any personal connection or political theory that might 
prove effective in advancing his goals.  His early advocacy of free speech was largely 
instrumentalist. But it was not merely instrumentalist.  World War I produced in Baldwin a true 
and lasting aversion to state power that lent itself to a new breed of civil libertarian thought.  
Historians of the ACLU often have dismissed Baldwin’s theoretical ruminations as ill-formed, 
inconsistent, and secondary to his true skills as an organizer and administrator.  Baldwin’s 
radicalism was not, however, a mere youthful flirtation; it was fundamental to the subsequent 
course of civil liberties advocacy in the United States.   
 
The NCLB’s efforts to work through state channels—its stubborn pursuit of 
administrative intervention, despite its attendant dangers—produced substantial tension within 
the organization.  Again and again, NCLB supporters sought to convince government officials to 
act quietly for their cause, either through opposition to legislative repression or, more commonly, 
through liberal interpretation of repressive statutes.  They corresponded with low-level 
bureaucrats, friends and acquaintances in the President’s cabinet, even Wilson himself. This 
tendency flowed directly from the progressive origins of the organization’s leaders.  Before the 
war, the same actors had habitually relied on regulation to contain and channel the public will.318  
They had supported progressive legislation, but they believed that administrative agencies would 
craft optimal solutions to social problems.319
                                                          
317 New York Legislative Documents, 144th Sess., 1921, vol. 18, part 2 (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company, 1921), 1981.  
   
318 For example, in 1918 Roger Baldwin expressed in a letter, “Our view is that public opinion now would be 
absolutely unresponsive to any presentation of our side of the case.” Roger Baldwin to Lenetta Cooper, 6 April 
1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 17.   
319 To borrow from James Henretta’s description of Charles Evans Hughes, their “ideal was not government by the 
people but for the people.” James A. Henretta, “Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America,” 
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All too often, in these early years and after, the NCLB was disappointed.  Even when 
correspondence remained friendly, government officials rarely acted on NCLB 
recommendations, and their assurances were beset with delays and equivocations.  By April 
1918, Baldwin had come to question whether anything “practical” could be accomplished by 
“working on legislation or administrative orders affecting civil and religious liberties.”320 
Although it might help sway public opinion in particular cases, the combination of an intolerant 
majority and a government solicitous of its sympathies would almost ensure defeat for radical 
causes, and condemnation or worse for radical actors.321 “The situation at Washington is not one 
which lends itself at all to any influences from the outside,” he observed.  “The President is in 
complete control, wherever he wants to take control. Congress is willing to pass any legislation 
demanded by the Executive. Nothing can be expected from it in the way of protecting our 
liberties.”322
Moreover, the Espionage Act convinced the NCLB leadership that administrative 
insulation was itself a substantial threat to civil liberties.  Although there remained a liberal 
contingent within the government, the Department of Justice and the Post Office Department 
were all too eager to exercise their discretion in the service of repression.
  
323
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Law and History Review 24 (Spring 2006): 131.  Similarly, Daniel Rodgers has suggested that the Progressive 
appeal to “the People” succeeded in part because it “allowed those who sincerely believed in a government serving 
the needs of ‘the people’ to camouflage from voters the acute distrust many of those same persons harbored of 
political egalitarianism.” Rodgers, “Progressivism,” 122.    
 And postal 
censorship proved far more damaging than threat of prosecution had ever been.  Burleson’s 
suppression of the radical and pacifist press shut down a number of radical organizations and 
made effective dissent, as well as effective defense work, impossible.  This sort of censorship 
320 Roger Baldwin to Harold Evans, 13 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 3, vol. 25 (answering an inquiry as to 
whether Evans’s Friends organization should extend its work to civil liberties). 
321 Ibid. (“If the authorities don’t do it, a mob will, and the authorities will act with or without law.”). 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid. He observed, “the Administration is at war within itself. The liberals at Washington are as disheartened as 
any of us at the course pursued by the Postmaster General and the Attorney General.” 
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was unpredictable and nearly impossible to counteract. “We are not dealing now with law,” 
Baldwin lamented shortly after passage of the Espionage Act. “We are dealing with the shifting 
policies of autocratic and arbitrary officials.”324
The most important influences on the early ACLU, however, were the very labor 
organizations that they mobilized to protect.  Between World War I and the late New Deal, the 
ACLU’s skepticism toward state power, driven by its close alliance to the radical labor 
movement, would differentiate it from the progressive advocates of civil liberties with whom it 
cooperated.  Most of its leadership shared the progressive commitment to the public interest as 
against the insidious effects of private interests and private “rights,” but the vision of civil 
liberties that it espoused was modeled on labor voluntarism, not individual autonomy.  It was 
positioned against the state, as a right outside the realm of state interference. But it was also 
asserted collectively, through group power, in the public interest.  
 
In other words, the ACLU of the interwar period promoted a radical theory of rights that 
resisted the very state machinery that its leadership had helped to create and refine. The ACLU 
was always adamant that its theory of civil liberties was distinct from the conservative 
celebration of individual rights at the heart of Lochner-era jurisprudence.  Its state-skepticism did 
not evoke concern for private property.  Rather, it recognized that groups maintained rights “only 
by insisting upon them.”325
                                                          
324 Baldwin to I. C. Herendeen, 10 September 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 36. 
  Where the NCLB borrowed methods and arguments from the Free 
Speech League, the early ACLU looked to the direct action of the IWW.  The ACLU was acutely 
aware that the mere absence of state suppression would not ensure equality of opportunity for 
dissenters.  In organizing publicity on behalf of the IWW, Baldwin and his correspondents were 
distressed by the trivial and distorted coverage of the trial by the mainstream press, which was 
325 ACLU, “Maintain Your Rights,” undated, ACLU Papers, reel 7, vol. 69. 
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printing sensationalist accounts of the proceedings.326
By contrast, the progressives recognized the dangers of unmitigated state power, but they 
imagined the First Amendment as a guideline for promoting open discussion, not just a check on 
state suppression.  Indeed, they sought to mobilize state power on behalf of dissenters. As 
Professor Zechariah Chafee of Harvard Law School would later observe, “the argument of 
Milton and Mill that unrestricted discussion is the best way to ascertain and disseminate truth 
loses much of its force if the discussion, even though unhampered by law, will not be thorough. 
It may be necessary for the community not to rest content with a negative attitude of hands off 
but to adopt in addition positive measures to ensure that argument and counter argument on vital 
issues will have full play.”
  These same reports, they emphasized, 
were fomenting public enthusiasm for future prosecutions and coloring the views of jurors in 
subsequent trials.  ACLU literature stressed that major industrial interests were distributing 
broad-based propaganda and backing the mainstream press; the left, they understood, lacked the 
resources to compete.  The solution they proposed was the assertion of working-class power.  
For the late NCLB and early ACLU, non-state repression was undoubtedly a violation of civil 
liberties—but its remedy, like its cause, was nongovernmental.  Over time, as the ACLU 
increasingly adopted a litigation strategy for protecting free speech, this component of the 
ACLU’s program would dwindle in importance. In the early 1920s, however, it was the core of 
its civil liberties agenda.   
327
                                                          
326 Paul Hanna, Report to Baldwin, 13 April 1918, ACLU Papers, reel 4, vol. 28. 
  The ACLU would consistently split over progressive measures 
designed to increase overall speech.  For example, in the 1920s, some members called for the 
mandatory allocation of radio airtime to dissenters, while others demanded that the state stay out 
327 Zechariah Chaffee, introduction to Civil Liberty, ed. Edith M. Phelps (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1927), 49. 
Cf. Bertrand Russell, who believed that “equality of opportunity among opinions can only be secured by elaborate 
laws directed to that end, which there is no reason to expect to see enacted.” Bertrand Russell, Free Thought and 
Official Propaganda (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1922), 41. 
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of broadcasting altogether.  More pointedly, when Roger Baldwin and the executive board of the 
ACLU expressed opposition to New Deal legislation protecting the rights of labor through the 
machinery of the state, the membership and national committee pressured them to reconsider.  
The ACLU included many committed progressives within its ranks, and one of its major 
accomplishments during the 1920s was to build an alliance with the progressive establishment, 
with whom it shared many substantive goals.  But in its justification of First Amendment 
freedoms, the ACLU would cast state power as more oppositional than facilitative.   
In fact, on these issues the ACLU’s core leadership often found itself aligned with the 
American Bar Association against progressive reformers, a fact that caused Baldwin significant 
consternation.  As Leon Whipple, the ACLU’s official theoretician, would comment in 1927: 
“Libertarians on principle have been few and far between, and have generally belonged to three 
queerly mated groups: the Quakers, the Anarchists, and the lawyers.”328
                                                          
328 Whipple, Ancient Liberties, 137. He explained: “The Quaker gives obedience to God through his conscience and 
hence has always demanded freedom from his interference by the state. The Anarchist oddly enough holds about the 
same faith, though he replaces God with some sort of Will-in-Nature, and wants to do away with both state and law. 
The legalist has evinced a certain professional interest in the principles of liberty, for intellectual pride has 
demanded that he try to erect his rule into principles.” Ibid.  
 The first two groups, of 
course, were the ACLU’s primary constituencies during World War I.  Finding common ground 
with the third would be the organization’s central project during the 1920s.  In significant ways, 
the resonances between its anti-state radicalism and the conservative tradition of state-skeptical 
constitutionalism were responsible for the ACLU’s eventual success where progressives 
continued to fail, namely, in the courts. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE SEX SIDE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 
 
When the ACLU announced its successful appeal in United States v. Dennett in March 
1930, many Americans welcomed the news as a victory for justice.  Though few knew it, it was 
justice of an uncommonly poetic sort.  The case was the ACLU’s first important attack on postal 
obscenity censorship, and the Second Circuit’s seminal decision was a significant achievement 
for the organization and its client.  Newspaper accounts heralded Mary Ware Dennett as the 
protagonist.1
The object of the legal dispute was Dennett’s sex education pamphlet, The Sex Side of 
Life: an Explanation for Young People, which was widely regarded as the best available tract on 
the subject.
  But Dennett’s role in the struggle was quite different from what she and her civil 
liberties allies might have predicted.  For years, the pioneering birth control activist, a former 
secretary of the National Civil Liberties Bureau, had lobbied unsuccessfully for revision of the 
postal censorship laws.  In the end, it took a criminal prosecution—of Dennett herself—to 
mobilize public opinion and effect legal change. 
2
                                                          
1 Newspaper accounts of the Dennett decision were virtually unanimous in their support for Dennett, and the few 
critics lamented that public opinion was squarely on Dennett’s side (see note 
  Postal authorities declared the pamphlet obscene despite effusive praise by medical 
practitioners, religious groups, and government agencies for its frank and objective style.  When 
204).  For a discussion of Dennett’s 
opponents, see Leigh Ann Wheeler, “Rescuing Sex from Prudery and Prurience: American Women’s Use of Sex 
Education as an Antidote to Obscenity, 1925–1932,” Journal of Women’s History 12 (Autumn 2000): 173–96 
(describing opposition by Reverend William Sheafe Chase).   
2 No historian of free speech has provided an account of how and why the organization branched out into this new 
realm.  Meanwhile, obscenity scholars have related changing public mores during the 1920s and 1930s to a 
relaxation of obscenity regulation, but they have not connected the liberalizing trends to legal developments in the 
broader context of civil liberties. For example, Jay Gertzman, Bookleggers and Smuthounds: The Trade in Erotica, 
1920–1940 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), examines the ACLU’s National Committee for 
Freedom from Censorship and its effect on obscenity regulation, but it does not address concurrent developments in 
the regulation of political speech, nor does it discuss the architects of the free speech movement, like Zechariah 
Chafee and Roger Baldwin.  Leigh Ann Wheeler discusses the regulation of sex education literature as well as 
commercial sexually explicit materials, but she is principally concerned with the relationship between the anti-
obscenity movement and women’s political power, identity, and sexuality.  Leigh Ann Wheeler, Against Obscenity: 
Reform and the Politics of Womanhood in America, 1873–1935 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). 
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Dennett continued to circulate it by mail in defiance of the postal ban, she was prosecuted for 
obscenity. The ACLU came to her defense.  
At the time, however, the organization’s leadership was unconcerned with Dennett’s 
broader goals.  According to a 1928 bulletin, it was ACLU policy to contest obscenity 
regulations only when they were “relied upon to punish persons for their political views.”3  For 
most of the executive board, “political views” encompassed the struggle for control of the means 
of production, but not of the body or the mind.  The early ACLU was not interested in defending 
cultural expression.4
By the late 1920s the organization had moved beyond its initially narrow commitment to 
the “right of agitation.”  It had defended religious and academic freedom, which it regarded as 
strategically and theoretically linked to the protection of political and economic speech.  
Nonetheless, most members of the ACLU thought obscenity laws were acceptable, and many in 
fact welcomed state regulation in the realm of morality.  ACLU board members agreed to 
sponsor Dennett’s case because, in their view, The Sex Side of Life was not obscene; it instructed 
the youth on an issue of social importance, thereby advancing the public interest in a direct and 
familiar way.  No one suggested that Dennett should be permitted to publish her pamphlet if it 
were shoddily written, much less actually lewd.  No one anticipated that United States v. Dennett 
would usher in a new era for the ACLU. 
 
Unexpectedly, however, the Dennett litigation unleashed a far more sweeping anti-
censorship initiative.  The heavily publicized conviction, overturned by the Second Circuit on 
appeal, generated popular hostility toward the censorship laws and convinced ACLU attorneys 
                                                          
3 ACLU Bulletin 63, “Civil Liberty and the Courts: Obscenity and Political Opinions,” November 1928, ACLU 
Records and Publications, reel 2.   
4 Rabban, Forgotten Years, 310; Walker, American Liberties, 68.  Cf. Graber, Transforming Free Speech, 144 
(noting Zechariah Chafee’s belief that obscenity did not warrant First Amendment protection because it implicated 
only individual, as opposed to social, interests). 
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that speech should be protected regardless of its social worth.  United States v. Dennett is often 
overlooked in histories of free speech—perhaps because it never reached the Supreme Court, or 
because it was not decided on First Amendment grounds, or because its implications for the 
broader civil liberties movement were not immediately apparent.5  And yet, Dennett 
fundamentally redefined the way that lawyers, judges, and activists understood the category of 
civil liberties.6
By the early 1930s, the ACLU was the undisputed leader of the anti-censorship campaign 
and an aggressive advocate of artistic freedom and birth control.  Indeed, many of its supporters 
were reluctant to defend Communists but eager to endorse artistic freedom.   With that shift, the 
ACLU inched closer toward a new model of civil liberties: one that celebrated individual 
expressive freedom over substantive social reform.  Thus transformed, the civil liberties 
movement finally attracted widespread public support, paving the way for a pluralistic turn in 
politics as well as personal morality.  The payoff was swift and spectacular.  When Dennett was 
decided, the ACLU was a fringe group and the civil liberties it defended were often maligned as 
  It introduced the possibility of a free speech agenda premised on personal 
autonomy, a cause that resonated strongly with mainstream Americans, rather than economic 
equality, which polarized them.     
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Edward G. Hudon, Freedom of Speech and Press in America (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963); 
Judy Kutulas, Modern Liberalism; Murphy, Meaning; Stone, Perilous Times (none of which list Dennett in the 
index).  In her history of censorship laws designed to protect the youth, Marjorie Heins, Not in Front of the 
Children: ‘Indecency,’ Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 42–44, briefly 
describes Dennett’s importance as a doctrinal bridge.  Walker’s history of the ACLU devotes a page to the case; 
Charles Lam Markmann, The Noblest Cry: A History of the American Civil Liberties Union (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1965), affords it a paragraph. 
6 Two published works deal with Dennett at length: a 1995 article by John Craig and a biography of Dennett by 
Constance Chen.  John M. Craig, “‘The Sex Side of Life’: The Obscenity Trials of Mary Ware Dennett,” Frontiers 
15 (1995): 145–66; Constance M. Chen, The Sex Side of Life: The Story of Mary Ware Dennett (New York: New 
Press, 1996).  Chen focuses on Dennett’s life and legacy, with particular attention to her birth control activities.  
Craig points to many of Dennett’s important themes but is more interested in its effects on the birth control 
movement and obscenity law than its broader implications for civil liberties advocacy and the meaning of free 
speech.  Leigh Ann Wheeler’s illuminating account of the complicated relationships between Mary Ware Dennett, 
the social hygiene movement, and anti-obscenity activity is sensitive to the concerns and rationales of Dennett’s 
adversaries, but it discusses her court battle only in passing and does not explore the origins of the ACLU’s 
emerging liberalism. Wheeler, “Rescuing Sex”; Wheeler, Against Obscenity. 
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un-American.  A mere decade later, President Roosevelt would stand before the nation and 
declare that the first of the fundamental human freedoms was the freedom of speech.7  United 
States v. Dennett,8 in the words of ACLU co-counsel and emerging free speech leader Morris 
Ernst, was a “test-case of vital importance.”9
 
 
The New Battleground 
The strident radicalism of the ACLU’s early rhetoric, like the revolutionary moment that 
produced it, was short-lived.  During 1920 and 1921, the ACLU’s preferred technique was to 
“dramatiz[e] the issues of civil liberty by demonstrations in areas of conflict.”10
But the looming labor revolution dissipated just as quickly as it had taken shape, and it 
was soon evident that social change through “agitation” was a long-term program at best. The 
Republicans who came to office in the 1920 election were forthright about their opposition to the 
labor policy of their Democratic predecessors, and they were eager to reverse any remaining 
  The resulting 
“free speech fights” were reminiscent of the techniques employed by the IWW in prior decades.  
For two years, the ACLU was on the front lines of the labor struggle, marching, picketing, and 
organizing, outside the factory gates and in the Alabama and West Virginia coal fields.  
                                                          
7 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Annual Message to Congress,” Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress, 6 
January 1941, Record Group 46, NARA I, Sen. 77A-H1.  
8 United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2nd Cir. 1930). 
9 Appellant’s Second Circuit Brief, 59, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 490. This chronology turns on its head the 
conventional wisdom that acceptance of free speech in America began with political speech and steadily expanded 
toward more personal liberties. See, e.g., Ken I. Kersch, “How Conduct Became Speech and Speech Became 
Conduct: A Political Development Case Study in Labor Law and the Freedom of Speech,” University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 8 (March 2006): 266 (summarizing dominant narrative: “[W]hereas 
free speech protections were largely focused on core political speech in the early twentieth century, they were 
expanded to protect other forms of speech, such as (anti) religious (blasphemy), sexual (indecency), artistic, 
commercial, and other forms of speech.”).  Civil liberties advocacy groups, including the ACLU, did indeed follow 
that trajectory.  But the public did not.  Rather, it was civil libertarians’ successful defense of popular, non-political 
causes like the dissemination of scientific and sexual knowledge that paved the way for popular tolerance of political 
dissent. 
10 ACLU, Fight for Free Speech, 8–9. 
182 
 
wartime advances.  Meanwhile, the postwar depression undermined labor’s demands for higher 
wages and put unions on the defensive. By 1921, union membership had declined by 1.5 million 
and the open shop was the rule.  The next year, the Harding administration was faced with two 
major strikes, and in both cases it threw its support squarely to employers, with devastating 
consequences for labor.11
On the judicial front, the situation was even bleaker. The Supreme Court, under its newly 
appointed Chief Justice William Howard Taft, swiftly undercut many of labor’s legislative and 
administrative gains.
  
12  Its 1921 decision in Duplex v. Deering declared secondary boycotts 
unlawful under the Clayton Act and authorized the use of injunctions to block them.13 In Truax 
v. Corrigan, it went further, striking down a state anti-injunction law as an unconstitutional 
violation of equal protection and due process.14 Other decisions effectively outlawed picketing 
(American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Central Trade Council15) and made unions subject to 
high damages for restraint of interstate commerce (United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal16
                                                          
11 When miners throughout the struggling coal industry organized a national strike, Harding proposed and the UMW 
rejected a plan that called for compulsory arbitration; Harding’s subsequent threats of military intervention were 
disregarded by labor, and the strike resolved after three months without significant federal assistance. The second 
strike was organized by nonoperating railroad workers and was fueled in part by opposition to the industry’s refusal 
to implement the few pro-labor recommendations issued by the National Railroad Board.  In July 1922, the 
shopcraft unions of the AFL’s Railway Employee Department, whose members lacked the protection of the more 
respectable railroad brotherhoods and were thus repeatedly targeted for wage cuts, delivered on their threat to strike 
unless the RLB reversed its recently announced wage cuts and forced the railroads to reinstate its former work rules.  
The administration condemned it as criminal and sanctioned strike-breaking.  Federal Judge James Wilkerson dealt a 
further blow to the already doomed strike with a sweeping injunction, which essentially claimed authority to enjoin 
any strike involving interstate transportation.  Dubofsky, State and Labor, 95. Notably, criticism of Wilkerson’s 
decision was swiftly forthcoming in parallel decisions by Judge Charles Amidon and Judge George M. Borquin—
the same judges who were most sympathetic to Espionage Act defendants—that relied on the Clayton Act to refuse 
injunctions against the striking railroad workers. Great Northern Railway Company v. Local Great Falls Lodge of 
International Association of Machinists, 283 F. 557 (1922); Great Northern Railway Company v. Brosseau, 286 F. 
414 (D. Mont. 1922). Amidon would become a member of the ACLU in 1929. 
).  
12 Forbath, American Labor Movement, 158–59. 
13 Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).  
14 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
15 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Central Trade Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921). 
16 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. 344 (1922). 
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Such decisions gave license to the most anti-labor of federal courts to issue sweeping injunctions 
against labor activity. 
Unions, of course, were not wholly without power during the 1920s.  Congressional 
Democrats, together with a few influential liberal Republicans, exerted pressure on labor’s 
behalf.  Although the radical unions fared poorly under a decade of Republican leadership, their 
more conservative counterparts like the railroad brotherhoods and the UMW retained 
considerable strength. Their strategy—to appease employers in exchange for a share in the 
decade’s general economic abundance—seemed the best that labor could muster.  The 
Republican Party offered up such concessions as high tariffs, immigration restrictions, and a few 
modest labor bills, including the Railway Labor Act of 1926, which officially recognized 
railroad workers’ right to bargain collectively but not the right to strike.17
From the perspective of the ACLU, the changing labor landscape called for a revised set 
of civil liberties commitments.  As strikes declined in frequency, so too did the opportunities for 
ACLU assistance in the field.  The “right of agitation” had been premised on the assumption that 
pickets, boycotts, and organizing drives would pave the way to peaceful revolution.  By the mid-
1920s, however, the general strike was a distant specter. Intolerance was “so entrenched” that it 
was unnecessary to “lock[] people up to control their heresies.”
  By the mid-1920s, 
however, both true government support for labor (for example, of the kind envisioned by the 
Non-Partisan League) and mass mobilization through direct action had come to appear hopeless.   
18
                                                          
17 See generally Robert H. Zieger, Republicans and Labor, 1919–1929 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1969).  At the level of individual disputes, however, the Republican presidents proved unwilling to intervene and 
counseled unions to pursue their grievances in court. 
 Ample employment and 
reasonable wages had seduced the workers into complacency; they needed reminding that 
fleeting material comforts were no substitute for control of the means of production.  “Enough of 
18 ACLU News Release, April 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303 (abstract of remarks by Baldwin). 
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our workers can buy second hand cars to ward off class-consciousness,” Baldwin lamented at 
mid-decade. “All they need for contentment is the price of gasoline.”19
The ACLU’s 1925 Annual Report laid out the organization’s new understanding. Despite 
a perception of improvement in the civil liberties situation, “intolerance and repression” 
remained significant.  The decrease in violence of the 1920 variety simply indicated that “no 
serious conflict or minority activity has aroused the latent forces of repression.”  In other words, 
flagrantly oppressive tactics were no longer necessary to quash worker militancy; “widespread 
prosperity and the consequent absence of industrial strife” had already accomplished that task. 
“The efforts to impose majority dogma by law and intimidation have shifted from the industrial 
arena to the field of education,” the report concluded. Education was “the new battle ground.”
   
20
The ACLU continued to promote the right of agitation, but in place of the picket, its 
priorities were to safeguard radical education and to undermine the countervailing attempts by 
the state to institutionalize conservative views.  The change was an adjustment in emphasis 
rather than a wholesale reformulation of the organization’s agenda.  Even as strikes raged across 
America, the ACLU’s principal activity was publicity—“for ours,” an early report explained, “is 
a work of propaganda—getting facts across from our point-of-view.”  The ACLU sought to 
“educate” Americans through news releases and statements, pamphlets, an information service 
distributed to a national network of cooperating speakers and writers, and publicity agents.
 
21
                                                          
19 Roger Baldwin, “Civil Liberties in the United States” (draft), 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303.  
  
Still, over the early-to-mid 1920s, disputes over education played an increasingly central role in 
the ACLU’s work.  The organization continued to defend the few anarchists and Communists 
prosecuted under state criminal syndicalism laws. It contested ideologically grounded 
20 American Civil Liberties Union, Free Speech 1925–1926: The Work of the American Civil Liberties Union (New 
York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1926), 3. 
21 ACLU, Fight for Free Speech, 8. On the ACLU’s activity in connection with early 1920s strike, see Murphy, 
Meaning, 138–50.  
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immigration laws, and it opposed alien registration and deportation bills. It also engaged with 
racial discrimination, especially lynchings. But during the labor lull of the 1920s, it made 
primary and secondary education its most visible focus.  It was clear to the ACLU’s leadership 
that the long-term success of the radical movement entailed protecting not only the tools of labor 
radicalism, but also advocacy of and instruction in their use and goals.   
Naturally, the ACLU’s first and most consistent target was the suppression of radical 
teachings and radical teachers.  In fact, freedom for radical teachers had been part of the ACLU’s 
agenda since the NCLB days. Leon Whipple was discharged from the University of Virginia 
after espousing pacifism and celebrating Russia in a speech at a neighboring women’s college.22  
Even closer to home, Scott Nearing was dismissed first from the University of Pennsylvania and 
then the University of Toledo before assisting in the creation of the NCLB.  Nearing was also 
intimately involved with the Rand School of Social Science, a Socialist institution for the 
education of workers, whose lecturers included Franklin H. Giddings, John Spargo, James T. 
Shotwell, and Charles A. Beard (who had resigned his own position at Columbia University after 
the expulsion of two professors for their purported dissemination of disloyal doctrines).23
                                                          
22 Leon Whipple, “Free Speech and Jefferson’s University,” ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 37. The NCLB approached 
him to offer its assistance; the ensuing correspondence led to an arrangement for funding his scholarship on the 
history and theory of civil liberties. Roger Baldwin to Leon Whipple, 27 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 
37. 
  The 
Rand School was targeted for state suppression early in the war, and during the postwar Red 
23 “Quits Columbia; Assails Trustees,” New York Times, 7 October 1917; “Down with Education,” Seattle Union 
Record, 31 July 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 5, vol. 40. Algernon Lee served as educational director.  In March 1918, 
Nearing was indicted under the Espionage Act for his pamphlet “The Great Madness,” which was published by the 
Rand School and denounced the War as a victory for “American plutocracy.” “Scott Nearing and Mrs. Stokes 
Arrested,” Survey, 30 March 1918, in ACLU Papers, reel 6, vol. 53. Algernon Lee served as education director. 
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Scare, it was the center of the NCLB’s battle against the Joint Legislative Committee to 
Investigate Seditious Activities, or Lusk Committee.24
The Lusk Committee launched a campaign against the Rand School in June 1919, at the 
urging of its counsel, Archibald Stevenson—the same Red hunter who had sought to convince 
the Department of Justice to prosecute the NCLB the previous year. Fifty men, most of whom 
had been members of the American Protective League, ransacked the school’s facilities in 
pursuit of papers and materials; two days later, they returned to search the safe for its financial 
records.
   
25  Although the raids produced minimal evidence (the most sinister finding reported in 
the New York Times was “that persons identified with the Rand School had interested themselves 
in the defense of William Haywood and other I.W.W. leaders convicted in Chicago”), the 
Attorney General of New York compliantly initiated charges to cancel the school’s charter, 
cheered on by the press.26
According to the NCLB, the episode posed a “challenge to all liberal Americans.” In 
August, three months before Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, the 
organization prepared a statement by prominent non-Socialists urging the state to cease its attack 
on the Rand School.
   
27
                                                          
24 See generally Todd J. Pfannestiel, Rethinking the Red Scare: The Lusk Committee and New York’s Crusade 
against Radicalism, 1919–1923 (New York: Routledge, 2003). The Committee was named for State Senator Clayton 
R. Lusk. 
 “If its teachings are unsound the surest way to demonstrate that fact is to 
25 The Lusk Committee simultaneously targeted the headquarters of the Left Wing Socialists and the local IWW 
offices, in what the New York Times called “the biggest of the kind in the history of the city.” “Raid Rand School,” 
New York Times, 22 June 1919; “Opens Safe in New Rand School Raid,” New York Times, 24 June 1919. Both raids 
were authorized by warrants. 
26 “Raid Rand School,” New York Times, 22 June 1919; “Opens Safe in New Rand School Raid,” New York Times, 
24 June 1919; a few days later, the “most important piece of documentary evidence” was a “plan of propaganda 
among the colored people, especially in the South.” The Rand School operated under a charter issued to the 
American Socialist Society in 1901.  “Moves to Close the Rand School,” New York Times, 28 June 1919; “The Rand 
School,” New York Times, 24 June 1919 (editorial condemning the school). See generally People’s Freedom Union, 
“The Truth about the Lusk Committee,” March 1920, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 115.   
27 National Civil Liberties Bureau, “Bolshevism and Cool Heads” (draft), 5 July 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 22, vol. 
159A. See also NCLB Press Release, 18 July 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 22, vol. 159A (noting that the statement 
“calls attention to the danger that coercion of minority opinion inevitably will drive criticism underground and will 
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permit them to be heard and observed,” it argued. “The people of New York are capable of 
making up their own minds about them.”  Such reasoning fit neatly into the progressive model of 
free speech that had receded during the War but was re-emerging among liberal lawyers and 
academics.28 In communications with government officials and potential contributors, the NCLB 
emphasized the value of political expression as a means both of buttressing democratic 
legitimacy and of facilitating “social progress.” It attracted mainstream support by celebrating 
(along with Justice Holmes) a marketplace of ideas,29 or (before Justice Brandeis) the centrality 
of open discussion to democratic decision-making.30
                                                                                                                                                                                           
harm the orderly processes of discussion of public affairs”). The New York Times printed large excerpts of the 
statement. “Want Rand School Opened,” New York Times, 19 July 1919.  
  In the NCLB’s assessment, the state had 
28 In the years after World War I, a new pluralism (verging at times on relativism) crept into legal and political 
theory.  To borrow from Morton Horwitz’s influential account of legal realism, the war disrupted the “self-assurance 
about values that Progressives were able regularly to muster.”  Horwitz, Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, 191.  Some 
interwar libertarians lauded free speech for its potential to flush out the political vision most compatible with the 
“public good,” but others wondered whether any such ideal existed in the first place. Vincent Blasi notes that Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes was a pluralist, skeptical of absolute truth and yet committed to the articulation of steadfast 
political beliefs.  In this pragmatist model, he suggests, dissenting speech represents a crucial challenge to 
established power structures and the means through which false conceptions are periodically replaced.  Vincent 
Blasi, “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas,” Supreme Court Review (2004): 14, 29–30, 45–46.  See also Graber, 
Transforming Free Speech; Post, “Reconciling Theory and Doctrine.” Cf. Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: 
Keywords in American Politics since Independence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 197–98 
(describing move from public interest to propaganda among political scientists during the 1920s). 
29 The concept of the “marketplace of ideas” is generally attributed to Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United 
States, though he did not explicitly use the phrase.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even 
more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).  The ACLU often 
invoked the analogy.  E.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Are you Free to See, Hear, Read? (New York: 
American Civil Liberties Union, June 1947) (“The American Civil Liberties Union philosophy is grounded in the 
belief that truth wins out in the open market-place.”). The invocation of the market was easily adapted to a 
libertarian ideal of moral autonomy.  Indeed, Morris Ernst put it to rhetorical use in an argument against the 
regulation of fortune telling: “The state should not forever be our nursemaid. . . . Fortune telling should be allowed 
free trade in the market place of thought.  It will then live or die on its own merits.  Do not let us encourage 
palmeasies and bootleggers of astrology.  Suppression never succeeds.”  “Take Your Choice—Should We Drive Out 
the Fortune Tellers?” New York American, 7 August 1931, Ernst Papers, box 2, folder 3. 
30 In his famous concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), Brandeis wrote: “Those who won 
our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in 
its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a 
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is 
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little to fear from the Rand School’s propagation of potentially erroneous views. Rather, the “real 
danger” was “the immeasurable harm which such coercion of minority opinion does to the 
processes of orderly discussion of public affairs.”31
Although the NCLB issued its statement while the legal proceedings were pending, it was 
a general pronouncement on the government’s policy, not the merits of the legal case.  By the 
same token, when the case eventually collapsed, the Lusk Committee continued to lambast the 
Rand School just as vigorously.
   
32  In fact, the Rand School’s attorney claimed that “it was 
apparent from the day the action was begun that the Attorney General never intended to try it.”33
 In 1920, the Committee proposed legislation to shut down the Rand School by 
prohibiting the state from licensing any private school “where it appears that the instruction 
proposed to be given includes the teachings of the doctrine that organized government shall be 
overthrown by force, violence or unlawful means.”
  
The Lusk Committee was concerned with public opinion, not law, and it was not deterred by 
legal setbacks.   
34
                                                                                                                                                                                           
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government.” 
 Had the bill stopped there, it might have 
avoided significant controversy. But the so-called Lusk Laws went much further. They also 
required public school teachers to demonstrate through external assessment that they were “loyal 
and obedient to the government of [New York State] and of the United States.” Any teacher who 
31 National Civil Liberties Bureau, “Bolshevism and Cool Heads” (draft), 5 July 1919, ACLU Papers, reel 22, vol. 
159A. 
32 Justice John V. McAvoy ordered that the case against the Rand School be brought by July 28 so as not to interfere 
unjustifiably with the operations of the Rand School. “Rand School Case Set for July 28,” New York Times, 12 July 
1919. When the Deputy Attorney General announced on July 30 that he was not ready to proceed with the case, 
Justice McAvoy dismissed the case without prejudice. “Court Dismisses Rand School Case,” New York Times, 31 
July 1919.  
33 Samuel Untermeyer, the attorney who represented the Rand School (and later defended Roger Baldwin in the 
New Jersey State courts), disclaimed any sympathy with the socialist program.  “Court Dismisses Rand School 
Case,” New York Times, 31 July 1919. 
34 “Ask Legislature To End Rand School,” New York Times, 18 March 1920; “Pass Bill to Kill Rand School Here,” 
New York Times, 16 April 1920. 
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had ever advocated change (whether peaceful or violent) in the form of the state or federal 
government was to be denied a certificate of fitness. The bill passed, but Governor Al Smith 
vetoed it, explaining that it targeted teachers for their thinking, not their teaching, and that its 
effect “would be to make the Commissioner of Education the sole and arbitrary dictator of the 
personnel of the teaching force of the State in its public schools.”35
Despite Smith’s denunciation, the legislature passed the bill again in 1921, and Governor 
Nathan L. Miller signed it.
  
36 That fall, an oath was administered to public school teachers 
throughout the state, and principals were required to report on the “morality and loyalty” of their 
teachers.37
The anonymous evaluations and closed proceedings proved too much for many New 
Yorkers to bear.  Newspapers denounced the law and, even more fervently, its administration. 
The Buffalo Times declared the law “a reversal of all civilization,” worse than “the barbarism of 
darkest Africa.”
  Often, the assessments were based on opinions by undisclosed informants.  Teachers 
suspected of disloyalty were not told why.  In the spring of 1922, the Commissioner of Education 
appointed a five-member Advisory Council, led by Archibald Stevenson, to decide contested 
cases in secret meetings.   
38 The Buffalo Evening News decried the “star chamber procedure.”39
                                                          
35 “Gov. Smith Vetoes Six Bills Aimed at Socialist Party,” New York Times, 20 May 1920. Smith’s statement was a 
resounding endorsement of free speech: “This country has lived and thrived from its inception until today, when it is 
recognized as the leading world power, upon the fundamental principles set forth in the Declaration of 
Independence, one of which was the declaration that all men are created equal. No matter to what extent we may 
disagree with our neighbor he is entitled to his own opinion, and until the time arrives when he seeks by violation of 
law to urge his opinion upon his neighbors he must be left free, not only to have it, but to express it. In a State, just 
as in a legislative body, the majority needs no protection, for they can protect themselves. Law, in a democracy, 
means the protection of the rights and liberties of the minority.” As for the Rand School provision, Smith believed 
that “the bill strikes at the very foundation of one of the most cardinal institutions of our nation: the fundamental 
right of the people to enjoy liberty in the domain of idea and speech.” 
 The New 
York Evening Post called for repeal of the law, which interfered “with the fundamental rights of 
36 “Governor Approves Two Loyalty Bills,” New York Times, 10 May 1921.  
37 People’s Freedom Union, “The Truth about the Lusk Committee,” March 1920, ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 115. 
38 Ibid. (quoting Buffalo Times, 7 December 1921). 
39 Ibid. (quoting Buffalo Evening News, 25 May 1922). 
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freedom of thought and speech.”40 Most tellingly, The Nation acknowledged the public’s 
“callous indifference to the civil liberties of workers” but hoped that an attack on education 
might attract popular outrage; in an atmosphere of fear, hypocrisy, and servility, it explained, 
“you cannot make good citizens, to say nothing of honest men and women.”41 In May 1923, at 
the urging of newly re-elected governor Al Smith, the public school law was repealed.42 So was 
the private school licensing law, despite a split decision by New York’s intermediate court 
upholding its constitutionality against a due process challenge43—in a case argued for the Rand 
School by Socialist leader and labor lawyer Morris Hillquit, a member of the ACLU’s National 
Committee.44
 The fight over the Lusk Laws taught the ACLU that academic freedom, unlike the rights 
of anarchist immigrants or radical workers, commanded mainstream support. The lesson was 
   
                                                          
40 Ibid. (quoting New York Evening Post, 18 May 1922). 
41 “The Degradation of Teaching,” Nation, 7 December 1921. 
42 Smith called the laws “repugnant to the fundamentals of American democracy.” “Lusk Laws Repealed by Smith’s 
Approval,” New York Times, 26 May 1923.  
43 Zechariah Chafee observed that “after the [Rand] school’s foot was pinched by state regulation, its teachers may 
have understood better the irritation which other kinds of business feel under government regulation.” The Rand 
School argued that the excessive restrictions on education embodied in the Lusk Committee restrictions on radical 
education were a deprivation of liberty and property under the due process clause. Zechariah Chafee, “The Rand 
School Case,” New Republic, 27 September 1922, 118 (“In the past much social legislation restricting private 
enterprise had been held unconstitutional under [the Fourteenth Amendment], to the indignation of Socialists, labor 
leaders, and even such a staunch individualist as Theodore Roosevelt.  The class rooms of the Rand School must 
have frequently echoed to denunciations of Ives v. Railway Co., invalidating the first New York Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, Re Jacobs, denying the state power to forbid the manufacture of cigars in crowded tenements, 
and Lochner v. New York, upsetting the ten-hour day in bakeshops.  It was amusing, therefore, to find the Rand 
School, a Socialist institution, striving on the authority of these very cases to limit governmental control over a 
private activity.”).  
44 The Rand School declined to apply for a license and initiated a test of its constitutionality in the state courts. 
When he announced the school’s intention to challenge the law, Algernon Lee predicted that Senator Lusk would 
not intervene by locking its doors. He pointed to “the development since the excitement of war of a saner disposition 
on the part of those in authority to thrash matters of this kind out in an orderly legal manner.” “Rand School To Defy 
Lusk Loyalty Law,” New York Times, 25 September 1921. The state was, in fact, cooperative in arranging to test the 
law. “Rand School Safe Till Law Is Tested,” New York Times, 28 September 1921; “Debs Bust Cheered by Crowd 
of 10,000,” New York Times, 1 January 1922.  In a 2 to 1 decision, the Appellate Division upheld the law. People v. 
American Socialist Society, 202 A.D. 640 (N.Y.A.D. 1922).  Morris Hillquit speculated that the court’s decision 
was “the first adjudication by an authoritative American tribunal which sanctions the institution of preliminary 
censorship” and declared that the decision “sweeps away all constitutional safeguards which have been thrown 
around the freedom of press and speech, and opens the door to oppressive class despotism.” “Rand School Loses 
Fight on Lusk Law,” New York Times, 15 July 1922. The Appellate Division permitted the school to stay open 
pending decision by the Court of Appeals. “Rand School to Stay Open,” New York Times, 7 October 1922.  
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reinforced by controversy over a second restrictive education law, which was then working its 
way up through the federal courts. That law effectively abolished private education in the state of 
Oregon, and the surrounding litigation culminated in the Supreme Court’s oft-cited decision in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which recognized parents’ authority over their children’s education 
and disclaimed the “power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept 
intrusion from public teachers only.”45 For the ACLU, the Oregon public school law was a 
curious initiation into the field of academic freedom.  The law was backed by the Ku Klux Klan, 
and its purpose was to abolish the Catholic Schools, which were widely regarded as an 
impediment to the assimilation of immigrant children.46
William S. U’Ren, an ACLU National Committee member, was among Oregon’s most 
notable progressive reformers and had played a critical role in introducing the initiative, recall, 
and referendum to his state’s legislative process. On the issue of the public school law, he 
advised the ACLU’s executive committee to “pay no attention,” because it raised no issue of 
“civil or religious liberty.”
  As a rule, neither the Klan nor anti-
immigrant sentiment was popular within the ACLU.  Still, most of the ACLU leadership 
personally opposed parochial education as superstitious and conservative. Moreover, the Oregon 
law garnered substantial progressive support, even within the ACLU.  
47
                                                          
45 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 On the contrary, U’Ren approved of the measure because it would 
raise the quality of the public school system and mitigate class difference in education. “If every 
normal child must go to the district public school through the first eight grades, then every 
46 See generally Paula Abrams, Cross Purposes: Pierce v. Society of Sisters and the Struggle over Compulsory 
Public Education (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).  
47 William S. U’Ren to Roger Baldwin, 27 December 1922, ACLU Papers, reel 34, vol. 245. As for Governor 
Pierce, who was endorsed by the KKK, U’Ren thought he had “respect for the constitutional rights of citizens.” 
William S. U’Ren to Roger Baldwin, 6 December 1922, ACLU Papers, reel 34, vol. 245. He explained that he had 
known Pierce since the 1890s and that although he was a “politician,” he had supported every measure that U’Ren 
had ever advocated, except the single tax. He told Baldwin: “I may be wrong, but it is my judgment that a man who 
has that kind of a record is fairly liberal and progressive. I think he will make an excellent governor.”  
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parent, whether rich or poor, Jew or Gentile, Catholic or Protestant, saint or sinner, will have the 
highest possible selfish parental interest in making the best possible school because there is no 
other for his or her children,” he explained.  The executive committee, however, uniformly 
rejected U’Ren’s reasoning, and it pledged its support to opponents of the school law.  The 
fourteen members to whom Baldwin read U’Ren’s letter “all fe[lt] distinctly that an issue of both 
civil and religious liberty [was] involved and that the right to worship according to the dictates of 
one’s conscience is certainly involved in the right to send children to schools of your own 
choosing, public or private.”48
Baldwin’s rhetoric notwithstanding, the ACLU did not understand the law’s menace 
primarily in terms of the free exercise of religion, or even (as later Supreme Court decisions 
would cast it) of individual liberty or family autonomy. As Baldwin told U’Ren: “All the rest of 
us here seem perfectly clear on the other side. Perhaps it is because we’ve got a number of 
experimental private schools in and near New York which are infinitely more valuable to the 
future of education than anything the public schools are doing. Under such a law as you have in 
Oregon, they would be wiped out.”
  
49 When it discussed Pierce v. Society of Sisters publicly, the 
ACLU invoked religious freedom and parental rights.  In so doing, it made new allies among 
conservatives and helped to secure a unanimous decision in the Supreme Court.  At bottom, 
however, the members of the ACLU’s executive committee opposed compulsory public 
schooling because it threatened the future of the Rand School and projects like it.  They believed 
that control of the curriculum was a more insidious version of the violently repressive machinery 
of World War I.50
                                                          
48 Roger Baldwin to William S. U’Ren, 4 January 1923, ACLU Papers, reel 34, vol. 245. 
  Industrial interests were purging radical teachers, dictating lesson plans, and 
49 Roger Baldwin to William S. U’Ren, 17 January 1923, ACLU Papers, reel 34, vol. 245. 
50 Cf. Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, 
trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), 123–73. 
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prohibiting private alternatives—all to ensure that the public school system would inculcate 
children with the values of the dominant capitalist culture.  By contrast, radical education, if it 
were only sheltered from state suppression, had the potential to awaken the masses.  
It is no wonder, then, that the ACLU’s first committee, formed in the fall of 1924 and 
chaired by Tufts Professor Clarence R. Skinner, was its Committee on Academic Freedom.  
When the organization first addressed the issue of academic freedom as a potential area of 
activity in June 1924, it openly acknowledged its concern—namely, “propagandists’ efforts to 
distort education in the interest of a particular conception of political and economic thinking,” of 
which the Lusk Committee’s effort to shut down the Rand School was the most prominent 
example. Such laws, the ACLU insisted, were “special interest” measures to promote 
industrialist propaganda and thereby undermine the broader public interest.51
 Over the following summer, the ACLU explored potential avenues of involvement in 
academic freedom work.  The possibility of a new alliance with the American Association of 
University Professors—which had first occupied the field in 1915 with its thoroughly 
progressive Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure—was 
appealing. Despite the AAUP’s general capitulation to popular hysteria during World War I,
   
52
                                                          
51 The pamphlet declared that “the public mind is poisoned at its source when special interests take hold of 
educational institutions for promoting their own propaganda.” American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom of Speech 
in Schools and Colleges (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, June 1924), in ACLU Papers, reel 34, vol. 
245.  
 
progressive academics had formulated a robust defense of freedom in the classroom under 
ordinary circumstances.  The premise of the AAUP’s Declaration was that academic knowledge 
was capable of objective assessment and was properly evaluated by peers within a scholar’s 
52 E.g., “Academic Freedom in Wartime: American Association of University Professors Takes Stand for Freedom 
of Word and Action on the Part of Teachers,” New York Post, 1 May 1918 (noting the AAUP policy that instructors 
convicted of disobedience could be deprived of academic office and that faculty should “be required by their 
institutions to refrain from propaganda designed, or unmistakably tending, to cause others to resist or evade the 
Compulsory Service law or the regulations of the military authorities”).  
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discipline rather than by lay trustees, who were motivated by politics and ideology.53 “The claim 
to freedom of teaching is made in the interest of the integrity and of the progress of scientific 
inquiry,” the Declaration explained, and it was therefore available only to “those who carry on 
their work in the temper of the scientific inquirer.” The AAUP was primarily concerned with 
ideas expressed in scholarship and in the classroom, not with political activities outside of 
academic institutions.54
 For a combination of ideological and institutional reasons,
   
55 the ACLU was most 
interested in precisely those issues that the AAUP discounted.  “In cases involving freedom of 
opinion outside the class room the public interest is peculiarly involved,” an ACLU statement 
explained.  “In such cases we offer the aid of our legal and publicity services to teachers or 
students whose views subject them to attack.”56
                                                          
53 See J. Peter Byrne, “Academic Freedom: A ‘Special Concern of the First Amendment,’” Yale Law Journal 99 
(1989): 251–340; J. Peter Byrne, “Neo-orthodoxy in Academic Freedom,” Texas Law Review 88 (2009): 143–170.  
 An outside organization like the ACLU could 
not properly defend a teacher who used the classroom to disseminate propaganda; “the extent to 
which a teacher may legitimately lay before a class his own opinions on controversial questions 
is a matter for those engaged in teaching to determine through their own organization.” 
Conversely, it was patently the ACLU’s concern to ensure that educational institutions did not 
attempt to impede teachers in their exercise of “the common rights of citizens, including the right 
54 “Teachers Must Be Left Free, Lowell Holds,” New York Call, 14 January 1918; Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. 
Post, For the Common Good: Principles of American Academic Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009). 
55 Many potential members of the ACLU’s committee were concerned that it would duplicate the work of the 
AAUP. The ACLU assured these candidates that the two organizations had different objectives and that the AAUP 
was fully aware and supportive of the ACLU’s proposed work.  E.g., Roger Baldwin to Allyn A. Young, 29 August 
1924, ACLU Papers, reel 35, vol. 248; Allyn A. Young to Roger Baldwin, 21 October 1924, ACLU Papers, reel 35, 
vol. 248 (“I understand you are not concerned so much with ‘professional freedom’ as with other things—student 
repression of liberal opinion, obstacles put in the way of ‘radical’ lectures, and the like. I should say that your 
committee could do no harm and might do some good.”); H. W. Tyler, AAUP, to Roger Baldwin, 25 October 1924, 
ACLU Papers, reel 35, vol. 248 (“I believe you can render a real service in this field. We certainly have our hands 
more than full with the problems brought to us.”).  
56 ACLU, “Schools and Colleges.” 
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of expressing their views on political and economic issues, in speech or in print.”57 The ACLU 
was also concerned (inspired, presumably, by the energy of the student movement in Europe) 
with the right of college students to hear radical speakers and organize radical activities on 
campus. In fact, Roger Baldwin told Ernst Freund that he hoped the committee would “prevent[] 
further inroads upon the agitation of radical and labor issues in the colleges.”58 An October press 
release reiterated that commitment.59
 Although the last issue was something of an after-thought in the ACLU’s platform on 
academic freedom, it soon took center stage. During July 1925, national attention was riveted on 
Dayton, Tennessee, where Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan clashed in the 
courtroom over the scientific plausibility of creationism.  For the ACLU, however, the Scopes 
trial, which it sponsored, was a case about academic freedom rather than evolution.
  The new committee would resist “college and school rules 
restricting liberal and radical activities,” in addition to preserving teachers’ and students’ 
“freedom of opinion” outside the classroom.  It would also oppose laws limiting teachers’ 
autonomy in the classroom, such as those prohibiting teaching of pacifism, of “certain concepts 
of history,” and of evolution.  
60  Indeed, the 
ACLU leadership was distressed by Clarence Darrow’s flagrantly anti-religious approach during 
the trial and would have preferred a more moderate and publicly palatable strategy.61
                                                          
57 Ibid.  
  Much of 
58 Roger Baldwin to Ernst Freund, 27 August 1924, ACLU Papers, reel 35, vol. 248. 
59 ACLU Press Release, 22 October 1924, ACLU Papers, reel 35, vol. 248 (noting that the ACLU’s new committee 
would investigate “interference with the activities of liberal or radical students and instructors in any college or 
school in the country”). 
60 See Edward J. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate over Science 
and Religion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 73–83. 
61 The principal exception was Darrow’s law partner, ACLU counsel Arthur Garfield Hays, who vehemently 
defended his approach. Unsigned letter to Felix Frankfurter, 10 November 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 44, vol. 299 
(describing the positions of various members of the ACLU leadership).  
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the executive committee disapproved of his confrontational tone and wanted him replaced with a 
more respectable attorney, ideally future Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, on appeal.62
 To Baldwin, the Scopes trial was an opportunity to reach out to a new constituency for 
financial and political support.
   
63  “Persons who have not contributed before to the defense of 
civil liberty will do it now on such an issue as this,” he reflected. “Supporters of educational and 
scientific work will be interested, of course, and some liberal spirits in the churches. They need 
not fear contamination with the defense of reds!”64  To that end, Baldwin was careful to maintain 
an independent defense fund for the “Tennessee Evolution Case,” distinct from the general 
ACLU finances, “banked and handled separately under the auspices of the distinguished 
committee” that the organization assembled for the task.65 The ACLU assured correspondents 
that its purpose in Scopes was neither to denigrate religion nor to eliminate moral instruction in 
the schools.66 Rather, it was to preserve American liberty by preventing the “complete 
standardization” of the “intellectual life of [the] nation.”67
                                                          
62 Roger Baldwin to John T. Scopes, 10 August 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 44, vol. 299 (“[I]t is not a radical case and 
does not require a man whose economic philosophy is radical to handle it. Furthermore, we believe that the 
importance of the issue demands that we should get the lawyer most likely to impress the Supreme Court, and 
certainly one who would not prejudice the court in advance. We believe that the man for that job is Charles Evans 
Hughes, who has already made a corking public statement as the President of the American Bar Association on the 
issues involved in your case. Furthermore, there is something to the psychology of having before the court a man 
who is not an agnostic or atheist.”).  
  The enemy was “force[d] 
conformity”—which was why the ACLU could advocate the right of Catholics to private 
63 Larson, Summer for the Gods, 206–07.  
64 Letter from Roger Baldwin, undated, ACLU Papers, reel 38, vol. 274. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Telegram from ACLU to Noah W. Cooper (President, Davidson County Sunday School Association), 11 June 
1925, ACLU Papers, reel 38, vol. 274; ACLU, “Statement on Civil Liberty Situation in America at Present,” 29 
August 1925, ACLU Papers, reel 41, vol. 285 (“It is not as an advocate of the theory of evolution but of academic 
freedom that the American Civil Liberties Union is presenting an appeal to the Tenn. Supreme Court to test the 
constitutionality of the statute. If similar legislation were aimed at the teachings of a religious group in the U.S. it 
would be equally obnoxious to those who advocate civil liberties.”). 
67 Forrest Bailey to Rev. Noah Cooper, 15 June 1925, ACLU Papers, reel 38, vol. 274. 
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education in Oregon and the right of Tennessee school teachers to explain evolution in the same 
breath.68
In the Oregon public school controversy, the ACLU’s nod to inviolate traditions and 
family values had garnered conservative sympathy; in the evolution context, the notion that 
experimentation and diversity in intellectual inquiry was the source of democratic progress 
resonated with progressive audiences. As Roger Baldwin told James P. Cannon, the ACLU had a 
particular crowd to reach in the overarching struggle for economic equality.
   
69 It was up to the 
“liberals”—or, as Baldwin preferred to call them, “Libertarians”—to “fight for civil liberty as a 
principle of progress.”70   The ACLU’s pamphlet on the Scopes trial lumped anti-evolution laws 
together with compulsory bible reading and restrictions on radical teachers. “All of them,” it 
claimed, “involve precisely the same issues as the laws punishing opinion passed during the war, 
and the criminal syndicalism and sedition laws passed in 35 states during and just after the war.” 
All were part of an immense and unprecedented effort “to regulate public opinion and to penalize 
minority and heretical views,”71 and they were bound to narrow human understanding.  Such 
rhetoric was effective.  In the fall of 1926, Baldwin recounted that “the Scopes evolution case in 
Tennessee [had] opened the eyes of hundreds to the growth of intolerance and brought them into 
camp.”72
These early seminal cases—the Rand School, Pierce, and the Scopes trial—were 
instrumental in attracting another constituency besides Baldwin’s Libertarians: lawyers.  With 
the battle over education, the source of repression had subtly shifted. Even more than before, the 
  
                                                          
68 Ibid.  
69 Roger Baldwin to James P. Cannon (ILD), 26 May 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303. 
70 Roger Baldwin, “Civil Liberties in the United States” (draft), fall 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303. 
According to Baldwin, liberals were “persons who merely welcome change without fighting for it.” 
71 American Civil Liberties Union, The Tennessee Evolution Case (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, July 
1925), in ACLU Papers, reel 44, vol. 299. 
72 Roger Baldwin, “Civil Liberties in the United States” (draft), fall 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303. 
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ACLU came to define itself in opposition to state authority.73  Perhaps because the old 
progressive convictions were so deeply ingrained, or perhaps because progressive ideology was 
so pervasive and its language so dominant, the early ACLU had continued to pursue a number of 
familiar and tested tactics. It had reached out to government agencies and public officials in 
opposition to restrictive legislation and in pursuit of amnesty for political and industrial 
prisoners.  When mobs and vigilantes shamelessly beat dissenters, it had called upon officials to 
intervene, notwithstanding its concerns about government abuses. More tellingly, when local 
officials aligned with courts to quash local labor struggles, even Roger Baldwin had been 
tempted to enlist state and federal assistance in leveling the playing field.74  But for political and 
legal reasons, the indoctrination of young citizens through state channels was best countered by 
other means.75
                                                          
73 Roger Baldwin to William H. Jefferys, 22 December 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303 (“[A]ll through 
history governments have been the chief persecutors. It is with government agencies that we have to deal all the 
time, opposing the repressive and often lawless tactics of the executive and of government by an appeal to the 
judiciary. And the judiciary now has pretty nearly emasculated civil liberties as they have been conceived by the 
forefathers and maintained for a hundred years.”). 
  
74 E.g., ACLU Executive Committee Minutes, 26 September 1921, in ACLU, Minutes: “Mr. Baldwin reported at 
length on his recent trip to West Virginia, where he organized the publicity in connection with the presentation of 
the miners’ case to the United States Senate investigation committee. . . . Mr. Baldwin gave it as his opinion that the 
only possible solution of the conflict lies in action by the federal government, forcing an agreement between 
operators, workers and the state authorities. The committee agreed to address a communication to the president, 
urging upon him either the appointment of a special commission to do this work, or a request by him to the Senate 
committee to endeavor to effect a settlement.” Other examples include the ACLU-sponsored Committee of Inquiry 
on Coal and Civil Liberties, which was produced for incorporation into the findings of the United States Steel 
Commission, and the ACLU’s successful appeal to Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot to restore civil liberties 
in the coal regions of his state. 
75 See, e.g., Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Education, to Roger Baldwin, 10 May 1924, ACLU Papers, reel 35, 
vol. 248 (“This Bureau, being a branch of the Federal Government, exercises no control or supervision over the 
public school systems of the several States. . . . Whatever any official of this office might say with regard to 
religious tests would be of the nature of mere opinion, and the only action which has thus far been taken has been to 
refrain from the expression of an opinion.”).  Until the Supreme Court’s 1925 decision in Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652 (1925), the federal courts were equally powerless to prevent the curtailment of expressive or religious 
freedom by state and local government. 
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The ACLU only gradually came to regard the rights it supported as enforceable primarily 
by the courts.76  Roger Baldwin was notoriously hostile to court-based activism in the early 
1920s.77  His distrust of judicial methods stemmed not only from notorious exercises of judicial 
review, like Lochner v. New York, but also from the less mandarin but equally reviled labor 
injunctions issued by the trial courts. As ACLU counsel Walter Nelles observed: “Judges are 
chosen from lawyers of standing at the bar, and standing is attained by devoted service to 
important property interests. It is extraordinary when a judge can slough off the prepossessions 
which his practice has engendered.”78
Ever a pragmatist, however, Baldwin encouraged experimentation rather than ideological 
rigidity, and the organization’s lawyers continued to pursue judicially enforceable constitutional 
rights, despite serious reservations from much of the ACLU’s membership—most notably Felix 
Frankfurter, who staunchly opposed the pursuit of civil liberties through constitutional litigation 
and regarded the Supreme Court’s “occasional services to liberalism” as a dangerous step toward 
judicial legislation.
   
79  In the early years, of course, judicial victories were few and far between. 
In 1921, the ACLU reported on the disheartening series of defeats in all cases pertaining to 
freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the rights of labor.80  The Supreme Court, the 
organization declared, had “gone over to the side of reaction.”81
                                                          
76 On constitutionalism outside the courts, see Chafee, Freedom of Speech, 3–6 (“It is often assumed that so long as 
a statute is held valid under the Bill of Rights, that document ceases to be of any importance in the matter, and may 
be henceforth disregarded. On the contrary, [the First Amendment] is much more than an order to Congress not to 
cross the boundary which marks the extreme limits of lawful suppression. It is also an exhortation and a guide for 
the action of Congress inside that boundary. It is a declaration of national policy in favor of the public discussion of 
all public questions.”). 
   
77 Mark V. Tushnet. The NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925–1950 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 4; Murphy, Origin of Civil Liberties, 244.  
78Walter Nelles, “Objections to Labor Injunctions,” in Civil Liberty, ed. Edith M. Phelps (New York: H. W. Wilson 
Co., 1927), 156. 
79  Walker, American Liberties, 81 (quoting Frankfurter). 
80 In one field of civil liberties activity, freedom from unlawful searches and seizures, the Supreme Court had 
gradually extended protection in a series of Prohibition cases culminating in Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 
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But eventually, a combination of periodic state-court successes, Holmes’s and Brandeis’s 
powerful Supreme Court dissents, and victories in such non-labor cases as Meyer v. Nebraska 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters would make the courts an inviting venue. The ACLU sought to 
build on the Supreme Court’s existing understanding that respect for “personal rights” was 
crucial to rule of law.82  For the most part, ACLU lawyers were unabashed legal realists, and 
they brought their cases to the courts because, increasingly, that is where they were most likely 
to win.  In spring 1925, within a week of its decision in Pierce, the Supreme Court implied in 
Gitlow v. New York that the First Amendment’s freedoms would henceforth be binding on the 
states.  Notably, Gitlow—like Whitney v. California—was argued by Walter Nelles and Walter 
Pollak of the ACLU.  By the end of the year, litigation appeared sufficiently promising to prompt 
ACLU counsel Arthur Garfield Hays to propose a study of “affirmative legal action” as a means 
of securing “labor’s civil rights.”83 To labor leaders, seeking judicial protection for striking 
workers was a betrayal of deeply held beliefs.84
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1921).  See Albert DeSilver, The Supreme Court vs. Civil Liberty (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 
April 1921), in ACLU Papers, reel 7, vol. 69. 
  But as Baldwin freely admitted, he was “not 
81 Ibid. 
82 Walter Nelles reflected in 1920 that the rights against search and seizure were the only ones that had weathered 
the Red Scare. Perceived violation of these rights by the Department of Justice were largely responsible for the 
backlash against the Palmer Raids. Most famously, a group of twelve prominent lawyers and academics, including 
Felix Frankfurter, Zechariah Chafee, Ernst Freund, and Roscoe Pound, were sufficiently outraged to write a “Report 
upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Department of Justice,” which condemned the recent wave of 
warrantless searches and arrests and other unlawful methods, though it explicitly declined to “raise any question as 
to the Constitutional protection of the free speech and a free press.” National Popular Government League, Report 
upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Department of Justice (Washington, D.C.: National Popular 
Government League, May 1920). The statement argued: “Free men respect justice and follow truth, but arbitrary 
power they will oppose until the end of time.  There is no danger of revolution so great as that created by 
suppression, by ruthlessness, and by deliberate violation of the simple rules of American law and American 
decency.” Ibid., 8.  
83 Executive Committee Minutes, 26 October 1925, ACLU, Minutes (“Mr. Pitkin’s favorable report on Mr. Hays’s 
proposal for a study of affirmative legal action was adopted, with a recommendation to the American Fund that that 
organization pay the costs of the investigation.”). American Civil Liberties Union, The Fight for Civil Liberty, 
1927–1928 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1928), 58 (“This was a fund of $650 appropriated by the 
American Fund for Public Service to make a study of legal means to secure labor’s civil rights. The material was 
incorporated in the book ‘Don’t Tread on Me’ by Arthur Garfield Hays.”). 
84 See Chapter 4.  
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troubled . . . about any issue of theory or principles.”85
Integral to the ACLU’s embrace of academic freedom in the 1920s was the deep 
conviction of the leadership that radical propaganda could in fact bring about fundamental social 
change. The ACLU’s establishment allies typically assumed that exposing radical ideas to 
scrutiny would ensure their demise. For example, a brief of the Special Committee of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, of which Charles Evans Hughes was a member, 
opposed the expulsion of Socialists from the New York Assembly on the theory that tolerance of 
dissent was “the most efficient safety-valve against resort by the discontented to physical 
force.”
  Throughout his career, he was more 
concerned with achieving results than with ideological consistency.  And for the time being—for 
the ACLU’s core leadership, if not the growing number of members and National Committee 
members from across the political spectrum—securing the rights of labor remained the 
organization’s overarching goal.   
86 By contrast, the ACLU leadership (though it often articulated the conservative line) 
believed that a proper airing would convert the masses. Education, as Leon Whipple put it in his 
ACLU-sponsored treatise on civil liberties, was “the source of all true progress in social 
liberty.”87 In Whipple’s view, civil liberties were most important not at revolutionary 
moments—“in serious struggles,” he argued, they were “but one part of the battle” in which the 
most powerful force would prevail—but in the calm periods in between.88
                                                          
85 Roger Baldwin to James P. Cannon (ILD), 26 May 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303. 
  Whipple explained 
that once an emergency has passed, “the executive, the courts, and the police sink back into 
normalcy from which they have been prodded.” Active violence ceases and restrictive laws are 
ignored, repealed or struck down as unconstitutional. “In such times,” he continued, 
86 Quoted in Chafee, Freedom of Speech, 189. The expulsion proceedings were initiated by the Lusk Committee.  
Holmes and Brandeis often invoked this rationale as well.  
87 Whipple, Civil Liberty, 317–18. 
88 Whipple, Ancient Liberties, 146.  
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“constitutional liberty has perhaps its greatest value for it is the educational force of new ideas 
that produces social change, not the spectacular struggles that are in fact only symbols of how far 
the change has gone.”89
A muted radicalism infused the ACLU’s theory of civil liberties in the 1920s. The 
organization’s leaders ordinarily spoke in terms of pluralism and tolerance, but their true 
objectives were more ambitious, and occasionally they came out. In Roger Baldwin’s 
understanding, “the Klan’s attempt to compel all children to go to public schools” and the 
“Fundamentalist attack on scientific teaching” were instances of a more general phenomenon, 
namely, “the effort of all groups in power to hold on their privileges, and to write those 
privileges into law.”
  
90 The consolidation of power of which they were reflective had coincided 
with the War, but its true cause was the Russian Revolution: “Bolshevism is the issue which has 
aroused the propertied classes to the defense of things as they are all over the world.”91  Baldwin 
invoked familiar progressive tropes even while he speculated that “political liberalism [was] 
dead.” The prewar radicals, when they fought for the initiative, the referendum, and “other 
devices for popular control,” had “voiced the old American faith that privileged classes could be 
controlled by the ‘Public.’” Indeed Baldwin, “as a humble members of the reformers’ crew of 
those hopeful days,” had “believed it too.”  But he had since come to recognize that there “is no 
‘Public’; the ‘People’ as a political party are unorganizable.”  In place of the public interest there 
were only “economic classes.” Industrial autocracy had taught Roger Baldwin that “the only 
power that works is class-power.”92
                                                          
89 Ibid. 
 
90 ACLU News Release, April 1926, reel 46, vol. 303 (abstract of remarks by Baldwin). 
91 Roger Baldwin, “What has become of the Pre-War Radicals,” 4 January 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303. 
92 Ibid. 
203 
 
As Baldwin often emphasized in correspondence with critics, his views were his own, not 
the ACLU’s.93 Still, they were echoed in the private correspondence of many within the 
organization’s inner circle.94  The ACLU leadership promoted a broad right to education because 
it hoped that the radical labor movement, if given the opportunity to educate the masses, would 
ultimately triumph.95  The organization’s new rallying cry was Justice Holmes’s dissenting 
proclamation in Gitlow v. New York96: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian 
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only 
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”97
By the mid-1920s, the ACLU was staunchly committed to contesting the government 
regulation of unconventional ideas in the education context.  The question for the next half-
decade was how far its new program would reach.  In the minds of the ACLU leadership, state 
inculcation of religious orthodoxy was clearly inimical to revolution.  So was the effort to shut 
unconventional ideas, whether political or otherwise, out of the schools (including the 
  
                                                          
93 Roger Baldwin to C. H. Scovell, 21 October 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303 (“As an organization, we stand 
for everybody’s civil rights, and I think we have never failed to defend all comers impartially. But since by far the 
larger part of the struggle for free speech centers around industrial conflict, just as it did in the Middle Ages around 
religious conflict, it is natural most of our friends and supporters should be those who feel the importance of the 
labor movement as a creative force. While that has nothing to do with the official position of the organization, it 
motivates many of us. . . . I have often said that if the Union could find an enthusiastic executive who was not 
committed as I am to partisanship for the labor movement and to test radical expressions, they would make the 
philosophy of free speech stand on firmer ground. But although we have tried, we have not found anyone who could 
tackle it in so dispassionate a spirit.”). 
94 Forrest Bailey, Baldwin’s co-director, revealed his personal biases in a letter admonishing the Field Secretary of 
the ACLU’s Southern California branch to be more discrete in his public statements: “Let me be perfectly clear on 
this point. I too am a radical and am as much concerned as you can possible be to see the end of the capitalist 
system. The only point I wished to raise . . . was that we consider it an error to give out the overthrow of the 
capitalist system as one of the aims about which this organization is concerned.” Forrest Bailey to Robert Whitaker, 
1 February 1926, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303.  
95 Baldwin nonetheless had his pessimistic moments. E.g., ACLU News Release, April 1926, reel 46, vol. 303 
(quoting remarks by Baldwin: “Tolerance can be achieved only by making repression and intolerance difficult. 
Whether such a spirit can be aroused in a country so prosperous and so constantly extending  throughout the world 
its economic power, is doubtful.”). Even the Rand School lamented in 1923 that while enrollment was high and its 
lectures on art and literature were full, “the proletariat ha[d] begun to weary of ‘serious subjects.” “Tired 
Proletarians,” New York Times, 11 January 1923. 
96 Quoted, e.g., in Roger Baldwin, Draft Speech, ACLU Papers, reel 46, vol. 303.  
97 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673.  
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prohibition on ACLU-sponsored meetings in the New York Public Schools, an ongoing battle 
that in 1927 the ACLU deemed the “most important free-speech fight of the year”).98  There was 
one field, however, into which the organization had not yet ventured.  In spite of the 
longstanding association of radicalism with “free love,”99 the ACLU had resolutely excluded the 
regulation of sexual relations from its purview.  Nonetheless, there was a mounting sentiment 
within the ACLU that social progress was threatened not only by laws directly suppressive of 
radical ideas, but (in Leon Whipple’s words) by the “steady extension of the police power over 
health, morals, and personal habits”—the “slow encroachment” of the state onto all aspects of 
personal liberty.100
 
 With the suppression of Mary Ware Dennett’s foundational sex education 
pamphlet, the ACLU faced the new terrain head on.  
The Sex Side of Life   
Mary Ware Dennett had challenged social norms throughout her life, politically and 
personally.  Born in 1872 to a middle-class family in Worcester, Massachusetts, she attended 
Boston-area schools (public and private) and studied at the School of Design and Decoration at 
the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.  From 1894 to 1897 she headed the department of decoration 
and design at the Drexel Institute in Philadelphia.  In 1898 she and her sister opened a gilded 
leather shop, the kind of fancywork to which aspiring female artists could turn for an income, 
and the two women garnered national attention for rediscovering a lost process for making 
cordovan gilded leathers.101
                                                          
98 ACLU Press Release, 16 May 1927, in American Civil Liberties Union Records and Publications, 1917–1975 
(Glen Rock, N.J.: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1977) (hereafter ACLU Records and Publications), reel 1.  
   
99 See Stansell, American Moderns.  
100 Whipple, Ancient Liberties, 146. 
101 “Mrs. Dennett, 75, Suffrage Leader: A Founder of National Birth Control League Dies—Fought to Legalize Sex 
Education,” New York Times, 26 July 1947.  
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Mary Ware married William H. Dennett in 1900.  Together, they had three children, one 
of whom died in infancy.  Dennett separated from her husband in 1909 when he declared himself 
a free lover and sought to convince her to accept his relationship with their friend and neighbor, 
whose own husband sanctioned the relationship and invited William to live in their home.  The 
custody proceedings and subsequent divorce generated sensationalist news coverage, which 
distressed Dennett deeply.102
When the war drew to a close, Dennett’s focus shifted to birth control, the cause that 
would dominate her life for the next two decades.  In 1915, Dennett had helped organize the 
United States’ first birth control organization, the National Birth Control League.  Four years 
later, she founded the Voluntary Parenthood League—the institutional rival of Margaret Sanger’s 
American Birth Control League—and became Sanger’s chief contender for leadership of the 
birth control movement.  While Sanger tempered her demands for birth control reform in the 
interwar period by advocating medical regulation rather than open access, Dennett called for 
  Despite her aversion to publicity, however, she remained active in 
public life.  During the first decade of the twentieth century she served as field secretary of the 
Massachusetts Woman Suffrage Association, and in 1910, she was elected corresponding 
secretary of the National American Woman Suffrage Association.  During the First World War, 
Dennett became a prominent pacifist.  She was a founding member of the People’s Council of 
American for Democracy and Peace and a member of the Woman’s Peace Party in New York.  
Notably, she also served as field secretary for the American Union Against Militarism and, once 
it was organized as a separate entity, for the NCLB.  In that capacity, she witnessed first-hand the 
unchecked use of postal censorship to curtail public exposure to unpopular views.  
                                                          
102 William Dennett unabashedly professed his love for Chase, as well as his free love ideology in general, in the 
court proceedings. “Lover of Wife Honored by Complaisant Husband,” Atlanta Constitution, 24 September 1909.  
The husband of his lover, H. Lincoln Chase, joined the couple at their small town farmhouse in 1913.  Two years 
later, the press reported that the arrangement was a success.  E.g., “Chase to Join Wife and Her Soul Mate,” New 
York Times, 25 January 1915.  
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repeal of all restrictions on contraception.  In particular, she was a fierce and vocal opponent of 
the 1873 Comstock Act.  A federal statute, the Comstock Act gave the postal authorities 
immense discretion to censor obscene material, and Dennett considered it a formidable obstacle 
to birth control reform.  Under its terms, the postal service was free to suppress not only “lewd” 
images and literature, but also publications considered morally suspect, such as arguments 
against the legal regulation of marriage and pamphlets providing information about 
contraception, as well as contraceptive devices themselves.103
In the early 1920s, Dennett believed the Comstock Act was on its way out.  Under the 
leadership of Postmaster General William Hays, censorship of political materials had declined 
from its wartime heights, and Dennett thought Hays might even petition Congress for a change in 
the laws.
 
104  But the postal crusade against obscenity and birth control redoubled under Hubert 
Work, who took over the office in 1922 when Hays was named president of the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America (it was in this role, which he held for more than twenty 
years, that he would implement the influential 1930 “Hays Code” for movie self-censorship).  
Consequently, Dennett spearheaded a legislative effort to repeal the prohibition on the 
dissemination of information about birth control, which she unavailingly distinguished from the 
dissemination of contraception itself.  In 1923, after a long effort, she managed to find sponsors 
in the Senate and the House.  The Cummins-Vaile Bill, which Dennett drafted, would have 
prohibited postal censorship of birth control materials.105  But despite her unflagging efforts, 
including her publication in 1926 of Birth Control Laws,106
                                                          
103 Those found guilty of violating the Act were subject to six months to five years imprisonment at hard labor or a 
fine of between one hundred and two thousand dollars.  Comstock Act, 17 Stat. 598 (1873). 
 a book that criticized the Comstock 
104 Mary Ware Dennett to Senator Ferris, 21 April 1925, Dennett Papers, reel 22, file 470. 
105 The bill would have deleted the phrase “for the prevention of contraception” from the Comstock Act.   
106 Mary Ware Dennett, Birth Control Laws: Shall We Keep Them, Change Them, or Abolish Them (New York: F. 
H. Hitchcock, 1926).  
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laws and advocated legislative change, the bill reached a dead end.  According to Dennett, few 
members of Congress actually opposed the bill, but it was kept off the floor to avoid the liability 
of a vote.107
Ultimately, it would be the courts rather than the legislatures that would rein in the postal 
censors.  The impetus for change was Dennett’s own sex education pamphlet, The Sex Side of 
Life: An Explanation for Young People.  The pamphlet was heralded by secular and religious 
reformers as an indispensable educational tool,
 
108
For all the controversy it would engender, The Sex Side of Life was penned, ostensibly, 
with very modest intentions.  Dennett claimed that when she wrote the pamphlet in 1915, she had 
particular “young people” in mind: her sons Carl (then fourteen years old) and Devon (age ten).  
According to Dennett, Carl asked her a series of questions about sex in his letters home from 
summer camp.  She prepared the pamphlet by way of response and sent it to him while he was 
away.  Coincidentally, at just that time, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was 
sponsoring a competition for the best pamphlet on sex education for adolescents between the age 
of twelve and sixteen.
  and its censorship, coupled with Dennett’s 
conviction for mailing an obscene publication, touched off a firestorm of public outrage and 
offended judicial sensibilities.   
109
Dennett sampled more than sixty books and pamphlets on sex before writing her own.  
She rejected their tone of disapproval and insisted that sex, in the appropriate context, “is the 
very greatest physical and emotional pleasure there is in the world.”  She criticized one attempt 
 
                                                          
107 Mary Ware Dennett, “Cummins and Birth Control,” New York Times, 22 August 1926.  
108 Among the pamphlet’s thousands of supporters and subscribers were the Bridgeport, Connecticut public library; 
the First Methodist Episcopal Church in Pueblo, Colorado; the Juvenile Court of Cook County, Illinois; the Boy 
Scouts of Louisville, Kentucky; the Massachusetts Department of Public Health; the Bethel Evangelical Church in 
Detroit, Michigan (whose pastor, from 1915 to 1928, was Reinhold Niebuhr); the Minnesota Department of 
Education; and numerous YMCA chapters.  List of Larger Contributors, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 445. 
109 Chen, Story of Mary Ware Dennett, 176.  
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at sex education for its “old-fashioned stupid idea about women,” which made her indignant 
because it implied that “women were made to be taken care of” rather than being “partners in 
life with men.”110
Dennett’s introduction to The Sex Side of Life attributed the deficiency in sex education 
literature to the fact that “those who have undertaken to instruct the children are not really clear 
in their own minds as to the proper status of the sex relation.”  Educational literature was 
confused with respect to physiology and sentimental in its description of natural science, but it 
was most troubling in its moral treatment of sex; it presented children with a “jumble of 
conflicting ideas,” from fear of venereal disease and the duty of suppressing one’s “animal 
passion” to the sacredness of marriage.
  Moreover, she worried that the literature assumed prior knowledge and traded 
in euphemisms instead of frankly explaining the terminology and physiology of sex.  
111  Emotionally, Dennett noted, the subject was simply 
ignored.112
Endeavoring to correct these omissions, Dennett outlined the physiological process of 
sex, including an explicit description of the mechanics of intercourse.  She addressed tabooed 
topics from venereal disease (which, she assured her readers, was treatable by modern medicine) 
to masturbation, which she discouraged unless the urge was “overwhelming.”
   
113  Finally, she 
made the “frank, unashamed declaration that the climax of sex emotion is an unsurpassed joy, 
something which rightly belongs to every normal human being.”114
                                                          
110 Quoted in ibid., 172. 
  By the time Dennett was 
haled into court, sentiments like these would be par for the course (Sanger, for one, also utilized 
them).  Indeed, social scientists would make mutual sexual gratification a prerequisite of the new 
111 Mary Ware Dennett, The Sex Side of Life (New York: n.p., 1919), 2, in ACLU Papers, reel 68, vol. 374.  The 
pamphlet was reprinted in Mary Ware Dennett, Who’s Obscene? (New York: Vanguard Press, 1930).  
112 Dennett, Sex Side of Life, 3.  
113 Ibid., 22.  
114 Ibid., 4.  
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companionate marriage.115  But in 1915, Dennett’s celebration of sexual pleasure was 
unconventional, even radical.116
The Sex Side of Life combined advanced views about women’s sexuality circulating 
among sophisticated feminists with the social hygiene impulse that was burgeoning at that 
time.
   
117  A progressive-era reform initiative, the social hygiene movement sought to hold men 
and women to a “single standard” of sexual fidelity in order to combat prostitution, venereal 
disease, and associated social pathologies.  Social hygienists—particularly the women among 
them—also imagined sexual responsibility as a mechanism for achieving sex equality, though 
their ambitions were predictably undermined in practice.118
Where Dennett broke from the social reformers was in her permissive approach to 
sexuality.  Dennett, too, advocated a single standard for men and women, but hers was a standard 
of relative leniency.  Whereas her reformist counterparts sought to mobilize state regulatory 
authority on behalf of sexual purity, Dennett consistently counseled her young correspondents 
that sexual experimentation was natural and desirable.  This bolder message, however, was 
understated in The Sex Side of Life, and Dennett generally minimized it when she promoted the 
   
                                                          
115 See Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 149.  Cott, 
citing Kinsey’s 1950s studies, notes that women’s sexual practices changed drastically during the 1920s. 
116 For prewar feminists, equality in the bedroom was merely one facet of a larger struggle for women’s equality.  
Stansell, American Moderns, 227.  These broader implications of The Sex Side of Life fell away in the intervening 
years.  Cott, 157 (“What was thrown overboard in the transformation of Feminist critiques into social scientists’ 
proposition of companionate marriage was the ballast anchoring harmony between the sexes to sexual parity in the 
public world as well as the bedroom.”).  One acquaintance from Dennett’s suffrage days advised her in 1930 that she 
had sought to reframe birth control and sex education as “necessary for the performance of marital and parental 
obligations” in order to accommodate the conservative tendencies of the League of Women Voters. S. P. 
Breckenridge to Mary Ware Dennett, 15 January 1930, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 483.  
117 See generally Kristin Luker, “Sex, Social Hygiene and the Double-Edged Sword of Social Reform,” Theory and 
Society 27 (1998): 601–34.  Though The Sex Side of Life was more celebratory of sex and more tolerant of “deviant” 
sexual practices than its social hygiene counterparts, the difference between them was relatively modest, as 
Dennett’s defenders were eager to point out.  See, e.g., Remarks of Dr. Louis I. Harris, former New York City 
Commissioner of Health, Public Hearing on Sex Education – Freedom of Censorship, Town Hall, New York City, 
21 May 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 484.   
118 The male physicians allied with female social hygienists were more interested in medical prophylaxis than in 
gender equality, and the new policies disproportionately targeted prostitutes and promiscuous young women. Luker, 
619–20.  
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pamphlet.  As late as the early 1930s, organized vice crusaders assumed that Dennett was an ally 
in the struggle against sexual promiscuity.119
Consistent with her family-friendly narrative, Dennett kept the focus on Carl and his 
wholesome boyhood curiosity.  According to Dennett, Carl did not mention his mother’s essay 
until he returned home from camp, when he called out from the shower, in the hearty manner 
young boys used in sex education literature long afterward, “Hi, mother, that paper you sent me 
was all right.”  “Did it fit the bill?” Dennett asked.  “It sure did,” he replied.
    
120
Despite the warm response to Dennett’s pamphlet in educational and social science 
circles,
  Carl’s 
enthusiastic endorsement was only the beginning.  His friends began borrowing the text, and her 
own friends and colleagues requested copies.  Soon thereafter, the medical community took an 
interest in Dennett’s explanation.  The Sex Side of Life was printed in The Medical Review of 
Reviews, alongside a glowing editorial review, in February 1918.  Dennett began producing the 
text in pamphlet form.  Copies were distributed by the YMCA, a chief purveyor of social 
hygiene literature, and used for instruction in the Union Theological Seminary and the 
Bronxville, New York public schools.  
121 circulation of the pamphlet was beset by legal difficulties.  In 1922, Postmaster 
General Work declared The Sex Side of Life obscene and unmailable.  Three years later, a second 
postmaster agreed and upheld the ban.  Notwithstanding Dennett’s repeated requests, the postal 
service refused to identify the offending characteristics or passages of the pamphlet.122
                                                          
119 See note 
  Dennett 
239 and corresponding text.  
120 Lewis Gannett, “Books and Other Things,” New York Herald-Tribune, 20 March 1930. 
121 At her sentencing hearing, Dennett told Judge Burrows that the “total number of adverse criticisms which [she 
had] received by letter [had] been less than a dozen in eleven years, and all of those criticisms were purely of an 
academic character.” Sentencing Hearing, Trial Transcript, Second Circuit Case File 10712, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in National Archives and Records Administration Northeast Region, New York, 
New York (hereafter NARA Northeast Region), Record Group 276, 97. 
122 In June 1925, Edgar Blessing, Solicitor of the Post Office Department, confirmed that Dennett’s pamphlet 
contained matter forbidden admission to the mails by Section 211 of the United States Penal Code but refused to 
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solicited letters from senators and other prominent individuals in an effort to convince the postal 
service to reconsider the ban, but the campaign was unsuccessful.123  Dennett believed her 
pamphlet was targeted in retaliation for her outspoken criticism of postal censorship practices, 
and she was outraged.124
After trying to reason with the postal authorities, Dennett began to consider her other 
options.  Newspaper accounts, to make her a more sympathetic defendant, would later portray 
Dennett as a matronly grandmother who had been dragged into a humiliating judicial 
entanglement against her will.  In fact, many journalists quite consciously constructed Dennett as 
an unassuming figure, over Dennett’s own objections.
   
125  According to most reports, Dennett’s 
only ambitions were to educate her children and to help other mothers do the same; they painted 
the outspoken feminist as an appropriately modest woman, the unwitting victim of a ruthless 
legal assault.  Dennett, however, resented this characterization.  It was true that she was shy of 
publicity, and while her case was pending, she turned down all but one of the many speaking 
invitations she received.126  But Dennett, at fifty-three and in robust health, had always taken a 
much more calculated and proactive approach to the law, and her own case was no exception.127
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indicate in writing which passages he considered objectionable.  Edgar M. Blessing to Mary Ware Dennett, 13 June 
1925, Dennett Papers, reel 22, file 463.  
   
123 See, e.g., Mary Ware Dennett to Senator William E. Borah, 9 April 1925, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 415; Mary 
Ware Dennett to Senator George Norris, 7 April 1925, Dennett Papers, reel 22, file 463. 
124 Mary Ware Dennett to Florence Garvin, 17 August 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 436.  
125 In the New York Times, Dennett urged the press to “mention the public work [she had] done during the last thirty 
years rather than to stress the individual facts of private life.”  Mary Ware Dennett, “Mrs. Dennett Excepts” (letter to 
the editor), New York Times, 3 May 1929.  Though Dennett preferred to emphasize her accomplishments and public 
work, the newspapers refused to budge, since the fact that Dennett was a grandmother “carried great weight with the 
newspaper reading public.”  W. P. Beazell (editor for The World) to Mary Ware Dennett, 1 May 1929, Dennett 
Papers, reel 21, file 456. 
126 Many organizations asked Dennett to speak at their functions, panels, and symposia during 1929 and 1930, but 
Dennett refused virtually all invitations. Mary Ware Dennett to Vine McCasland and Myra Gallert, 1 March 1929, 
Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 438. 
127 After meeting with Ernst, Dennett immediately wrote to him that despite her “very real dread of the publicity” 
she was ready—indeed, “heartily glad”—to have the case proceed.  Mary Ware Dennett to Morris Ernst, 20 October 
1928, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 485. 
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Dennett was intimately familiar with her potential allies in the effort to end postal 
censorship.  After all, as secretary of the NCLB she had organized the 1918 conference on 
“American Liberties in Wartime.”  She had met or corresponded with most of the leaders of the 
interwar civil liberties movement, and she counted as friends and acquaintances many of the 
early board members of the ACLU.128
 
  The challenge, as she well knew, was to convince her 
former colleagues that sex education was part of the broader struggle for expressive freedom. 
The ACLU and Obscenity 
Although the ACLU professed to “make[] no distinction as to whose liberties it 
defend[ed]” and to put “no limit on the principle of free speech,”129 this sweeping language was 
misleading.  Baldwin and his peers were adamantly opposed to the silencing of ideas, but they 
were relatively untroubled by “moral” censorship and its implications for personal autonomy.130  
The monthly ACLU bulletins reporting on the “civil liberty situation” occasionally included 
blurbs on obscenity cases, but the organization rarely took an aggressive stand on such 
prosecutions.131
The censorship cases in which the organization did become involved almost invariably 
pertained to political speech
  Even as rampant artistic censorship in Boston rendered the city a laughing stock 
in much of America, the ACLU remained largely aloof from the debate.   
132
                                                          
128 For example, John Haynes Holmes served as a Vice President of the Voluntary Parenthood League.  
 or to the prior restraint of expression, an issue with a very 
129 Press Release, 16 May 1927, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 1. 
130 Rabban, Forgotten Years, 311–12.   
131 See, e.g., Report on the Civil Liberty Situation for Month of April 1926, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 1 
(listing under the heading “freedom of the press” the acquittal in Boston of H. L. Mencken, the editor of the 
American Mercury, for “obscene and indecent” content).  
132 See, e.g., John S. Codman to Roger Baldwin, 4 November 1924, ACLU Papers, reel 37, vol. 260; ACLU Press 
Release, 28 April 1927, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 1.  Less commonly during this period, the ACLU 
participated in religion cases.  E.g., ACLU Bulletin No. 185, 9 February 1926, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 
1. 
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established pedigree.133  The limits of this enterprise were conspicuous to prewar free speech 
activists.  In correspondence between Theodore Schroeder and Baldwin in 1918, the former 
complained that the ACLU was narrowing the scope of civil liberties to the political, to the 
exclusion of “the more personal liberties which are being very much invaded.”134  Baldwin, 
unpersuaded, dismissed these issues as peripheral to “the wider political question which we are 
discussing.”135
In the mid-1920s, however, a new minority within the ACLU began to argue that 
obscenity prosecutions were of considerable public importance and ought to receive more 
attention from the organization.  The two most prominent voices for expansion were Arthur 
Garfield Hays and Morris Ernst, who were appointed general counsels during this transitional 
period.
  
136  As contemporaries of their ACLU colleagues (almost all of whom were born in the 
1880s and came of age during the progressive era137
                                                          
133 Chafee, The Censorship in Boston, argued that prior restraint was untenable because it afforded too much 
discretion to individual government agents.  The pamphlet was written by Baldwin but attributed to Chafee. Walker, 
American Liberties, 83. 
), Hays and Ernst endorsed protective labor 
laws and distrusted judicial oversight in the economic realm.  And yet, they were uneasy about 
state interference with personal conduct and beliefs.  They defended free speech not because they 
thought it the surest way of securing radical economic change, or even of finding political truth, 
134 Theodore Schroeder to Roger Baldwin, 27 November 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3.  Schroeder mentioned 
such issues as Sunday regulations, the appropriation of public funds to religious institutions, the suppression of 
secularists and free thought lecturers, biblical instruction in public schools, the exemption of church property from 
taxation, compulsory medical licensing, optometry regulation, anti-liquor and anti-tobacco laws, and laws regulating 
women’s propriety and behavior.  Theodore Schroeder to Roger Baldwin, 4 December 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 1, 
vol. 3.   
135  Roger Baldwin to Theodore Schroeder, 7 December 1917, ACLU Papers, reel 1, vol. 3. 
136 ACLU Bulletin 325, 18 October 1928, ACLU Papers, reel 1; ACLU Bulletin 391, 14 February 1930, ACLU 
Records and Publications, reel 2.  In 1926, Baldwin invited Ernst to act as the organization’s chief counsel, but Ernst 
preferred to serve in an informal capacity until his appointment as associate general counsel in 1930.  Roger 
Baldwin to Morris Ernst, 13 March 1926, Ernst Papers, box 399, folder 3.  
137 John Haynes Holmes was born in 1879; Hays in 1881; Frankfurter in 1882; Scott Nearing in 1883; Baldwin, John 
Nevin Sayre, and Norman Thomas in 1884; Albert DeSilver and Ernst in 1888; Elizabeth Gurley Flynn in 1890.  A 
few members of the early leadership, including L. Hollingsworth Wood (born 1873) and Henry R. Linville (born 
1866) were born earlier.  
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but because they recognized how rapidly public morality (as well as political ideology) shifted.  
They were skeptical that any overarching truth was ascertainable by anyone, let alone the 
government.   
Though they were cynical about the process of judicial decision-making, Ernst and Hays 
were lawyers.  As such they tended to favor the courts as a venue for protecting civil liberties.138  
Moreover, both maintained successful private law practices and regularly defended periodicals 
and publishing houses against obscenity charges.  In these private censorship matters, they based 
their legal strategies on the long-term interests of their clients.139
Relatively speaking, then, Ernst and Hays stood out as liberal individualists
  And their clients, though fully 
conversant in the language of “public good” and community enrichment, were unenthusiastic 
about submitting their investments to government review.  They knew that respectability 
conferred certain advantages, but the costs of confiscation and prosecution far outweighed the 
benefits of official approval.  Keeping the state out was best for the bottom line.   
140 in a circle 
of reformers and radical activists.  Moreover, as Jews in an overwhelmingly Protestant 
movement, they came to the ACLU from different backgrounds and with different values.141
                                                          
138 Only three of twenty executive committee members were lawyers in 1920.  Walker, American Liberties, 69.  
  By 
1928, both were vocal opponents of censorship.  In 1926, Hays had represented H. L. Mencken, 
139 As was customary during this period, see, e.g., Gordon, “Legal Profession,” 319–20, both Hays and Ernst 
maintained lucrative private law practices in addition to their civil liberties work.  Over the next decade, as the 
ACLU professionalized and increasingly focused on legal work, the national office (but not the local affiliates) 
began to employ fulltime attorneys.  See generally Kutulas, Modern Liberalism. 
140 In October 1928, Arthur Garfield Hays debated the question “Is Liberalism a Menace” at the Ford Hall Forum.  
He argued that liberalism was the way forward and that radicalism was an ill-advised theory.  Circular, Dennett 
Papers, reel 22, file 477. 
141 Walker explains Ernst and Hays’s aggressive libertarian stand on censorship of the arts on this basis.  Walker, 
American Liberties, 83 (“Thoroughly secularized Jews, they shared none of the puritanism of the ACLU 
Protestants.”).  The New England Protestants within the ACLU apparently shared this view.  See, e.g., John Haynes 
Holmes to Morris Ernst, 16 January 1940, Ernst Papers, box 5, folder 1 (attributing Holmes’s “‘squeamishness in the 
field of censorship” to his “rigorous New England” upbringing and his “puritanical instinct”).  As Jews, Ernst and 
Hays may also have been more invested in displacing religious moralism and promoting a secular worldview.  See 
generally David A. Hollinger, Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth Century American 
Intellectual History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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editor of the American Mercury, in his notorious battle with Boston’s Watch and Ward 
Society,142 and he was celebrated as a hero in the Boston anti-censorship campaign.143  
Meanwhile, Ernst was fighting censorship through multiple channels.  In 1926, he testified 
before the Senate Committee of Interstate Commerce against the Dill Bill to restrict 
broadcasting.  He advocated the free use of radio for the expression of public opinion, cautioning 
that “[o]nce the country has become accustomed to censorship of broadcasting, it is but an easy 
step to the censorship of newspapers.”144  And while he was certainly concerned about the 
suppression of political speech,145 he was eager to protect artistic expression as well.  In 1927, 
Ernst unsuccessfully defended John Herrmann’s What Happens, an unremarkable book 
containing an apparently objectionable profanity, before a New York jury.146  In the wake of the 
defeat, he undertook a systemic study of obscenity censorship in America.  His 1928 book, To 
the Pure: A Study of Obscenity and the Censor, co-authored with William Seagle, was a scathing 
critique of the obscenity laws.147
Notwithstanding their opposition to the vice societies, Ernst and Hays tended to separate 
their service to the ACLU from their private (and usually remunerative) anti-censorship work.  
By the late 1920s, however—just as Ernst and Hays were gaining influence within ACLU—the 
organization’s agenda was in flux.  After several years of largely haphazard expansion in its 
   
                                                          
142 Hays advised Mencken to provoke his own arrest by selling an issue of the journal containing an allegedly true 
story by Herbert Asbury, entitled “Hatrack,” about a small-town prostitute.  He then succeeded in getting the 
charges dismissed.  When the postal service nonetheless refused to mail the April issue of American Mercury, Hays 
sought and won an injunction. 
143 It was Hays’s representation of Mencken in the postal matter that prompted Dennett to seek his assistance in 
1926.  Arthur Garfield Hays to Mary Ware Dennett, 25 May 1926, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 441. 
144 ACLU News Release, 26 February 1926, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 1. 
145 His proposed amendments to the bill involved political and economic provisions. 
146 Lewis Gannett attributed Ernst’s commitment to the anti-censorship cause to his loss in that case.  Lewis Gannett, 
“Books and Things,” New York Herald-Tribune, 9 December 1933. 
147 Morris L. Ernst and William Seagle, To the Pure: A Study of Obscenity and the Censor (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1928). To the Pure stressed the deleterious effect of censorship on public knowledge (as well as the 
arbitrariness of the criminal censorship laws), an argument that was convincing to D. H. Lawrence, among others. 
Letter from D. H. Lawrence, 10 November 1928, Ernst Papers, box 5, folder 3.  
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activities, the ACLU leadership lacked the clarity of its early vision, and a revised statement of 
principles and commitments was in order.  Meanwhile, the mounting success of civil liberties 
claims in the courts commended litigation as a strategy for reform and afforded a new measure of 
power to the organization’s lawyers.  In November 1928, Ernst proposed to the National 
Committee the expansion of the ACLU’s activity to include censorship of the movies and talkies, 
and the committee approved the addition.148  And yet, as late as 1929, the organization stated 
that while it opposed advance censorship of any kind, prosecution of a published work was not a 
civil liberties concern.149
In February 1929, Roger Baldwin, on behalf of the executive committee, urged a formal 
clarification and extension of the organization’s objectives.  Baldwin reminded members of the 
national committee that “the policy of the American Civil Liberties Union since its foundation 
has been to protect the civil liberties described as ‘freedom of speech, press, and assemblage’” 
and occasionally, if incidentally, the “right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”
  Despite their public position, however, many ACLU members had 
begun to reassess their views on this issue.    
150
 The members of the National Committee were open to some changes and hostile to 
others.  Baldwin received a flood of letters opposing the ACLU’s expansion into fields not 
  But these rights, he emphasized, were not the only ones protected by the state and 
federal constitutions.  The letter laid out several avenues for expansion, ranging from civil rights 
and criminal defense to opposition to the draft and American imperialism.  Among its various 
proposals was opposition to the censorship of books, plays, radio, and movies, though the 
committee likely intended to curb political censorship rather than foster artistic freedom.   
                                                          
148 National Committee Minutes, 12 November 1928, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 1.  
149 In fact, Baldwin insisted that “the best way to control . . . downright obscenity is by criminal prosecution” after 
the fact.  Roger Baldwin to Mary E. McDowell, 25 February 1929, ACLU Papers, reel 63, vol. 360. 
150 Roger Baldwin to the National Committee, 14 February 1929, ACLU Papers, reel 63, vol. 360. 
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directly associated with freedom of speech and press.  In response to this criticism, the Executive 
Committee promised not to take on such issues as the rights of criminal defendants, civil liberties 
in areas under American military control, or the validity of the draft (“as a violation of liberty of 
conscience, instead of as now, opposition only to interference with agitation against it”151).  A 
few members of the National Committee, including labor activist and University of Chicago 
settlement house director Mary McDowell, opposed any new involvement in censorship work.152
A letter to Baldwin from Harvard Law professor and future Supreme Court justice Felix 
Frankfurter cogently expressed concerns shared by much of the National Committee.
  
Most, however, supported or at least accepted the ACLU’s recommendations with respect to 
censorship.   
153  
Frankfurter argued against diluting the ACLU’s message and spreading its resources too thin.  
He explained: “I am emphatically for a restriction of the Union to the protection of freedom of 
speech, press and assembly, and equally emphatically against assuming responsibility for the 
protection of negroes, the promotion of pacific ideals, the resistance of economic penetration in 
Latin-America, etc., etc., etc., except in so far as activities or opinions in regard to the foregoing 
or any other item, like birth control, raise questions of freedom of speech, press, and 
assembly.”154
                                                          
151 Roger Baldwin to the National Committee, 5 April 1929, ACLU Papers, reel 63, vol. 360. 
  Frankfurter wanted the ACLU to be interested in such issues as civil rights, 
pacifism, internationalism, and birth control only to the extent that they implicated the freedom 
to espouse those causes.  He reasoned: “[I]t is one thing to ‘back up’ local groups that seek to 
gain a hearing for birth control; it is a totally different thing to ‘back up’ that local group in 
152 In response to McDowell’s letter, Baldwin sought to frame the censorship provision as a clarification rather than 
expansion of the ACLU’s position on censorship.  Roger Baldwin to Mary E. McDowell, 25 February 1929, ACLU 
Papers, reel 63, vol. 360.  
153 Felix Frankfurter to Roger Baldwin, 16 February 1929, ACLU Papers, reel 63, vol, 360. 
154 Ibid. (emphasis in original).  
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securing birth control legislation.  The former is the Union’s essential concern; the latter is none 
of the Union’s business.”155
Like an increasing contingent of civil libertarians, Frankfurter was ready to defend speech 
regardless of its viewpoint.  But he had a particular kind of speech in mind—namely, speech 
advocating political or economic change, or access to the democratic process.  As a veteran of 
the post-World War I civil liberties movement, that is what “free speech” meant to him and to 
the majority of his colleagues.  A more libertarian position on artistic censorship would require a 
major change in public values as well as the law.  That change found an unexpected form in 
United States v. Dennett. 
   
 
United States v. Dennett 
In 1926, Dennett proposed a legal challenge of the Comstock laws to Arthur Garfield 
Hays.  She hoped a court might be persuaded to enjoin the postal service from censoring The Sex 
Side of Life.  Hays was sympathetic to the project, but he thought their chances slim and 
counseled Dennett to wait for a more opportune moment.156  The problem, he explained, was the 
standard of review.  A court would declare the postal ruling invalid only if it was “arbitrary and 
wholly without foundation”—a decidedly difficult hurdle.  Dennett’s pamphlet was explicit in its 
description of sex, and if a court considered its propriety subject to debate, it would uphold the 
ban.157
                                                          
155 Felix Frankfurter to Roger Baldwin, 1 March 1929, ACLU Papers, reel 63, vol. 360. 
  In other words, in the mid-1920s, postal suppression of Dennett’s pamphlet was so 
clearly lawful that a renowned civil liberties attorney considered it imprudent to bring a test case.  
156 Arthur Garfield Hays to Mary Ware Dennett, 21 May 1926, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 441.   
157 Dennett continued to write to Hays periodically for over a year.  In October 1927, Hays finally, frankly advised 
her that “there would be very little chance of obtaining an injunction,” and she let the matter drop.  Arthur Garfield 
Hays to Mary Ware Dennett, 4 October 1927, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 441. 
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No court was likely to consider the censorship inappropriate, let alone declare it contrary to 
legislative intent or, even more radically, unconstitutional.    
Two years later, however, Dennett had better luck.  When Morris Ernst published an 
article attacking censorship, she wrote to him about her plight.  Responding to her overture, Ernst 
told her that he had followed her work for years and asked whether she had “ever considered 
testing out the legality of the pamphlet in the courts.”158  Dennett was forthright about Hays’s 
discouraging advice.159
Postal authorities beat Ernst and Dennett to the punch.  Despite the postal ban, a resolute 
Dennett had continued to send her pamphlet through the mail in sealed envelopes throughout the 
1920s.
  Nonetheless, after some initial hesitance, Ernst enthusiastically devoted 
himself to Dennett’s case, and he promptly began exploring possibilities for getting The Sex Side 
of Life into court.   
160  The postal service quietly tolerated her defiance until 1928.  In that year, however, in 
purported response to a complaint by members of the Daughters of the American Revolution, the 
Post Office Department ordered The Sex Side of Life from Dennett under a fictitious identity.161  
Dennett obligingly mailed out a copy of the pamphlet.162  Soon thereafter, in December 1928, 
she was indicted under the Comstock law in the Federal District Court sitting in Brooklyn, the 
jurisdiction in which her Astoria, Queens home was located.  Dennett faced a maximum sentence 
of five years in prison or a five thousand dollar fine or both.163
                                                          
158 Morris Ernst to Mary Ware Dennett, 30 August 1928, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 485.  
  Ernst immediately agreed to 
159 Mary Ware Dennett to Morris Ernst, 1 September 1928, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 485.  
160 The postal service was legally prohibited from opening sealed envelopes.  Even during the litigation, Dennett 
never stopped circulating the pamphlet, though she did so by express.  “Author of Sex Guide Wins Plea,” Los 
Angeles Times, 4 March 1930. 
161 American Civil Liberties Union, The Prosecution of Mary Ware Dennett for “Obscenity”: Who Determines 
Obscenity (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, June 1929), in Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 481. 
162 The fact that Dennett was litigated as a criminal matter helped her case immensely.  Ernst, however, was 
disappointed that he would not be able to seek an injunction as he had hoped.  Mary Ware Dennett to Vine 
McCasland and Myra Gallert, 1 March 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 438. 
163 ACLU Bulletin 352, 26 April 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
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represent her (he donated his time at both the trial and appellate levels164
When the ACLU agreed to sponsor Dennett’s case, no one on the Executive Committee 
was advocating a full-scale assault on the obscenity laws.  Rather, still reeling from their divisive 
role in the Scopes trial, they saw Dennett’s prosecution as another opportunity to defend a 
contentious contribution to modern science from the censorial reach of old-fashioned moralists—
this time, they hoped, without triggering public resentment.
), and he convinced the 
ACLU to sign on as well.   
165
Ernst’s strategy in the District Court was consistent with the ACLU’s expectations.  His 
first act as Dennett’s attorney, in January 1929, was to file a motion to quash her indictment.  
That is, he asked Grover M. Moscowitz, the presiding judge, to rule that The Sex Side of Life was 
not obscene as a matter of law.  To do so, he sought to portray the pamphlet as an irreproachable 
example of good, clean sex education—in the words of one of its medical endorsers, as “[t]he 
simplest, sweetest, and most direct treatment of the subject”
  According to ACLU literature, 
The Sex Side of Life contributed to an important public discussion about sexual hygiene and 
sexual relations within marriage.  No one, they insisted, actually thought the pamphlet was 
“obscene” in any legitimate sense of the word; squeamish, if not vindictive, authorities were 
using the obscenity laws to quell discussion on an important but uncomfortable social issue.   
166
                                                          
164 Executive Committee Minutes, 29 April 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2.  Ernst insisted on 
representing Dennett without compensation, despite her reluctance to accept charity.  In January 1929, Dennett 
accepted ACLU sponsorship of the appeal “[o]n the basis that this sort of a fight does involve more than the victim’s 
welfare.”  Mary Ware Dennett to Vine McCasland, 1 March 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 438.  Meanwhile, an 
“unknown Cambridge woman,” Frances W. Emerson, sent Dennett one thousand dollars, essentially bankrolling her 
for the duration of the defense.  Mary Ware Dennett to Family, 8 May 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 433.  
Emerson—who was married to William Emerson, the Dean of Architecture at M.I.T. (where Dennett’s ex-husband, 
also an architect, had once studied)—was an active philanthropist and was eager to assist in Dennett’s case.  When 
she became aware of Dennett’s financial difficulties, she asked her to “keep [her] check for [her] own personal 
expenses.”  Frances W. Emerson to Mary Ware Dennett, 20 May 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 431. 
 ever produced.  Adolescents, 
165 Ernst repeatedly compared Dennett’s case to the Scopes trial.  Mary Ware Dennett to Rae Morris, 9 May 1929, 
Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 449.   
166 Memorandum in support of motion to quash indictment, NARA Northeast Region, Record Group 276, 8. 
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Ernst suggested, are not satisfied with cryptic allusions, and when no appropriate literature 
exists, they rely on the “filthy misinformation of the streets, the dirty words chalked upon 
signboards and the obscene gossip of other children.”167
Ernst also urged the court to consider the motives and circumstances of publication.
  By contrast, the truth, unadorned and 
respectful, was not obscene. 
168  
Dennett’s rationale for producing the pamphlet—her belief that existing sex education literature 
was inadequate because it did not grapple with the physical, moral or emotional implications of 
sex—was, according to Ernst, “in complete accord with modern scientific thought.”  The fact 
that Dennett produced the pamphlet “as an unselfish social service,”169 rather than to make 
money, confirmed that her motives were pure.170
In short, rather than challenge the existing definition of obscenity, Ernst argued that The 
Sex Side of Life was safely outside its realm.  The pamphlet, he insisted, “is neither smut nor 
pornography.  There is not a dirty word or a dirty thought in it.”
 
171  His memorandum to quash 
the indictment quoted at length from a pamphlet produced by the New York State Department of 
Health describing a need for comprehensive sex education materials of precisely the kind 
Dennett had produced.172
In the face of Ernst’s argument, Judge Moscowitz felt inadequate to the task of assessing 
the pamphlet’s character.  He therefore proposed an open hearing at which representatives from 
both sides would express their opinions of the pamphlet.  And he called three members of the 
clergy—a Catholic priest, a Protestant minister, and a Jewish rabbi—to join him on the bench 
   
                                                          
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid., 4.  
169 Ibid. 
170 In reality, Dennett always had her precarious financial situation in mind.  When the Medical Review of Reviews, a 
professional journal, offered to publish the essay, she expressed reluctance to publish without compensation.   
171 Ibid., 8.  
172 Appellant’s Second Circuit Brief, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 490, 34. 
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during arguments and to “aid the conscience of the court on the matter.”173  All of this may 
sound like the setup for a joke.  And indeed, the exaggerated rhetoric of the prosecuting attorney, 
United States District Attorney James E. Wilkinson, seems comical in retrospect.  Wilkinson 
denounced “The Sex Side of Life” as “pure and simple smut.”174  “If I can stand between this 
woman and the children of the land,” he proclaimed in court, “I will have accomplished 
something.”175
To Moscowitz, however, the issues were serious.  Although he privately believed that 
Dennett’s pamphlet was not obscene, he did not feel comfortable deciding the issue without 
submitting it to a jury.
  
176  To make matters worse, Moscowitz was facing legal difficulties of his 
own—charges of misconduct in an unrelated matter—and he feared the publicity that might 
attend a decision either way in the highly publicized Dennett case.  As it turned out, Moscowitz 
never made use of his clerical guests177; instead, he permitted the parties to submit written 
statements.  Ernst chose a representative sample from the scores of endorsements the pamphlet 
had received, and Wilkinson submitted a collection of letters solicited in opposition.  Even then 
the decision was too much for Moscowitz, and he delayed the trial yet again.  After a series of 
postponements, he simply punted.  With apologies, he convinced Ernst to have the case 
transferred.178
                                                          
173 ACLU, Prosecution of Mary Ware Dennett, 5. 
  Ernst thereupon withdrew his motion to quash the indictment and filed a 
174 Ibid., 6.  
175 Ibid.  An article in the Nation said of Wilkinson, “He learned his fundamentalism in Georgia where he was born.”  
Dudley Nichols, “Sex and the Law,” Nation, 8 May 1929, 552. 
176 Moscowitz told Ernst that had he retained the case, he would have sent it to the jury, but “if he had been on the 
jury he would have voted for acquittal.”  Mary Ware Dennett to Vine McCasland and Myra Gallert, 13 March 1929, 
Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 438. 
177 Moscowitz canceled the hearing at the last minute on the grounds that the witnesses would unduly influence the 
jury.  ACLU, Prosecution of Mary Ware Dennett, 6.  After Dennett’s conviction, Wilkinson claimed in argument 
before Judge Burrows that all three of the clergy members consulted by Judge Moscowitz had privately considered 
the pamphlet inappropriate. Motion to Set Aside the Verdict, Trial Transcript, NARA Northeast Region, Record 
Group 276, 93.  
178 Dennett confided to her close friends that Moskowitz feared a favorable decision in her case would be used 
against him by his “enemies” and “practically beg[ged]” Ernst to have the case transferred to another judge.  Mary 
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demurrer instead, which brought the matter before another judge, Marcus B. Campbell.  Judge 
Campbell heard argument from Ernst and Wilkinson on the demurrer, which he denied.  He then 
reassigned the case on the theory that Ernst would no longer want him to preside over the matter. 
Dennett’s case finally went to trial April 1929, before Judge Warren B. Burrows.  The 
only evidence submitted to the jury, despite Ernst’s best efforts, was the pamphlet itself.  
Burrows excluded all evidence of Dennett’s motives as well as the approval of the pamphlet by 
educators and physicians.179  The all-male jury returned a guilty verdict in under an hour.180  
Dennett was fined three thousand dollars, but she refused to pay and declared that she would 
serve out her prison term instead.181
Although Ernst’s strategy did not avail Dennett in the District Court, he was optimistic 
about persuading the appellate judges to reverse her conviction.  He hoped that public outrage 
over the lower court’s decision would carry weight on the appellate level.  He devoted the bulk 
of the brief to arguing that the District Court improperly excluded evidence of Dennett’s 
  Ernst promptly filed an appeal.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ware Dennett to Vine McCasland and Myra Gallert, 7 March 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 438. Eventually, 
Moscowitz convinced Ernst to accept a transfer on the condition that the letters submitted in support of the pamphlet 
would become a part of the court record—a provision that Judge Campbell later declared invalid. Mary Ware 
Dennett to Vine McCasland and Myra Gallert, 13 March 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 438.  
179 ACLU, Prosecution of Mary Ware Dennett, 4. 
180 Several explanations were offered for the jury’s behavior, which seemed so inconsistent with public opinion.  
First, and most important, outside assessments of the pamphlet were kept from the jury.  Secondly, potential jurors 
were excluded if they were familiar with sex education literature.  Dudley Nichols, in his article for The Nation, 
offered a third possible explanation: “mankind’s universal sex fears.” Nichols, “Sex and the Law,” 554.  The sex 
composition of the jury was also notable.  As women were ineligible to serve on juries in New York until 1937, 
Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1998), 142, all twelve members of the jury in Dennett’s case were men. Influenced perhaps by their 
verdict, Ernst became a strong advocate of gender inclusion in the jury system.  In a 1931 article, he explained: “In 
the final analysis law is nothing more [or] less than the expression of the wishes, the customs and the modes of the 
people.  With the jury composed only of men the jury system must fail because it represents only one-half of the 
population.”  “Take Your Choice—Should Women Serve on Juries?” New York American, 15 June 1931.  
181 Dennett was willing to serve time in prison to help the anti-censorship cause.  Mary Ware Dennett to family, 8 
May 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 433.  Because the appeal was successful, however, she was never 
imprisoned.  
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motivations and of the pamphlet’s positive reception, and that the case should never have gone to 
trial.182
But he also made a series of powerful substantive claims about the Comstock Act that 
moved beyond his arguments at trial.  First, he argued that The Sex Side of Life did not fall within 
the category of obscenity as it ought to be defined.  In his brief, Ernst traced the history of 
obscenity in the law and argued that the “essence of the crime is sexual impurity, not sex 
itself.”
   
183
In this regard, Ernst’s rhetorical task was to portray The Sex Side of Life as an “honest 
presentation of sex facts,” firmly planted in an educational mission.  He was at pains to 
distinguish the pamphlet from those modes of speech deemed subject to regulation in the past: 
“lurid literature and advertisements distributed by quacks to beguile the public into buying 
worthless nostrums” (that is, the information on birth control that had once been grist for the 
Comstock mill), “violent attack[s] on religion or religious customs,” “defense[s] of illegitimacy 
or moral laxity,” and “forthright pornography.”  And Dennett’s book was indeed a departure 
from these earlier forms of sexualized literature, some informative, some prurient.     
  A publication like Dennett’s, which neither was impure nor “pander[ed] to the prurient 
taste,” was not properly within the meaning of the statute. 
Ernst also made a bolder argument on appeal: he claimed that the Comstock Law was 
unconstitutional.  He argued first that the federal government had exceeded its authority in 
propagating the statute—that control over people’s morality had never been relinquished to it.  
He cautioned that if the obscenity law were deemed constitutional, the government would be 
empowered to enforce a federal moral standard that might directly conflict with the local 
                                                          
182 Ernst also presented a technical deficiency (insufficiency of indictment), but he urged the court to decide the case 
on the merits rather than relying on “legalistic grounds.”  The fact that the judges complied suggests that they 
wanted to reach the merits of the case. Appellant’s Second Circuit Brief, 40–42. 
183 Ibid., 12 (italics in original). 
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standards of the various states, to which such decisions were entrusted.184  But Ernst, unlike the 
historical predecessors he cited, did not merely suggest that the statute fell outside the federal 
power to control the post roads under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. He also argued that 
it flatly contravened the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.185
Ernst was not naïve about his chances.  The ACLU had written off constitutional 
argument in a 1928 bulletin describing its position on obscenity.  “There is no longer any doubt 
that so-called obscene publications are not protected by the federal constitution,” it reported with 
apparent resignation.
  
186  The Supreme Court had ruled in Ex parte Jackson that the First 
Amendment did not apply to the mails, and it had given no indication that it was about to change 
its mind.187  Indeed, Ernst conceded that obscenity statutes had been repeatedly deemed 
constitutional by the federal courts.188  He nonetheless contended that changing public mores 
warranted reconsideration of the issue.  Most important, he sought to extend the powerful 
rhetoric of Justice Holmes and Brandeis’s dissents in the Supreme Court’s recent First 
Amendment cases, which dealt with political speech, to the obscenity cases.  For example, he 
quoted from Justice Holmes’s dissenting opinion in United States v. Schwimmer: “if there is any 
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the 
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the 
thought that we hate.”189
In 1930, the vast majority of what today falls within the scope of the First Amendment 
was beyond its purview.  Even in the realm of political speech, few interwar free speech 
 
                                                          
184 Ibid., 51–52.  
185 Ibid., 9, 52.  
186 ACLU Bulletin 63, November 1928, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
187 Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).  
188 Memorandum in support of motion to quash indictment, 53. 
189 Ibid.; United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929).  
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advocates believed that the Founders had anticipated and enshrined in the Constitution a robust 
vision of freedom of expression.  Rather, ACLU attorneys sought consciously to write free 
speech into the First Amendment.  Law, to these legal realists, was not a vehicle for protecting 
natural rights.  It was a political tool.190
Judge Augustus N. Hand, writing on behalf of a three-judge panel,
  And while Ernst’s First Amendment argument was 
predictably unavailing, the fact that he made it at all reflects a sense of new possibility.  He 
argued that the Comstock Law was unconstitutional because he believed there was a fighting 
chance that the Second Circuit would agree. 
191 accepted the spirit 
of Ernst’s argument if not its implications.  Hand insisted that there could be no doubt about the 
constitutionality of the statute, but he nonetheless reversed Dennett’s conviction on the basis that 
The Sex Side of Life was not obscene.  The decision implicitly modified the test adopted by the 
Supreme Court fifty years earlier in United States v. Bennett.192
                                                          
190 Morris Ernst conveyed this idea in a letter: “Before any person is appointed to the bench in the future, there 
should be a very stringent cross examination by the proper committees of Congress as to the man’s economic faith. 
It is about time that we got away from the idea that there is such a thing as a good lawyer or a bad lawyer. He is 
either a man of our prejudices or of other prejudices.” Morris Ernst to Heywood Broun, 21 May 1935, Ernst Papers, 
box 8, folder 2.  
  In Bennett, the defendant had 
been convicted of mailing a pamphlet advocating the legalization of prostitution.  Judge Samuel 
Blatchford affirmed the District Court’s application of the “Hicklin test,” named for the 1868 
British case, Regina  v. Hicklin, from which it was derived.  In that case, Lord Chief Justice 
Cockburn had inquired “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave 
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a 
191 The other judges were Judges Thomas W. Swan and Harrie B. Chase.  
192 United States v. Bennett, 16 Blatch. 338 (1879).  
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publication of this sort may fall.”193  Under the Hicklin test, a work could be judged obscene on 
the basis of a single passage that would corrupt youth, the most susceptible of audiences.194
Judge Hand’s opinion in Dennett was more permissive.  A sex education pamphlet like 
Dennett’s might have an “incidental tendency to arouse sex impulses,” he explained, but that 
effect was “apart from and subordinate to its main effect.”  Any sex instruction might titillate 
some of its readers, but in Dennett’s case, this tendency “would seem to be outweighed by the 
elimination of ignorance, curiosity, and morbid fear.”  A work must be judged in its entirety; an 
explicit passage in a truthful and socially constructive sex education pamphlet would not render 
the whole work obscene.  In sum, the court held, “an accurate exposition of the relevant facts of 
the sex side of life in decent language and in manifestly serious and disinterested spirit cannot 
ordinarily be regarded as obscene.”
   
195
Dennett was decided as a matter of statutory interpretation. Modest in its reasoning, it left 
the Comstock Act more or less intact.  And yet, it signaled the end of judicial deference to postal 
censorship.  Judge Hand’s opinion meant that judges would henceforth subject administrative 
determinations of obscenity to genuine examination.  Moreover, it acknowledged for the first 
time that sexual matters were not always or necessarily destructive of social values.  Indeed, its 
basic recognition of a public interest in sex laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court’s mid-
century extension of First Amendment protection to sexually explicit speech.
   
196
                                                          
193 Regina v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, 371, 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 60 (1868). 
 
194 The Hicklin decision was motivated by concerns about the corruption of youth, and it defined as obscene any 
material that would elicit in “the young of either sex . . . thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character.”  Ibid.  
It is ironic that the Second Circuit chose to abandon this emphasis in the Dennett case, which involved a pamphlet 
explicitly addressed to “young people.”  
195 United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 569 (2nd Cir. 1930).  The ACLU announced the reversal of Dennett’s 
conviction in ACLU Bulletin 394, 6 March 1930, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
196 In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957), Justice Brennan wrote on behalf of a six-justice majority of 
the Supreme Court that “[t]he portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient 
reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.” Sex, he explained, “is one of 
the vital problems of human interest and public concern.”  He then went on to reject the Hicklin test as an 
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Despite her relief, Dennett refrained from celebrating for a several days while the 
government decided whether to appeal the case to the Supreme Court.  The United States 
Attorney filed a request to do so,197 but the Solicitor General, Thomas T. Thacher, decided to let 
the Second Circuit’s decision stand.  According to Thacher, Dennett was a mere factual dispute 
unworthy of consideration by the Supreme Court.198
A few years after Dennett, Morris Ernst would declare: “The decisions of the courts have 
nothing to do with justice. . . . [T]he point of view of the judge derives from the pressure of 
public opinion.”
  In reality, of course, the Second Circuit’s 
decision effected a very real change in the law of obscenity.  But public opposition to the case, 
along with the possibility of an adverse judgment in the Supreme Court, no doubt dissuaded 
Thacher from pursuing the issue.  
199  While Ernst’s claim is an oversimplification, it rang true in the Dennett case.  
Many prominent men and women, along with myriad organizations and members of the clergy, 
had rallied to Dennett’s defense.200
                                                                                                                                                                                           
abridgement of First Amendment freedoms and to adopt the modified common law test—“whether to the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals 
to prurient interest”—as the new constitutional standard.  Ibid., 489.  Gerald Gunther described a similarly delayed 
constitutionalization of statutory interpretation in the context of Learned Hand’s “direct incitement” test in the 
Masses case. 
  Indeed, in her letters to her family, Dennett described an 
197 Howard W. Ameli, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, initially announced that he 
would seek appeal.  “Plan New Appeal in Dennett Case,” World, 5 March 1930. 
198 Department of Justice Press Release, 5 June 1930, quoted in Felix Frankfurter, “The Business of the Supreme 
Court at October Term, 1929,” Harvard Law Review 44 (November 1930): 19, n. 22. 
199 Draft of Interview between Thomas Stix and Morris Ernst, 23 January 1935, Ernst Papers, box 11, folder 3.  In 
the Married Love case, which was patterned on Dennett and litigated the following year, Ernst’s office circulated 
requests for letters of support, explaining: “In the numerous obscenity cases which we have handled, we have found 
the opinions of representative citizens in the community most helpful in influencing the courts to arrive at common 
sense decisions. We have always maintained that obscenity, in the last analysis, is measured not by the application 
of a statute, but by public opinion and that public opinion could best be crystallized in getting the opinions of 
representative persons in the community.”  Alexander Lindey to Messrs. G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 24 September 1930, 
Ernst Papers, box 359, folder 1. 
200 “Mrs. Dennett Freed in Sex Booklet Case,” New York Times, 4 March 1930.  Private congratulations poured in.  
See, e.g., B. W. Huebsch to Mary Ware Dennett, 3 March 1930, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 423; telegram from  
Rupert Hughes (historian and screenwriter) to Mary Ware Dennett, 3 March 1930, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 423.  
John Dewey, who chaired the Defense Committee for some time, wrote: “I don’t know when I have had such a 
spontaneous outburst of elation.  I feel as if I had been let out of jail myself.”  John Dewey to Mary Ware Dennett, 3 
March 1930, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 423.  
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outpouring of assistance and encouragement from all reaches of society.  “The support for the 
case is rolling up till it looks like a mountain range,” she reported.  Aid was forthcoming from 
organizations as well as private citizens.  The New Republic donated its back cover to the 
Defense Committee.  Associations and universities issued official statements on Dennett’s 
behalf.  Old friends and colleagues from Dennett’s suffrage and Voluntary Parenthood League 
days—including muckraker Ida Tarbell—reestablished correspondence and offered to help, and 
hundreds of strangers sent letters, donations, and orders for The Sex Side of Life.201  Dennett was 
most touched by the support she received from ordinary people, including an Italian worker, 
whose letter Dennett had translated by a neighbor,202 and a “colored” man who offered to serve 
Dennett’s sentence in her stead.203
When the decision was announced, newspapers throughout the country ridiculed the 
prosecution and congratulated Dennett on her victory.
   
204  Journalistic support may have been 
particularly enthusiastic given the financial and editorial interests at stake.  One might suppose, 
for example, that Roy Howard agreed to chair the Dennett Defense Committee because the 
prospect of leniency in the obscenity laws appealed to his business sense as well as his aesthetic 
sensibilities.205
                                                          
201 “Some enemies” came out of the woodwork as well.  Mary Ware Dennett to Family, 8 May 1929, Dennett 
Papers, reel 21, file 433.   
  But whatever the underlying motivation, coverage of the Second Circuit decision 
was unqualifiedly exuberant.  The Kansas City Star considered it “preposterous that [Dennett] 
202  F. Mazsella to Mary Ware Dennett, 26 April 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 433. 
203 Mary Ware Dennett to family, 2 May 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 433; James Layne to Mary Ware 
Dennett, 26 April 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 444. 
204 Dolores Flamiano has examined the press coverage of the Dennett case in depth, and it bears out Dennett’s claim 
in Who’s Obscene that the vast majority of newspaper stories were celebratory.  Dolores Flamiano, “‘The Sex Side 
of Life’ in the News: Mary Ware Dennett’s Obscenity Case, 1929–1930,” Journalism History 25 (Summer 1999): 
64–74.  
205 Newspaper support, in turn, likely helped to sway public opinion in Dennett’s favor.  Indeed, this phenomenon 
may help explain the public relations disaster that was the prosecution.  While many organizations and individuals 
had endorsed “The Sex Side of Life” before the Dennett trial was in the news, public support was far more 
forthcoming in the wake of the pro-Dennett coverage.  But regardless whether Americans were predisposed to 
Dennett’s side or rather were convinced by friendly journalistic portrayals, the crucial point is that they eventually 
came to support her and her cause.   
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should have been put to trial.”206  The World called the reversal of Dennett’s conviction “a denial 
of the archaic idea on which this prosecution rested and which threatened free thought so 
seriously,” a decision “manifestly of the first importance.”207  Lewis Gannett of the Tribune 
labeled Dennett “an historic case, a landmark in the history of America’s attitude toward sex,”208
The ACLU was effusive, calling the Second Circuit’s decision “an outstanding victory 
for free speech” that would dissuade the government from bringing future prosecutions.
 
and he hailed the court’s decision as a clarion call for broader reform.   
209  
Dennett too was gratified by the outcome.210  Ernst, however, was less sanguine.  Certainly, he 
was pleased by Judge Hand’s opinion and its vindication of The Sex Side of Life.  He nonetheless 
regretted that the decision did not undermine postal censorship more broadly.211
In this context, a final point about Ernst’s litigation strategy bears mentioning.  It is a 
prerogative of the lawyer to argue in the alternative—to set out multiple and even inconsistent 
theories according to which a court might reach a decision for the litigant.  In the Dennett case, 
Ernst did precisely that.  The Second Circuit reversed Dennett’s conviction not because The Sex 
Side of Life expressed the author’s imagination or because it evoked an intellectual response in 
the reader or even because it did no harm, but rather because it enhanced the public good.  
Though formulated a full decade after World War I, Ernst’s brief supplied the court with a 
progressive vision of First Amendment Law: “[I]f enlightenment and breadth of vision are 
necessary to social welfare; if it is right to try and banish ignorance from a realm of human study 
where taboos and truth-dodging have been definitely established as the causes of incalculable 
 
                                                          
206 “Common Sense on a Sex Pamphlet,” Kansas City Star, 5 March 1930. 
207 “Mrs. Dennett Vindicated,” World, 6 March 1930. 
208 Lewis Gannett, “Books and Other Things,” Tribune, 20 March 1930.  
209 ACLU Bulletin 395, 13 March 1930, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
210 “Mrs. Dennett Freed in Sex Booklet Case,” New York Times, 4 March 1930. 
211 Ernst seems to have better appreciated the magnitude of the victory in retrospect, particularly when vice 
crusaders held it up as their principal obstacle to enforcement of censorship laws.  Morris Ernst to Mary Ware 
Dennett, 31 December 1934, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 414. 
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harm in the past, then the judgment of conviction must be set aside, and the defendant 
discharged.”212
And yet Ernst also gestured, in conclusion to his brief, toward a bolder principle. “[E]ven 
if the pamphlet were not educational, even if it were utterly worthless,” he suggested, “the mere 
fact that it deals with sex would not bring it within the statute.”  He clarified: “[T]o be obscene 
within the meaning of the law [the pamphlet] must be more than coarse, vulgar or indecent, more 
than scurrilous and vicious, more than indelicate and shocking to the sense of modesty of the 
community, more than offensive to the institutions, ideals and doctrinal conceptions of the 
people.  It must be found to have a lewd, lascivious and obscene tendency calculated definitely to 
corrupt and undermine the minds and morals of the community.”
  Ernst argued throughout the proceedings that Dennett’s pamphlet deserved 
protection because it was of substantial social value.  This was a position that the Second Circuit 
proved willing to accept. 
213  Put simply, Ernst argued 
that regardless of social worth, all expression should be permissible unless its principal purpose 
was to pollute public morals.214
Ernst would litigate dozens of obscenity cases over the next decade, winning most of 
them.
  In doing so, he urged the court to break from precedent and 
accept a radical new vision of free speech.   
215  The early cases involved “wholesome” materials of the Dennett variety.  Over time, 
however, Ernst became more ambitious.  Still citing Dennett as a central precedent, he defended 
a body of literature and illustrations that verged increasingly on the pornographic.216
                                                          
212 Appellant’s Second Circuit Brief, 15.  
  It is evident 
213 Ibid., 61.  
214 He would later explain that the exclusion of “clearly” obscene language would result in “the censor winning all 
cases.” Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 4 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081. 
215 Books that Ernst successfully defended in the New York state courts include Radclyffe Hall’s Well of Loneliness, 
Arthur Schnitzler’s Casanova’s Homecoming, Hsi Men Ching, Clement Wood’s Flesh, Octave Mirbeau’s Celestine, 
Louis Charles Royer’s Let’s Go Naked, and Erskine Caldwell’s God’s Little Acre, among others.  
216 Ernst and his associates continuously pushed the boundary of acceptability by portraying whatever book they 
were presently defending as the paragon of purity while referring to earlier works—which they themselves had 
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from Judge Hand’s decision that in 1930 the courts were not yet ready to accept this approach, 
which would have removed government from the business of deciding which ideas are good for 
society.  Ernst, however, was ready to espouse it.  And the Dennett case had made this new 
position possible, even before the Second Circuit’s decision was handed down.  
 
The ACLU’s Campaign against Censorship 
In histories of free speech, United States v. Dennett is generally cast (often in footnotes) 
as a pivotal precursor to United States v. Ulysses and the final demise of the Hicklin test.217
                                                                                                                                                                                           
defended—as comparatively smutty.  In fact, they would often cite the condemnatory passages from dissents to 
cases which they had won as evidence of the relative promiscuity of the prior book. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law 
Submitted on Behalf of the Defendants, People v. Brewer & Warren Inc. (N.Y. City Mag. Ct. 1930), 18, Ernst 
Papers, box 90. 
  And 
indeed, as a doctrinal matter, Dennett did provide the basis for future decisions.  But Dennett was 
more than a step along the way to the judicial protection of artistic expression.  In the months 
after the Second Circuit’s decision, the ACLU capitalized on the popularity of the Dennett case 
to reevaluate and expand its position on censorship.  The reformulation was not a matter of 
simple opportunism.  Rather, the public conversation about censorship unleashed by Dennett’s 
conviction and subsequent vindication changed the way that the ACLU related to the law and 
politics of obscenity.  Although it began as an education case in the mid-1920s mold, United 
States v. Dennett sparked a debate about whether censors could ever be trusted to advance the 
public good.  The appeal and its aftermath strongly influenced the beliefs and tactics of 
influential civil libertarians, as well as their contributors and supporters.  Within a few years of 
the Second Circuit’s decision, civil libertarians were aggressively advocating not only open sex 
education but also artistic freedom and even, in some cases, birth control. 
217 On the Ulysses case, see Paul Vanderham, James Joyce and Censorship: The Trials of Ulysses (Hampshire: 
MacMillan Press, 1998); Carmelo Medina Casado, “Legal Prudery: The Case of Ulysses,” Journal of Modern 
Literature 26 (Fall 2002): 90–98. 
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United States v. Dennett marked a turning point in the intellectual trajectory of the ACLU 
and, more broadly, in American understandings of and relationships to civil liberties.  There is no 
doubt that extrinsic developments, from the cultural experimentalism of the Roaring Twenties to 
the compelling rhetoric of Holmes and Brandeis’ First Amendment dissents, influenced the 
course of events.  The ACLU appointed Ernst and Hays as general counsel in the late 1920s 
because free speech was becoming an increasingly liberal and lawyerly affair.  Ernst, for his part, 
was moving toward a theory of expressive autonomy well before Mary Ware Dennett sought his 
services.  He was resistant to morals regulations from the start, and the professional and financial 
pressures of his private law practice were nudging him ever more forcefully in that direction.  
The circumstances of Dennett’s prosecution were, however, particularly well suited to Ernst’s 
needs.   Ernst was acutely aware that an unfavorable legal posture or an unsympathetic defendant 
could undermine the soundest of litigation strategies.218
In a period when government regulation of private life seemed increasingly trivial, 
ineffectual, and ill advised, the defense of sex education was a singularly persuasive cause.  A 
constellation of factors made Dennett a landmark event in the history of civil liberties, ranging 
from popular support for the case and the financial contributions it generated to Ernst’s 
newfound confidence in strategic litigation.  The very fact of winning in United States v. Dennett 
made a broader agenda seem possible.   
  He knew that a public relations defeat 
for the ACLU would be costly for the organization; if it happened on his watch, it threatened to 
shift internal authority to the board’s progressive holdouts.  Dennett was Ernst’s opportunity to 
bring together the tolerance of dissent and the freedom from sexual squeamishness under a single 
civil liberties banner. 
                                                          
218 See note 277 and accompanying text. 
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As an organizational and institutional matter, Dennett’s ordeal was instrumental in 
expanding the ACLU’s position on censorship.  The Executive Committee officially offered 
Dennett the organization’s support in January 1929.219  In April of that year, the board 
constituted “The Mary Ware Dennett Defense Committee,”220 which was to include educational, 
religious, and scientific leaders from across the country and drum up public support for 
Dennett’s cause.221  In early November, the Defense Committee (headed by John Dewey,222 after 
several months under the leadership of Scripps-Howard newspaper publisher Roy Howard) 
launched a national campaign on Dennett’s behalf, soliciting support throughout the United 
States.223
Early on, the ACLU was enthusiastically committed to Dennett’s defense but 
conservative in its justification of the pamphlet.  It explained its participation in the case in 
narrow terms, emphasizing the propriety and importance of The Sex Side of Life rather than 
asserting an abstract right against state interference in private matters:  “[W]e condemn the 
prosecution as an evidence of an intolerant and unenlightened attitude toward the serious 
discussion of the facts of sex.  Obscenity should not be defined in law or in facts as governing 
the instruction of youth in matters of vital concern to wholesome living.  Mrs. Dennett’s high-
minded motive, her wisdom in presenting a difficult subject and the practical value of her 
pamphlet have been attested over ten years by thousands of educators, clergymen, and social 
  
                                                          
219 Executive Committee Minutes, 21 January 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. The ACLU formally 
announced its offer of assistance to Dennett on January 24, 1929.  ACLU Press Bulletin 339, 24 January 1929, 
ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2.  Within a month, it authorized the formation of a special committee to raise 
funds for printing costs associated with a possible appeal and to appoint a subcommittee for that purpose.  Executive 
Committee Minutes, 18 February 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2.  
220 The formation of the committee was unanimously approved by the Executive Committee of the ACLU. 
221 ACLU Bulletin 353, “National Committee Forms for Mrs. Dennett’s Defense,” 3 May 1929, ACLU Records and 
Publications, reel 2. 
222 Prior to the Armistice of November 1918, Dewey had been skeptical of free speech claims.  The failure of the 
Versailles Peace Conference to “make the world safe for democracy” prompted him to reevaluate his position. 
Rabban, Forgotten Years, 301. 
223 ACLU Press Release, 14 November 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2.  
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workers.”224  Freedom of the press, argued the ACLU, “means the right to print and distribute 
freely facts or opinions on public issues.”225  The Sex Side of Life was not obscene because it did 
just that: it provided children with sorely needed information on sex education, a public issue of 
the utmost importance.  Even one year later, as the appellate decision neared, the ACLU clung to 
its early position.226  A press bulletin issued in January 1930 quoted Forrest Bailey, secretary of 
the Mary Ware Dennett Defense Committee: “The real question the court is asked to decide,” he 
said, “is whether a serious and accurate piece of writing on sex that has been found valuable for 
ten years in the work of leading educational and welfare agencies can be condemned as 
‘obscene’ in the meaning of the law.”227
At Ernst’s urging, however, the Second Circuit’s decision ventured significantly beyond 
the modest question that Bailey described—indeed, it fundamentally changed the legal doctrine 
of obscenity.  And the litigation, sensationalistic from the outset,
 
228 generated outpourings of 
public support that changed the ACLU’s vision of civil liberties.  The change did not quite 
happen overnight.  As late as 1932, Ernst complained that “many people who belong to an 
organization such as the Civil Liberties Union are afraid of the right to spread sexual ideas.”229
                                                          
224 Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, 29 April 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
  
Still, after Dennett, obscenity was undeniably a civil liberties issue.  The Executive Board of the 
ACLU, guided by Ernst, seized on the Dennett case to explore and excoriate postal censorship 
more generally.  “The importance of the case in court far exceeds the issue of [The Sex Side of 
Life] itself,” an ACLU pamphlet explained. “It involves the whole method of determining 
225 ACLU Press Release, 17 January 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
226 ACLU Bulletin 385, 10 January 1930, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
227 ACLU Bulletin 387, 16 January 1930, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
228 Shortly after her conviction, Dennett contracted to write a book for Vanguard press on “the stupidities and 
arbitrary rulings of the Post Office Department.”  ACLU Bulletin 354, 9 May 1929, ACLU Records and 
Publications, reel 2.  Dennett, Who’s Obscene, was released by Vanguard Press in 1930.  
229 Morris Ernst, “Sex Wins in America,” Nation, 10 August 1932, 123. 
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obscenity, the rules of evidence in trials, and the constitutionality of the law under which the Post 
Office Department operates its censorship.”230
Just as the Dennett case convinced civil libertarians that obscenity was a worthwhile civil 
liberties issue, it also persuaded many anti-obscenity activists that censorship laws at least 
occasionally resulted in the suppression of desirable speech.  Mainstream organizations, 
including the League of Women Voters and the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, 
advocated “rigid enforcement of anti-vice laws,” but they also lobbied for better sex 
education.
   
231  Like their male counterparts in the anti-vice movement, they condemned “dirty” 
magazines, movies, and burlesque shows.  At the same time, however, they regarded marital sex 
as natural and desirable.232  Characteristically, Catheryne Cooke Gilman, a leading anti-
obscenity reformer, circulated The Sex Side of Life to teenagers (and planned to adapt the text for 
younger children) in order to discourage the sex delinquency that she attributed to inadequate sex 
education and induced ignorance, or “the conspiracy of silence.”233
  Gilman’s attitude was representative of an increasingly influential segment of the anti-
obscenity movement that sought simultaneously to eliminate prurience and to promote healthy 
and fulfilling sexual practices within marriage.
 
234
                                                          
230 ACLU, Prosecution of Mary Ware Dennett, 8. 
  “Old-fashioned” vice crusaders, such as 
231 “Social Morality Work of the W.C.T.U.,” Woman’s Journal, 15 May 1920, 1267.  
232 Male social hygienists also tentatively supported The Sex Side of Life. While the American Social Hygiene 
Association did not officially endorse the pamphlet, several of its members used it as a reference in preparing the 
organization’s own materials.  Bascom Johnson, Director of the Division of Legal and Protective Measures, 
American Social Hygiene Association, to Morris Ernst, 20 April 1929, Ernst Papers, box 46, folder 1.  The president 
of the American Social Hygiene Association disapproved of Dennett’s lenient attitude toward masturbation but 
nonetheless asked Judge Moscowitz not to condemn the pamphlet, lest an adverse decision “occasion the 
suppression of similar documents published by the American Social Hygiene Association.”  E. L. Keyes, M.D., to 
Hon. Grover Moscowitz, 4 February 1929, Ernst Papers, box 46, folder 1. 
233 Gilman observed that men were far more likely than women to oppose sex education.  Wheeler, Against 
Obscenity, 126.  Men—both critics and supporters of Dennett—generally agreed with this assessment.  William 
Sheafe Chase, Gilman’s longtime anti-obscenity ally, submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the government in the 
Dennett case.  He told Gilman that Dennett “was thinking as a woman and of women, rather than of her boys as their 
father would think of them.”  Ibid., 125. 
234 Ibid., 118. 
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Boston’s Watch and Ward Society and the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, 
indiscriminately condemned all sexually explicit material.235  Indeed, from their perspective, 
materials like Dennett’s were even more dangerous than outright pornography, because they 
threatened to make sex respectable.236  By contrast, reformers like Gilman saw sex education 
materials as an antidote to sexual prurience rather than its cause.  They feared that prosecutors 
would target educational offerings rather than the more worrisome but better financed 
commercial ones.237  Many endorsed explicit medical materials about sex, and few frankly 
opposed contraception.238  While Gilman and her allies continued to distinguish desirable 
treatments of sex, like The Sex Side of Life, from the more vulgar sort,239
In short, ordinary citizens felt strongly that Dennett’s prosecution crossed a line, and free 
speech enthusiasts pressed their advantage.  In May 1929, fifteen hundred people attended a 
Town Hall meeting to discuss the Dennett case and associated issues.  Speakers cited a need for 
freedom of instruction on “sex subjects” by health authorities, religious bodies, and educators, 
among other groups.  “Because this freedom [was] shown by the recent trial and conviction of 
Mary Ware Dennett to be seriously menaced,” the attendees called for the formation of a 
permanent agency on censorship.  Its principal purpose was to resist the censorship of sex 
 Dennett’s prosecution 
demonstrated how easily censorship laws could target the former and prompted many social 
moderates to question censorship in general.  
                                                          
235 John Sumner, head of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, vigorously supported the Dennett 
prosecution and submitted one of the few letters to the District Court that was critical of the pamphlet.   
236 Critics often attributed the vice crusaders’ excessive zeal to their hypersensitivity to sexual materials, which they 
believed stemmed from Victorian repression as well as an underlying perversity on the part of the censors. E.g., 
Samuel Marcus to Morris Ernst, 16 January 1940, Ernst Papers, box 5, folder 1 (asserting that various prominent 
vice crusaders “derived a vicarious sex satisfaction out of pornography”). 
237 Wheeler, Against Obscenity, 124.   
238 Ibid., 5.  
239 Gilman had vocally supported Dennett’s distribution of “The Sex Side of Life,” but when she discovered that 
Dennett was on the letterhead of the ACLU’s National Committee for Freedom from Censorship, she wrote Dennett 
to express her disapproval.  Ibid., 131.  
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education, but its agenda would encompass the “systematic consideration of censorship and the 
problems of public policy underlying it,” as well as “recommendation for alterations in existing 
laws, federal and state, wherever required to insure the necessary freedom.”240
  Out of this meeting, the National Committee for Freedom from Censorship (“NCFC”) 
was born.  Crucially, contributions to the Dennett Defense Fund had far exceeded what was 
necessary for the appeal, and the ACLU voted to finance the NCFC out of the surplus.  The 
fundraising potential of the anti-censorship work took on increasing significance in the wake of 
the stock market crash and encouraged the organization’s new direction.
   
241  From the outset, the 
NCFC emphasized the need for direct action as well as litigation.  In March, a few days after 
Judge Hand issued his opinion in Dennett, an ACLU bulletin instructed members to urge their 
local broadcasting stations to protest exclusion of the subject of birth control from the air.242
By 1931, the ACLU was ready to enter the censorship fray in full force.  The Board of 
Directors hoped to unify the anti-censorship campaign, and to that end it hired a full-time 
secretary for the NCFC.
  
One year later, the ACLU’s Monthly Bulletin for Action asked ACLU constituents to monitor 
for news of censorship initiatives or ordinances in their cities and towns. 
243  In July, the council announced a “drive against censorship in all its 
forms” headed by Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Hatcher Hughes.244
                                                          
240 Forrest Bailey, letter to the editor, 23 May 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
  It pursued reform 
through a combination of legislative change and test case litigation.  In particular, it focused on 
241 After the stock market crash, ACLU funds steeply declined, and extension into new terrain was economically 
difficult.  By the time the Dennett defense fund was exhausted, however, censorship work had become such an 
integral part of the ACLU’s agenda that the board found ways to support it through other means. Board Minutes, 5 
October 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3. 
242 ACLU Bulletin 397, 27 March 1930, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
243 Board Minutes, 20 April 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3. 
244 NCFC Press Release, 2 July 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3. 
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post office censorship, state movie censorship laws, the New York state theater padlock law, and 
the vice societies.245
Dennett herself became a powerful voice for civil liberties, and she was influential in 
expanding the ACLU’s mission.  Fresh from her court battle, she had a lot to say about the 
ACLU’s new project.  “Censorship is like wearing gray clothes because they don’t show the 
dirt,” she quipped in a 1930 forum.
 
246  For Dennett, the crusade against obscenity censorship 
meant doing battle with the “miserable old concept that sex itself is dirty.”  On the one hand, she 
advocated the free distribution of birth control and sex education literature because she deemed it 
“clean.”247 But she went much further, at this point suggesting that sexually explicit expression 
might be worth protecting even if she—or progressive social and scientific circles more 
broadly—deemed it perverse instead of illuminating.248
The antidote to obscenity, according to Dennett, was more speech.  “In the course of time 
it will become clear to all normal citizens,” she insisted, “that the dirt-seeing faculty can be 
educated but not legislated out of people.  As that discovery is made by larger and larger sections 
of the public, the demand will grow for dumping the obscenity laws into the legal scrap-basket as 
just so much useless clutter.”
  
249  Her stated goal—to “gradually eliminate the obscene mind from 
the world”— was still publicly oriented, but no amount of legal finessing and fine-tuning would 
accomplish the task.250  “The cure for the situation,” she insisted, “lies not in more suppression, 
but in less and less.”251
                                                          
245 Ibid. 
   
246 “Censorship Analyzed by Noted Publicists; Merits and Faults of System Are Placed in Limelight,” Paterson 
(N.J.) Call, 22 May 1930. 
247 Mary Ware Dennett to F. L. Rowe, 29 December 1934, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 414. 
248 Mary Ware Dennett, “‘Married Love’ and Censorship,” Nation, 27 May 1931, 579–80. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid.  
251 Mary Ware Dennett to F. L. Rowe, 29 December 1934, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 41.   
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Significantly, Dennett was proposing the same remedy for antisocial and corruptive 
speech in the moral realm as civil libertarians had been advocating in the political sphere for the 
past half-decade.  Her reasoning, however, was subtly different.  In the political context, ACLU 
lawyers argued that bad ideas (for example, the Ku Klux Klan’s) would be less powerful, and 
less damaging, if they were exposed to scrutiny; good ideas, even unpopular ones, would 
withstand a critical barrage.  That rationale did not easily translate to the circulation of sexually 
explicit speech, where legalization seemed sure to increase consumption of lascivious materials.  
Dennett claimed that education would operate more effectively when its target was out in the 
open, but the argument was clearly a stretch, as her former allies in the social hygiene movement 
were quick to point out.   
In reality, Dennett was approaching a libertarian stance on speech issues that far 
outstripped her reformist roots.  The problem, for Dennett, lay in specifying a legal definition of 
obscenity.  In her view, obscenity was by its very nature culturally dependent.  “It varies 
ridiculously from time to time and from place to place,” she noted, in a formulation that presaged 
the language of the Supreme Court decades later.  Given the slipperiness of social norms, it was 
foolhardy and dangerous to enforce community standards from the top down.  Though Dennett 
still invoked the “public interest,” that notion was becoming increasingly theoretical and abstract.  
When she said that the tolerance of divergent beliefs and behaviors served the public interest, she 
simply meant that the best society was one that valued cultural pluralism, if not individual 
freedom.  The ACLU actively solicited Dennett’s views on what sorts of projects the NCFC 
should pursue, and her evolving free speech absolutism pushed the organization in new 
directions.252
                                                          
252 See, e.g., Forrest Bailey to Members of the Executive Committee, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 414.  Dennett 
referred several cases to the ACLU.  See, e.g., Memorandum, 3 July 1930, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 483. 
  
241 
 
Of course, Dennett and Dennett were only one part of the new movement.  The NCFC 
capitalized (literally and figuratively) on its victory in Dennett, but mounting public opposition 
to censorship had helped make the groundswell of public support for Dennett possible in the first 
place.  As is so often the case, government efforts to ratchet up the suppression of speech gave 
rise to a broad-based resistance movement.253  Already in 1929, as vice crusaders in Boston and 
New York intensified their efforts to suppress “immoral” speech, the ACLU counted the 
censorship of books, plays and talking movies254 among the three new issues facing civil 
libertarians.255  The onset of the Depression made matters worse, as publishers and producers 
pushed the boundaries of acceptability in order to attract bigger audiences and stay afloat.  In 
New York State, the ACLU mobilized against a 1931 censorship bill that would have created a 
bureaucratic mechanism for regulating plays, akin to the one already in place for motion 
pictures.256  Civil liberties advocates took advantage of the heated public debate surrounding the 
proposal to attack censorship more generally.  Participants at a meeting organized to discuss the 
bill roundly condemned it, but they also “pledge[d] unremitting effort to repeal existing 
censorship laws,” including post office censorship, the restrictive regulation of the airwaves by 
the FCC, the censorship of moving pictures, mandatory curricula, and sectarian religious 
exercises in the public schools.257
                                                          
253 During this period, civil libertarians were developing an incipient constitutional rights claim for free artistic 
expression.  Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, “Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,” Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 42 (Summer 2007): 373–433. 
   
254 In January 1929 the ACLU announced that it regarded “the censorship of the talking movies as a new angle of 
the fight for free speech.”  ACLU Bulletin 339, 24 January 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2.  Just a 
few months later, however, an ACLU bulletin counseled that “hope of relief from censorship seems to lie rather with 
the legislature than with the court.”  ACLU Bulletin 67, “Civil Liberty and the Courts: Censorship of the Films,” 
March 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
255 ACLU News Release, 7 February 1929, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. 
256 The Mastic Bill would have made all plays subject to the approval of a bureau within the State Board of 
Education.  ACLU News Release, 24 March 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3. 
257 ACLU News Release, 29 March 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3. 
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The public attention generated by the effort to defeat theater censorship also spilled over 
into the NCFC’s campaign against customs censorship.  During the 1920s, the Customs Office 
unilaterally prevented the importation of thousands of medical, scientific, and artistic texts.  In 
the fall of 1929, the NCFC worked with Senator Bronson Cutting to craft amendments to the 
tariff bill that sharply curtailed customs censorship authority by transferring the power to 
determine whether a work was obscene from the customs office to the federal courts.258
 
  The 
change in venue reflected a concerted effort on the part of civil libertarians to weaken 
administrative control over speech.  The post office, of course, had long been an eager censor, 
from its quest for prurience after passage of the Comstock laws through its crusade to weed out 
national disloyalty under the Espionage Act.  But the interwar expansion of the administrative 
state made the threat of bureaucratic authority increasingly pressing.  As the Dennett case 
demonstrated, unchecked administrative discretion was apt to target not only unpopular speech, 
but even popularly valued speech—especially when its authors were critical of the state.  Rather 
than extol agencies for their expertise and insulation from political influence, as they had done 
several years prior, groups like the NCFC overcame their lingering Lochner-era inhibitions and 
hailed the courts as a fairer forum for resolving disputes.   
Censorship in the Courts 
Appropriately enough, the new tariff law became the vehicle for Morris Ernst’s next 
major legal battles.  Within a year of Judge Hand’s opinion in Dennett, Judge John M. Woolsey 
                                                          
258 Ibid.  Cutting’s bill would have removed all reference to the customs censorship of obscene books from the 
statutes, thereby leaving the battle against obscene books entirely to the state courts.  The following March, the bill 
was amended to give that power to the federal courts (with their right of trial by jury in civil cases).  ACLU Bulletin 
396, 19 March 1930, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 2. On the ACLU’s role in the tariff bill debate, see 
Christopher M. Finan, From the Palmer Raids to the Patriot Act: A History of the Fight for Free Speech in America 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2007), 104.  
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produced two trail-blazing obscenity decisions in the Southern District of New York.  Both 
involved the exclusion by customs agents of books written by Dr. Marie C. Stopes, a leading 
British birth controller; both were argued by Ernst; and both were filed under the Tariff Act of 
1930, which prohibited the importation of any material “which is obscene or immoral.”259  In 
both cases, as in the many others he would argue in the coming years, Ernst emphasized 
changing public mores.  The public, he insisted, was ready to talk openly about sex.260
The first case, United States v. One Obscene Book, entitled “Married Love,”
  
261 centered 
on Stopes’s sex manual for married couples.  Stopes was a longtime friend of Dennett’s, and 
Dennett urged Ernst to take up the case.262  Although Judge Woolsey decided the matter on 
procedural grounds (the proceeding was barred, he held, by a prior decision in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania that deemed the work not obscene and thus eligible for importation), he 
was moving toward a wholesale reformulation of the Hicklin test, at least in the customs context.  
In doing so, he relied heavily on the Dennett precedent.  Ernst devoted three full pages of the 
brief to comparison with Dennett, and he submitted a copy of The Sex Side of Life as well as his 
appellate brief from the case to the court.263
                                                          
259 Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 688 (1930), codified at 19 U.S.C. 1305. 
  The strategy worked.  The book was not obscene, in 
Woolsey’s view, because it “treat[ed] quite as decently and with as much restraint of the sex 
260 Ernst made particular use of this strategy in the state courts.  See, e.g., Memorandum Submitted on Behalf of 
Defendants, People v. Samuel Roth (N.Y. City Mag. Ct. 1931), Ernst Papers, box 90 (“We have developed sturdier 
tastes. And we have grown wiser in the process. We have found that it is better to encourage freedom of expression 
than to risk the evils of suppression.”).   
261  United States v. One Obscene Book, entitled “Married Love,” 48 F.2d 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).   
262 Letter from Mary Ware Dennett to Alexander Lindey, 16 October 1930, Dennett Papers, reel 23, file 487. 
Coincidentally, during the 1920 hearings over the Lusk Committee bill, a proponent of the law sought to impugn the 
morality of the Rand School by reading passages of Married Love (which was available in the Rand School 
bookstore).  “Defends Rand School and Criticized Book,” New York Times, 17 May 1920. Algernon Lee called the 
book “a frank discussion of certain facts of sex from the viewpoint of personal hygiene” and told reporters that he 
“would welcome a thorough comparison of the private life and personal character of our staff and our student body” 
with that of the bill’s advocates.  
263 Married Love case materials, Ernst Papers, Box 90.  Dennett expressed to Lindey that she was “really surprised at 
the extent to which [her] case serve[d] as a precedent.”  Mary Ware Dennett to Alexander Lindey, 18 March 1931, 
Ernst Papers, box 359, folder 3. 
244 
 
relations as did Mrs. Mary Ware Dennett in ‘The Sex Side of Life, An Explanation for Young 
People.’”264  Married Love, according to Woolsey, “may fairly be said to do for adults what Mrs. 
Dennett’s book does for adolescents.”265
In The Nation, Dennett—who by virtue of her published writing as well as her own 
travails had come to be regarded as something of an expert on obscenity law—celebrated 
Woolsey’s decision in the Married Love case.  She identified two factors that appeared 
promising for future cases.  First, judges had begun to appraise publications based on their total 
effect and intent rather than considering isolated excerpts.  Second, the recent decisions 
presupposed a reader of normal intelligence and demeanor, not an unusually susceptible one.
 
266  
Both ideas had been latent in her own case, but Judge Woolsey’s opinion in Married Love made 
them explicit.  His decision, according to Dennett, “has established another precedent by which 
the absurd obscenity statutes of this country may be slowly but surely broken down.”267
Three months later, in July 1931, Judge Woolsey built upon that precedent in United 
States v. One Book Entitled “Contraception.”
 
268 Ernst and his colleague Alexander Lindey, 
acting together on behalf of the NCFC, represented the book in what Gordon Moss called “the 
first test case undertaken by this Council in an effort to liberalize the Customs censorship of 
foreign books.”269
                                                          
264 District Court Opinion (Judge Woolsey), Section III, Admiralty Case File 106-165, NARA Northeast Region, 
Record Group 21. 
  The Contraception case, like Married Love, involved the importation of a 
practical guide by Dr. Stopes.  This one, however, was bolder in its content.  Contraception was 
an explicit account of the theory, history, and practice of birth control.  Applying the test he had 
265 In Married Love, Stopes urged husbands to be more attentive to their wives’ sexual and emotional needs. 
266 Dennett, “‘Married Love’ and Censorship,” 580. 
267 Ibid.  
268 United States v. One Book Entitled “Contraception ,” 51 F.2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).   
269 Gordon W. Moss to the editor, 29 July 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3.  Stopes herself played no 
role in the legal battle to admit the book into the United States.  ACLU Press Release, 7 July 1931, ACLU Records 
and Publications, reel 3. 
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articulated in the Married Love case, Judge Woolsey reasoned that the reading of Contraception 
“would not stir the sex impulses of any person with a normal mind.”270  As a “scientific book 
written with obvious seriousness and with great decency,” it was not obscene.  Nor was it a drug, 
medicine, or article for the prevention of conception within the meaning of the statute.  Woolsey 
therefore dismissed the action against the seized book and held that Contraception was eligible 
for importation into the United States.  His opinion made it permissible to import birth control 
information for the first time since the practice was made illegal in 1890.271
However progressive Woolsey’s views, his decisions in the two obscenity cases are as 
notable for what they did not hold as for the relief they granted.  In both cases, the ACLU argued 
that the customs law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press.  
Woolsey rejected this argument in short shrift.  “I think there is nothing in this contention,” he 
wrote. “The section does not involve the suppression of a book before it is published, but the 
exclusion of an already published book which is sought to be brought into the United States. . . . 
Laws which are thus disciplinary of publications whether involving exclusion from the mails or 
from this country do not interfere with freedom of the press.”
   
272  Freedom of the press, for 
Woolsey, meant freedom from prior restraints on publication.273
                                                          
270 District Court Opinion (Judge Woolsey), Section VI, Admiralty Case File 107-197, United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, NARA Northeast Region, Record Group 21. 
  He was not yet ready for an 
extension of the First Amendment on the order of what the ACLU was suggesting.  The 
constitutional argument was a long shot in the customs case, just as it was in United States v. 
Dennett.   
271 Gordon W. Moss to the Editor, 29 July 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3.  The favorable decision 
was unexpected, and Stopes cabled from London to congratulate the ACLU on its “surprising victory.”  ACLU 
Bulletin 466, 24 July 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3. 
272 District Court Opinion (Judge Woolsey), Section I, Admiralty Case File 106-165, United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, NARA Northeast Region, Record Group 21. 
273 Woolsey thus rejected the seemingly plausible argument that prohibiting the importation of a book to the United 
States constitutes a prior restraint because it wholly prevents its circulation within American borders. 
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Nor did the Woolsey decisions represent a frontal assault on the Comstock Laws.  As 
NCFC Secretary Gordon Moss was careful to emphasize, the Contraception case involved the 
Customs Bureau law, a statute far narrower than the postal laws, which explicitly prohibited the 
transportation of birth control materials by mail.274  Moss was skeptical that the decision (or any 
others) would have much weight in “whittl[ing down the meaning of the postal prohibition,” 
which “appear[ed] to be water-tight.”275
Finally, Married Love and Contraception applied only to medical and scientific tracts.
 
276  
The judiciary had not yet signaled a similar openness with respect to literary texts.  The ACLU 
was ready to move on this issue, but it was waiting for an ideal test case.  In a letter to Arthur 
Garfield Hays regarding a medical text containing “many illustrations of a decidedly risqué 
character,” Gordon Moss relayed the position of at least one representative of Ernst’s office 
when it came to strategic litigation: “[W]e should take only those cases where the cards [are] 
stacked in our favor, and where a favorable decision would establish precedent for an entire class 
of literature heretofore prohibited.”277  The constraints were even more rigid in the realm of 
artistic expression,278
                                                          
274 Gordon W. Moss, letter to the editor, 29 July 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3. 
 where the ACLU was hesitant to defend any book written in the twentieth 
century.  Strategic litigation had availed the ACLU well in the past decade, and it was a method 
275 Gordon W. Moss to W. W. Norton, 7 November 1932, ACLU Papers, reel 86, vol. 503. 
276 By 1937, a Harvard Law Review article reported confidently, citing Dennett, that “[u]nder any ‘test,’ it seems 
clear that serious medico-scientific works are not within the obscenity ban.”  “Recent Cases: Obscenity, Test of 
Obscene Literature,” Harvard Law Review 48 (Jan 1935): 519. 
277 Gordon W. Moss to Arthur Garfield Hays, 18 August 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 86, vol. 503. 
278 For example, in June 1931, Forrest Bailey recommended a test case of Massachusetts’s revised obscenity law 
based on Marshall McClintock’s We Take to Bed, which had been censored in Boston because it contained “an 
adjective ending in ing—the present participle of the most dreadful of the four-letter words that make pure people 
tremble.”  Forrest Bailey to Morris L. Ernst, 20 June 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 806, vol. 503.  He admitted to Ernst 
that Roger Baldwin was “a little squeamish about taking up this particular book-defense because he fears we may in 
some way involve ourselves in defending the use of that word.”  Forrest Bailey to Morris Ernst, 30 June 1931, 
ACLU Papers, reel 806, vol. 503.  Ernst ultimately counseled Bailey to “pick a better volume.”  Morris Ernst to 
Forrest Bailey, 2 July 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 806, vol. 503. 
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with strict practical guidelines.  Gordon Moss believed that censorship “in the field of literature” 
should first “be taken up on behalf of these old classics.”279
Nonetheless, the book that would break down the censorship barriers turned out to be 
decidedly modern: James’s Joyce’s Ulysses, a book as celebrated by critics as it was castigated 
by vice crusaders.  Ernst represented Random House, which had contracted with Joyce to publish 
an American trade edition of the book, and he actively sought to avoid litigation in the matter.
 
280  
Although the U.S. Attorney’s office chose (reluctantly) to prosecute, Ernst was able to arrange 
for Judge Woolsey to preside over the case.281  Chastened by Woolsey’s dismissive tone in the 
Stopes cases, Ernst did not even raise a First Amendment claim.  Instead, he played up Ulysses’s 
artistic innovativeness and its reliance on real and familiar patterns of colloquial speech.  Joyce’s 
profanity was not intended to incite lustfulness, he argued; it was designed to reveal the harsh 
reality of human expression and behavior.  Judge Woolsey was convinced.  In United States v. 
One Book Entitled Ulysses,282 Woolsey explicitly repudiated the Hicklin test.  Once again 
deeming the customs laws inapplicable, he reasoned that even in the literary context a book must 
be judged by its aggregate effect, not by isolated passages, and that obscenity must “be tested by 
the court’s opinion as to its effect on a person with average sex instincts.”  In November 1933, 
the Second Circuit agreed.283
                                                          
279 Gordon Moss to Sidney J. Abelson, 7 April 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 86, vol. 503.  Ernst was less discriminating 
when it came to private clients, like publishers and booksellers, whom he defended in the New York state context. 
The New York state courts relaxed their obscenity standards slightly earlier than the federal courts, though 
eventually the two forums began to leap frog one another, and Ernst routinely cited the most lenient examples from 
one court to the other.   
  
280 Ernst and Lindey wrote a series of letters to Customs officials and to the U.S. Attorney’s office seeking to 
persuade them that Ulysses ought to be admitted as an artistic masterpiece. Ernst Papers, box 93.  Lindey apparently 
hoped for a test case, but given the firm’s fee arrangement with Random House, which gave it royalties in the book 
but provided limited reimbursement for legal fees, Ernst sought to avoid protracted litigation if possible.  
281 Morris Ernst to Alexander Lindey, Office Memorandum, 12 August 1932, Ernst Papers, box 270, folder 3.  U.S. 
Attorney George Medalie was sympathetic to the book but felt obligated to prosecute. 
282 United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y 1933). 
283 United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
248 
 
The public outcry over the censorship and prosecution of Ulysses became a political 
liability for the Hoover administration, a lesson that the newly elected Roosevelt took to heart.  
The devastating effects of the Depression had made the vice crusaders’ efforts to curb the 
circulation of sexual materials seem increasingly trivial.  As Ernst explained in 1934, “In this 
period while men’s stomachs have been empty, there appears to have been less fear of writings 
dealings with sex.”284  The press coverage of Ulysses drove this point home, and in the wake of 
the Second Circuit’s decision, the Customs Service hired a special advisor on obscenity matters 
and downsized its censorship effort substantially.285  In short, Ulysses changed the practice as 
well as law of customs censorship—and, by extension, it precipitated a real shift in mainstream 
American attitudes about obscenity.  After Ulysses, many foreign books long since barred as 
obscene were made available in reputable American bookstores for the first time.  This ease of 
access, in turn, encouraged many American readers to rethink the acceptable parameters of 
sexual propriety in literature.  Whatever its limitations, the Ulysses case was a major victory for 
Ernst and the civil liberties movement.  A 1938 Harvard Law Review article, reflecting on the 
decision, called it a “new deal for literature.”286
 A new public appreciation for artistic freedom and the reformulation of obscenity law 
were the most visible legacies of United States v. Dennett.  But birth control was Dennett’s true 
and enduring passion, and it is appropriate that her own legal battle paved the way for a major 
liberalization on that issue as well.  As with obscenity, the legal battle was only part of the story.  
To begin with, Americans were becoming increasingly suspicious of government regulation of 
private life.  The failure of Prohibition provided a timely example of the folly of interfering with 
 
                                                          
284 Roger Baldwin and Morris Ernst, “The New Deal and Civil Liberties” (radio debate over the Blue Network of 
NBC), 27 January 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717.  Ernst foresaw a shift from sexual to political censorship. 
285 Walker, American Liberties, 86. 
286 Leo M. Alpert, “Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature,” Harvard Law Review 52 (November 1938): 41. 
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private morality.  A few years later, in the aftermath of Judge Woolsey’s decision in Ulysses, 
Morris Ernst tellingly declared: “The first week of December 1933 will go down in history for 
two repeals, that of Prohibition and that of squeamishness in literature. . . . Perhaps the 
intolerance which closed our breweries was the intolerance which decreed that basic human 
functions had to be treated in books in a furtive, leering, hypocritical manner.”287
Ernst might easily have extended the comparison to contraception.
   
288  Opinion polls over 
the course of the late 1920s and early 1930s showed a steady upward trend in popular support for 
birth control, which was rapidly winning mainstream approval.289  The Depression was 
instrumental in this change.  Many Americans regarded family limitation as a necessary corollary 
to their increasingly strained household finances.290  In 1931, the Federal Council of Churches of 
Christ in America, a coalition of mainline Protestant denominations (and the precursor to the 
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America), tentatively 
approved the use of birth control by married couples.  A substantial majority of its Committee on 
Marriage and the Home believed that “the careful and restrained use of contraceptives by 
married people is valid and moral” and that “[s]ex union between husbands and wives as an 
expression of mutual affection, without relation to procreation, is right.”291
 Still, as in the case of obscenity regulation, the courts moved more closely in step with 
public opinion than the legislatures did.  Despite growing approval for contraception, state and 
 
                                                          
287 Statement by Morris L. Ernst upon the Handing Down of Judge Woolsey’s Opinion in the Ulysses Case, Ernst 
Papers, box 93. On the relationship between the rise of the administrative state and the construction of individual 
rights in the Prohibition cases, see Robert Post, “Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American 
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era,” William & Mary Law Review 48 (2006): 1–182. 
288 Dennett did so. In 1929, she complained that “sexual knowledge [was] being conducted on a bootleg basis.” 
“Mrs. Dennett Goes on Trial Today,” New York Times, 6 March 1929. 
289 Hazel C. Benjamin, “Lobbying for Birth Control,” Public Opinion Quarterly 2 (January 1938): 49. 
290 Leslie J. Reagan, When Abortion Was a Crime: Women, Medicine, and Law in the United States, 1867–1973 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 132–36.  By the late 1930s, the federal government assisted in the 
provision of contraceptives under limited circumstances, and in 1937, the American Medical Association repudiated 
its longstanding opposition to birth control.  Ibid. 
291 “Birth Control: Protestant View,” Current History (April 1931): 97.  
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federal governments were reluctant to anger religious constituencies by tackling the issue 
directly, and they continued to censor materials advocating and explaining their use.292  
Disillusioned with the prospects of legislative change, Morris Ernst suggested “nullification” of 
prohibitions on birth control, a process which entailed executive non-enforcement as well as 
judicial erosion of the laws.293
One step in the “nullification” process was the Contraception case.  As Dennett had long 
argued, the practice of birth control would never be made legal as long as information about 
contraceptives was forbidden.  The Comstock Act, however, had prohibited more than writing 
about contraception; it had also banned from the mails “any drug or medicine, or any article 
  Significantly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, this strategy was 
predicated on the realist assumption that judicial decisions would reflect changing social 
norms—not the modern, liberal notion that courts would serve as a check on repressive 
majoritarian impulses.  In other words, Ernst believed, Lochner notwithstanding, that courts were 
more likely than legislatures to resist pressures by powerful donors or by small but influential 
voting blocs.  Partly, the difference was a function of framing: whereas a legislative vote to 
legalize birth control (or to permit communist leafleting) would look like a substantive 
endorsement of promiscuous sex (or of communism), an equivalent judicial decision could more 
easily be cast as an abstract commitment to individual rights.  Consequently, Ernst increasingly 
focused his energies on incremental judicial reform.  His approach was fruitful, and Dennett was 
among its critical components.  The doctrinal progression from United States v. Dennett to the 
pivotal 1936 birth control case United States v. One Package was indirect in comparison with the 
parallel path from Dennett to Ulysses, but the Dennett precedent was nonetheless crucial.      
                                                          
292 See, e.g., Reagan, When Abortion Was a Crime, 139–140. 
293 Ernst, “Sex Wins,” 123.  Ernst believed birth control legislation would never be directly repealed.  Morris Ernst 
to Charles G. Norris, 22 January 1930, Ernst Papers, box 267, folder 28.   
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whatever, for the prevention of conception, or for causing unlawful abortion.”  That provision, 
too, needed to be whittled down.   
The first major breakthrough came in 1930, with the Youngs Rubber case.294  In it, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was asked to decide a trademark 
infringement lawsuit by the manufacturer of Trojan condoms.  In his opinion, Judge Thomas 
Swan, who had been a member of the Second Circuit panel that reversed Dennett’s conviction, 
declared (albeit in dicta295) that contraceptives were permissible when prescribed by physicians.  
Three years later, the Comstock laws were limited still further, with the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
in Davis v. United States.296  The defendants in that case, contraceptive wholesalers, were 
charged in Ohio with the circulation of contraceptive devices by common carrier.297  The Sixth 
Circuit judges were not bound by Second Circuit precedent, but they nonetheless cited Dennett 
for the proposition that birth control laws “must be given a reasonable construction.”298
The Davis decision, in turn, provided a persuasive doctrinal basis for the Second Circuit’s 
1936 decision in United States v. One Package, which invalidated importation restrictions on 
medically indicated contraceptives.
   
299
                                                          
294 Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103 (1930).   
  That case was sponsored by Margaret Sanger and the 
American Birth Control League.  Like so many others, it was argued by Morris Ernst, who 
would serve for many years as general counsel of Planned Parenthood.  As fate would have it, it 
was heard in the District Court by Judge Grover Moscowitz, who by then had ridden out the 
295 The Second Circuit decided the case on the basis that a plaintiff could maintain a suit for trademark infringement 
in equity even if he was violating the statute.  
296 Davis v. United States, 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933).  
297 The indictments in Davis were brought under Sections 334 and 396 of Title 18 U.S.C.A., a statute regulating the 
carriage of contraceptive devices and of explanations for their use by express companies and other common carriers 
operating in interstate commerce. 
298 Davis, 62 F.2d at 475. 
299 United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d. Cir. 1936). 
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misconduct charges that stole him away from the Dennett case.300  Moscowitz held that the 
diaphragms at issue had been seized improperly by customs because they were intended for 
medical purposes.  Judge Augustus Hand, once again writing for the Second Circuit, affirmed 
Moscowitz’s decision.301  According to Hand, Congress would not have intended to “prevent the 
importation, sale, or carriage by mail of things which might intelligently be employed by 
conscientious and competent physicians for the purpose of saving life or promoting the well 
being of their patients.”302
Like Dennett itself, the case was decided as a matter of statutory interpretation only.  It 
did not create a liberty interest in contraception, despite Ernst’s efforts,
  
303 nor did it use the term 
“right.”   It applied only to the importation of contraceptives; as a matter of precedent, it had 
virtually no relevance to a subsequent interpretation of a state statute by a state court.  And many 
such statutes still existed.  A summary of birth control laws in the United States prepared by the 
NCFC in July 1931 provides a useful snapshot of the regulations and restrictions on the books at 
that time.  According to the report, twenty-one states specifically prohibited the dissemination of 
information about contraception (though only Connecticut forbade actual use).304  Despite all 
this, Sanger celebrated the decision as “the end of birth control laws,” “an emancipation 
proclamation to the motherhood of America.”305
                                                          
300 Although the House declined to impeach Moscowitz, it issued a Public Condemnation of his business dealings.  
Time, 12 April 1930, 1.  
 
301 The Solicitor General chose not to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Lamar Hardy, U.S. Attorney, to 
Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, 25 January 1937, Ernst Papers, box 69, folder 15. 
302 86 F.2d at 739.   
303 Ernst argued that due process required that medical professionals be free to prescribe contraception.  Trial 
transcript, United States v. One Package, Ernst Papers, box 69, folder 9, 71; Brief for Claimant-Appellee, Ernst 
Papers, box 69, folder 11, 36.   
304 National Committee for Freedom from Censorship, “Summary of Birth Control Laws in the United States,” 28 
July 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3.  
305 David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: 
Macmillan, 1994), 42 (quoting Sanger). She also called it a “complete victory.” “Mrs. Sanger Sees Court Ruling as 
Victory for Birth Control,” New York World-Telegram, 6 December 1936.  Morris Ernst and Harriet Pilpel 
proclaimed, “[the decision] marks the successful termination of a 60 year struggle to make clear that the federal 
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Dennett, no doubt, was more reserved about the decision.  Beginning with her effort to 
repeal the Comstock Act—which, of course, began her long civil liberties saga—she had 
criticized Sanger for advocating a narrow medical exception to the birth control laws.  Dennett 
believed strongly that only universal access would guarantee “birth control knowledge for all 
citizens instead of class privilege.”306  The dispute came to a head in the early 1930s, when 
Dennett argued against Sanger’s proposed amendment to the birth control laws because it 
exempted medical professionals from penalty without removing birth control from the auspices 
of the obscenity laws.  In the same month that the ACLU endorsed Sanger’s bill, Dennett urged a 
“clean repeal amendment”307—prompting an editor of Time to advise Dennett to “get together 
for unified action in behalf of birth control, voluntary parenthood or what you agree to call your 
movement” lest people come to regard their “several causes as the mere fields of action for 
ambitious ladies.”308
Almost a decade after her indictment, Dennett retired from public life.  In her letters to 
colleagues and friends, she often reflected on how future historians would regard her, and one 
wonders whether she later was satisfied with her legacy.  Dennett dedicated her life to “public 
work,” and she was vehement that she had “done a thing or two beside achieve ‘silver hair’” 
  Still, even for Dennett, United States v. One Package must have seemed an 
important victory.  In it, Ernst did not argue that advocacy of birth control was permissible, or 
even that instructions on the use of birth control was permissible.  He argued that birth control 
itself was an inappropriate subject for government regulation.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
obscenity laws do not apply to the legitimate activities of physicians.” Morris Ernst and Harriet Pilpel, “A Medical 
Bill of Rights,” Journal of Contraception (February 1937): 35.   
306 Mary Ware Dennett to Margaret Sanger, 15 February 1930, Dennett Papers, reel 86, file 502.  
307 ACLU Press Release, 5 February 1931, ACLU Records and Publications, reel 3.  Gordon Moss, secretary of the 
NCFC, evidently sided with Dennett. Gordon W. Moss to Mary Ware Dennett, 17 April 1932, ACLU Papers, reel 
86, vol, 502. 
308 Myron Weiss (Associate Editor, Time) to Mary Ware Dennett, 12 March 1931, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 412. 
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during her years of service.309  In addition to her many accomplishments as a suffragist and birth 
control advocate, she helped limit the scope of obscenity laws and, indeed, helped redefine civil 
liberties.  Still, she believed that future generations would enjoy a robust individual autonomy 
that her contemporaries could barely imagine.  In a celebration of Judge Woolsey’s decision in 
Married Love, she wrote, “If we who are living now could come back to this earth a hundred 
years hence we should probably view with amused incredulity the records of the preposterous 
doings of our century in the field of censorship.”310
 For his part, Ernst assisted and in turn was influenced by Sanger as well as Dennett.
  As for her disagreement with Sanger, 
Dennett felt strongly that half-measures were destructive and that history would vindicate her 
approach.   
311  
An article in The Nation written while Dennett’s appeal was pending reflected on the irony that 
the “[t]wo well-known women” had come together in the New York penal system.  “For on 
successive days Mrs. Dennett, the conservative, was convicted of sexological heresy by a federal 
jury over in Brooklyn, while Mrs. Sanger, the militant, sat in a Manhattan police court and heard 
eminent volunteers from the medical profession so smash charges against her birth-control clinic 
that it appears improbable that the magistrate will hold the case for trial.”312
                                                          
309 Mary Ware Dennett to Heywood Broun, 1 May 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 20, file 416; Mary Ware Dennett to 
family, 8 May 1929, Dennett Papers, reel 21, file 433. 
  Ernst, of course, 
was defense counsel in both matters.  
310 Dennett, “‘Married Love’ and Censorship,” 580. 
311 See, e.g., Morris Ernst to Margaret Sanger, 20 May 1933, Ernst Papers, box 267, folder 28 (“[O]n all general 
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In retrospect, there was much to recommend both strategies.  Dennett’s disillusionment 
with legislative change made the social reformist ever more radical; Sanger’s success at 
ingratiating herself with professionals endeared the erstwhile socialist to incremental reform.  
The differences were ideological as well as strategic.  In time, Dennett adopted a theory of civil 
liberties much like the rights-based individualism that Sanger had espoused decades earlier and 
gradually repudiated.313
The question whether to sacrifice principle in favor of stop-gap gains would plague the 
ACLU for decades.  In his many years of service to the ACLU, Ernst himself would often face 
precisely this dilemma.
  For the mature Dennett, birth control was a matter best left to private 
discretion, despite its public implications.  Government interference in individual 
decisionmaking was impossible to modulate and undesirable as a matter of principle.  Sanger’s 
compromises may have yielded more in the way of concrete results, but the ACLU was deeply 
indebted to Dennett for the civil liberties revolution it wrought.   
314  Indeed, he foresaw with astounding acuity the path that birth control 
litigation would follow over the coming decades, with its halting expansion of the health 
exception to include, eventually, threats to a woman’s psychological wellbeing, irrespective of 
her marital status.315
                                                          
313 In 1916, when Sanger (along with her sister, Ethyl Byrne) was arrested for operating the country’s first public 
birth control clinic, she had argued (as the judge summarized it) for “[a] right of copulation . . . that cannot be 
invaded by the Legislature forbidding the sale of articles necessary to the free enjoyment of such right.”  In her 
attorney’s words, the statute was “an infringement upon [a woman’s] free exercise of conscience and pursuit of 
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  He was uneasy about this medical “compromise,” and yet he regarded it as 
314 Most famously, during World War II, Ernst discouraged criticism of the administration because he felt it 
undermined ACLU credibility and influence.  Walker, American Liberties, 156.  
315 Essay draft, Ernst Papers, box 198.  
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a potentially fruitful strategy.316
 
  In their court briefs, however, ACLU lawyers were free to make 
their boldest arguments.  And while practical exigencies influenced what cases they chose to 
pursue, their theory of civil liberties became ever more capacious.   
Conclusion 
United States v. Dennett ushered in a new era of civil liberties advocacy in America.  In 
the years immediately after World War I, the reformers-turned-radicals who led the civil liberties 
movement had envisioned free speech as a vehicle for working-class power, a backdoor 
approach to a just society. As the enforced conformity of the 1910s gave way to the pluralistic 
ambivalences of the 1920s, their rhetoric subtly shifted.  Increasingly, they called for an open 
public conversation about how best to govern America. Throughout, they retained a progressive 
emphasis on advancing the public good, and they defended free speech in political and economic 
terms.   
After Dennett, a new theory of civil liberties steadily gained ground.  Lawyerly and 
individual-centered, that vision prioritized autonomy over equality.  Where earlier free speech 
advocates (including Dennett herself for much of her career) had hoped that a rich and varied 
public discourse would ensure the best political and social outcome, a growing crop of civil 
libertarians felt that government intervention in the realm of private beliefs was inherently 
against the public interest.  For some, even this abstract interest in maximizing the public good 
                                                          
316 Ibid. (“Possibly those who are in favor of compromising on this issue feel sure that if birth control material and 
information can be made legal for the offices of doctors and prescription rooms of druggists, there will be no 
practical way of preventing such literature reaching the eyes of the general public.”). 
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receded into the background.  By 1942, the Colorado Supreme Court framed the central tension 
of one First Amendment case as the “liberty of the individual v. the general welfare.”317
Many within the ACLU resisted the new approach.  Some still clung to a radical vision of 
the right of agitation. Others, such as Alexander Meiklejohn, thought that art was worth 
protecting only to the extent that it enabled the “voting of wise decisions.”
   
318 An important 
minority, however, were articulating the alternative justification for civil liberties, at least in the 
non-political context.  These influential few defended free speech not as an avenue to peaceful 
revolution, or as a prerequisite of self-governance, or even because they thought it the surest way 
of discerning the truth, but rather because they believed that people’s convictions and 
dispositions were their own concerns.  Put simply, they were committed to what a 1934 NCFC 
statement labeled “personal choice.”  The committee explained: “A certain amount of unworthy 
material is bound to come into existence in one form or another, as time goes on. It is for the 
individual to approve or condemn whatever he encounters—to accept what he deems desirable 
for himself and to reject the rest. However, it is he, the individual who must exercise this 
choice.”319
Crucially, Dennett taught Ernst and the ACLU that “civil liberties” was a pliable 
category.  If it could hold non-political speech, perhaps it could also stave off state interference 
with private conduct.  Sex education was only the beginning.  Lawyers like Ernst called for the 
protection of artistic expression and later of self-expression of any sort—political, artistic, or 
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“personal”—as long as it did not cause actual harm to others.  They would ultimately conclude 
that birth control advocacy and birth control use are flip sides of the same civil liberties coin.320
In short, after Dennett, key figures within and outside the ACLU understood the category 
“free speech” and the scope of civil liberties advocacy differently than they had at the outset of 
litigation.  Perhaps that transformation was a product of broader forces and would have occurred 
even absent Ernst and Dennett’s intervention, though a close reading of the historical record 
points to contingency rather than inevitability.  But whatever its immediate effects, United States 
v. Dennett demonstrates that popular and judicial acceptance of a negative vision of civil liberties 
in America—one that incorporated nonpolitical speech and embraced individual autonomy—was 
a new development.  Today, the protection of speech like Dennett’s seems fundamental to civil 
liberties advocacy; it is hard to imagine a world in which administrative censorship on the basis 
of morality was thought to facilitate free speech, by enhancing the quality of public discourse.  
Nonetheless, that is precisely the sort of world in which Ernst and Dennett lived.
 
321
The freedoms grouped together under the new civil liberties tent were framed against a 
common enemy: the state.  In the early interwar period, the ACLU’s progressive allies had 
maintained their commitment to regulatory governance even as they distanced themselves from 
majoritarian politics.  They imagined the legislative and executive branches as potential 
protectors of minority interests, a counterbalance to powerful private forces (primarily, industry) 
 
                                                          
320 Ernst’s 1940 article for the Britannica Book of the Year listed as one of the year’s crucial civil liberties 
developments the refusal of United States Supreme Court to review a Massachusetts decision closing birth control 
clinics in that state.  He noted that new cases would seek to persuade the courts “that medically regulated 
contraception should not be interfered with.”  In the same paragraph, he lauded a new Post Office Department ruling 
that permitted the free circulation of birth control information and supplies to doctors and pharmacists.  Morris 
Ernst, “Civil Liberties,” in Britannica Book of the Year, 1940 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1940).  
321 To borrow from Robert Gordon, Dennett has the potential to “tell[] us that the difficulties we have in imagining 
forms of social life different from and better than those we are accustomed to may be due to the limits on our 
conceptions of reality rather than to limits inherent in reality itself.”  Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” 
Stanford Law Review 36 (1984): 100.  That is true whether Dennett itself changed everything or, rather, was merely 
one “episode,” albeit an important one, “in an ongoing story of bargaining and conflict between contending 
normative orders.”  Hendrik Hartog, “Pigs and Positivism,” Wisconsin Law Review (1985): 935. 
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as well as mass ignorance and prejudice.  Administrative censorship cases, including Dennett, 
brought home the dangers of central government authority much more convincingly than did 
earlier appeals to labor voluntarism.  They also demonstrated that free speech, properly framed, 
could attract popular support.  And they rehabilitated the judiciary—a longtime bastion of anti-
democratic values and a reviled instrument of corporate power—as a potential forum for social 
advocacy.   
Whatever the costs and benefits of the new approach, and there were many of each, the 
new model of free speech was wildly successful.  Its institutionalization during the next half-
century gradually erased the stigma of a more radical free-speech past.  By promoting artistic 
freedom and sexual autonomy, the ACLU made civil liberties into something more than a 
stepping stone to economic redistribution.  Critics alleged that its defense of personal freedom 
was disingenuous—that it ventured into the new realm precisely to bolster its credibility.322  For 
some members, no doubt, the allegations were true.  Nonetheless, over the course of the 1930s, 
much of the ACLU leadership internalized a more generalized commitment to civil liberties.  In 
turn, the vision of civil liberties that United States v. Dennett helped to validate gave rise to an 
individualist language that anticipated, and perhaps even supplied, the state-skeptical rhetoric of 
postwar American liberalism.323
                                                          
322 For example, Harold Lord Varney alleged in the American Mercury that Alexander Woolcott, “a genuine 
Liberal,” joined the ACLU because he “was persuaded that the Union was primarily a defender of artistic freedom 
against the throttling hand of censorship”—and that an additional 300 members signed on as a result. Harold Lord 
Varney, “The Civil Liberties Union,” American Mercury 39 (December 1936): 386.  
   
323 More obliquely, it paved the way for what mid-century aesthetes and intellectuals would celebrate as the 
fulfillment of individual identity and cultural critic Phillip Rieff would denigrate as “post-communal culture.”  
Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 11.  
Rieff explained: “Much of modern literature constitutes a symbolic act of going over to the side of the latest, and 
most original individualist.  This represents the complete democratization of our culture.” Ibid., 9.  
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CHAPTER 4: FROM LEFT TO RIGHTS 
 
 A deep irony pervades the story of civil liberties during the 1930s.  For over a decade, the 
ACLU leadership had been promoting a robust right of agitation—a right to challenge the 
existing industrial and political order through direct action by organized labor.  During the New 
Deal, for the first and only time in American history, a substantial part of the government shared 
the ACLU’s early understanding of civil liberties.  And yet, at the precise moment when its 
project became possible, the organization abandoned its commitment to civil liberties as a 
vehicle for fundamental social change.  In its place, it promoted a value-neutral vision of civil 
liberties based on constitutional protections, secured through the federal courts and against the 
state.  
 The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt precipitated sweeping changes with respect to both 
labor policy and the civil liberties agenda.  In the early months of Roosevelt’s presidency, the 
ACLU was optimistic.  Before he even took office, the ACLU sent Roosevelt a series of 
proposals for safeguarding civil rights through federal action.1  Recommendations for 
administrative action included the restoration of rights to those convicted under the Espionage 
Act, issuance of passports irrespective of political views, provision of radio airtime to minority 
viewpoints, and continuation of the Department of Justice’s hands-off policy with respect to 
working-class political and economic movements.2
                                                          
1 ACLU, “Proposals for Restoring or Protecting Civil Rights Through Federal Action,” 16 February 1933, ACLU 
Papers, reel 97, vol. 608. 
  Legislative proposals touched on such issues 
as the abolition of postal censorship, prohibitions on wire tapping to obtain evidence in federal 
2 The last recommendation entailed declining to pursue federal injunctions against strike activities or to assist in 
state prosecution of radicals. 
261 
 
cases, and the admission of pacifist aliens to citizenship.3  Given the change in administration, 
the ACLU was hopeful that its proposals would be enacted.  In fact, Baldwin professed to be 
“embarrassed by the number of friends of Civil Liberty in public office in Washington and in the 
states.”4
Although the ACLU was pleased with Roosevelt’s personnel choices—especially the 
Secretary of the Interior, ACLU member Harold I. Ickes
  
5—Baldwin expressed concern that it 
would be “difficult to quarrel with friends.”6  His apprehension turned out to be prescient. 
During the 1920s, when liberals, progressives, and radicals all were shut out of power, the 
disagreements among them posed little threat to a unified civil liberties campaign. In the 1930s, 
by contrast, seemingly small differences took on immense proportions. Over the course of the 
decade, ACLU supporters would split over the desirability of radio censorship, the extension of 
free speech to Nazi marches, and the propriety of racial discrimination in public 
accommodations.7
                                                          
3 Harry Ward, Helen Phelps Stokes, James Maurer, Arthur Garfield Hays, and Roger Baldwin to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, 16 February 1933. Where an earlier ACLU had traced policies like these to the prewar repression of 
labor radicals, by 1933 the ACLU leadership was insisting that “all of these issues involve new policies adopted 
during or after the war, wholly out of keeping with American traditions of civil liberty.” 
  The most important fracture in the civil liberties alliance, however, occurred 
over New Deal labor policy.   
4 Roger Baldwin, Remarks to the Council of Jewish Women in Brooklyn, 21 March 1933, quoted in Daniel, ACLU 
and the Wagner Act, 52. 
5 Roger Baldwin to Harold L. Ickes, 28 February 1933, ACLU Papers, reel 97, vol. 608 (“We have all welcomed, 
with the greatest satisfaction, the announcement by Mr. Roosevelt yesterday of your appointment as the Secretary of 
the Interior. I know of no department of the government in which your progressive views can render more 
significant service than there. We shall be descending upon you in Washington shortly with half a dozen problems 
affecting Indians and the Colonies where issues of civil liberty have been unhappily neglected.”). 
6 Ibid. For example, Frances Perkins had strong connections to the ACLU and Baldwin expected her to advance the 
ACLU’s agenda. Roger Baldwin to Allan Harper, 8 March 1933, ACLU Papers, reel 97, vol. 608 (speculating that 
Homer Cummings, a “routine politician,” would not last as Attorney General and advising Harper to “count on 
Frances Perkins to take precisely the stand we do in regard to aliens.”).  
7 Former Georgia Senator Thomas Hardwick joined the ACLU National Committee in August 1930 after Baldwin 
assured him that his views on race would not bar him from membership. Hardwick explicitly told Baldwin that he 
did not believe “that segregation makes for inequality [of] treatment between the races, nor . . . that either political 
or social equality is possible between the races.” Thomas Hardwick to Roger Baldwin, 28 July 1930, ACLU Papers, 
reel 71, vol. 384. Baldwin responded that the board appreciated his “frankness” and took “no stand on social 
equality as such,” though it “believe[d] in the right to advocate it.” He also warned Hardwick that “there are two 
262 
 
 
The NIRA 
 The first test of the administration’s commitment to labor was the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, signed by President Roosevelt in June 1933 after heated congressional debate.8  
Although the primary purpose of the act was to modify antitrust laws to permit trade associations 
and to promote industrial efficiency, it was drafted in consultation with the AFL and contained 
several concessions to labor. Section 7(a) of the NIRA affirmed workers’ right to organize 
without employer interference and to engage in collective bargaining. Most labor leaders 
celebrated the provision, and in July, the ACLU wrote to labor organizations to offer its help in 
enforcing the act.  Employers, it emphasized, were creating company unions and discharging 
employees for union membership, in “plain denial of the rights accorded to organized labor by 
the law.”  The ACLU was confident that complaints by unions would be taken up by federal 
officials as long as “the facts are plainly put to them.”  It therefore requested any information on 
employers’ unlawful activity and promised to present all complaints to the Labor Advisory 
Committee initially charged with enforcement of the labor provisions of the act.9
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Negroes on the National Committee in which your name will appear.” Roger Baldwin to Thomas Hardwick, 2 
August 1930, ACLU Papers, reel 71, vol. 384.  Baldwin suspected that Hardwick would not long remain on the 
board. Roger Baldwin to William Nunn, 19 December 1930, ACLU Papers, reel 71, vol. 34. Sure enough, Hardwick 
tendered his resignation the following summer after the ACLU published a pamphlet entitled “Black Justice.”  
Board Minutes, 13 July 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 80, vol. 451. Baldwin told him that the board had accepted his 
resignation “with great regret on our part, for we know that in spirit and in principle you stand for precisely what the 
organization stands for.” Roger Baldwin to Thomas Hardwick, 14 July 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 80, vol. 451. 
   
8 Labor leaders and advocates had been instrumental in Roosevelt’s victory and expected the President to reciprocate 
with union-friendly policies.  They were favorably disposed toward many of the Wilson administration veterans who 
were tapped as officials and advisors.  It was quickly evident, however, that Roosevelt’s economic program was 
only peripherally concerned with organized labor.  Early initiatives focused on reinvigorating industry and 
agriculture and relieving poverty among the unemployed. Frances Perkins, Roosevelt’s selection as secretary of 
labor, had few connections to organized labor.  William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 
1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 60–62.  
9 Harry Ward and Arthur Garfield Hays to labor organizations, 14 July 1933, ACLU Papers, reel 99, vol. 618. 
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In practice, however, Section 7(a) proved largely ineffectual. A combination of poor 
leadership and inconsistent support from the administration served to buttress organization in 
already strong unions while abandoning the most vulnerable.10 Employers quickly discovered 
that their recalcitrance would be quietly accepted.  In August 1933, Roosevelt sought to address 
widespread labor conflict by creating a National Labor Board (NLB) empowered to investigate 
and mediate labor disputes. Its chair, Senator Robert F. Wagner, was a staunch union advocate.  
Although the NLB lacked independent enforcement power, it often issued decisions favorable to 
labor. It opposed company unions, promoted secret elections, and ordered companies to 
recognize and negotiate with unions.  And yet, at the same time, the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA) charged by statute with implementing the NIRA opposed the closed shop 
and exclusive representation by majority unions, and it defended employers’ rights to form 
company unions.11  Roosevelt vacillated between the two approaches, ultimately undercutting 
the authority of the NLB.  In December, the ACLU organized a Committee on Workers and 
Farmers Rights. Its first order of business was to submit to both President Roosevelt and the 
officers of the AFL a list of violations of labor’s right to organize, strike, and picket to 
demonstrate the ways that NRA officials had thwarted the collective bargaining clause of the 
NIRA.12
 The administration’s failure to enforce the NIRA was only one of the ACLU’s objections.  
In fact, a sizeable contingent of the board was relieved at the weakness of the NLB.  During the 
1920s, the ACLU had supported left-wing miners in their struggle to disrupt John L. Lewis’s 
  
                                                          
10 E. Michael White, “Labor under the NRA: A Report to the Discussion Group,” 27 December 1933, ACLU Papers, 
reel 96, vol. 598 (noting that the Compliance Division of the NRA had proven ineffectual and that the codes and the 
President’s Reemployment Agreement were violated by employers except where strong unions were available to 
enforce them); Bernard Bellush, The Failure of the NRA (New York: Norton, 1975). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Roger Baldwin to friends, 2 December 1933, ACLU Papers, reel 96, vol. 598. 
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control of the United Mine Workers of America. It continued that policy when a group of Illinois 
miners split off from the UMW to form the Progressive Miners of America, and it expressed 
concern to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins that the NIRA would buttress Lewis’s ability to 
secure an exclusive bargaining arrangement that would marginalize the radical minority.13
Despite frequent allegations to the contrary by patriotic groups and congressional 
inquiries, the ACLU was never simply a front or an apologist for the Communist Party.  
Although the two groups had often worked closely together on particular cases and issues, they 
clashed on multiple occasions.
  The 
ACLU’s longstanding concern for minority representation became a basis for cooperation with 
the far left, whose representatives were most likely to suffer the effects of the government policy 
and thus were most vocal in denouncing the NIRA.  
14
                                                          
13 Daniel, ACLU and the Wagner Act, 34. Cletus Daniel’s extensive treatment of the ACLU’s position on the 
Wagner Act is an excellent resource.  Daniel, however, assumes that the ACLU condemned the Wagner Act because 
it believed the New Deal was inadequate to rescue its preferred medium, liberalism, from its inevitable demise. 
Ibid., 18–19. He implies that the ACLU’s involvement with labor prior to the New Deal had been passing only; 
“with the launching of the New Deal in the spring of 1933, federal labor policy suddenly became a subject of 
transcending interest and concern to the membership of the ACLU as well as to liberals in general.” Ibid., 21. 
Reading the 1930s ACLU through the lens of modern civil libertarianism, he concludes that the broadening of the 
ACLU’s agenda “to the point of encompassing fundamental issues of political economy” went “far beyond the 
defense of civil liberties.” Ibid., 46.  
 Nonetheless, many ACLU board members were attracted to the 
Soviet experiment, and while none but Elizabeth Gurley Flynn officially joined the Communist 
Party, several made regular financial contributions and expressed sympathy for communist 
ideology, if not party practices. In 1935, when the Communists abandoned their opposition to the 
New Deal in favor of an anti-fascist united front, relationships like these would become 
14 Significant conflicts arose over the refusal of the Communist Party to discourage bail jumping, which prompted 
the ACLU and the Garland Fund to withhold bail to Communist defendants, in turn precipitating the resignation of 
William Foster from the ACLU national committee; interference by Communists with socialist meetings, which 
elicited increasingly stern rebukes from the ACLU during the late 1920s and early 1930s; and differences between 
ACLU attorneys and the Communist-affiliated International Labor Defense, whose court tactics emphasized the 
class struggle rather than legal rights.  ACLU Board Minutes, 24 November 1930, ACLU Papers, reel 71; vol. 384; 
Memorandum on Cooperation in Communist Cases, 24 November 1930, ACLU Papers, reel 71, vol. 384. 
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commonplace.  In the early 1930s, however, they were a source of significant tension within the 
ACLU.   
The ambivalence on the ACLU board toward the NIRA was divisive.  When Roger 
Baldwin submitted a letter to President Roosevelt and to NRA chief Hugh Johnson demanding 
protection for minority unions, the labor experts within the ACLU strongly objected.15  Morris 
Hillquit considered the ACLU’s stated concern for minority unions to be meddlesome as well as 
misguided, and he threatened to resign over the board’s position.16  Joseph Schlossberg, the 
general secretary-treasurer of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and a member of 
the ACLU’s National Committee, cautioned Baldwin that his well intentioned intervention 
would undercut labor’s strength by propping up company unions.17   Despite these criticisms, the 
left wing of the ACLU board, including Harry Ward, Corliss Lamont, William B. Spofford, and 
Robert W. Dunn, along with Baldwin, steered the ACLU toward a radical course. In September, 
Baldwin began collaborating with radical unionists in devising a statement on the NRA.18
                                                          
15 John Fitch, John R. Commons, and W. Jett Lauck all refused to sign it.   
  The 
program they produced entailed unchecked freedom to strike (regardless of the terms of any 
applicable NRA code), prohibition of racial discrimination by unions, and proscription of the 
16 Daniel, ACLU and the Wagner Act, 37–39. Hillquit thought unified leadership essential for unions, and he was 
outraged that the ACLU would presume to interfere in union affairs. He told Helen Phelps Stoke that the ACLU was 
qualified to “combat any actions or policies of public officials or quasi public authorities in derogation of the 
constitutional rights of the citizens.” On the other hand, there were few representatives of organized labor in the 
ranks of the National Committee, and the organization had “neither call nor capacity to deal with the internal affairs 
of trade unions.” Morris Hillquit to Helen Phelps Stoke, 30 August 1933, quoted in ibid., 41. Hillquit died five 
weeks after sending a second threat of resignation.  
17 Joseph Schlossberg to Roger Baldwin, 2 April 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698 (referencing previous 
correspondence in which Schlossberg took the position that “minority group recognition would be used by the 
employers for the promotion of company unions,” a concern borne out by the “so-called automobile settlement and 
the modifications proposed in the Wagner bill”). Baldwin conceded that Schlossberg was right but felt that “all that 
has happened since merely confirms the fact that none of this federal machinery can work to the advantage of 
labor’s right to organize and strike unless you’ve got a fighting labor movement to exercise them.” Baldwin to 
Joseph Schlossberg, 3 April 1934, ACLU papers, reel 107, vol. 698. 
18 Baldwin worked with William F. Dunne of the Trade Union Unity League, A. J. Muste of the Conference for 
Progressive Labor Action, and Louis Weinstock, who represented the so-called AFL Committee on Unemployment. 
Daniel, ACLU and the Wagner Act, 47–49. 
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closed shop, in addition to more conventional recommendations for the elimination of labor 
spies, the union shop, and compulsory arbitration. They sent a delegation to discuss the program 
with Roosevelt and asked him for decisive presidential action.19 Roosevelt, though polite, was 
unsympathetic.20
Conflict within the ACLU temporarily abated when it became clear that the NRA, in 
practice, was serving to buttress employer interests; leftists and liberals alike condemned the new 
turn in administration of the Act, albeit for different reason and in different tones. By the end of 
1933, the ACLU’s board was able to recruit a respectable group of liberals to a new Committee 
on Workers and Farmers Rights, convened at the request of radical socialists and Communists to 
marshal liberal support for their anti-New Deal agenda.
  
21  Mary Van Kleeck—director of 
industrial studies for the Russell Sage Foundation, and a communist sympathizer—was 
appointed chair of the committee, ensuring that it would follow a reliably anti-state path. Like 
the other leftists on the ACLU Board, Van Kleeck had come to believe that economic planning 
that aimed to ameliorate the dangers of capitalism would undercut the class struggle and lead 
America down a path to fascism. To Van Kleeck, the right of trade unions to engage in collective 
bargaining was an important civil liberty that was threatened rather than protected by the 
NIRA.22
                                                          
19 Ibid., 51.  
  Her initial draft of a memorial to President Roosevelt was so critical of New Deal 
policies that the ACLU Board asked her to revise it.  Baldwin helped write the final version, 
20 According to Daniel, Roosevelt “had no interest in promoting the growth of an independently powerful labor 
movement that was likely to insist on defining and pursuing its own particular wants without regard to the larger 
purposes and broader designs of the ‘organic’ nation envisioned by New Dealers.” Ibid., 58. 
21 Ibid., 59. Dunne, Muste, and Weinstock had all been active in organizing the Cleveland Trade Union Conference 
for United Action, which brought together radical socialists and Communists in condemnation of the New Deal.  
They asked the ACLU to spearhead the National Committee on Workers and Farmers Rights. 
22 According to Van Kleeck, unions had enthusiastically greeted Section 7(a), and they had dutifully called off 
strikes when the government urged them to cooperate, but “no single example can be cited of the success of the 
government in fulfilling its promise as the workers have understood it, by actually securing a trade union 
agreement.” Mary Van Kleeck, Address on Labor’s Rights in the NRA, at the Annual Meeting of the ACLU, 19 
February 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 105, vol. 678. 
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which lamented the administration’s tolerance of company unions and the failure of the National 
Labor Board to support strikes. 
For Baldwin, opposition to the NIRA reflected broader antipathy to state intervention in 
the field of labor relations.  In a 1934 radio discussion, Morris Ernst told Baldwin that if the 
major avenues of communications—the newspapers, the radio, and the movies—were kept open, 
the problem of labor relations would take care of itself.23  Although Ernst claimed that he was 
“not much of a believer in law,” he thought “the fundamental right of free speech” could be 
preserved as long as “responsible positions” were filled by “fair-minded men.”  Baldwin was far 
less sanguine about administrative solutions.  He conceded that Roosevelt had thus far proven 
tolerant of minority viewpoints—he had not censored the realm of ideas, despite having the 
power to do so, and he had evinced tolerance toward aliens, Indians, the unemployed, and 
political dissenters—but Baldwin believed that the relative openness of the administration 
stemmed merely from a lack of significant opposition to its goals.24
                                                          
23 Baldwin reiterated the ACLU’s commitment to an earlier bill, vetoed by President Hoover, “requir[ing] station-
owners to give equal facilities to all sides of controversial questions.” He acknowledged that some degree of 
censorship was inevitable but thought the “alternative of government ownership . . . far worse.” Roger Baldwin and 
Morris Ernst, “The New Deal and Civil Liberties” (radio debate over the Blue Network of NBC), 27 January 1934, 
ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717. 
  He also thought that civil 
liberties entailed something more than the right to air disfavored ideas.  Indeed, the “central 
struggle involving civil liberties” was the conflict between capital and labor, and on that score, 
the influence of the New Deal had been detrimental and far-reaching.  Baldwin explained: “We 
have seen in these ten short months an enormous growth of trade-union organization, inspired by 
the codes. At the same time, we have seen an unparalleled attack by employers upon trade union 
rights. Troops have been called out against strikers in five states. Police, gunmen, indeed every 
24 Baldwin considered issues like race discrimination, lynching, and injustice in the south to be “less important” than 
economic rights, “but yet vital.” He noted that on such issues relief was generally sought through federal action (for 
example, “on lynchings by federal prosecution of negligent officials, and on Scottsboro and the Mooney cases by 
appeals to the federal courts, backed by the nation-wide agitation carried on by working class elements”). Speech of 
Roger Baldwin, Annual Meeting of the ACLU, 19 February 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 105, vol. 678. 
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weapon known in the struggle between capital and labor, has been invoked. Scores of strikers 
have been killed or wounded and hundreds have been jailed. On the whole we have seen the 
N.R.A. administration refuse to interfere in this strike except to get workers back to work by 
accepting some form of government mediation or arbitration, usually to their disadvantage.”25
Baldwin insisted that the New Deal was paving the way to economic fascism, that is, the 
protection through “dictatorship [of] the economic system of business for private profit,” if not 
the “wholesale suppression of all opposition.” He pointed to the abrogation of states’ rights and 
the centralization of power in the federal government, “reaching out to every home and business 
in the land,” and he dismissed as naïve the hope that the New Deal was “a back-door entrance to 
state socialism.”
   
26 He expressed the same point more strongly in his speech at the ACLU’s 
Annual Meeting in February 1934.  Whereas the ACLU of the 1920s had been embroiled in local 
struggles, the New Deal necessitated action on the national stage. Baldwin emphasized that in the 
“new federal arena of combat,” resistance to the expansion of state power was minimal. “On the 
right it comes from employers still wedded to laissez-faire economics,” he explained. “On the 
left it comes from radicals who oppose state capitalism as a form of economic fascism, denying 
to the working class a chance to develop its power.” Even the workers and farmers, however, had 
largely abandoned their opposition in the face of doles and subsidies. “The price of a temporary 
industrial peace,” he lamented, “is the sacrifice of their own struggle for increased power.”27
According to Baldwin, the New Deal had not delivered on its promise to support 
organized labor, which Baldwin considered the only plausible mechanism for improving social 
and economic conditions.  The Roosevelt administration had failed to protect activity by 
  
                                                          
25 Roger Baldwin and Morris Ernst, “The New Deal and Civil Liberties” (radio debate over the Blue Network of 
NBC), 27 January 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Speech of Roger Baldwin, Annual Meeting of the ACLU, 19 February 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 105, vol. 678. 
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independent trade unions and, despite protests from the ACLU and many other groups,28 had 
declined to outlaw company unions.  It had curtailed the right to strike and discriminated against 
left-wing unions. It had withheld union representation on the code authorities—a right in any 
case far less valuable than the rights to organize, convene mass meetings, and hold a picket line. 
Baldwin concluded: “The present tendencies are to take labor into camp as part of the 
governmental industrial machine and thereby to lull opposition to sleep by making the workers 
believe the government will look after their interests. It will do nothing of the sort. Labor gets its 
rights only as it fights for them.”29 In the history of the New Deal to date, the workers who had 
accomplished most were the ones who had struck hardest. “The real fight is on the job,” he said, 
“not in Washington.”30
Baldwin’s view became the institutional position of the ACLU.  The 1934 annual report 
cautioned that the “enormous increase of the power of the federal government under New Deal 
policies carries with it inevitable fears of inroads on the rights of agitation. Alarms are widely 
expressed over alleged dictatorship by the President, the abrogation of States’ rights and the vast 
economic powers of the federal government.”
  
31
For the next year, Baldwin would sound the consistent message that “the issue of liberty 
is inseparable from economic power.”
 
32
                                                          
28 Harry Ward to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 28 February 1934, in Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official Files, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereafter Franklin D. Roosevelt papers), Official File 2111 
(American Civil Liberties Union, 1933–45).  
  He reiterated his longstanding belief that “only as 
29 Roger Baldwin and Morris Ernst, “The New Deal and Civil Liberties” (radio debate over the Blue Network of 
NBC), 27 January 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717. 
30 Ibid. According to Baldwin, this principle was responsible for the particularly disfavored plight of “Negro 
workers” in the current administrative scheme. “Exploited by the employers in the hardest and lowest-paid jobs, 
they are also excluded from most unions. They cannot organize and fight in independent unions, Negro Workers’ 
rights—N.R.A. or no N.R.A.—are pretty near zero.” Ibid. 
31 American Civil Liberties Union, Liberty under the New Deal: The Record for 1933–34 (New York: American 
Civil Liberties Union, 1934), 3.  
32 He condemned the President’s appeal for a “moratorium” on the class struggle, issued against a backdrop of 
rapidly burgeoning violence against strikers by troops, vigilantes, and local law enforcement agencies, because he 
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channels of agitation are relatively open for the growth of all political forces can the struggle be 
carried on without bloodshed and violence.”33  His understanding of the right of agitation had, 
however, shifted subtly.  In Baldwin’s increasingly Marxian historical view, the liberties 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights had grown out of the triumph of capitalism over feudalism; “civil 
liberty and democracy were the necessary political tools of the new system of free competition in 
business.”34  According to Baldwin, it was up to the middle class to ensure the preservation of 
civil liberties and to reduce the incidence of violence during times of crisis. In fact, it was the 
“disinterested agitation” of the middle class that would “keep open the high road of tolerance.”  
Baldwin acknowledged that the complete absence of repression was “impossible in a society 
made up of warring class and controlled by the strongest,” since “the state is always an 
instrument of violence and compulsion in the hands of the dominant economic class.”35
                                                                                                                                                                                           
considered it unfair and counterproductive. Roger Baldwin, “Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” 24 October 1934, 
ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717. 
 He was 
adamant that the slide into Fascism could be prevented, but only if the channels for organization 
and protest were preserved.  “No greater tasks confronts that active section of the middle class 
outside the immediate conflict between capital and labor,” he believed, “than the maintenance of 
33 Ibid. Baldwin continued: “The New Deal’s main objective is manifestly to save and prolong the life of the profit 
system in private hands. Property-owners now exercise their power through their role in governmental bodies, as in 
the days of rugged individualism mainly they did from outside the government.  But the New Deal is not wholly the 
creature of business pressures. Its liberal elements represent the interests of consumers and producers. In effect it is a 
coalition government—an unstable union of forces representing property-owners and those who in effect work for 
them.” Ibid.  
34 Roger Baldwin, “Coming Struggle for Freedom,” 12 November 1934, ACLU Papers, Reel 109, Vol. 717. He 
added that “these rights of agitation are demanded so instinctively by forces in revolt that they are championed 
generally in all lands.” 
35 To buttress the point, he quoted Lenin: “So long as the state exists there can be no liberty. When we can speak of 
liberty there will be no state.”  On the issue of political and economic power, he explained: “The new collective 
forms of business have shifted control slightly from bankers to industrialists, and on the intellectual side from 
lawyers to professors, but power lies precisely where it was before—with the masters of property. We have traded 
individual capitalism for state capitalism.” Ibid.  
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those rights of agitation, of organization, of the building of power from below through which, 
throughout all history, progress has come.”36
In light of these views, Baldwin and the other leftists on the ACLU board were even 
more hostile to Senator Robert F. Wagner’s labor disputes bill than they were to the NIRA. 
Introduced in March 1934—the same month that President Roosevelt betrayed the trust of union 
organizers in the automobile industry by endorsing proportional representation and company 
unions—the Labor Disputes Act would have given the National Labor Board power to enforce 
the labor-protective measures of Section 7(a) of the NIRA. It sought to prohibit company unions, 
and it required recognition of independent unions and exclusive majority representation. It also 
ensured that mediation and arbitration were voluntary and guaranteed the right to strike. The bill 
received enthusiastic support from the NLB, the AFL, and the Socialist Party.  The Communist 
Party, however, condemned it as a tool to break strikes and cripple working class agitation, and 
Mary Van Kleeck adopted the Communist Party line. She told Senator Wagner that “to prevent 
or discourage strikes which have for their purpose gradual increase in the workers’ power in a 
period when fundamental economic change in the ownership of industry can clearly be 
envisaged may only serve to check the rising power of the exponents of human rights.”
 
37
Baldwin supported Van Kleeck’s position but treaded gingerly around his labor allies. He 
invited Van Kleeck, along with a representative of the International Juridical Association, a left-
wing labor lawyer group, to explain their reservations about the bill at a meeting of the Board.  
After discussion, the board authorized Baldwin and Harry Ward to write to Massachusetts 
Senator David I. Walsh, chair of the Senate labor committee, in opposition to the bill. They told 
Walsh that they “regard[ed] the regulation of labor relations by the Federal Government as 
  
                                                          
36 Ibid.  
37 Mary Van Kleeck to Robert F. Wagner, 12 March 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698. 
272 
 
dangerous to the rights of labor to organize and strike.”  Administration of the NIRA had 
demonstrated that any state machinery for the conciliation of conflict, no matter how well 
intentioned, was bound to undercut the rights of labor to organize and strike in the long run.38  In 
conclusion, they suggested that in the event that action on the bill was inevitable, amendments 
proposed by the IJA would correct the worst of its faults.39  The letter angered both moderate 
labor advocates and committed leftists, especially Van Kleeck.40 Baldwin sought to appease Van 
Kleeck by assuring her that although he was constrained to moderate his position in official 
communications on behalf of the ACLU, he had “always objected to the N.R.A. as well as to the 
New Deal,” since its underlying purpose was to “help prolong the capitalist system.”41
The ACLU was never forced to settle its internal disagreement over the labor disputes 
bill.  In the end, Wagner’s version met with vehement opposition from business interests and 
received little support in Congress.  Critics charged that it was unconstitutional because it 
extended to manufacturers not in interstate commerce and because it trampled due process by 
combining prosecutorial and adjudicative roles in a single body.
 
42
                                                          
38 International Juridical Association, “Memorandum Suggesting Certain Amendments to the Labor Disputes Act,” 
ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698.  The IJA suggested that all representatives on the NLB either be designated as 
government representatives or be directly elected by employees and employers respectively, and, notably, that 
enforcement of provisions outlawing unfair labor practices should be available through the courts as well as the 
NLB.  It also urged explicit protection of the right to strike and picket; provision for representation of substantial 
minority groups; and the inclusion of espionage and blacklisting as unfair labor practices.  
  Senator David Walsh’s 
committee offered an amended bill that expressly disavowed class antagonism and jettisoned the 
39 Harry Ward and Roger Baldwin, for the Board of Directors, to David I. Walsh, Chairman, Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor, 20 March 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698. They also asked Wagner’s secretary to 
arrange an opportunity for representatives of the ACLU and IJA to testify before the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor. 
40 George Soule to Roger Baldwin, 30 March 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698 (“I again question the wisdom 
of opposing the creation of a National Labor Board by statute. It seems to me that industrial experience proves that 
the existence of bodies for arbitration and mediation favor the growth of a union movement.”); Mary Van Kleeck to 
Roger Baldwin, 30 March 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 108, vol. 698 (“The point is that one must either be opposed to 
this bill or accept it, and it is not correct to suggest amendments if one opposes it.”).   
41 Roger Baldwin to Mary Van Kleeck, 4 April 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698. 
42 Charles J. Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 41–55; Dubofsky, State and Labor, 121–22.  
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pro-labor provisions of the original. The new, watered down version made collective bargaining 
voluntary and permitted company unions. An ACLU communication urged members of 
Congress to oppose the amended bill as a “sham and a fraud” that weakened existing rights and 
would “inevitably serve as a weapon in the hands of employers to crush organized labor.”43 In 
fact, the ACLU considered it “the severest blow to organized labor yet proposed,” and the 
International Juridical Association condemned it “unequivocally.”44
The summer and fall of 1934 witnessed violent and widespread strikes among radicals as 
well as established AFL unions.  It was soon clear the new NLRB, which was governed by a 
progressive vision of bureaucratic expertise as a means of maintaining orderly industrial 
relations, would be inadequate to the task of administering national labor policy.  Its decisions 
were very much like those of the NLB’s, and as with the earlier board, they were summarily 
ignored by employers. The Department of Justice initially proved unwilling to sue for 
enforcement of NLB orders, and when it was finally convinced to do so, it lost in the federal 
  Although the revised bill 
had significant political approval, it never reached a vote.  Roosevelt, convinced by a wave of 
strikes in the late spring that some kind of immediate action was necessary, pushed his National 
Industrial Adjustment Act, or Resolution No. 44, through Congress. The resolution authorized a 
National Labor Relations Board to conduct investigations, hold elections, and issue orders in 
furtherance of Section 7(a).  Wagner thought it best to accept the stopgap measure while building 
good will for a more aggressive bill.  A permanent resolution would have to wait for the new 
Congress.   
                                                          
43 Harry Ward and Arthur Garfield Hays to Senators, 5 June 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698. 
44 ACLU Press Release, 15 June 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698. 
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courts.45  Meanwhile, in January 1935, Roosevelt announced that the NLRB would not operate 
in industries already governed by code authorities. In February, a federal district court issued a 
decision in a case involving an NLB order, holding that manufacturing did not fall within 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Frank Nebeker, who had so eagerly 
prosecuted the IWW in Chicago almost two decades earlier, argued and lost the government’s 
case.46 In March, NLRB chair Francis Biddle pronounced that Section 7(a) was a mere “paper 
right, a sort of innocuous moral shibboleth.”47
In the meantime, Roger Baldwin set about mobilizing support for his critical vision of the 
New Deal and labor’s rights.  Much of his energy in the fall of 1934 was invested in a conference 
on “Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” held in Washington, D.C. in early December.
  
48 Its 
stated purpose was “to put pressure on Congress and on the administration to make good those 
professions of belief in liberty voiced by the President last spring.”49  The announcement for the 
conference, which labeled the ACLU a “militant organization,” stated that three hundred 
prominent liberals would attend, with the goal of recommending federal legislation, changes in 
federal regulations, and test cases in the courts “to protect rights of labor and minorities and to 
assure freedom of expression.”50
                                                          
45 Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 216–18.  Schechter Poultry 
Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), decided in May, thwarted an early effort by the Department of 
Justice to enforce an order issued under the NIRA.  
 The final program included representatives of a broad range of 
liberal and radical organizations, including the American Federation of Teachers, the Church 
League for Industrial Democracy, the Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, the Fellowship 
46 United States v. Weirton Steel Corp., 10 F. Supp. 55 (D. Del. 1935), discussed in ibid., 218–20.  
47 Quoted in Irons, New Deal Lawyers, 225.  
48 The conference was hosted at the Hotel Arlington, which promised orally not to discriminate on the basis of race. 
When this representation was violated, the attendees unanimously voted to depart the hotel. The remaining sessions 
were held at the Howard University Law School at the invitation of Charles H. Houston.  
49 Topics for the conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 719. 
50 Announcement of Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal, 28 October 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, 
vol. 719. 
275 
 
of Reconciliation, the International Labor Defense, the National Committee on Federal 
Legislation for Birth Control, the National Urban League, and the NAACP.51 Representatives of 
the government were invited to reply to arguments and data presented.52  President Roosevelt 
was asked to prepare a statement to be read at the Conference on Civil Liberties, but on receiving 
the ACLU’s file from the Bureau of Investigation, he declined.53  ACLU chair Harry Ward 
explained that the conference, which in his view had “historic significance,” was designed to 
“raise[] a test not only of the value of the New Deal but also of the whole democratic process,” 
by asking “whether the claim that civil liberties are the means to orderly social change is 
anything more than an idealistic belief.”54
The organizers sought to present a comprehensive picture of the state of civil liberties in 
all its manifestations. Panels touched on such far-ranging issues as anti-lynching legislation, 
tribal autonomy for American Indians, expansion of political asylum, transfer of colonial 
possessions from naval to civilian rule, and the rights of the unemployed.
 
55
                                                          
51 Program of Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal (December 8–9, 1934), ACLU Papers, reel 110, 
vol. 721. 
 Legislative proposals 
discussed at the conference included bills to expand asylum for political refugees, to provide jury 
trials in postal censorship cases, to repeal the postal censorship provision of the Espionage Act, 
to require equal radio airtime on all sides of controversial questions, and to criminalize lynching 
52 ACLU Press Bulletin 641, 30 November 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 719. Government officials and 
members of Congress who appeared on the program included Col. Daniel MacCormack, Commissioner General of 
Immigration and Naturalization; Hugh L. Kerwin of the Department of Labor; Louis G. Caldwell and Bethuel M. 
Webster of the Federal Radio Commission; and Robert Weaver and Nathan Margold of the Department of the 
Interior. Karl A. Crowley, Solicitor of the Post Office Department, failed to attend as scheduled. ACLU Press 
Bulletin 642, 7 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 719. 
53 John Clayton to Stephen T. Early, 4 December 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 2111 (American 
Civil Liberties Union, 1933–45). 
54 Harry F. Ward, Statement at the Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal, 8 December 1934, ACLU 
Papers, reel 110, vol. 721. 
55 The conference’s publicity director encouraged graphic presentation of dramatic issues like “lynchings, 
discrimination against Negroes, breaking up of demonstrations of the unemployed, [and] concentration camps for 
workers”—all of which could be “made more real, more shocking, more immediate by effective exhibits.” Clifton 
Read to cooperating organizations, 1 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 719. 
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under federal law.56  There were occasional differences of opinion between New Deal 
representatives and their critics and between the competing camps among the representatives.  
For example, in debating a resolution protesting the conviction of the Scottsboro boys, NAACP 
representatives refused to endorse language “support[ing] the legal defense of the boys by the 
International Labor Defense,” until Baldwin proposed compromise wording. Members of the 
panel on radio censorship clashed over the dangers of administrative discretion, the desirability 
of federal regulation of radio content, and the tradeoffs between private and public control of the 
airways.57  On the whole, however, the delegates “showed surprising unanimity of opinion on 
fundamentals,” and the ACLU was optimistic “that a comprehensive civil rights legislative 
program,” to be drafted by a continuing committee, would “receive support of all the liberals and 
radicals of the 22 cooperating organizations including church, legal, Negro, educational, anti-
censorship, farm, student, and labor defense groups.”58 At the end of the month, representatives 
drafted a letter to President Roosevelt asking him to sponsor some of its strongest legislative 
proposals.59
                                                          
56 Memorandum of Bills Proposed for Discussion, Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal, ACLU 
Papers, reel 110, vol. 719. The Committee on Action Affecting Negroes adopted a resolution in favor of a broad 
civil rights bill with an anti-lynching provision as one of its provisions.  Report of Committee on Action Affecting 
Negroes, Conference on Civil Liberties Under the New Deal, 9 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721. 
  
57 E.g., Louis G. Caldwell, “Excerpts from ‘Freedom on the Air,’” Conference on Civil Liberties and the New Deal, 
ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721. 
58 ACLU Press Bulletin 643, 14 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721. 
59 Harry Ward, Arthur Garfield Hays, Roger Baldwin, Walter White, Powers Hapgood, and Bethuel Webster, Jr., to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 26 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721.  The authors urged a Senate 
investigation of anti-labor vigilantes, the equal provision of radio facilities on public issues, federal jury trials in 
postal censorship cases, and a bill for the federal prosecution of lynchers (modeled on the Costigan-Wagner anti-
lynching bill).  On the labor issue, the proposals included measures to outlaw company unions, to require employers 
to enter into collective bargaining with majority unions, and to lodge final decisionmaking power in the NLRB.  
Carol King complained to Baldwin that he submitted the bills drafted by the ACLU before the conference, rather 
than the revised versions adopted at the conference. Carol King to Roger Baldwin, 3 January 1935, ACLU Papers, 
reel 117, vol. 784.  
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For Baldwin, of course, the most important proposals formulated at the conference were 
those involving labor relations.60  The agenda, if not the output, of the labor sessions was heavily 
slanted to the left.  The attendees took up a bill to bring farm workers within the provisions for 
collective bargaining, amendments to Section 7(a) to buttress rights of collective bargaining and 
to prohibit company unions, and a measure to prevent discrimination against black workers 
under the NRA.61  Mary Van Kleeck was supposed to speak on “The Rights of Labor Under the 
new Deal,” but she withdrew several days before the conference.  Instead, a speech submitted by 
Francis Gorman of the United Textile Workers, also absent, was read aloud by an aide. Although 
Gorman was critical of the manner in which Section 7(a) had been administered, he was not 
opposed to an effective legislative solution.  Like most of the socialists and liberals within the 
ACLU and in the New Deal coalition, he thought that reform within the existing system was a 
tenable, if not preferable, alternative to revolution.  So did the conference’s predominantly 
socialist Committee on Labor’s Rights, which submitted a report condemning the NRA and 
regional labor boards for declining to enforce Section 7(a) but withholding criticism of Roosevelt 
and the NLRB.62
The introduction to the resolutions issued by the conference noted that New Deal 
legislation, “at the most important point of conflict, that between capital and labor,” had failed to 
follow through on its promise to facilitate collective bargaining.  A qualified anti-New Deal 
   
                                                          
60 In his address to the participants, Baldwin proclaimed that government agencies had failed “to make good the 
promise implied in law of support of genuine collective bargaining.” Roger Baldwin, “The Main Issues of Civil 
Liberties under the New Deal,” 8 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721. He continued, “Company-
controlled unions are recognized as legitimate agencies for bargaining when they should long since have been 
outlawed. Compulsory arbitration has been written into the coal code. The merit clause in the auto code promotes 
discrimination against union labor. All the codes are administered by employers’ associations, with a rare 
representative of labor here and there. . . . When government boards have taken a forthright stand on labor’s rights, 
enforcement machinery is lacking or ineffective.” 
61 Memorandum of Bills Proposed for Discussion, Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal, ACLU 
Papers, reel 110, vol. 719. 
62 Daniel, ACLU and the Wagner Act, 94–95.  
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statement presented by a special committee on labor’s rights was “vigorously debated” on the 
floor and passed, in amended form, with several opposing votes.63 It declared that the NRA, in 
practice, had served to buttress employer control and to “deceive the workers as to their rights, 
and to weaken the power of reliance upon their own organized strength.” It therefore concluded 
that the “principle of the NRA” was “in violation of the interests of workers’ rights to organize 
and strike—their only sources of power and liberty.”  The conference participants had “no 
illusions as to the place of law in achieving civil liberties”—“we know from experience that 
economic power and organized pressure alone make for strength,” they explained—but they 
nonetheless proposed legislation that would undercut the influence of industrial interests.64 In the 
end, the labor proposals sent to Congress were modest ones: to outlaw company unions and to 
require employers, in agriculture as well as industry, to bargain collectively with representatives 
of the majority of their workers.65 In fact, the resolutions were so compatible with mainstream 
liberal sentiment that many members of Congress promised their support.66
                                                          
63 Minutes of the Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721. The special 
committee included Max Bedacht, Powers Hapgood, and Roger Baldwin.  
  
64 Resolutions, Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal, 9 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 
721.  Cf. ACLU Press Bulletin 643, 14 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721 (“Asserting that 
‘economic power and organized pressure’ alone make for strength, the conference declared ‘that existing laws or 
any laws which may be enacted will remain without meaning or force unless backed by wide and militant 
organization of workers, tenant farmers, share croppers and unemployed workers.’”).    
65 ACLU Bulletin 646, 11 January 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 117, vol. 784.  The other proposals were substantially 
the same as those submitted to President Roosevelt. Baldwin had apparently taken Joseph Schlossberg’s advice on 
minority representation to heart. He wrote: “[A]s long as company-controlled unions exist, I think we would be in 
favor of the position taken by the National Labor Relations Board in requiring employees to deal with 
representatives of a majority of their workers and without rights for minority groups to make separate contracts. If 
company-controlled unions are outlawed, then I think we would doubtless favor the principle of the representation 
of workers according to their own choice on the theory of proportional representation. We have not discussed the 
point you raised of a company controlling several plants in which a minority might be located in a particular plant 
where it constituted in that plant a majority.” Roger Baldwin to Paul Furnas, 12 January 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 
115, vol. 772. 
66 E.g., J. J. Hoeppel to Harry Ward, 10 January 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 117, vol. 784 (“Four out of the five 
projects outlined are, in my opinion, meritorious.”); Harry Sauthoff to Harry Ward, 11 January 1935, reel 117, vol. 
784 (“I want you to know that I am with you one hundred per cent, and I feel I can safely say that all the 
Progressives from Wisconsin take the same position on these matters as I do.”); Robert Wagner to Roger Baldwin, 
11 January 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 117, vol. 784 (expressing substantial agreement);  F. J. Sisson to Roger 
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The NLRA 
 By the spring of 1935, persistent labor tensions, coupled with a newly elected labor-
friendly Congress, rendered true congressional reform a realistic possibility for the first time. On 
February 21, Senator Wagner introduced his new National Labor Relations Act in Congress. 
Wagner told Baldwin that “some of the suggestions which were made last year by the American 
Civil Liberties Union and by some of the lawyers associated with the International Juridical 
Association [had] proved most helpful in connection with the preparation of a new bill.”67
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Baldwin, 11 January 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 117, vol. 784 (supporting four of five proposals); B. J. Gehrmann to 
ACLU, 13 January 1935, reel 117, vol. 784 (supporting four of five proposals).  
  The 
Wagner Act was a revised version of the earlier bill, with a new preamble to insure against 
constitutional challenge. It drew from the most protective strains of American labor policy. As 
Senator Edward P. Costigan noted during debate over the bill, it codified the very provisions that 
the Commission on Industrial Relations had endorsed two decades before.  It guaranteed 
workers’ right to organize without employer interference, mandated that employers bargain with 
representative unions, and preserved the right to strike. It also ensured that employers would not 
unduly influence representation elections and legitimated exclusive majority representation. And 
it created a three-member quasi-judicial board to resolve labor disputes, whose orders would be 
enforceable by the federal courts. In short, it gave collective bargaining the stamp of government 
approval.  As with Wagner’s earlier bill, labor endorsed it wholeheartedly. The President once 
again waffled.  Employers were just as adamant that it be defeated, and they were eagerly 
assisted in their propaganda efforts by the recently founded American Liberty League, an 
67 Robert Wagner to Roger Baldwin, 24 January 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
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organization of conservative Democrats and other New Deal opponents who deemed the bill an 
affront to the American constitutional tradition. 
For the ACLU, the debate over the Wagner Act provoked a heated controversy between 
its liberal and leftist contingents.  Despite the position adopted at the Conference on Civil 
Liberties, the leftist majority on the board remained opposed to state regulation of labor relations.  
The ACLU’s committee on labor’s rights, which was assigned to make further recommendations 
on pending legislation, was dominated by three members of the International Juridical 
Association who had shared Baldwin’s and Van Kleeck’s view of the 1934 bill.  Among them 
were Carol Weis King, a lawyer for the International Labor Defense who would go on to join the 
Communist Party, and Nathan Greene, co-author with Felix Frankfurter of The Labor 
Injunction,68 whom Baldwin would later describe as a “fellow traveler with the Communist 
opposition.”69
In a letter to Senators Wagner and Walsh, Baldwin explained that the ACLU would not 
support the Wagner Act because no federal agency “intervening in the conflicts between 
employers and employees [could] be expected to fairly determine the issues of labor’s rights.”  
Almost in passing, Baldwin expressed several concrete objections, including the ability of the 
board to act on its own initiative, the exclusion of agricultural workers, and the failure of the act 
to prohibit “discrimination on account of sex, race, color or political convictions.”
  On March 18, the ACLU board considered a memorandum by the IJA on the 
faults of the Wagner bill and voted to oppose the proposed legislation.  
70
                                                          
68 Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction (New York: Macmillan, 1930). 
  In later 
69 Quoted in Daniel, ACLU and the Wagner Act, 97. For the next half-decade, Greene would play a dominant role in 
formulating the ACLU’s policy on labor issues.  The other committee members were Milton Handler and Paul 
Brissenden, both liberal labor scholars at Columbia University, and Isadore Polier of the International Juridical 
Association. 
70 Wagner declined to address the objections in light of Baldwin’s “frank statement that [he was] philosophically 
against any legislation that might set up a government agency as one of the areas within which the industrial struggle 
might be waged.” Robert Wagner to Roger Baldwin, 5 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780.  In general, 
those advocates of the Wagner Act who were concerned with racial discrimination thought that “racial 
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years, the latter objections would become major civil liberties concerns.  For the time being, 
however, Baldwin’s central objection was to the desirability of any governmental intervention in 
the labor struggle.  He pointed out that all of the boards established by the federal government 
had “tended to take from labor its basic right to strike by substituting mediation, conciliation or, 
in some cases, arbitration.”  He reiterated the view, first adopted by the ACLU board in 1920, 
that “only unions militant enough and strong enough to withstand many pressures have been able 
to achieve anything like an unrestricted exercise of their rights.”71
Wagner was disappointed at the ACLU’s position and considered it short-sighted. He told 
Baldwin, “Whether we will it or not, government in every country is going to be forced to play a 
more important role in every phase of economic life, and for that reason it seems to me more 
useful to attempt to direct the nature of that role rather than merely to state the truism, that 
government is likely to be influenced by the forces in society that happen to be strongest.” 
Wagner believed that governmental authority was the only feasible means of countering 
powerful private interests.  Over “a decently long period of time,” appropriate state policies 
 Baldwin acknowledged that 
the labor movement believed Wagner’s bill would strengthen its ranks but insisted, based on “a 
very wide contact with struggles of labor for its rights to organize, strike and picket all over the 
country,” that the dominant view was misguided.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discrimination, etc. will only be eliminated after economic injustices are corrected.” John W. Edelman to Roger 
Baldwin, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; John P. Davis to Roger Baldwin, 25 January 1935, in Gardner Jackson 
Papers, 1912–1965, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereafter Jackson Papers), 
General Correspondence, box 3, folder ACLU: Labor (advising against a prohibition on racial discrimination in 
trade unions because “such promises, even if enacted into law would be unenforceable in any real sense” and would 
in any case “be used by the industry as another weapon to defeat the solidarity of the trade-union movement,” and 
urging the ACLU instead to enlist the support of the union rank and file in defeating segregation). 
71 Roger Baldwin to Robert Wagner, 1 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; Roger Baldwin to David I. 
Walsh, 30 March 1935, Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, box 3, folder ACLU: Labor. 
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would buttress labor, not quash it. In fact, in Wagner’s view, even Section 7(a) had proven to be 
“a galvanizing force.”72
After fifteen years, the ACLU was up against fundamentals.  For the first time, the 
progressive project for the affirmative protection of labor’s rights was a realistic possibility.  The 
ACLU had been founded on resistance to state power.  Its concept of civil liberties as a right of 
agitation was premised on a theory of labor voluntarism that labor itself had come to abandon.  
When the state appeared ready to come genuinely to its aid, the labor movement set aside its 
reservations (which, in any case, had always been qualified) and embraced government action.  
But for the ACLU, resistance to state authority was a core unifying ideology, within and outside 
the labor context. In such cases as Pierce, Scopes, Dennett, and Ulysses, they had convinced 
others and themselves that the governmental oversight of ideas is dangerous and misguided.  
Over the course of the 1920s, they had expanded from a skeptical stance toward state 
intervention in labor disputes to a general aversion to state interference with minority viewpoints, 
personal morality, and private life.   
 
Significantly, the liberals within the ACLU were less hostile to the motivating philosophy 
of the Wagner Act than were the labor radicals. For lawyers like Arthur Garfield Hays and 
Morris Ernst,73
                                                          
72 Robert F. Wagner to Roger Baldwin, 5 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
 as for other New Dealers, the rights to organize, picket, and strike had always 
been derivative of a larger commitment to expressive freedom.  They had never entirely accepted 
the notion of a right of agitation as an independent revolutionary force, productive of (rather than 
protected by) the marketplace of ideas.  More to the point, they never were opposed to state 
power as such, merely to the intrusion of the state into the realms of democratic decisionmaking 
73 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 29 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. Ernst thought that the Wagner 
Act was the only effective way to counteract fascism. Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 10 May 1935, ACLU Papers, 
reel 116, vol. 780. 
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and private conduct.  As a result, they were willing to bracket the regulation of labor relations as 
an appropriate forum for the exercise of state power—even if the result was ameliorative and 
counter-revolutionary—as long as rights derived from the First Amendment were preserved. In 
other words, for liberals, fundamental transformation of the economic system might be 
accomplished through the exercise of civil liberties, but it was not a civil liberty in and of itself.74
Indeed, for many, the notion that labor relations should be isolated from state intervention 
smacked of the Lochner-era tradition of economic liberty, which they had all expressly 
repudiated. Francis Biddle, chair of the NLRB created under Public Resolution No. 44, wrote 
Baldwin to express his surprise that the ACLU board was opposing the Wagner bill in the face of 
“enthusiastic support” from organized labor, particularly as it contained no mediation 
provision.
 
75  Baldwin answered that Biddle’s board had been “the only bright spot in the whole 
record of the past two years of the government’s mediation of labor disputes.” He expressed 
support for the provisions of the bill outlawing company unions and protecting the right to strike, 
but he fell back on his conviction from “experience” that “labor wins its rights to organize and 
bargain collectively not by dependence upon governmental agencies but by its own organized 
power.”76
                                                          
74 Letter from Arthur Garfield Hays, 7 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“From the point of view of civil 
liberties the subject of unionism should be confined to the rights of free press, free speech, free assemblage, the right 
to organize, strike, picket and demonstrate, the right to be free from unfair injunctive processes and cognate 
matters.”).   
  Reliance on administrative machinery inevitably would weaken unions’ independent 
strength, Baldwin concluded. Biddle thought that Baldwin was “too damned theoretical.”  He 
was convinced that the Wagner bill would enhance union cohesion and power.  More to the 
75 Francis Biddle to Roger Baldwin, 12 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
76 Roger Baldwin to Francis Biddle, 13 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
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point, he told Baldwin: “You sound a little, I confess to say, like the Liberty League. If that 
doesn’t stop you I don’t know what will.”77
Biddle was right: his criticism struck close to home.  For months, Baldwin had been 
concerned that the board’s objection to federal labor legislation seemingly allied it with 
industrial interests. In fact, he professed “to hesitate to use so misunderstood a word as ‘liberty,’ 
invoked today so loudly by those rugged defenders of property rights, the ‘Liberty League’ and 
allied organizations,” who understood liberty as a “right to exploit the American people without 
governmental interference.”
   
78 Baldwin took great pains to distinguish the agenda of the Liberty 
League from the ACLU’s, emphasizing that “the historic conception of liberty” was “the 
freedom to agitate for social change without restraint.”79 In his address to the Conference on 
Civil Liberties Under the New Deal, he again clarified that the ACLU was “not concerned with 
those liberties so loudly proclaimed today by reactionaries opposed to the New Deal economic 
controls,” whose conception of liberty was based on “property rights,” rather than “human 
rights.”80  And in his letter to Wagner, he noted that although the board regretted that its 
opposition was shared by “reactionary employers,” its position was based on “diametrically 
opposite grounds.”81
                                                          
77 Francis Biddle to Roger Baldwin, 17 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
   
78 Roger Baldwin, “Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” 24 October 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717. 
79 Ibid. He added: “Practically today that means freedom for the working-class to organize and of minorities to 
conduct their propaganda.” The following month, Baldwin again rejected the liberty espoused by groups like the 
American Liberty League and Americans First, explaining: “They are the dying gladiators of individualism in 
business of laissez faire economics. But the landslide has buried their straw man of liberty. Collectivism has come to 
stay.” Roger Baldwin, “Coming Struggle for Freedom,” 12 November 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717.   
80 Baldwin, “The Main Issues of Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” 8 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, 
vol. 721. 
81 Roger Baldwin to Robert Wagner, 1 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. See also Joseph Schlossberg to 
Roger Baldwin, 14 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“Rightly or wrongly the American Federation of 
Labor is committed to the Wagner Bill. By your opposition to the bill you unwillingly lined up with the employers 
and all reactionaries who opposed the bill. . . . This is one case in which the Civil Liberties Union can well afford to 
take no official position.”). 
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 Baldwin’s vigorous protestations betrayed an underlying insecurity, and when pressed 
hard enough, he capitulated.  In light of substantial support for the Wagner Act both within the 
ACLU and among the organization’s allies in the labor movement and the government, the board 
ultimately agreed to reconsider its position.82 In May 1935, it held a referendum for the members 
of the National Committee and local branches on the desirability of the Wagner bill.83  
Notwithstanding the strong convictions of the ACLU leadership, the majority of the returns 
favored support of the Wagner Act in some form, and the board voted to rescind its opposition 
and take no official position on the bill.84
As it turned out, the ACLU’s change in position was of little relevance except as a matter 
of internal politics.
  
85
                                                          
82 E.g., John W. Edelman, David S. Schick, and Isadore Katz to Roger Baldwin, 3 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 
116, vol. 780 (“There is very little left in the field of radicalism that we can cling to, what with the state of affairs in 
the Socialist Party, etc. Civil Liberties is one thing we regard with affection. We do not need to cite to you that in 
previous difficulties with the American Federation of Labor over the defense of Communists etc., it was us that went 
to the bat, stuck our labor necks out and fought like hell with Bill Green. . . . It is therefore with a greater chagrin 
that we bump up against the A.C.L.U. condemnation of the Wagner-Connery Bill for which we individually and 
organizationally are fighting.”); John W. Edelman to Roger Baldwin, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“Trade 
unionists who know ‘what it’s all about’ realize well enough that the Labor Disputes Bill has many weaknesses and 
will not bring about social justice, but they also know that the passage of some such legislation is essential to enable 
the organization drive in the unorganized industries to continue. . . . The Civil Liberties [Union] functions usually 
for the alleged radical unions who are so weak that they are licked before getting started with or without a Labor 
Disputes Bill. In fact the Communist led unions don’t really want to settle strikes and you know that is the case. But 
some of us are connected with really militant-acting unions who do things and who want to settle strikes. We have 
used the government mechanisms and the arbitration technique very effectively to that end. . . . The Civil Liberties 
Union in the end must work with the conservative as well as the radical labor movement; you cut off cooperation 
with the conservative movement and don’t gain anything with the radical group by attacking the Disputes Bill.”).  
 By the time the board issued its retraction, passage of the bill was all but 
assured.  The Committee on Education and Labor reported favorably on it, and it passed both 
houses of Congress with decisive majorities.  When the Supreme Court unanimously declared 
83 Roger Baldwin to members of the National Committee and local branches, 8 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 115, 
vol. 772. Members were asked to choose among five options: “against creating any such federal board for labor 
relations,” “in favor of the Wagner bill substantially as it stands,” “in favor of the Wagner bill with amendments as 
indicated,” “for the substitute proposals suggested,” or “Against the Civil Liberties Union taking any position on the 
bill.” Roger Baldwin to board members, 8 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 115, vol. 772. 
84 ACLU Statement, 27 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; Baldwin to board, 22 May 1935, ACLU 
Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. Baldwin reported that only 25 ballots were received out of 84 eligible voters. Felix 
Frankfurter personally supported the bill but was opposed to the ACLU taking a position on it. Roger Baldwin to 
Felix Frankfurter, 17 May 1935 (annotated return ballot undated), ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
85 Wagner nonetheless sent a cordial acknowledgment. Robert Wagner to friends, 7 June 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 
116, vol. 780. 
286 
 
the NIRA unconstitutional in the Schechter Poultry case, it was clear that a new measure was 
necessary. And on July 5, 1935, President Roosevelt signed the bill into law.   
For the ACLU, the split over the Wagner Act was symptomatic of a fundamental shift in 
its understanding of civil liberties.  The board’s memorandum issued in conjunction with its 
referendum on the Wagner Act acknowledged the sentiment of some members of the ACLU that 
its central argument—that labor could advance “only through its own economic power, not 
through dependence on legislation”—was not properly within the field of civil liberties.  This 
perceived slippage was a substantial point of contention for liberals on the national committee, 
who had never shared the board’s commitment to the right of agitation.  Alexander Meiklejohn, 
writing to record his support for the bill, commented on “the tendency of the Board to engage in 
industrial disputes instead of fighting for the maintaining of civil liberties in connection with 
them.”86  Judge Charles Amidon, head of the ACLU-sponsored National Committee on Labor 
Injunctions, thought the organization should limit its work to “the civil liberties rights of persons 
when those rights are directly invaded.” He cautioned that “to carry on campaigns against 
economic wrongs, which ultimately affect civil liberty, would probably lead the union into 
controversies that would impair its usefulness in the field of its special work.”87
Until the Wagner Act, the ACLU did not regard civil liberties as bounded by the Bill of 
Rights. The board often merged the right of workers to a living with the right of workers to 
espouse their economic program, emphasizing that civil liberty preexisted the Constitution.  The 
debate over the Wagner Act taught the ACLU leadership an important lesson.  The 
organization’s impressive successes during the 1920s had generated broad-based support for a 
vision of civil liberties based on expressive freedom.  The upshot of the ACLU’s expansion into 
 
                                                          
86 Alexander Meiklejohn to Roger Baldwin, 22 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
87 Charles F. Amidon to Roger Baldwin, 27 April 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 105, vol. 678. 
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new realms and its enlistment of new constituencies was a change in its perceived purpose.  The 
new supporters of the civil liberties agenda did not regard it as appropriate for the ACLU to 
intervene in “purely” economic matters.  Even longtime members had come to rethink the 
theoretical basis for their commitment to free speech. For the time being, the leftist majority on 
the board clung to its substantive commitments, but its justification for doing so had begun to 
crumble.  
Ironically, the ACLU’s early understanding of civil liberties found its strongest ally in the 
NLRB, which came to regard the effective organization of workers as the most important of civil 
liberties.  The new vision, of course, was enforced by the state, not asserted against it.  Still, the 
underlying objective of the Wagner Act was to strengthen organized labor, and labor leaders 
wasted little time in using the new mandate to their fullest advantage. In the months after its 
passage, John L. Lewis, Sidney Hillman, and other AFL labor veterans turned aggressively to 
organizing unskilled workers in the mass production industries. When the AFL rebuffed their 
strategy in its 1935 convention, Lewis assembled his allies in the new Committee for Industrial 
Organization.  He also worked closely with New Deal Democrats, who enacted additional 
protections to foster CIO efforts.88
For their part, employers flagrantly resisted compliance with the new legislation. They 
continued to engage in blatant anti-labor practices, including industrial espionage, 
strikebreaking, and the use of munitions and private police forces.
  
89
                                                          
88 For example, Senator James Byrne’s anti-strikebreaking bill, enacted in June 1936.  
 Although these methods 
were clear violations of workers’ new statutory rights, employers’ lawyers advised that the 
Wagner Act was unconstitutional and would shortly be declared so by the Supreme Court.  True 
to form, employers mobilized around a legal campaign, supported most visibly by the American 
89 Jerold S. Auerbach, “The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal,” Journal of 
American History 51 (Dec. 1964): 443.  
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Liberty League’s National Lawyers Committee, a collection of corporate lawyers who believed 
that the Wagner Act was incompatible with Lochner-era values. The threat of an adverse 
decision was so menacing that the NLRB devoted much of its energy during 1935 and 1936 to 
formulating its own legal strategy.   
Congress, however, did not leave the new body without recourse.  In the spring of 
1936—prompted by the suppression of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, an organization of 
tenant farmers and sharecroppers in northeastern Arkansas, and by the ineffectuality of the 
NLRB—Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette, Jr. submitted a Senate resolution authorizing 
the investigation of “violations of the rights of free speech and assembly and undue interference 
with the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively.”90  La Follette initially doubted that 
the Senate would act on his proposal, but after highly effective preliminary hearings, the 
resolution was approved in June with significant public support.91
                                                          
90 See generally Auerbach, Labor and Liberty. 
  Known as the La Follette 
Civil Liberties Committee, the new body, like the NLRB, regarded civil liberties as synonymous 
with the rights of labor, whether statutory or constitutional.  It set out to investigate the activities 
of detective agencies, employer associations, corporations, and individual employers “in so far as 
these activities result in interference with the rights of labor such as the formation of outside 
unions, collective bargaining, rights of assemblage and other liberties guaranteed by the 
91 Gardner Jackson to Roger Baldwin, 9 April 1936, Jackson Papers, box 42, folder La Follette Civil Liberties (“At 
first . . . [La Follette] took the position that there was not a ghost of a show of getting a resolution through the Senate 
and that the best we could hope for was to string out a preliminary hearing as long as we could with good headline 
stuff and then push another resolution next session on the basis of what was turned up at this preliminary hearing. 
Now, however, he is taking the position that with a comparatively few witnesses presenting as strong material as 
possible, his subcommittee will make a favorable report to the whole committee with a chance that the whole 
committee will, in turn, report it out favorably and get action on it this session. He says that it is our job to pressure 
the whole committee with letters, wires, etc.”). See also Robert Wohlforth to Senator Elbert D. Thomas, 6 October 
1936, in Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, General Data and Information, Sen 78A-F9, Record Group 
46 (Records of the United States Senate), National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 
(hereafter La Follette Committee Papers), 10.25, box 4, folder October 1936 (enclosing nine editorials from New 
York and Washington papers and commenting that “nearly all of the editorials, with few exceptions, are favorable”).  
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Constitution.”92 The younger Senator La Follette, whose famous father had begun his career as a 
law partner of the Free Speech League’s Gilbert Roe, chaired the subcommittee, which was 
organized within the Senate’s Committee on Education and Labor.93
Several members of the ACLU, including Morris Ernst, Norman Thomas, and the 
Washington-based Gardner Jackson, were instrumental in engineering the new measure, which 
they had first proposed at the Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal. The ACLU 
suggested situations that warranted investigation, and it recommended appropriate witnesses and 
offered to pay their travel expenses. Baldwin was convinced that “the worst evil which should be 
investigated is the mounting rise of force and violence by employers against the organization of 
labor,” which threatened “rights presumably guaranteed by federal legislation.”
  
94 He thought a 
successful inquiry would justify a full slate of federal legislation protecting the rights of labor 
against public and private curtailment.95 At first, the ACLU urged the committee to investigate 
civil liberties abuses in other contexts as well.96
                                                          
92 Felix Frazer (Investigator) to James A. Kinkead, 9 October 1936, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25,  box 4, 
folder October 1936. 
  It soon became evident, however, that the La 
93 The committee also included Elbert Thomas, a Utah Democrat, and Louis Murphy, who died soon after his 
appointment.  
94 Roger Baldwin to Robert La Follette, 16 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887. 
95 Ibid. In particular, he recommended legislation involving an amendment to the Civil Rights statute; the federal 
licensing of detective agencies engaged in interstate business; the relation of federal aid to state troops used in 
strikes; the importation of strike-breakers; and the relation of the federal government to local interference with the 
rights of the unemployed. 
96 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 9 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887 (“The testimony should, of course, 
be headed up toward federal legislation such as control of private employment bureaus, radio, post office jury trials, 
a method of handling employment through federal employment service during times of strikes, etc.”). At the 
preliminary hearings, Arthur Garfield Hays and Morris Ernst were prepared to testify regarding postal and radio 
censorship, sedition and criminal syndicalism laws, and alien laws, as well as the operation of the federal civil rights 
statute, the use of state troops against strikers in relation to the federal government’s aid to the national guard, and 
other issues. Memorandum Re: La Follette Investigation, 20 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887.  La 
Follette told Baldwin that he “sincerely appreciate[d]” the ACLU’s interest and was grateful for the offer of 
assistance but “in the interest of prompt action upon this resolution the sub-committee hesitates to prolong these 
preliminary hearings any more than absolute necessary.” Robert La Follette to Roger Baldwin, 22 April 1936, 
ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887. 
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Follette Committee would confine its inquiry to labor relations.97  At the preliminary hearings, 
NLRB chair J. Warren Madden was the first witness.  He tellingly declared, “The right of 
workmen to organize themselves into unions has become an important civil liberty.”98
The civil libertarianism of the La Follette Committee was in many ways a holdover from 
the ACLU’s early days. Its principal goal was the elimination of all interference with workers’ 
right to organize, whether perpetrated by local law enforcement or by employers themselves.  
Like the ACLU, the committee sought to generate liberal support for its vision by invoking the 
specter of totalitarianism—“We are unquestionably the most powerful agency against Fascism in 
this country,” one staff member wrote—and the corresponding collapse of American 
democracy.
 The 
connection between the two bodies was not merely ideological; much of the La Follette 
Committee’s staff was borrowed from the NLRB.  
99  In his testimony at the hearings, NLRB member Edwin Smith recited the ACLU’s 
well-worn argument that the unchecked abuse of civil liberties would lead to violent revolt.  He 
denounced “entrenched interests” and “alleged patriotic organizations” for arguing that 
repression was the only means of saving America from the radicals.  “You cannot suppress 
freedom of expression,” he cautioned, “without rapidly undermining democracy itself.”100
                                                          
97 It seems that Baldwin concurred in the committee’s decision. An unsigned letter, probably written by Baldwin, 
reported that based on an examination of ACLU materials it appeared that “the Senate Committee can be most 
useful by confining itself largely to the attack on the rights of labor, particularly strikers.” Letter to Rabbi Sidney 
Goldstein, 27 March 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887. 
 The 
true goal of the committee, however, was something more than expressive freedom or individual 
rights. As Smith put it in an address to the ACLU: “Civil liberties are not abstractions which 
98 Quoted in Auerbach, Labor and Liberty, 65.  
99 Felix Frazer to Byron Scott, 3 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, folder February 1937. 
100 Statement by Edwin S. Smith before Hearings of Subcommittee on Senate Resolution 266, 23 April 1936, ACLU 
Papers, reel 131, vol. 887. The committee was careful to maintain an air of impartiality to maintain its credibility.  
See, e.g., Robert Wohlforth to Harold Cranefield, 9 March 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, folder 
March 1937 (“Under no condition should you or any members of this Committee try to address any union meetings. 
However well intentioned this may be, it is providing ammunition for those opposed to the Committee to give us a 
terrific smear.”). 
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hover above the passions of contending groups and can be successfully brought to earth to 
promote the general welfare.”101 Robert La Follette was adamant that “the right of workers to 
speak freely and assemble peacefully is immediate and practical, a right which translates itself 
into the concrete terms of job security, fair wages and decent living conditions.”102
In the coming years, the ACLU would do its utmost to sustain the work of the La Follette 
Committee through publicity, lobbying, and letter-writing campaigns.
   
103 Indeed, it considered it 
to be “the most helpful single agency in exposing violations of labor’s rights by employers.”104
 
 
Like the committee, the ACLU would defend the Wagner Act as a guarantor of labor’s rights to 
strike, picket, and organize.  Still, the perceived threat of the expansion of state power would 
linger in the background. Eventually, it would reemerge as a shield against intrusion on 
employers’ “personal rights,” in the form of constitutional protection for employer free speech 
and procedural safeguards on the discretion of the NLRB. The ACLU leadership had come to 
accept government intervention in the realm of labor relations, but in the process, paradoxically, 
it had shifted its agenda from the rights of labor to a content-neutral Bill of Rights.   
Civil Liberties in the Courts 
 For the ACLU, mounting support for a theory of civil liberties premised on the Bill of 
Rights translated into a complicated relationship with the federal courts.  During the 1920s, the 
federal judiciary had been one of many institutions to which the ACLU turned for protection of 
                                                          
101 Edwin S. Smith, Civil Rights for Labor, before Washington, D.C. branch of ACLU, January 1938, ACLU Papers, 
reel 156, vol. 1078. 
102 Robert M. La Follette, Jr., “Management, Too, Must be Responsible,” National Lawyers Guild Quarterly 1 
(December 1937): 4. 
103 Roger Baldwin to Gardner Jackson, 14 April 1936, Jackson Papers, box 42, folder La Follette Civil Liberties 
(“Our board has agreed to go to the limit on this”); Roger Baldwin, “The Senate Investigates Civil Liberties,” 23 
November 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887; Baldwin to friends, 24 July 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 
969 (urging support for additional appropriations).   
104 Roger Baldwin to Frederick Wright, 28 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
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constitutional rights—and for much of the decade, not the most important one.  Increasingly, 
however, the federal courts were a favorable forum for the ACLU’s efforts to protect civil 
liberties, particularly in cases involving infringements by state courts and legislatures.  On the 
other hand, federal litigation threatened to undermine the labor movement’s most important 
legislative victories, including the Wagner Act.  The ACLU had long struggled with these 
tensions, but the president’s ill-fated judiciary reorganization proposal finally forced the 
organization to face it squarely. 
 As soon as the Wagner Act took effect, dozens of challenges to the statute began making 
their way up through the federal courts. In May 1936, the Supreme Court had declared in Carter 
v. Carter Coal Company that labor provisions in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act were an 
unconstitutional extension of Congress’s commerce power.105
President Roosevelt was determined to forestall that outcome.  With the help of Labor’s 
Nonpartisan League, founded by John L. Lewis to mobilize labor voters, the 1936 presidential 
election resulted in a landslide victory for Roosevelt. The President considered the results a 
  Relying on Carter Coal, 
corporate attorneys easily convinced judges that the Wagner Act was inconsistent with a century 
of settled judicial precedent. Unlike earlier measures (for example, the Clayton Act), the new 
legislation was unmistakably pro-union in its statutory language. Courts nonetheless proved 
ready and willing to invalidate it on constitutional grounds. Lower court decisions severely 
undercut the NLRB’s authority to issue orders in all but the most clearly interstate industries, 
such as transportation and communications.  Industry and labor alike considered it a matter of 
time until the Supreme Court took up the Wagner Act and expressly declared a broader 
application unconstitutional.   
                                                          
105 Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
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mandate for the New Deal.  Popular support for his new labor policies seemed unequivocal, and 
he pledged to do whatever was necessary to preserve them.  With the NLRB mired in 
constitutional litigation, its legitimacy squarely rejected by industry and its lawyers, preserving 
those labor policies meant doing something about the courts.  
 There was substantial liberal support for measures to curb the power of judicial review in 
economic cases through such means as constitutional amendment or statutory limitations on 
federal jurisdiction.106  The approach on which Roosevelt ultimately settled, however, was less 
direct and distinctly unpopular, even among critics of the Court.107
The proposal polarized supporters of the New Deal. Organized labor endorsed it, as did 
many administrators of the NLRA.
  In February 1937, Roosevelt 
recommended a bill that would have authorized the appointment of an additional justice to the 
Supreme Court for every sitting justice who had not retired within six months after reaching the 
age of seventy (up to a maximum of six). Had the bill passed, Roosevelt would have been able to 
appoint six new justices. Although it was clearly designed to ensure a pro-New Deal majority, 
Roosevelt publicly justified the measure on the grounds that the current justices were unable to 
meet the demands on their resources.   
108 Liberals, however, were divided,109
                                                          
106 On the constitutional revolution, see William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional 
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the 
New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Richard 
A. Maidment, The Judicial Response to the New Deal: The United States Supreme Court and Economic Regulation, 
1934–1936 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991); Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in 
Recession and War (New York: Knopf, 1995).  
 and the ACLU, which 
107 See generally Brinkley, End of Reform; Osmond Fraenkel, An Open Letter to the President, 8 February 1937, 
ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978 (“May I take the liberty of expressing the opinion that you have been less ably 
advised than usual, to recommend the appointment of additional justices to the United States Supreme Court? . . . 
The precedent you are creating seems to me to be not only unsettling, but to carry in it the seeds of its own 
destruction.”). 
108 “Liberals Divided on Plan to Enlarge Supreme Court,” New York World-Telegram, 5 February 1937 (noting that 
Elinore M. Herrick, an NLRB regional director, supported the plan, as did Rose Schneiderman, president of the 
Women’s Trade Union League). 
109 Ibid. For example, Rabbi Stephen Wise supported the plan, Karl Llewellyn gave it qualified approval, and Frank 
Walsh opposed it.  
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had never satisfactorily resolved its own relationship to the courts, found it difficult to settle on a 
position.  In its early years, the ACLU had only grudgingly adopted a judicial strategy for the 
vindication of civil liberties.  Roger Baldwin thought the courts would simply enforce existing 
power disparities as they had in previous decades.  Felix Frankfurter staunchly opposed the 
pursuit of civil liberties through constitutional litigation, and he regarded the Supreme Court’s 
‘occasional services to liberalism’ as a dangerous step toward judicial legislation.110
 On the other hand, the ACLU had always proven willing to use the courts when it suited 
their cause. Unlike labor lawyers, many of whom spurned the judiciary on principle, the 
organization had spent two decades whittling away at adverse precedent in the domain of free 
speech. Baldwin would have preferred to rely on grass-roots agitation and direct action, but he 
had resigned himself to the fact that “the middle-class mind works legalistically”—that 
“whenever rights are violated, the first thing they want to do is get a lawyer and go to court.”
 Even the 
ACLU’s general counsels turned to the courts out of practical exigency rather than ideological 
commitment.  
111  
In fact, when Baldwin refused to endorse the Wagner Act in light of past administrative denials 
of the rights of labor, his labor allies were quick to criticize his inconsistency. That, “in many 
cases, the right of free speech, assemblage, and press have been denied in the courts,” they told 
him, “has not led us to fight against the courts and to seek to strike down the rights guaranteed in 
the constitution.”112
 To be sure, the ACLU was not sanguine about the power of the federal judiciary.  It had 
bitterly opposed the use of federal labor injunctions and, along with the AFL and state labor 
 On the contrary, they had used the courts to their fullest advantage.  
                                                          
110 Quoted in Walker, American Liberties, 81. See also H. N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter (New York: 
Basic Books, 1981).   
111 Roger Baldwin to Robert Whitaker, 6 April 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 105, vol. 678. 
112 Isadore Katz, John Edelman, and David Schlick to Roger Baldwin, 22 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 
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federations, it had been instrumental in securing passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In 1931, 
its National Committee on Labor Injunctions, whose four hundred members included Frank P. 
Walsh, managed to produce a draft anti-injunction measure agreeable to the AFL, labor lawyers, 
law professors, and interested organizations.113 The bill eliminated ex parte hearings, ensured 
that all violations of injunctions would be tried by juries, limited punishment of contempt, 
abolished yellow dog contracts, and ensured that no acts “which involve only workers’ rights to 
meet, speak, [or] circulate literature” would be enjoined.114 Once the federal bill was passed, 
William Green, president of the AFL, arranged for the ACLU to assist in the preparation of state 
anti-injunction bills, as well.115 The object of such laws, the ACLU explained, was to stop 
judicial “law-making.”116
 At the same time, however, the ACLU was urging labor lawyers to turn the power of 
injunctions to their advantage.  A 1930 ACLU pamphlet called Legal Tactics for Labor’s Rights, 
condensed from a book co-authored by Arthur Garfield Hays, laid out a “new policy for 
aggressive fighting in the courts to establish labor’s rights.”
   
117
                                                          
113 Monthly Bulletin for Action, January 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 79, vol. 444. The ACLU sought to elicit press 
support through an amendment providing for jury trials for all contempts of courts not committed in the court’s 
presence, including criticism by journalists. E.g., Roger Baldwin to Roy Howard, 3 February 1932, ACLU Papers, 
reel 90, vol. 536. Frankfurter, who drafted the amendment, though it better not to push the matter. “What you have 
got is not wholly what you want, but it is a good deal,” he said, “and I think we had better forego creating an 
atmosphere whereby the Supreme Court will feel that this is just the beginning of continuous onslaughts upon the 
present charges of the federal courts.” Felix Frankfurter to Roger Baldwin, 29 March 1932, ACLU Papers, reel 90, 
vol. 536. 
  The pamphlet, aimed at labor 
groups, argued that judicial action was advisable even when defeat appeared inevitable, because 
lawsuits generated positive publicity and produced “a good moral effect.” Moreover, in the long 
run, they were capable of whittling away the courts’ approval of repressive employer 
114 Memorandum on the Proposed Injunction Bill, January 1932, ACLU Papers, reel 90, vol. 536. 
115 William Green to Roger Baldwin, 29 December 1933, ACLU Papers, reel 99, vol. 615D.  
116 Committee on Labor Injunctions, “The Federal Anti-Injunction Bill,” February 1932, ACLU Papers, reel 90, vol. 
536. Alexander Fleischer to Chief Editorial Writer, 9 March 1932, ACLU Papers, reel 90, vol. 536. 
117 American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Tactics for Labor’s Rights (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 
April 1930), 3, in ACLU Papers, reel 90, vol. 536. The book on which the pamphlet was based was Arthur Garfield 
Hays, Clement Wood and  McAlister Coleman, Don’t Tread on Me (Vanguard Press, 1928). 
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practices.118 The authors hoped that the pursuit and denial of injunctions would convince the 
public that labor had been wrongfully oppressed by law—that its “ancient legal rights of civil 
liberty” were being violated.119  They encouraged attorneys to appeal all strong cases, even after 
a strike had ceased, to build favorable precedent or, if relief were consistently denied, to buttress 
their charge of bias. If they were successful, they mused, employers themselves might come to 
favor legislation to curb the power of the courts. “The vital thing for labor to realize, and to make 
labor attorneys realize,” the pamphlet insisted, “is that the chief object to be gained is, not the 
winning of legal actions, but the bringing of them.”120
 The ACLU understood that organized labor was hesitant to make use of the federal courts 
because it “regard[ed] the injunction as a weapon which should be abolished” and was reluctant 
to “sanction it by using it.”
 
121  The organization nonetheless dismissed such concerns as overly 
scrupulous. “It is almost like saying to the employers ‘we won’t use this because you do,’” one 
ACLU pamphlet protested.122 Employers were adept at generating public sympathy by 
complaining of disorder.  The workers, in response, would do well to “stir up the cry of 
repression of civil liberty,” and the pursuit of legal remedies was the most effective way of doing 
so.123
                                                          
118 Ibid.  
  Of course, even more than in the administrative context, unions were hesitant to 
compromise their independence by relying on judicial redress of their grievances. Veteran labor 
leaders, the ACLU acknowledged, were likely to regard a favorable court decision as a palliative 
that undermined the cure. On the other hand, the “impatient tactician . . . maintains that there is 
no conflict between pressing for strong organization and at the same time seeking relief in the 
119 Ibid., 4.  
120 Ibid. (emphasis in original).  
121 Ibid., 8–9.  
122 “Injunctions to Protect Civil Liberties” (undated), ACLU Papers, reel 72, vol. 395. 
123 Ibid.  
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courts.”124  Curiously, despite Baldwin’s profound concern that the Wagner Act would weaken 
unions, he was less concerned by the pursuit of judicial remedies.  After passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, he felt that injunctions were “pretty well hedged in,” and that “under the new 
rule” labor’s use of injunctions was potentially advantageous. “As a matter of fact,” he added,” I 
have always taken the position . . . that labor made a mistake in being so ethical about not using 
weapons so often used against it.”125
 Injunctions were not the only use that the ACLU made of the federal judiciary.  During 
the 1920s, the national office and its local affiliates were involved in virtually every significant 
civil liberties decision that made its way to the United States Supreme Court. In 1931, in 
Stromberg v. California, which the ALCU handled jointly with the ILD, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a California red-flag law.
   
126  The same year, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931), it prohibited prior restraint on the press in a case involving a hate-mongering Minnesota 
newspapers shut down under a public nuisance law. The ACLU immediately agreed to represent 
the targeted newspaper, but it turned the defense over to the Chicago Tribune and the American 
Newspaper Publishers’ Association.127  The ACLU was intimately involved in the Alabama trial 
of the “Scottsboro boys,” falsely accused of raping two white women.  Two cases involving the 
defendants reached the Supreme Court, and both were argued by ACLU attorney Walter Pollak 
upon the request of the ILD.128
                                                          
124 ACLU, Legal Tactics, 17. 
  Then, in January 1937, the Supreme Court decided De Jonge v. 
125 Roger Baldwin to William Pickens, 2 April 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 107, vol. 698.  
126 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Initially, the ACLU felt the victory in Stromberg was limited.  “In 
the Courts,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (June 1931), 2 (“The decision offers no hope for voiding the laws in principle, 
for the court held that the display of a flag as a symbol of criminal purposes could be punished. Punishment for 
displaying a red flag will depend on who does it, under what circumstances, and for what purpose. The only gain 
under the current decision is that such display cannot be punished as a symbol of ‘opposition to organized 
government.’”). 
127 “Minnesota Press Gag Law Knocked Out,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (June 1931), 1.  
128 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935). By 1935, the Supreme 
Court was sufficiently won over by the Supreme Court’s civil liberties record to organize a memorial radio program 
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Oregon, involving a Communist Party organizer convicted under the Oregon criminal 
syndicalism law.129
 Within the ACLU, debate over the “court-packing plan” centered less on its immediate 
threat to civil liberties decisions than on the general desirability of judicial review.  After all, the 
addition of pro-New Deal justices was unlikely to disrupt the trend toward greater protection of 
civil liberties, particularly in cases involving radical speech. Norman Thomas thought it was 
possible that an enlarged court would be favorable to civil liberties, but he also noted the 
possibility that “the psychological and practical effects” of the proposal, as a precedent for future 
maneuvers, might prove injurious. Thomas noted that the Supreme Court had rarely protected 
civil liberties against congressional encroachment. On the other hand, it had proven willing to 
intervene in cases involving repressive state legislation. Indeed, Thomas thought that stripping 
the court of all review would prompt “a flood of legislation, especially in Southern states, of 
what I might call a Ku Klux Klan sort,” “a whole series of Herndon cases.”
 ACLU attorney Osmond Franekel argued the case.  The decision was the 
first of a flood of civil liberties victories in cases involving Communists, Jehovah’s witnesses, 
and the labor movement.  
130
Many members were concerned that weakening the Court would undermine civil 
liberties.
 
131
                                                                                                                                                                                           
honoring the seminal contributions of Justice Holmes.  Roger Baldwin to Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, 
20 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 117, vol. 785. On the Scottsboro cases, see James Goodman, Stories of 
Scottsboro (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). 
 William Fennell was adamant that the board should oppose the President’s plan, and 
he was outraged when it expressed hesitation. “Have they forgotten the Oregon school case?” he 
asked. “The Herndon case? The Scottsboro case? The De Jonge case? I hope a small group of 
129 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). Critics of the Court thought that enthusiasm about DeJonge was 
misguided.  E.g., Louis Boudin to Osmond Fraenkel, 18 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. Fraenkel, 
however, believed it to be warranted. Osmond Fraenkel to Louis Boudin, 20 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, 
vol. 978. 
130 Norman Thomas to Roger Baldwin, 25 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 969. 
131 E.g., Ruth and Russell Jewell to Roger Baldwin, 11 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
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New Dealers and socialists on the committee will not be permitted to overlook the point . . . that 
when the courts are subservient to the executive all hope of democracy dies.”132 John Haynes 
Holmes thought that the ACLU should consider only the effect of the Supreme Court problem on 
“the sanctity and authority of the provisions for civil liberty embodied in the Constitution,” not 
labor and industrial questions. “What impresses me,” he commented, “is that the United States 
Supreme Court, so far as civil liberties is concerned, is for us and not against us, and we should 
be for and not against the Court.”133
 Not everyone was so impressed. In fact, a lively debate unfolded within the ACLU on the 
desirability of judicial review in civil liberties cases. Critics of the Court accused their opponents 
of whitewashing its record, while defenders of judicial review thought the detractors were 
“mak[ing] the Court’s record worse than it is.”
 
134 In an attempt to formulate a position, the 
ACLU circulated a survey to ten “eminent lawyers,” including Hays, Ernst, Fraenkel, and 
Thomas, requesting their views of the most commonly cited proposals.135
The responses ran the gamut. Most of those polled thought the Court should retain its 
power to invalidate both acts of Congress and state legislation on constitutional grounds.  Several 
thought it acceptable to require a supermajority of the Supreme Court in decisions invalidating 
federal laws.  The participants split over suggestions to permit a two-thirds congressional veto of 
constitutional decisions or to make the constitutional amendment process less demanding.  
  Although the 
responses were submitted after the President’s plan was unveiled, the survey predated it, and 
none of the participants addressed it. They did, however, offer their opinions of other proposals.  
                                                          
132 William Fennell to Lucille Milner, 14 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
133 John Haynes Holmes to Harry Ward, 29 January 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
134 Louis Boudin to Osmond Fraenkel, 18 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978; Osmond Fraenkel to Louis 
Boudin, 20 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
135 Preliminary Report of the American Civil Liberties Union Temporary Committee Concerning the Supreme 
Court, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. Also polled were Charles Beard, Edwin Borchard, John Finerty, Felix 
Frankfuter, Lloyd Garrison, Walter Gellhorn, Max Lerner, and Whitney North Seymour. Frankfurter and Beard 
declined to participate. 
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Notably, all thought it acceptable to restrict the due process clause to procedural matters while 
making the Bill of Rights binding on the states, as long as the provision was carefully worded. In 
effect, that was the compromise that the Supreme Court itself ultimately adopted.  
The participants’ comments illuminate the various tensions among self-described civil 
libertarians with respect to state and judicial power.  Walter Gellhorn, an administrative law 
scholar who was then serving as regional attorney for the Social Security system, considered all 
of the proposals to be harmless. He thought the importance of the courts in safeguarding liberties 
was exaggerated.  The principal threat to civil liberties, in his view, was administrative abuse.  
Lloyd Garrison, dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School and the first chair of the 
original NLRB, thought that all of the measures posed some danger to civil liberties and 
cautioned against “giving majorities too much say over minorities.”136 Morris Ernst felt that 
some check on the Supreme Court was necessary, but he favored a congressional override, and in 
fact wrote a book advocating just that.137 Edwin Borchard, a law professor at Yale, commented 
that he did not think it necessary to weaken the Court or its influence. “On the contrary,” he 
wrote, “it ought to be apparent that the current danger is an expansion of the executive power 
into dictatorship”—and he considered the Court to be “the greatest safeguard we have against 
executive arbitrariness.”138
                                                          
136 Ibid.  
 Finally, Norman Thomas emphasized that a simple count of Supreme 
Court decisions would underestimate the effectiveness of the federal judiciary in fostering civil 
liberties.  He noted the “psychological effect of the review power of the Court,” which he 
137 Morris L. Ernst, The Ultimate Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1937).  
138 Edwin Borchard to Osmond Fraenkel, 4 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
301 
 
thought—based on “some fairly close contacts with American life”—was more significant than 
the Court’s critics appreciated.139
In May, the ACLU issued an analysis of the Court’s record in civil liberties cases in an 
effort to educate the public regarding the pending proposals. The pamphlet was designed to 
address the question frequently posed to the ACLU as to “how far the Court has been a defender 
of civil liberties.”  It tallied the Court’s decisions in such far-ranging areas as military trials, 
slavery or peonage, searches and seizures, freedom of religion, education, aliens and citizenship, 
freedom of speech, and labor relations.  Its author, Osmond Fraenkel, was the ACLU’s Supreme 
Court litigator and was optimistic about future gains.  He acknowledged that the Court had 
“more often failed to protect the Bill of Rights than preserve it,” and that those decisions 
favorable to civil liberties involved “less important issues.”  Pointing to decisions sustaining 
convictions under the Espionage Act and state criminal syndicalism laws, he concluded “that the 
Court has been unable to withstand popular hysteria.” Nonetheless, he thought the Court had 
begun to protect personal rights more vigilantly as a result of its “widening conception” of the 
due process clause.
 
140  In responding to the board’s survey on proposals for limiting the Court’s 
power, he emphasized that “so long as we believe in safeguarding the rights of minorities, the 
power of review is essential to protect these rights.”141
                                                          
139 Norman Thomas to Roger Baldwin, 25 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 969. He also thought the 
“due process of law clause . . . should be confined to matters of procedure.” Thomas, like many others within the 
ACLU, favored a constitutional amendment granting Congress the power to legislate “in economic and social 
matters” and a corresponding restriction on judicial review in those cases only. 
  
140 ACLU Press Release, 21 May 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. According to Fraenkel, the Supreme Court 
had “spoken strongly against federal laws restricting civil liberties” only once, in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 
(1866).  Felix Cohen went further. By his interpretation of the case law, “No person deprived of any civil liberty by 
an oppressive act of Congress has ever received any help from the Supreme Court. On the other hand, when 
Congress has extended aid to those deprived of civil liberties, the Supreme Court, in five cases out of seven, has 
nullified the aid that Congress tendered.” Felix Cohen to Osmond Fraenkel, 24 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, 
vol. 978. 
141 Preliminary Report of the American Civil Liberties Union Temporary Committee Concerning the Supreme 
Court, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
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 In the end, the ACLU board elected not to adopt a formal position on the judiciary 
reorganization plan in light of the substantial disagreement among its members.  Other groups, 
however, proved eager to voice their opinions on the connection between civil liberties and the 
President’s proposal. For example, Robert La Follette favored a constitutional amendment but 
thought that Roosevelt’s statutory measure was warranted as a stopgap measure. He 
acknowledged the importance of preserving civil liberties but argued that “no kind of legal 
guaranty has ever been able to protect minorities from the hatreds and intolerances let loose 
when an economic system breaks down.”142 Similarly, the National Lawyers’ Guild and the 
International Juridical Association endorsed the President’s plan as the best possibility for 
immediate action, though they believed a constitutional amendment would be “necessary in the 
end.”143
                                                          
142 He continued: “Liberals, be realists; do not let a lot of professional legalists, paid to do the job, bind you to the 
woods while they are showing you the trees.” Radio Address by Hon. Robert M. La Follette, 13 February 1937, 
ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
 An IJA pamphlet distributed by the Guild minimized the protective potential of the 
Court in civil liberties cases. According to the pamphlet, the only satisfactory solution was 
“fundamental action” in the form of a constitutional amendment preventing any court, state or 
federal, from invalidating any legislation of Congress or the state legislatures on constitutional 
grounds. “Judicial protection for civil liberties by means of the power to invalidate laws cannot 
be separated from judicial protection for the selfish interests of large property,” it argued, nor 
from “dangerous restraints upon legislative authority to provide for the general welfare.” In a 
view diverging increasingly from the ACLU majority’s, the pamphlet concluded that “there can 
143 The Guild distributed the IJA pamphlet in advance of a referendum on constitutional amendments at the First 
Annual Convention. International Juridical Association, Curbing the Courts (International Juridical Association, 
1937), in William Gorham Rice Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, Madison, Wisc., box 19, folder 7. 
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be no true enforcement of the Bill of Rights in the interests of persons instead of wealth, except 
by the elected representatives of the people.”144
 On the other hand, those members of the ACLU who valued judicial independence as a 
check on majoritarian repression had ample company.  In the face of mounting criticism of the 
federal courts, conservative lawyers, most of whom had resisted the Supreme Court’s speech-
friendly turn, evinced a sudden concern for the preservation of civil liberties.  In protesting the 
growing strength of the New Deal state, a Liberty League lawyer reasoned that “the lawyer is, in 
the nature of his profession, a conservative force, and is constantly called upon to defend the 
individual against the tyranny of the majority.”  It was the lawyer’s duty, he argued, to speak out 
against violations of the Constitution.  Indeed, he promised that “if and when any American 
citizen, however humble, is without means to defend his constitutional rights in a court of 
justice,” a Liberty League lawyer would agree to take the case without compensation.
 
145 When 
Arthur Garfield Hays wrote to inquire whether the offer was genuine, Beck responded that it 
was.  “I have always had a feeling of sympathy for the work of your Civil Liberties Union in 
defending constitutional rights of citizens,” he said, “even though I might not always agree with 
your intervention in every case.”146
Mainstream lawyers shared the Liberty League’s new enthusiasm for civil liberties. The 
American Bar Association staunchly opposed any restriction on the power of the federal courts, 
and it mobilized a massive publicity campaign that substantially weakened the prospects for 
    
                                                          
144 Ibid. 
145 James M. Beck, The Duty of the Lawyer in the Present Crisis: Some Observations on the Attempt by New Deal 
Spokesmen to Curtail Freedom of Speech as Exercised by the National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty 
League (Washington, D.C.: American Liberty League, 1935), 8.  
146 James Beck to Arthur Garfield Hays, 28 October 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 114, vol. 764. 
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passage of the President’s bill.147  In convincing New Deal supporters that the independence of 
the Supreme Court should be preserved, the Court’s recent civil liberties decisions proved 
invaluable. An ABA committee brainstormed methods for arousing popular hostility toward 
reorganization of the judiciary, and its “best idea” was to develop a series of radio broadcasts 
featuring “famous case[s] in which personal rights have been upheld by the Supreme Court” in 
the face of contemporary criticism.148  In the two issues of the ABA Journal devoted to the court-
packing plan, its threat to the Bill of Rights was a dominant theme. One article cautioned that 
labor leaders, by attacking the court, were undermining their future strength; the power to 
organize rested on free press and the right of assemblage, it argued, and in these “unsettled and 
quickly changing times” a future Congress might forbid unions altogether.149 Another urged 
minority groups, including labor, “to wake up to the fact that an independent judiciary is their 
best friend.”150
                                                          
147 A referendum taken in March 1937 revealed that ABA members overwhelmingly opposed the plan (6 to 1). 
William L. Ransom, “Members of the American Bar Association Decide Its Policies as to the Federal Courts.” 
American Bar Association Journal 23 (April 1937): 271–74, 277. Those figures were presented to the Senate. 
“Association’s Views on the Supreme Court Issue Presented to Senate Committee,” American Bar Association 
Journal 23 (May 1937): 315–18. In the member referendum, 18,695 ballots were returned and with reference to the 
Supreme Court 16,132 (86 percent) were against the proposal and 2563 (13 percent) were in favor. 142,320 ballots 
were sent to non-members. Of those, 40,021 (77.3 percent) were opposed and 11,770 (22 percent) were in favor. 
The ABA concluded that “the lawyers of America in every section and State of the Union are more aroused over the 
Supreme Court proposal, and the threat to an independent judiciary, than they have been on any previous occasion 
since the Civil War.” Ibid., 316. On the strategic use of personal liberties in opposition to the court packing plan, see 
radio address on behalf of Committee for Constitutional Democracy, C.B.R. to Arthur Vanderbilt, 24 May 1937, 
Vanderbilt Papers, box 369, folder Publicity: Committee on Public Relations. 
 William Joseph Donovan (later a founder of the Office of Strategic Services) 
devoted an entire article to “the question whether the existence of an independent judiciary in 
148 Arthur Vanderbilt to Frank Grinnell, 18 March 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 113, folder Correspondence 1937.  
149 Warren Olney, Jr., “The President’s Proposal to Add Six New Members to the Supreme Court,” American Bar 
Association Journal 23 (April 1937): 237–41. Olney also asked, “Has the President forgotten that during the frenzy 
generated by the World War, legislation was enacted by Congress and approved by the then chief executive, under 
which thousands of our citizens were suspected, many hundreds arrested and convicted on charges of which they 
were not in fact guilty?” Ibid., 246.  
150 George Wharton Pepper, “Plain Speaking: The President’s Case Against the Supreme Court,” American Bar 
Association Journal 23 (April 1937), 247–51.   
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this country has protected the civil liberties of minority groups.”151
In the end, of course, liberals sympathetic to the ABA’s arguments were spared the 
choice between judicial enforcement of civil liberties and the New Deal economic agenda.  For 
three long months during the spring of 1937, as the public debated the President’s proposal, the 
Supreme Court deliberated over five cases testing the constitutionality of the Wagner Act.
 Citing Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, Meyer v. Nebraska, the Scottsboro cases, and DeJonge, he concluded that they had.   
152
                                                          
151 William J. Donovan, “An Independent Supreme Court and the Protection of Minority Rights,” American Bar 
Association Journal 23 (April 1937), 254–60. Ironically, among the minorities Donovan thought protected by the 
Supreme Court were southerners in the post-Civil War cases. He explained: “That majority sought to dictate to the 
prostrate South by legislation in regard to matters which were purely local and social, and which were of no 
economic concern whatsoever. In a series of courageous decisions, such as United States v. Reese [92 U.S. 214 
(1876)], United States v. Cruikshank [92 U.S. 542 (1876)], and the Civil Rights Cases [109 U.S. 3 (1883)], among 
others, which like many of its recent opinions, stirred up a storm of protest among the administration’s supporters 
and caused it to be subjected to violent abuse in Congress, the Supreme Court declared that regulation of hotels, 
theaters, voting, and the like was a purely local matters which was not subject to control by the Federal Congress. 
These cases involved no economic or labor problems, but were purely questions of civil rights, and no one today 
would challenge the useful service which the Supreme Court performed in upholding the right of the local 
communities to settle these matters for themselves.” Ibid., 255. 
  In 
April, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for a five-member majority in upholding the 
broadest construction of the statute.  All of the companies in question, he insisted, operated 
within interstate commerce, and the NLRB’s procedures were consistent with due process. 
Employers and unions could not be made to agree on a contract, he concluded, but they could 
lawfully be compelled to try.  The administration declared victory.  Henceforth, the Supreme 
Court would allow Congress significant latitude in its regulation of labor and industry, but it 
would become ever more vigilant in upholding the Bill of Rights.  
152 The NLRB devoted considerable attention to its legal strategy. Because NLRB orders were enforceable only 
through the federal courts, the Board had the strategic advantage of choosing which cases to pursue, and where.  
They selected sympathetic cases in comparatively liberal circuits. In order to ascertain the limits of the statute’s 
constitutional applicability, they chose cases involving a broad cross-section of industries, including a steel 
producer, large manufacturers, and a small men’s clothing company.  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 
301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Company, 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks 
Clothing Company, 301 U.S. 58 (1937). Six weeks later, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 
(1937), the Supreme Court held that a state could constitutionally prevent a court from issuing an injunction against 
peaceful picketing. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE CIVIL LIBERTIES CONSENSUS 
 
 Residents of Jersey City during the 1930s had little doubt about the attitude of their 
municipal government toward labor relations.  Their mayor, Frank Hague, had staked the 
economic vitality of the New Jersey industrial center on its employer-friendly reputation.  The 
signs posted on the major thoroughfares made Hague’s commitments unmistakable. “This is 
Jersey City,” they boldly proclaimed. “Everything for Industry.”1
By most accounts, Hague’s opposition to organized labor was a matter of convenience 
rather than conviction.
 
2 When the Depression hit Jersey City, Hague was halfway through his 
thirty-year reign as one of America’s last and most powerful political bosses.3 During the 1920s, 
Hague had professed support for labor.4  In the early 1930s, however, Jersey City was struggling.  
Hague had raised corporate taxes to the breaking point, and industry was fleeing the city.  His 
solution was to lure New York-based employers to Hudson County by clamping down on 
unions.  In 1934, Hague and the Chamber of Commerce began a campaign to attract potential 
employers by emphasizing that Jersey City industries were more than 80 percent open shop.5
                                                          
1 American Civil Liberties Union, “Facts and Fancies” (Bulletin 4), undated, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042.  A 
pamphlet entitled “Jersey City Has Everything for Industry” was issued by the city in 1937.  Dayton David McKean, 
The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940), 192.  
  
“We took a hand and reorganized labor without regard for national heads of organized labor 
2 David G. Wittels, “Hague Always Labor’s Friend—When It Paid,” New York Post, 2 February 1938. 
3 “The Real Issue Behind ‘Hague Terror,’” New York Post, 16 May 1938 (“The Hague machine is even more corrupt 
than most other notorious ones. It is built to a greater extent on graft and pay-roll padding than probably any other in 
American history. The Case Committee proved that in 1928, and it’s been demonstrated every time any one poked a 
finger into the mess since.”). 
4 In the New York Post, David Wittels published a series of articles exposing “what is really behind the Hague 
terror.”  Wittels alleged that Hague had supported labor as long as doing so was profitable. Together with a corrupt 
union ally, he had dictated terms to unions for his own enrichment.  He also declared that Hague’s underlying 
motive was a 50,000,000 dollar a year business, “set up like an underworld empire.”  Wittels argued that Hague’s 
machine had “looted” Jersey City to the point of bankruptcy and then drummed up the Red Scare as a last effort to 
shut down criticism. “The Real Issue Behind ‘Hague Terror,’” New York Post, 16 May 1938.  Rather than refuting 
the Post articles, Hague dismissed them as “scurrilous.” McKean, Boss, 10.  
5 “Mayor Hague,” New York Post, 10 February 1938. 
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themselves,” he boasted that year. “The leaders who planted a feeling of hatred in the minds of 
the men are gone, and in their place are leaders with whom you can deal.”6
To ensure the most agreeable arrangements for employers, Hague’s police force harassed, 
beat, and arrested agitators and shut down all picketing, meetings, and leafleting by organized 
labor—even after Congress as well as the state and federal courts had made it unlawful to do so.  
When organizers began provoking arrests in order to challenge local ordinances and police 
practices in the courts, Hague simply had them deported across city lines by southbound buses or 
by ferry or the Hudson tubes to Manhattan.  Given the relatively robust protection of labor’s 
rights in nearby communities, these draconian tactics gave the city a distinct competitive edge.
  
7
It is unclear what the people of Jersey City thought of their well advertised labor policy.  
Hague routinely won reelection by overwhelming margins, and there was little vocal opposition 
to his administration. According to Hague’s critics, much of his support was secured by bribery 
or intimidation; the election fraud in Jersey City was sufficiently famous to make the term 
“Hagueism” a household word.
  
They also led to a series of clashes between Hague and the ACLU beginning in 1934, when 
board member Corliss Lamont was arrested for picketing.  By 1938, many prominent ACLU 
activists, including several of the organization’s attorneys, had become entangled in the struggle.  
8  The New York Post reported that ten thousand New Jersey 
families held their publicly funded jobs at Hague’s sufferance and that his most vocal and ardent 
supporters depended on him directly for their incomes.9
                                                          
6 “Hague Always Labor’s Friend—When It Paid,” New York Post, 2 February 1938 (quoting a 1934 welcome 
speech to an employer, the Baltimore Transfer Company). 
  Many Jersey City residents were won 
7 “The Hague Injunction Proceedings,” Yale Law Journal 48 (1938): 257–59.  
8 “Hague’s Control Extends Even To Jury System.” New York Post, 24 May 1938 (“The term ‘Hagueism,’ meaning 
vote frauds and corruption, has become a common word in the language.  Every time any one has made any sort of 
an investigation in Jersey City, a multitude of crimes against the election laws has been uncovered, and the criminals 
named. Yet never in all these years has even one Hague henchman been put on trial in Hudson County for vote 
fraud.”). 
9 “10,000 Families Dependent on the Boss,” New York Post, 17 May 1938. 
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over by Hague’s Red Scare tactics and his appeals to patriotism.  Moreover, the high revenues 
generated by the Hague machine supported generous municipal services and a famously low 
crime rate, in addition to the mayor’s lavish vacation homes.10
 Whatever Hague’s popularity among his voters, outsiders came to regard him as an 
unequivocal menace to American democracy.
 
11  His mistake, in large measure, was his failure to 
adapt to changing times. In a 1938 address, Hague promised to protect the “great industries” of 
Jersey City from outside threats. “We hear about constitutional rights, free speech and the free 
press,” he observed, echoing leaders of an earlier generation. “Every time I hear these words I 
say to myself ‘that man is a Red, that man is a Communist.’”12
By the late 1930s, Hague’s insistence that a “real American” would never invoke the Bill 
of Rights sounded outdated, even unpatriotic.
  
13  Dozens of prominent national organizations 
condemned his flagrant disregard for rule of law.  Free speech advocates emphasized the 
similarities between Hague’s autocratic practices and similar speech restrictions under Hitler and 
Stalin.  Like Father Coughlin and Huey Long, Boss Hague was emblematic of dangerous 
totalitarian tendencies within the United States.14  His oft-quoted pronouncement, “I am the 
law,” was palpable evidence that fascism could happen at home.15
                                                          
10 Walter C. Parkes, “Political War Rages in Jersey,” Salisbury Evening Post (N.C.), 20 January 1938 (noting that 
“an FBI investigation indexed Jersey City with less crime than any other city over 100,000, and there hasn’t been a 
gang there since 1918, significantly before national prohibition”). 
 Indeed, Reinhold Niebuhr, in 
11 The ACLU produced a partial list of newspapers featuring editorials critical of Hague. The list included forty-
eight newspapers, representing every region of the country.  American Civil Liberties Union, “More Candid Views 
of Mayor Hague” (bulletin 2), undated, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042.  
12 Address by Mayor Hague before Jersey City Chamber of Commerce, 12 January 1938, quoted in Jersey Observer 
(Hoboken, N.J.), 13 January 1938. 
13 Ibid. 
14 This argument was also invoked at trial. Hague Injunction Proceedings, Transcript of Record, Ernst Papers, box 
59 (hereafter Hague trial transcript), vol. 2, 2259.  Hague resented the term “Boss.” McKean, Boss, 11.  
15 In interviews, Hague sought to clarify the statement, which was made in the context of a juvenile delinquency 
panel at a local church. Hague insisted that he had merely wanted to assure parents that he would circumvent laws 
preventing him from adopting the right course for rehabilitating the youth. He explained, “My conscience is 
perfectly clear in this matter. I did not mean I wanted to be a dictator or anything of the sort. I believe in the law, and 
that it must rule all of us.” “‘Tyranny’ Charges Resented by Hague,” New York Times, 12 January 1938. 
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agreeing to sit on a committee for civil liberties in Jersey City, remarked that “Mayor Hague’s 
defiance of our laws is one of the most flagrant pieces of fascism in the modern day.”16  With 
prodding from the ACLU, President Roosevelt overcame his initial reluctance to censure a 
fellow Democrat and declared in a fireside chat that “[t]he American people [would] not be 
deceived by any one who attempt[ed] to suppress individual liberty under the pretense of 
Patriotism.”17
With the force of public opinion behind it, the ACLU adopted a bold strategy in Jersey 
City.  When Hague prohibited CIO leafleting and rejected meeting requests by the ACLU and 
the Socialist Party, ACLU attorney Morris Ernst sought and secured an injunction in federal 
court. The litigation culminated in the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in Hague v. CIO,
 
18 which 
affirmed the district court’s order.  The victory for civil liberties, though limited, was celebrated 
not only by labor groups, but by mainstream individuals and organizations throughout the 
country.19
The events leading up to Hague fundamentally influenced the articulation and reception 
of free speech advocacy during the 1930s.  When Hague was decided, civil libertarians had 
  
                                                          
16 Reinhold Niebuhr to Morris Ernst, 13 December 1937, Ernst Papers, box 280, folder 1. 
17 “For Creatures of Habit,” Time, 4 July 1938.  Meanwhile, the Department of Justice initiated a grand jury 
investigation of working conditions in Jersey City. 
18 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
19 Despite its importance, very little has been written about the Hague case.  The few books and articles that discuss 
it do so peripherally, either as an influential early free speech case (articulating the Supreme Court’s “public forum 
doctrine” and anticipating its jurisprudence on time, place and manner) or as a formative episode in the life and 
politics of Frank Hague.  On Hague and the origins of public forum doctrine, see Geoffrey R. Stone, “Fora 
Americana: Speech in Public Places,” Supreme Court Review (1974): 237–40;  Robert C. Post, “Between 
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum,” UCLA Law Review 34 (1987): 1721–
24. For contemporaneous accounts, see “The Hague Injunction Proceedings,” Yale Law Journal 48 (December 
1938): 257–72; Norman Thomas, Hagueism is Fascism (New York: Workers Defense League, 1938); Arthur 
Garfield Hays, Let Freedom Ring (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1937). See also Benjamin Kaplan, 
“The Great Civil Rights Case of Hague v. CIO: Notes of a Survivor,” Suffolk University Law Review 25 (1991): 
913–47; John J. Gibbons, “Hague v. CIO: A Retrospective,” New York University Law Review 52 (1977), 731–809; 
Abraham Isserman, “CIO v. Hague: The Battle of Jersey City,” Guild Practice 36 (1979): 14–32.  On Frank Hague, 
see McKean, Boss; Richard Connors, A Cycle of Power: the Career of Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague (Metuchen, 
N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1971).  
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already convinced much of the public that some modes of censorship—in the realms of academic 
freedom, sex education, and literature, for example—were more damaging than edifying.  On the 
whole, however, they had failed to translate those lessons into the political realm.  With the 
Hague case, for the first time, many Americans enthusiastically endorsed the judicial protection 
of radical speech. Most tellingly, the American Bar Association, known for its conservative 
politics, established a Committee on the Bill of Rights in 1938.  Its first action was to file an 
amicus curiae brief on behalf of free speech in Hague v. CIO. 
The ACLU’s emphatic disavowal of radicalism was effective, but it precipitated a deep 
rift with the left.  In time, it eclipsed the radical origins of the civil liberties movement, just as its 
proponents had hoped.  In 1934, Roger Baldwin considered “the struggle of capital and labor . . . 
the most conspicuous and vital application of the free speech principle.”20  At mid-decade, the 
ACLU sent its representatives into the field to picket alongside union organizers, as it had 
throughout the 1920s. Just a few years later, ACLU leaders carefully divorced advocacy of free 
speech from the underlying messages of the radical groups they were defending.  At trial and in 
interviews, they stressed the rights of fascists and conservatives as well as leftist groups.21
                                                          
20 Roger Baldwin and Morris Ernst, “The New Deal and Civil Liberties” (radio debate over the Blue Network of 
NBC), 27 January 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717.  
  In 
their courtroom arguments and briefs, the enemy was censorship, not substantive oppression.  At 
the heart of this shift in strategy lies a fundamental transformation in the relationship between the 
21 See, e.g., Trial transcript, vol.  2, 1142–43 (arguing that Arthur Garfield Hays was not a “Red” because he had 
represented the American League of the Friends of New Germany of Hudson County in a 1934 Chancery case).  
Hays’s absolutism on the right of the Nazi party to march was controversial within the ACLU. A Special Committee 
of the ACLU assigned to consider legislation to curb fascist activities in the United States concluded:  “The problem 
of parades in brown shirts with Swastikas, which has aroused so much discussion, cannot in our judgment be 
attacked except as a police regulation. The right to parade should never be denied, but it may be regulated in 
accordance with conditions of traffic. Where it is obviously aimed at intimidation and violence, and where violence 
can be plainly demonstrated to have resulted beyond police power to control, as in the case of Klan demonstration in 
Negro districts, police regulation in routing such parades may be warranted.” This was a striking exception in light 
of the ACLU’s arguments in the Hague case. Memorandum of the Special Committee to consider Legislation To 
Curb Fascist Activities in the United States, 21 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
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radical labor movement, individual rights, and state power—a transformation that the ACLU 
itself had helped to create.  
 
The Hague Machine 
 “For a great many years,” according to the New York Herald Tribune, the United States 
Constitution was “a dead letter in Jersey City.”22
In 1938, the New York Times described Hague as “a tall, red-faced, vigorous-looking man 
in his sixties,” with “hawk-like features.”
  The Hague machine commanded complete 
obedience, and potential dissenters were either bought off or crushed. To Frank Hague, the state 
legislature and state courts were tools of local government, and their federal counterparts, when 
they could not be turned to useful ends, were irrelevant.  
23 The New Yorker called attention to “his pale blue 
eyes,” which were “heavy-lidded and suspicious,” and his thins lips that curved “morosely 
downward.”24 According to Dayton David McKean, author of a 1940 biographical exposé on the 
Hague Machine, “no political boss ever looked less like one than Mayor Hague.”25  The mayor 
of Jersey City was an avid walker, health enthusiast, and mild hypochondriac. “His physique,” 
McKean reported, “was that of a prizefighter now elderly but excellently preserved.”26 
Appropriately, he was feared for his quick temper and frequent resort to physical violence. 
Indeed, he was known to pummel police officers and politicians who resisted his demands.27
                                                          
22 “The Constitution Re-Enters Jersey City,” New York Herald-Tribune, 3 April 1938.  
  
23 Russell B. Porter, “Hague at Hearing on His CIO Ban,” New York Times, 2 June 1938; Russell B. Porter, “Hague 
Urges Exile of ‘Reds’ to Alaska to Bar Revolution,” New York Times, 15 June 1938.  
24 John McCarten, “Profiles: Evolution of a Problem Child,” New Yorker, 12 February 1938, 22.  
25 McKean, Boss, 1.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Most accounts of Hague’s political career rely heavily on McKean’s biography. Alan Karcher, Speaker of the 
New Jersey General Assembly from 1982 to 1985, believed that McKean exaggerated the degree of corruption 
within the Hague administration.  Alan J. Karcher, New Jersey’s Multiple Municipal Madness (Rutgers University 
Press, 1998), 185. Pointing to the memoirs of Hague adversary Governor Walter Edge, who recounted that Hague’s 
operations were orderly, Karcher linked most of Hague’s corruption to support of bootleggers and bookmakers 
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Born in 1876 to Irish immigrants, Hague was the third of eight children. He spent his 
youth (as he habitually reminded his constituents) in the slums of Jersey City’s Horseshoe 
District.28 He was expelled from the public school system for misbehavior in the seventh grade, 
and he made no subsequent effort to compensate for his lack of formal education;29 despite his 
lavish tastes in clothing and travel,30 his syntax and demeanor always retained the strong flavor 
of his working class upbringing. After a brief stint as assistant to a blacksmith—“playing 
nursemaid to a locomotive,” as he described it—he tired of manual labor.31
From there, Hague engineered a swift and shrewd ascent up the political ladder.  He was 
intimately familiar with the gritty realities of Hudson County governance.  Graft and election 
fraud were staples of the Jersey City tradition, and though Hague presented himself as a 
municipal reformer, he adeptly turned them to his advantage.  In 1913, he became Commissioner 
of Public Safety under the new form of commission government. The police and fire 
departments, which were under his jurisdiction, had organized into AFL locals.  Citing 
corruption (though most likely exaggerating its extent), he gave their members the choice 
between leaving the unions and resigning from the departments.  The union charters were 
  He next tried his 
hand managing a mediocre boxer from Brooklyn. Although he made little money, he began 
cultivating connections, and by the age of twenty-one he was elected to his first public office.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
during Prohibition. Walter Evans Edge, A Jerseyman’s Journal: Fifty Years of Business and Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1948).  According to Karcher, ordinary municipal affairs under Hague generally served 
the population’s interest.   
28 The Horseshoe was the product of an 1871 gerrymander designed to concentrate Democratic voters in a single 
district. McKean, Boss, 17. 
29 See, e.g., McKean, Boss, 7 (“The only reference in any of his speeches or statements that would indicate that 
Mayor Hague has read a book since he left old Public School 21 is an extensive quotation in one of them from Mrs. 
Dilling’s The Red Network.”). Hague often emphasized his flirtation with juvenile delinquency. A police historian 
claimed that two of Hague’s brothers were members of a violent street gang in the 1880s. Ibid. 
30 By the 1930s, Hague spent significantly more time in Florida and Europe than he did in Jersey City.  He 
nonetheless kept abreast of developments in New Jersey, governing actively by telephone (letters would have left a 
paper trail). 
31 Ibid., 26.  
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surrendered, and Hague succeeded in replacing the existing leadership of both groups with 
grateful and reliable subordinates.32
This combination of suppressing criticism and promoting fealty was a trademark of 
Hague’s political style.
  
33  In fact, Hague once stated publicly that he had studied Tammany Hall 
and considered his own organization to be superior.  When Princeton University students were 
sent to Jersey City in 1921 to monitor elections on behalf of the Honest Ballot Association, they 
were beaten to the point of hospitalization.34  In addition to informal persuasion, Hague ensured 
that repression would have legal sanction.  In the early 1920s, he introduced a series of measures 
restricting the ability of dissenters to air their views.  For example, three years after Hague 
became mayor, the city introduced a permit requirement for public meetings advocating political 
change in private halls and event spaces.  In 1924, the Board of Commissioners adopted an 
ordinance restricting the distribution of handbills and periodicals in public places and in 
residential neighborhoods.  And in 1930, it passed the ordinance at the heart of Hague v. CIO, 
forbidding public assembly without a permit and authorizing denial of a permit to prevent riots 
or “disturbances.”35
                                                          
32 “Just One Word in a Law Helped a Lot,” New York World-Telegram, 19 January 1938. 
 
33 Jersey City was seventy-five percent Catholic, and Hague contributed generously to the Catholic Church.  He also 
supported the church on issues of morality. He kept burlesque shows and associated venues out of Jersey City, 
though they were plentiful elsewhere in Hudson County.  On one vice, he would not budge: he loved horseracing 
and led the campaign to repeal the antigambling amendment of the New Jersey Constitution.  He forestalled attacks 
from other religious groups by the same methods he used on dissenters in general: he threatened to increase property 
assessments or retaliated against family members on the city payroll. McKean, Boss, 216. 
34 “Name Mayor Hague in Election Inquiry,” New York Times, 19 March 1921. 
35 Specifically, the ordinance provided that “no public parades or public assembly in or upon the public streets, 
highways, public parks or public buildings of Jersey City shall take place or be conducted until a permit shall be 
obtained from the Director of Public Safety.” The Director of Public Safety could refuse a permit “when, after 
investigation of all of the facts and circumstances pertinent to said application, he believes it to be proper to refuse 
the issuance thereof; provided, however, that said permit shall only be refused for the purpose of preventing riots, 
disturbances or disorderly assemblage.” Ordinance, in Committee of Industrial Organizations et al. vs. Frank Hague, 
Mayor of Jersey City, et al., U.S. District Court of N.J., Equity 5865 (1938), Record Group 21, NARA Northeast 
Region (hereafter Hague District Court Papers), Bill of Complaint (hereafter Complaint), Schedule D.  
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Control and expansion of the municipal payroll was a core feature of Hague’s influence, 
and it was expensive.  Under Hague, the city added thousands of new employees and awarded 
many new contracts, often in exchange for minimal provision of services.36
To sustain this system, Hague increased taxes on businesses operating in Jersey City by 
as much as an order of magnitude.
  In return, Hague’s 
party received loyalty, as well as “contributions” amounting to at least three percent of most 
employees’ salaries.   
37  Among the most important potential revenue sources were 
the railroad companies. Nearly all were forced to route their trains through Hudson County in 
order to reach New York City, and Hague took advantage of his bargaining position to impose 
threefold increases in assessments.38 When the State Board of Taxes and Assessments in Trenton 
tried to thwart Hague’s maneuvers, he resolved to elect a governor who would appoint a more 
sympathetic board, along with friendlier prosecutors and judges.  Hudson County was populous 
enough to sway elections for state office, and within a few years it obligingly secured the 
governorship for A. Harry Moore, a Jersey City political ally who would serve three terms plus a 
stint in the United States Senate over the next two decades.  By the late 1920s, Hague asserted 
his authority throughout the state, even under Republican governors.39
                                                          
36 Despite the dramatic increase, the ratio of municipal employees to residents seems modest by modern standards. 
Connors, Cycle of Power, calculated that there was at most one employee per 750 residents, and that at the height of 
the Depression the figure was closer to 1 to 1000.   
  On the rare occasion that 
37 For example, he increased assessments on the Standard Oil Company from 1,500,000 to 14,000,000 dollars and 
on the Public Service Corporation from 3,000,000 to 30,000,000 dollars. McKean, Boss, 44.  
38 More than half of all second-class railroad property in New Jersey was within Jersey City borders.  Taxes on the 
railroad amounted to more than twenty percent of Jersey City’s total levy. Ibid., 255. 
39 Governor Harold G. Hoffman, a Republican, repudiated Hague in an early speech but soon learned the necessity 
of dealing with him. Although state legislative districts outside Hudson County eluded Hague, he nonetheless 
managed to dominate the legislative agenda. Ibid., 55.  The former governor sided with Hague in the free speech 
controversy. “Hague’s Tactics Win Praise of Hoffman,” New York Times, 15 August 1938.  
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his policies were challenged, the state court judges who owed him their appointments decided in 
his favor.40
Although Hague’s political dominance removed all external constraints on Jersey City’s 
taxing authority, businesses were so strained by the increased rates that many eventually 
relocated. The problem became particularly acute during the Depression, when many companies 
could not afford to pay.  Hague’s first solution was to decrease the level of municipal services.  
A 1929 investigation revealed that more than a quarter of children in Jersey City were denied a 
fulltime education due to school overcrowding.  A decade later, school playgrounds were the 
smallest in the state, and many schools still had outdoor toilets.  Meanwhile, the streets were 
rarely cleaned, and public recreational spaces were sparse and decrepit.
  
41
Federal assistance helped some, notwithstanding Hague’s complicated relationship with 
the Roosevelt administration.  Hague had been vice chairman of the Democratic National 
  These reductions, 
however, were minimal in comparison with the city’s other expenses. The Hague machine 
depended on its ability to remunerate its loyal servants with lucrative employment, and 
reductions in the city’s revenue stream threatened to undercut the source of Hague’s power.  
Lowering taxes was not an option.  
                                                          
40 See, e.g., Ex parte Hague, 104 N.J. Eq. 369 (N.J. Err. & App. 1929) (Court of Errors and Appeals held the 
legislature had no right to ask Hague about his wealth); In re New Jersey Bar Association, 162 A. 99 (N.J. Ch. 1932) 
(in which the court held that a vice-chancellor could not be investigated by an officer of the court and that the 
chancellor could not remove a vice-chancellor even if corrupt); Ferguson v. Brogan, 171 A. 685 (N.J. Sup. 1934) (in 
an election fraud case in which no votes were recorded for the anti-Hague candidate and residents claimed that had 
voted for the other ticket, Chief Justice Brogan, a Hague pick, ruled that the superintendent of elections had no right 
to open the ballot boxes; the court had the power but refused to open them); Clee v. Moore, 195 A. 530 (N.J. Sup. 
1937); Petition of Clee, 196 A. 476 (N.J. Sup. 1938). In addition to prosecutors and judges, Hague controlled the 
selection of jury panels, because the sheriff and jury commissioner were both county officials. 
41 See generally McKean, Boss.  The only public institution to weather the downturn was the Jersey City Medical 
Center, which Hague routinely invoked as a rejoinder to critics. It featured state-of-the-art facilities (including seven 
skyscrapers), an employee to patient ratio approaching one to one, and nearly twice as many hospital beds as 
guidelines recommended. The Jersey City maternity hospital boasted the lowest mortality rate of any in the world 
and provided clinics for complicated pregnancies, classes for expectant mothers, and home visits by nurses after 
discharge.  Hague was a pioneer in the use of socialized medicine for political gain, and he was reluctant to make 
cuts to his flagship program. McKean, Boss, 167–80. 
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Committee since 1924, and Hudson County voted Democratic in every presidential election 
thereafter.  The mayor might have exerted considerable national influence were it not for a 
political blunder in 1932, when he endorsed his close friend Al Smith—who shared Hague’s love 
of boxing, baseball, and expensive vacations—for president.  At the 1932 Democratic 
Convention, Hague imprudently announced that Roosevelt was unelectable (indeed, “the one 
man who is weakest in the eyes of the rank and file”) and intimated that he would not back him if 
he were nominated.42  When his ploy failed, however, Hague threw his support to Roosevelt, at 
the cost of his friendship with Smith. With aggressive campaigning, he delivered New Jersey for 
Roosevelt by a margin of thirty thousand votes.43  He also voiced his unequivocal support for 
New Deal policy.  Although the President disliked Hague, he understood his value and was 
hesitant to rebuke him.44
Still, Hague faced a dramatic shortfall in the municipal budget, and Jersey City industry 
was increasingly unwilling to make up the difference.  As the tax base declined, Hague was 
forced to explore new methods for making Jersey City businesses more profitable.  His solution 
was to ensure businesses that they could offset high taxes by paying low wages to unorganized 
workers. According to the New Jersey Labor Department, in the late 1930s more than three 
 More important, he ensured that Jersey City would receive ample 
federal funds.  Hague claimed to receive 500,000 dollars a month for distribution to the needy, 
and as usual, he exercised considerable discretion in determining which recipients were most 
worthy. 
                                                          
42 “Spontaneous Confusion,” Time, 4 July 1932.  
43 He promised James Farley that in exchange for opening the campaign in New Jersey he would arrange “the largest 
political rally ever held in the United States.” James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots: The Personal History of a 
Politician (1938; reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1973), 158.  When Roosevelt came to Sea Girt on August 27, 
Hague delivered what Farley called a “monster outdoor rally,” attended by more than one hundred thousand people. 
McKean, Boss, 97.  
44 Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), 7. 
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hundred thousand Jersey City workers were paid less than the minimum living wage.45  In the 
end, the policy was unsuccessful; wages could not drop indefinitely, and the astronomical tax 
rate outweighed low labor costs for all but a handful of sweatshops, to which Hague claimed to 
be “utterly opposed.”46
Hague had always followed an instrumentalist course when it came to the labor problem.  
In his early years, his policies were sufficiently pro-labor to prompt a prominent political writer 
to label him an incipient leader of the urban proletariat.
  Hague was nonetheless determined to deliver on his “pro-industry” 
promise. 
47  In 1919, his police blocked fifty 
strikebreakers who were sent from New York to unload a steamship.  The following year, he 
openly declared himself “a friend of labor” when he defended a strike by breakaway railroad 
workers who believed the AFL was no longer protecting the interests of the rank and file.48  
“Have confidence in me,” he assured the workers, after A. Mitchell Palmer denounced the strike 
as a Red plot: “I shall be at your command every hour and every minute.”49
Notwithstanding Hague’s ostensive support, unions were a minimal presence in Hudson 
County during the 1920s.  They were more significant only in the building trades, where they 
generally played by Jersey City rules. Early on, Hague developed a close working relationship 
with Theodore Brandle, a corrupt union organizer who headed the Jersey City ironworkers’ 
union and went on to lead the Hudson County Central Labor Union and eventually the State 
Federation of Labor.  Although Hague rarely intervened on labor’s behalf, the Central Labor 
Union endorsed him during his first election and throughout the 1920s.  In 1927, a prominent 
   
                                                          
45 Congress of Industrial Organizations, “Theatre Nite: Bring Democracy to Jersey City,” 20 February 1938, ACLU 
Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
46 Quoted in McKean, Boss, 193. 
47 Ibid., 272 (quoting Clinton W. Gilbert).  
48 “Strike Doubt is Cleared,” New York Times, 13 April 1920. Hague was among the commissioners elected in 1917. 
Harry Moore received more votes but remained director of parks and public buildings, leaving the mayoral position 
to Hague, who ceded his own commission of public safety to become director of public affairs. McKean, Boss, 43. 
49 David G. Wittels, “Hague Always Labor’s Friend—When It Paid,” New York Post, 2 February 1938. 
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industrialist pronounced that Jersey City residents were “less affected by the radical tendencies 
of the age than . . . people of any community on earth.”50
By the early 1930s, organized labor was no longer consistent with Hague’s design for 
Jersey City. With Hague’s blessing, the McClintic-Marshall Company employed non-union labor 
in constructing the General Pulaski Skyway, the freeway system connecting Jersey City and 
Newark en route to Manhattan.  Hague and Brandle clashed over the project, and their alliance 
broke down altogether in February 1932, when striking union members attacked six non-union 
workers with iron bars, killing one.  After the incident, Hague ordered the police to crush the 
strike.
  
51 He justified his change in policy by claiming that he had only recently discovered that 
union organizers were “racketeers” who accomplished their objectives through “sabotage, 
double-dealing, brutality, terrorism, intimidation, exploitation, and gorilla-rule.”52
When the Furniture Workers Industrial Union went on strike in 1934, ACLU board 
member Corliss Lamont was arrested along with prominent observers, including a future New 
York City magistrate.  All convictions were set aside, and the acting mayor apologized, but 
Jersey City’s draconian policy continued.
 Thereafter, 
Jersey City was unequivocally hostile to organized labor. Union members engaged in peaceful 
picketing were routinely arrest for disorderly conduct and equivalent violations. In most cases, 
charges were dropped or never filed in order to forestall legal challenges.   
53
                                                          
50 McKean, Boss, 184 (quoting Thomas C. Sheehan, president of the Durham Duplex Razor Company).  
  In February of 1936, the chamber of commerce 
estimated that Jersey City was more than 80 percent open shop. The population was largely 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers (more than one fifth of Jersey City residents were foreign-
51 Brandle spent all of his accumulated wealth on strike relief and on medical and legal assistance for strikers. 
52 McKean, Boss, 187.  
53 The same year, Hague defended the rights of a Nazi group, the Friends of New Germany, to hold meetings in 
Hudson Count.  American League of the Friends of New Germany v. Eastmead (1934).  The meeting was held in 
Union City, but the case was tried before Vice Chancellor Bigelow in Jersey City. ACLU v. Casey, 5 March 1937, 
before Hon. William Clark, Newark: Testimony of Arthur Garfield Hays, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
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born54). That spring, when a state anti-injunction bill was under consideration by the New Jersey 
Senate, Hague denounced it as radical and claimed it would injure New Jersey industries.55 
Despite efforts by the ACLU’s National Committee on Labor Injunctions—which described the 
“open political line-up of the leading Democratic politician in the state with commercial interests 
against organized labor” as an unprecedented development and emphasized that all of New 
Jersey’s neighboring states had enacted similar legislation without ill effect—Hague’s opposition 
ensured the bill would never reach a vote.56  Meanwhile, New Jersey’s Disorderly Persons Act of 
1936 permitted the arrest of any person who could not “give a good account of himself.”  Under 
the act pickets were arrested and jailed, often until the relevant strike was broken.57
Jersey City’s anti-labor practices prompted an inquiry by a special commission of the 
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners (NCDPP), organized as an adjunct to 
the International Labor Defense for the investigation of racial, industrial, and political 
persecution.
  Union halls 
were closed for building code violations, leaders were deported, and property and pamphlets 
were seized.  
58
                                                          
54 Foster Haley, “How Does Hague Do It?” New York Times, 12 June 1938 (reporting numbers from 1930 census). 
  Established in 1936, the commission—whose members represented such 
organizations as the Hudson County Committee for Labor Defense and Civil Rights and the New 
Jersey Civil Liberties Union, in addition to the NCDPP—invited testimony from all people who 
55 Frank Hague to Senator, 16 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 138, vol. 942; J. Owen Grundy to Roger Baldwin, 24 
April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 138, vol. 942 (“Mayor Hague first kept his hands off and allowed Democrats in the 
legislature to favor the Anti-Injunction Bill and then waited for reactions. When he saw such strong and 
conservative bodies as the State Bar Association and Chamber of Commerce oppose the bill, then he writes an open 
letter to his hand-picked senator, Edward P. Stout, declaring that the bill is radial and ill advised.”). 
56 ACLU Press Release, 24 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 138, vol. 942. 
57 “Report of the Sub-Committee on Civil Rights of the Executive Council of the Junior Bar Conference of the 
American Bar Association,” 26 July 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties 1939–1940, 16–17. 
58 Alan Wald, The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 
1980s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 56. The idea for the NCDPP came from Theodore 
Dreiser, who had been working with Communist Party organizer Joe Pass.  Dreiser served as chair, Lincoln Steffens 
was treasurer, and Elliott Cohen was executive secretary.  The organization was active in Harlan County and in the 
Scottsboro and Herndon cases.  
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felt that their constitutional rights had been suppressed by Jersey City officials.  The final report 
was based on transcripts of testimony, sworn statements, and resumes of court cases. It pointed 
to “a systematic strangulation of progressive labor forces and civil rights by police, municipal 
and county authorities in Hudson County, New Jersey.”59
 
  Jersey City, it concluded, had become 
a haven for New York City manufacturing concerns attempting to evade agreements that they 
had made with the labor unions to which their employees belonged.  
The First Injunction Suit 
The conflict between organized labor and the Hague machine intensified in late 1936, 
when a massive seamen’s strike initiated on the west coast shut down the Hudson County 
waterfront.  The International Seamen’s Union, associated with the AFL but flirting with more 
radical tactics, picketed non-union crews in eastern ports, including Jersey City’s piers.  Jersey 
City’s Chief of Police, Harry Walsh, forbade the picketing and vowed to use necessary force 
rather than arrests to ensure his orders were obeyed.  He also ordered reporters not to approach 
the scene of attempted picketing.  Abraham Isserman, a left-wing New Jersey attorney who was 
a member of the ACLU board, was acting as counsel for the seamen’s union.  At the union’s 
request, he invited the national office of the ACLU to become involved.60  The ACLU was eager 
to comply, and in late December it convened a meeting of local labor groups, including 
conservatives ones.61
                                                          
59 National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, “Report on the Denial of Labor and Civil Rights in 
Hudson County, New Jersey,” ACLU Papers, reel 154, vol. 1051. 
 Most of the important organizations attended, and all agreed to plans for a 
test case.  Members of the International Seamen’s Union, along with several other unions, 
60ACLU v. Casey, 5 March 1937, before Hon. William Clark, Newark: Testimony of Arthur Garfield Hays, ACLU 
Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
61 ACLU Report on Meeting Concerning Jersey City Ban on Picketing, 23 December 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 153, 
vol. 1051. 
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volunteered to provoke arrest by picketing in contravention of Walsh’s orders.  They agreed to 
remain in jail, without requesting bail, in order to “break down police resistance.”  If packing the 
jails proved ineffective, they would turn to “well known liberals” like John Haynes Holmes and 
Corliss Lamont to attract public attention.62
Jersey City authorities were determined to keep the entire affair out of the courts.
 
63  The 
coming weeks witnessed a few incidents of police violence, including assaults on reporters and 
observers.  Reverend Jay T. Wright of the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union was among the 
victims.64 For the most part, however, would-be picketers were turned back without arrest.  
Representatives of the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee sent to Jersey City noted that actual 
violence was minimal because participants offered little resistance for fear of being beaten.65  On 
January 1, union headquarters dispatched more than six hundred strikers to a mass 
demonstration, but nearly all were denied entry at the ferry docks.66  Civil liberties delegates, 
too, were ordered out of the district, though they persistently snuck back across city lines.67  In 
the end, the secretary of the La Follette Committee decided that further observations were futile 
and moved on to other inquiries, despite advice from an NLRB correspondent that the Hudson 
County situation could refocus attention from industrial espionage to the Bill of Rights, which, 
“as far as Labor [was] concerned, . . . [did] not exist in Jersey.”68
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
   
63 For example, a café frequented by strikers had its license revoked for “harboring god-damn Anarchists and 
Communists,” but when an ACLU attorney offered to challenge the decision, the license was restored. 
64 ACLU Bulletin 746, 2 January 1937, ACLU Papers, Reel 153, Vol. 1051; SDK to Felix Frazer, 9 January 1937, 
La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, folder Jan. 1937.  The New Jersey Civil Liberties Union appointed 
observers to attend the protests without participating in them or distributing circulars. Hague trial transcript, vol. 1, 
310–11. 
65 R. D. Cullen to Robert Wohlforth, 31 December 1936, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, folder Jan. 
1937.   
66 Felix Frazer to Robert Wohlforth, 1 Jan 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, folder Jan. 1937.  
67 According to Felix Frazer, a La Follette Committee investigator, picketing of all kind was forbidden in Jersey 
City, and informants ensured that no effective protest could be mounted. Ibid. 
68 Robert Wohlforth to Felix Frazer and H. D. Cullen, 5 January 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, 
folder January 1937. 
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The legal strategy, too, turned out to be a non-starter. Arthur Garfield Hays, acting for the 
ACLU, arranged a conference with Jersey City officials before Judge William Clark of the 
federal district court.  At the conference, the parties arranged for four picketers to march on a 
designated street without interference, and the police allowed them to proceed as agreed. The 
following day, however, the picket line was again disbanded.  At Clark’s urging, Hays went to 
Jersey City to investigate. The police (apologetically) attempted to turn him away, but when he 
demanded to be arrested or released, they let him through. Although Hays’s sign was torn off and 
his companions were all evicted into Hoboken, he was permitted to march for several hours with 
an American flag. A few days later, others tried to emulate his performance and were promptly 
cast out of town.  After consulting with Judge Clark, Hays returned to the street and was himself 
turned away.  He asked the court for an injunction, but the strike settled before any challenge 
made it into court. 
By that point, however, Hays and the ACLU were determined to open Jersey City to 
labor organizing. The same day that he requested an injunction in the seamen’s strike case, Hays 
witnessed the police haul two picketers from the AFL-affiliated Boot and Shoe Makers union 
onto the subway to Manhattan. He subsequently arranged for tests of Jersey City’s anti-labor 
practices, and he applied to Judge Clark for an injunction on their behalf.69
                                                          
69 The plaintiffs were also represented by Abraham Isserman, Edward Malament, Julius J. Rosenberg, and Sol D. 
Kapelsohn.  Brooklyn Local No. 654 of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union picketed the Uneeda Slipper 
Corporation, which relocated from Brooklyn to Jersey City to take advantage of Mayor Hague’s labor policy.  
Picketing was also conducted by members of the Upholsterers, Carpet and Linoleum Mechanics International Union 
of North America at the plant of the Pacific Parlor Frame Company.  In January Hays, along with two other 
members of the ACLU staff, filed a thirty thousand dollar damages suit against Hague and other city officials for 
assault and battery as a result of their picketing efforts on behalf of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union. ACLU 
Bulletin 793, 3 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051; ACLU Bulletin 797, 31 December 1937, ACLU 
Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. The two staff members withdrew their suits when they left the ACLU staff. ACLU 
Bulletin 809, 35 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
 At the hearing, Jersey 
City officials were remarkably candid about their anti-labor policies.  Hays examined Joseph 
Glavin, Assistant Corporation Counsel (and co-counsel with James A. Hamill in the case) 
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regarding Jersey City’s legal policy with respect to strikes. Glavin relied on the “law of 
necessity” as a basis for ejecting agitators from the city; arresting them, he explained, would 
simply feed their sense of martyrdom and encourage further displays.  He also insisted that 
unions had no right to strike to close a shop when employees were “perfectly satisfied” with 
existing conditions.70  Daniel Casey, the Acting Commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety, testified that the determination whether or not workers were on strike was left to his 
discretion, and that he would prohibit picketing that was aimed at persuading workers to 
unionize.71
Casey also admitted to instructing the police to remove trouble-makers from the city.  
Hays found this policy particularly disturbing, and he charged that it violated the “fundamental 
right of the American citizen to be arrested.” Jury trials and the writ of habeas corpus, he 
reasoned, were meaningless in the absence of an arrest. Indeed, deportations to concentration 
camps in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia demonstrated that the right to be arrested and brought 
before a court was the “most fundamental right we have.” Judge Clark agreed.  “The trouble with 
[your] theory,” he told Casey, “is that when you make up your minds as to the sort of people that 
are undesirable and escort them out, you are putting yourself right in the position that Hitler puts 
himself in.”
   
72
One of the more colorful exchanges of the injunction hearing involved Hays’s personal 
beliefs and political affiliation: Glavin accused Hays, a strong supporter of organized labor but a 
   
                                                          
70 Excerpts from testimony of Jersey City officials at injunction hearing during Boot and Shoe Workers strike, 
before Judge William Clark, 1 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051, 3. Judge William Clark disagreed, 
and advised Glavin to review the case law.  
71 Judge Clark encouraged him to reconsider his testimony, but Casey held firm. Ibid., 2. When asked by what 
authority he decided the legitimacy of strikes, Casey responded that he was not a lawyer. Judge Clark concurred and 
offered his opinion that the Casey’s lawyers were not very good ones.  
72 “Civil Rights vs. Mayor Hague,” ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063.  
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consummate and self-described liberal, of Communist agitation.73  Jersey City had a 
longstanding policy of openly excluding and suppressing Communists.74  During the 1936 
presidential campaign, the Communist Party was permitted to rent a hall in Jersey City only after 
obtaining a court order with the assistance of the ACLU.75  Hague put his position plainly in a 
statement to the president of the Hudson County Central Labor Union that December: “When the 
time comes, if ever, when Jersey City will be compelled to stand for Communist demonstrations, 
there will be war, and either the Communists or I will have to leave Jersey City.”76  
Communism, of course, was interpreted loosely in Hudson County, and Judge Clark insisted that 
Hays be given a chance to respond to the city’s allegations.77  Glavin proceeded to present a long 
list of organizations with which Hays was affiliated and which Glavin seemed genuinely to 
believe were Communist fronts, from the National Committee for Freedom from Censorship to 
the Committee on Coal and Giant Power.78  Hays denied any connection between the named 
organizations and the Communist Party, and he drew sharp distinctions among various left-wing 
ideologies.79
                                                          
73 ACLU v. Casey, 5 March 1937, before Hon. William Clark, Newark: Testimony of Arthur Garfield Hays, ACLU 
Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
   
74 For example, in 1932, Alfred Butel and Joseph Bloom were arrested when they stopped to ask a Jersey City police 
officer for directions, and the officer searched their car and found communist literature. Judge Barison sentenced 
Bloom to 90 days in the Hudson County Penitentiary for being a member of the Communist Party. McKean, Boss, 
214.   
75 Statement Concerning the Issues of Civil Rights in Jersey City, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063.  
76 ACLU Bulletin 746, 2 January 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051; SDK to Felix Frazer, 9 January 1937, La 
Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, folder Jan. 1937. 
77 ACLU v. Casey, 5 March 1937, before Hon. William Clark, Newark: Testimony of Arthur Garfield Hays, ACLU 
Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
78 Other suggestions were apparently more plausible.  For example, Glavin questioned Hays regarding his role in the 
American Society for Cultural Relations with Russia, which Hays helped to found.  Hays described it as a liberal 
organization with many respectable members.  Similarly, Hays was a member of the reception committee for the 
Soviet flyers, who were communist, and he sat on the Advisory Board of Russian Reconstruction Farms, an effort to 
raise funds and send American machinery and agriculturalists to Russia. Hays explained that there were many 
Americans who promoted social schemes in Russia who were not Communists. Ibid., 45–53. 
79 Hays told the court that he regretted that he was not a Communist, as he deplored anti-Red propaganda and would 
have liked to argue for his own right as a Communist to walk the Jersey City streets.  Asked whether he considered 
himself radical, he responded that Glavin would probably deem all of his ideas radical but that his radical friends 
considered him “terribly conservative.” He attributed his own “so-called radicalism” to the close friendship between 
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As for the ACLU, he emphasized the substantial conservative support for the 
organization’s work (“we get funds from the most ardent reactionaries,” he said) in such cases as 
Scottsboro, Herndon, and Mooney.80  Notably, he insisted that both he and the ACLU were 
committed to free expression for all individuals and groups, not just radical ones.81 “We have 
defended the right of the Ku Klux Klan to hold meetings, as well as the right of labor to hold 
meetings, as well as the right of people who believe in birth control, as well as the right of 
negroes to hold meetings in the south,” he recounted. “We all over the country have defended the 
right of free assemblage of everybody, no matter what they believed in.”82 Hays had personally 
defended the right of the Nazi party to march in Hudson County.  Judge Clark was highly 
sympathetic to Hays’s explanation and interjected arguments on his behalf.  “Certainly you 
cannot accuse Mr. Hays of being a Nazi,” he admonished Glavin. “He has tried to explain to you 
the American Civil Liberties Union is an organization interested in free speech and free 
assemblage, so that whether he is interested in the labor movement as a member of the American 
Civil Liberties Union, is irrelevant.”83
No one was surprised by Judge Clark’s decision. He awarded the unions a temporary 
injunction restraining the city from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful picketing, access to 
the public streets, distribution of printed materials, and organizing efforts.  On appeal, however, 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
his grandfather and the freethinker Robert Ingersoll, whose ideas heavily influenced Hays’s upbringing. Ibid., 49–
50.  
80 In describing sources of funding, Hays disclosed that Helen Hayes, a professor of astronomy at Wellesley, left 
him $20,000 to use at his discretion to promote the ends of justice.  He drew on those funds in civil liberties cases. 
Ibid., 22. 
81 He also addressed allegations that Roger Baldwin was a Communist.  According to Hays, Baldwin was a 
philosophical anarchist of the “Kropotkin type,” who believed that human being “should never be compelled to do 
things that they wouldn’t do if it weren’t for the pressure of an unfair economic system.” Ibid., 35. 
82 Ibid. Hays voiced the same message several months later, declaring: “The Communist bogey has long passed. 
Today we are called upon chiefly to defend the rights of workers who belong to all political parties, and chiefly to 
your own.” Arthur Garfield Hays to Frank Hague, 10 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051.  
83 ACLU v. Casey, 5 March 1937, before Hon. William Clark, Newark: Testimony of Arthur Garfield Hays, ACLU 
Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
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Jersey City secured a stay.  The Court of Appeals delayed for more than a year before dismissing 
the case as moot because one of the plants had declared bankruptcy and the other had settled 
with the striking workers.84
 
 By that time, national attention was directed toward a Jersey City 
injunction far greater in scope—one directed not at labor’s right to organize, but at the meaning 
of civil liberties in a constitutional democracy.  
The CIO in Jersey City 
At the 1937 injunction hearing before Judge Clark, Hays testified that the ACLU would 
continue its efforts in Jersey City until Hague agreed to “obey the fundamental law.”85 In 
November 1937, an ideal opportunity arose to deliver on that promise. That month, the CIO 
launched a Jersey City organizing drive.86 Quoting statements by William J. Carney, regional 
director of the CIO for New Jersey, local newspapers proclaimed an imminent “invasion.” 
According to reports, Carney had promised a “show down” between Hague and the CIO and 
implicitly threatened violence if the city refused to permit peaceful organizing efforts.87
On November 29, between fifty and one hundred CIO members tried to gather at their 
headquarters in New Jersey. They were blocked by police, who searched them and the premises 
and seized circulars announcing a scheduled meeting and informing residents of their rights 
   
                                                          
84 The Third Circuit issued its decision on December 13, 1938.  Casey v. ACLU, 100 F.2d 354 (3rd Cir. 1938).  
85 In September 1937, the ACLU announced that it was initiating another injunction proceeding against the city.  
The case began when the Jersey City police seized more than five hundred copies of a labor weekly, the People’s 
Press, during a Hudson County organizing drive.  Two members of the Can Workers Union were arrested for 
distribution of the newspaper. ACLU Bulletin 780, 4 September 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
86 The timing coincided with one of Hague’s typical political maneuvers.  In October 1937, Governor-elect A. Harry 
Moore offered Hague his soon-to-be vacated Senate seat as a present for the mayor’s sixty-second birthday.  Citing 
his obligations to his constituents to continue fighting the “Red group,” Hague declined. A more skeptical account of 
his decision emerged from “persons close to the political scene,” who pointed to controversy over voting conditions 
in Hudson County and to the uncertain reception Hague would receive in Washington from New Deal Democrats. 
Clipping, Newark Star-Eagle, 17 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. Hague’s personal attorney, John 
Milton, was seated instead.  
87 Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774 (3rd Cir. 1939).  
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under the Wagner Act.  Officers were stationed at the Hudson Tube stations to prevent entry to 
Jersey City of all CIO members arriving from New York City or Newark.  A few made it into 
town, but the police muscled them into squad cars, drove them to the city border, and ordered 
them not to return, even if they were Jersey City residents.  Those who disregarded the warning 
were arrested and, within hours, made to stand trial. Anthony Botti, the city magistrate who 
presided over the proceedings, voiced his approval of the city policy. “We don’t want the CIO in 
Jersey City,” he announced, “and we’ll go to the limit to keep them out.”88
At the invitation of Lee Pressman, General Counsel for the CIO, Morris Ernst agreed to 
assist the CIO with its legal challenge.  Ernst seemed the ideal candidate for the job.  Over the 
past several years, he had been intimately involved in labor causes.  In 1933, he had founded the 
journalists’ union, the American Newspaper Guild, which had recently affiliated with the CIO.
  He refused to 
consider a motion for adjournment to prepare a defense, denied a jury trial, and excluded facts 
challenging the court’s jurisdiction and the constitutionality of the city’s ordinance.  Then he 
sentenced seven of the defendants to five days in jail.  
89
                                                          
88 ACLU Bulletin 793, 3 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
  
He had just helped to organize the National Lawyers Guild for the purpose of defending New 
Deal labor legislation from an over-zealous judiciary.  For Ernst, however, the legal problem in 
Jersey City was not one simply, or even primarily, of labor organizing.  It presented a natural 
extension of the principles he had defended in Dennett, Ulysses, and United States v. One 
Package: the right to be free from the arbitrary control of an intrusive and irresponsible 
authority.  As he had emphasized during the early New Deal and again during the court-packing 
controversy, the reality of totalitarianism abroad made the threat of government overreaching at 
89 “Broun Hits Back at A.F. of L. Head,” New York Times, 20 July 1937.  
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home all the more palpable. In Jersey City, however, that threat emanated not from the Post 
Office or the Customs Bureau, but from a local despot.  
In his capacity as special counsel, Ernst (along with the law firm of Isserman & Isserman) 
appealed the convictions, which the Hudson County Court of Appeals had declined to review on 
the basis that the controversy was moot.90
In Jersey City, the ACLU asked both Congress and the federal courts to intervene 
actively on labor’s behalf. In fact, of all the possible and attempted mechanisms for opening the 
city to labor activity and dissenting speech, Ernst considered a La Follette Committee 
investigation and federal injunction proceedings to be the most important.
  More important, Ernst orchestrated a broader 
approach to the Jersey City legal campaign.  In the past, virtually every civil liberties case that 
reached the Supreme Court, and the vast majority of the ACLU’s legal work, involved defense 
against criminal prosecution.  Hague v. CIO was one of the first cases in which the ACLU 
sought to marshal the authority of the federal government rather than to cabin it.   
91 Together with 
William Carney, he submitted affidavits and evidence to the Senate Civil Liberties Committee 
and requested resumption of its inquiry in Jersey City.92  La Follette expressed interest in the 
matter but claimed to lack the funds for an investigation.  The staff was nonetheless agreeable to 
an “agitational campaign to get the committee interested,” since the publicity would 
“strengthen[] the general support of the committee’s work.”93
The federal judiciary ultimately turned out to be more forthcoming than its legislative 
counterpart.  In mid-December, drawing on its robust history of direct action in civil liberties 
 
                                                          
90 Committee on Civil Rights in Jersey City, 21 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
91 Memorandum on conference with Morris Ernst, 3 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
92 Memorandum for Roger Baldwin, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051.  
93 Although the Senator reportedly thought that a Jersey City investigation was advisable, the expectation was that it 
would “call for a bigger outlay, probably, than any project so far undertaken.”  Louis Colman, Assistant National 
Secretary, ILD, to Roger Baldwin, 24 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
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cases, the ACLU boldly announced plans for a “siege” on Jersey City in conjunction with the 
“CIO onslaughts.”94  Consistent with the advice of the ACLU’s 1930 pamphlet on anti-industry 
injunctions, Ernst arranged for the CIO to file a request for a meeting permit, with the 
expectation of challenging a denial in court.  But he also involved the ACLU directly, in an 
effort to generate interest in the broader constitutional issues implicated by Mayor Hague’s 
polices.  To highlight the denial of rights, he proposed a “free speech mass meeting,” to be 
addressed by members of Congress and “leading liberals,” within or near the city limits.95  In 
keeping with Ernst’s plan, the ACLU applied for a permit to hold an open air assembly featuring 
three members of Congress and a New York attorney.  The Director of Public Safety allowed the 
proposed dates to pass without issuing a permit, citing the danger of public disorder in light of 
purported public protest, most notably by a veterans’ committee consisting largely of Jersey City 
employees.96 “What Hague means when he talks of violence,” the Philadelphia Record 
explained, “is that when the C.I.O. comes to Jersey City it will be the police who will resort to 
violence.”97
                                                          
94 ACLU Bulletin 795, 17 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. In its 1930 pamphlet on anti-industry 
injunctions, based on Arthur Garfield Hays’s book on the same subject, the ACLU had encouraged labor organizers 
who were up against municipal permit ordinances to apply for permits on a large number of dates and at a broad 
range of venues; if city officials refused to designate a permissible meeting time, an applicant could sue to compel 
issuance of a permit. ACLU, Legal Tactics, 14. Hays thought that Hudson County was the ideal forum for testing the 
“new procedure” that he had been advocating for nearly a decade. Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 13 December 
1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051.  Ernst ultimately sued for an injunction rather than a writ of mandamus, 
though the CIO intended to sue in state courts for a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of a meeting permit 
   
95 In a memorandum for organizers, Baldwin indicated that the principal issues at stake in Jersey City were the rights 
to hold meetings in private halls and public places, to distribute literature on the public streets, to picket, to open 
CIO offices, and to be free from expulsion from the city. Memorandum from Roger Baldwin, 24 December 1937, 
ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020.  Ernst thought picketing was a low priority because Hague had allowed limited 
picketing in the wake of Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Memorandum for Roger Baldwin, ACLU 
Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
96 In addition to veterans’ associations, protests were made by the Jersey City Chamber of Commerce, the 
Association of the Sons of Poland, the Jersey City Real Estate Board, and the Ladies of the Grand Army of the 
Republic. The Third Circuit credited “evidence that Mayor Hague and his associates inspired at least some of these 
protests.” Hague, 101 F.2d at 779.  
97 Clipping, Philadelphia Record, 16 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. 
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The centerpiece of Ernst’s program was an omnibus injunction suit in federal court, in 
which the ACLU itself, not just the CIO, was a plaintiff.  But Ernst pursued a broad range of 
tools and objectives in Hudson County during the months of preparation before trial.  In addition 
to public meetings, the ACLU and CIO were interested in opening Hague’s terrain to picketing, 
literature distribution, and meetings in private halls, and to ending unlawful police practices, 
including violence and expulsions.98  They also wanted recognition of the CIO’s right to open 
offices in Jersey City.  The civil liberties forces were pursuing arrests and test case litigation 
under the literature distribution ordinance, and even legislative impeachment proceedings.  To 
minimize conflict in coordinating the multifaceted campaign, interested organizations agreed to 
cede control to a joint committee headed by the CIO.99 All cooperating groups were asked to 
clear proposals with Ernst’s office before acting.100
As usual, Hague’s answer was to denounce his critics as Communists—and in particular, 
as Communist intruders bent on radicalizing a peaceful and patriotic community.
  
101
                                                          
98 The list of issues is outlined in Memorandum on the Jersey City Work, 24 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 
153, vol. 1051. 
  According 
to Hague, the suppression of the CIO was not intended to “deprive anybody of their civil 
liberties,” but rather to “protect the rights of the people of this city against outsiders.”  The 
ACLU anticipated and understood this challenge, which was a common rhetorical frame for 
excluding labor organizers.  Its 1930 pamphlet had acknowledged that “a large part of the public 
99 Other groups, such as the Workers’ Defense League, had undertaken independent efforts—much to the ACLU’s 
frustration.  Roger Baldwin to William Carney, 29 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051.  See also 
Roger Baldwin to Joint Board on Civil Rights in Hudson County, 31 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 
1051. 
100 Memorandum on Conference with Morris Ernst, 3 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. Due to the 
number of actors interested in the Jersey City problem and the attendant confusion in executing a centralized 
strategy, the ACLU agreed to take no independent action without first securing confirmation in writing from Ernst’s 
office. Jerome Britchey to Roger Baldwin, 17 December 1937, reel 153, vol. 1051; Board Minutes, 20 December 
1937, ACLU Papers, reel 138, vol. 942 (“Resolution was adopted requesting Carney to consult with Joint 
Committee on Strategy on any move to be made in Jersey City and to tell other organizations to do the same.”). 
101 “‘Tyranny’ Charges Resented by Hague,” New York Times, 12 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. 
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still believes that strikes are the results of ‘outside agitation’” and had noted that “any action on 
the part of the strikers which brings home to the community tyranny on the part of employers or 
officials, has not only a legal, but also a great publicity value.”102 The advice might have been 
written for the Jersey City fight.  Indeed, in a memorandum outlining the ACLU’s strategy and 
objectives, Roger Baldwin wrote, “obviously one of the real difficulties is to overcome the fear 
and apathy of Jersey City inhabitants and to switch the campaign from an apparent invasion of 
outsiders to a movement by Jersey City residents themselves.”103 Appropriately enough, Hague 
touted that very memorandum (which was intercepted by postal officials in Jersey City104) as 
“documentary proof” that Baldwin was a “leading communist.”105  Ernst, according to Hague, 
was “second in command.” Together, the two men were “the leaders” of the Communist Party 
and, “from behind the scenes,” they were “directing the whole CIO program.”106
For the most part, the leadership of the Jersey City free speech effort responded to 
Hague’s red-baiting by disclaiming affiliation with the Communist Party.  Dean Spaulding 
Frazer of the Newark Law School, who served as counsel for the CIO in the Supreme Court, 
pleaded, “Let us not be misled by any herrings dragged across the trail, even though they be red 
ones.”
  
107
                                                          
102 ACLU, Legal Tactics, 14–15. 
  William Carney pronounced himself a devout Catholic and challenged Hague to 
“prove his charge that CIO leaders in the State are Communists,” which he dismissed as a 
103 Memorandum from Roger Baldwin, 24 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. 
104 The ACLU demanded an official investigation and indictment for mail tampering. “Baldwin Denies Red or CIO 
Affiliation in Talk at Church,” Bayonne (N.J.) Times, 15 January 1938. Ernst presented evidence of the alleged 
tampering to Attorney General Cummings and Postmaster General Farley; only six copies of the reproduced letter 
were mailed, and all but one intended recipient (Syd Ross, chair of the Hudson County Committee on Civil 
Liberties) received their letters. Ross’s letter was misaddressed and returned to the ACLU by the Jersey City post 
office. It had been opened before it was sealed. ACLU News Release, 5 January 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 
1051.  In May, U.S. Attorney John J. Quinn instituted grand jury proceedings against Postmaster William P. Kern. 
ACLU Bulletin 815, 6 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. The Hudson County grand jury unsurprisingly 
declined to indict. “Roosevelt Avoids Comment on Hague,” New York Times, 11 May 1938.  
105 Clipping, Hoboken (N.J.) Observer, 1 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Clipping, Hoboken (N.J.) Observer, 7 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. 
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distraction from the primary issue, namely, labor’s right to organize.108  Baldwin disavowed any 
sympathy for violent revolution, falling back on his pacifist determination to “fight[] violence on 
every front.”  His appearance at a church in Bayonne, New Jersey was an orchestrated display of 
anti-totalitarian, God-loving Americanism;109 his speech was preceded by remarks from a war 
veteran and first commander of the Essex County American Legion committee.110
Still, Baldwin was unwilling to vilify Communists outright.  Whatever his misgivings 
about the Stalinist suppression of civil liberties, he believed the Soviet economic program to be 
laudable and had even declared in a 1935 Harvard Class Book that “communism is the goal”—
though he always insisted he meant “economic communism” rather than its political 
counterpart.
   
111  When Ernst urged him to invoke the names of prominent anti-Communists and 
to announce himself opposed to “any form of dictatorship—right or left,” Baldwin emphatically 
refused.112 In the winter of 1937–1938, well before the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact shattered his 
remaining hopes for the Soviet experiment, Baldwin would not equate the Soviet Union with 
Nazi Germany.113
                                                          
108 “Prove Us Reds, Carney Invites,” Hackensack (N.J.) Record, 14 January 1938; Statement of William J. Carney, 
ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063 (“When Hague and his Open Shop employers attempt to divert the public’s 
attention from this clear-cut issue by dragging in such matters as Communism, the radicalism of certain individuals, 
the conservatism of others, they simply show the weakness of their case.”). 
  Instead, he criticized Hague for his “high-handed dictatorship,” which was 
incompatible with the commitments of the Roosevelt administration he claimed to support.  He 
109 “Baldwin Denies Red or CIO Affiliation in Talk at Church,” Bayonne (N.J.) Times.  
110 Barred from Jersey City, Baldwin scheduled the public appearance in Bayonne instead.  Bayonne veterans 
organized a rally to protest the visit by the “convicted draft-dodger” and presumptive Communist. “Thousands to 
Join in Anti-Red Rally,” Bayonne (N.J.) Times, 10 January 1938.  
111 Baldwin to Editor, San Francisco Daily News, 21 October 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 114, vol. 765. 
112 Memorandum to Baldwin, 4 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. The memorandum relayed Ernst’s 
recommendations.  Baldwin struck a line through the suggestions and wrote and underscored “no” at the bottom of 
the page.  Ernst himself would soon use the suggested language himself. Letter from Morris Ernst, 13 December 
1937, Jackson Papers, cont. 23, folder Ernst, Morris (“Those of us who oppose dictatorships, right or left must 
appreciate how essential it is to defend our civil liberties at this time.”).  
113 E.g., Lyman Bryson, ed., America’s Town Meeting of the Air: Personal Liberty and the Modern State (New 
York: American Book Company, 1935), 31 (forced with the choice between Fascist dictatorship and Communist 
dictatorship, “I know which one I am going to take”).  Ernst deflected one accusation of Communism by carefully 
informing Hague that the ACLU was “just as Communistic as the Bill of Rights and no more.” Telegram from 
Roger Baldwin to Frank Hague, 10 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
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predicted, “your baseless charges of communism to obscure the real issues will fall as flat as 
your un-American denial of constitutional rights.”114
This basic strategic difference was a source of tension among the various organizations 
challenging Hague’s repressive policies. William Carney’s goal in Jersey City was to “tell the 
world that the fundamental issue is that of the right to organize.”
 
115 The lawyers, on the other 
hand, were eager to dissociate the civil liberties campaign from the substantive demands of their 
labor clients.  Hays told the New York World-Telegram that the ACLU would oppose violence 
committed by organized labor against unorganized workers, just as it would protest employer or 
police abuses.116  Ernst was even more emphatic.  Drawing on his experience with sex education 
and artistic freedom cases, in which public opinion had proved to be a powerful influence on 
judicial decision-making, he assembled a new Committee on Civil Liberties in Jersey City 
composed of sixty-four of “the nation’s front-page figures in literature, the theatre, medicine, 
religion, law, art, journalism, housing and the academic world.”117
                                                          
114 Telegram from Roger Baldwin to Frank Hague, 4 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
  Labor leaders were notably 
absent from the group.  In his letter to potential members, Ernst emphasized that while the 
current fight involved the CIO, Hague had employed the same tactics against the AFL.  “It does 
not matter where you stand on the question of industrial versus craft unionism, or even as 
115 William Carney to Roger Baldwin, 7 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
116 Arthur Garfield Hays to Westbrook Pegler (New York World-Telegram), 4 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 
167, vol. 2063. Hays noted that violence against unorganized workers by unions was comparatively rare, and that 
victims of such violence were ordinarily protected by employers and the police. See also statement of William J. 
Carney, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063 (emphasizing that the central CIO interest was “whether or not the 
workers of Jersey are to be free to organize in unions of their own choosing”). Baldwin wrote Ernst in February to 
convey the concerns of members of the board regarding Hays’s testimony in the injunction hearing as to the 
ACLU’s attitude toward Soviet Russia. “Of course, we have no attitude to any foreign country, and none of us 
should be quoted as expressing other than a personal view,” he reminded him. Roger Baldwin to Arthur Garfield 
Hays, 3 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
117 Committee on Civil Liberties in Jersey City, Press Release, 20 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 
1051. Notable members included Walter Lippman and Charles and Mary Beard. Clipping, Newark Call, 19 
December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. Strangely, Ernst told Baldwin that he opposed communications 
sent to judge or jury outside the courtroom, a tactic he had used in obscenity cases.  Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 
26 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
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between organized and unorganized labor,” he told them. “The real issue in Jersey City is 
democracy versus dictatorship.”118
When Ernst labeled Hague “the greatest radical of our day” in a radio address, CIO 
organizers thought he had gone too far.
   
119 Neil Brant of the United Electrical, Radio, and 
Machine Workers of America complained that the radio slot should have been given to the CIO’s 
leadership rather than its lawyers.  A remark of that nature “may sound cute,” he chided Ernst, 
“but in my opinion it only tends to confuse the people and, intentionally or otherwise, it is a bit 
of red-baiting because it holds up the word ‘radical’ to contempt.”  Ernst’s opposition to a 
“dictatorship of the left,” however sincere, was not the issue in the CIO’s fight against Hague.  
Moreover, his cooperation with outspoken CIO opponents like Dorothy Thompson and General 
Hugh Johnson, who were interested only in the free speech aspects of the case, would serve to 
undermine the CIO’s broader objective.  The goal in Jersey City was to facilitate a successful 
organizing campaign, he told Ernst, not “to show the world how really respectable you are.”120 It 
was Brant’s opinion, shared by the Steering Committee, that Ernst’s “‘extra-legal’ activities were 
not aiding the organizing drive, but on the contrary were doing it some harm.”121 Months later, 
that sentiment was even stronger. Aside from Carney, the CIO leadership “took the attitude that 
the civil liberties angle was of no use to them.”122
                                                          
118 Letter from Morris Ernst, 13 December 1937, Jackson Papers, cont. 23, folder Ernst, Morris; Clipping, Newark 
Call, 19 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. 
 
119 “CIO Seeks Writ to ‘Stop’ Hague,” New York World-Telegram, 7 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 
2020. 
120 Neil Brant to Morris Ernst, 7 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2067. 
121 Baldwin chose not to become involved in the dispute, noting that Ernst was representing the CIO rather than the 
ACLU. Roger Baldwin to Neil Brant, 11 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
122 Jerome Britchey to Morris Ernst, 6 April 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2040. 
335 
 
A few days after calling Hague “the greatest radical,” Ernst complained that he was 
“being ragged” by the “extreme left, who are inevitably bad tacticians.”123 But the dispute was 
about something more than mere tactics.  Ernst was increasingly focused on the right of the CIO 
to voice its views, not the likelihood that its message would ultimately triumph.  And the right to 
speak, by 1938, was an effective rallying cry.  The battle over the judiciary reorganization plan, 
still fresh in public memory, had strengthened the association between free speech and American 
values.  To Ernst, it was precisely Dorothy Thompson’s dislike for the CIO that made her an 
ideal ally. In the New York Tribune, Thompson told readers she felt duty-bound to speak out in 
Jersey City for the same reason that she had fought the court-packing plan: because she believed 
that “the powers of government should be limited, and the basic rights guaranteed to individuals 
under the Constitution should not be left to the interpretation of a ‘kept’ Court, switched into 
line—to use the Nazi phrase—with the policy of this or that Administration.”124  By the same 
logic, Walter Lippmann reasoned in an article that proponents of an independent judiciary were 
bound to join him in condemning the denial of civil liberties in Jersey City.125  John Haynes 
Holmes, impressed by such appeals to liberalism, declared the “Hague business” to be the most 
important issue the ACLU had encountered in years.126
 Rule-of-law was a particularly persuasive argument in Jersey City in light of recent 
developments in international politics.  At a moment when Americans daily encountered 
totalitarian purges and propaganda—when, faced with Hitler, Stalin, Franco, and Mussolini, 
many believed that democracy in Europe was poised to topple altogether—Ernst emphasized the 
 
                                                          
123 Morris Ernst to McAlister Coleman, 17 January 1938, Ernst Papers,  box 123. He claimed that he had declined a 
number of invitations for radio and public appearances in deference to the long-term actors in the Jersey City fight, 
who resented watching “an alien like Ernst run away with part of the show.” 
124 Dorothy Thompson, “Who Loves Liberty,” New York Tribune, 10 January 1938.  She urged conservative groups 
like the ABA to prove their own consistency.   
125 John Ryan to Roger Baldwin, 28 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
126 John Haynes Holmes to Roger Baldwin, 15 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
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slippery slope from Mayor Hague to fascist dictatorship.  He broadcast the message by all 
available means, and a radio speech in December prompted dozens of congratulatory letters.127  
Others in the ACLU also embraced it.  For example, Arthur Garfield Hays compared Germany’s 
imprisonment of so-called Communists in concentration camps to Jersey City’s policy of 
expelling them to Hoboken. He told Hague that his record in labor disputes amounted to “a 
system of Fascism,” based on unbridled executive power.128  Norman Thomas, in a speech titled 
“Hagueism Is Fascism,” charged that Hague’s “process of working the masses up into a patriotic, 
nationalist frenzy, is characteristically fascist.”129 And the CIO declared that “‘I am the Law’ 
Frank Hague, Mayor of Jersey City, is playing the role of Adolph [sic] Hitler.”130
Arguments like these made the Jersey City situation—previously dismissed as a local 
matter—seem worthy of national attention.  Statements denouncing the “Hudson Hitler”
  
131 
resonated strongly with the public, and Ernst believed he had “done a swell job in taking a 
handful of arrests and developing a national issue out of the situation.”132
                                                          
127 Ernst Papers, box 123. 
 As Life Magazine 
explained, the CIO and its supporters were answering the charges of “Red Communists!’ by 
128 Arthur Garfield Hays to Frank Hague, 10 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. 
129 Thomas, Hagueism is Fascism, 4. He continued, “He has wrapped terror and exploitation in the flag and made 
the people like it.”  
130 Congress of Industrial Organizations, “Theatre Nite: Bring Democracy to Jersey City,” 20 February 1938, ACLU 
Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
131 E.g., Clipping, New York Evening Post, 12 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020 (quoting John R. 
Longo, secretary of the Holy Name Society of the Church of Our Lady of Sorrows in Jersey City). See also “Hague 
Turns Down Place as Senator,” New York Times, 18 January 1938 (quoting statement by John Ferguson, Republican 
superintendent of elections: “We do not live in a democracy in Hudson County: we live in an absolute autocracy, 
under an absolute dictator”).   
132 Morris Ernst to McAlister Coleman, 17 January 1938, Ernst Papers, box 123. On the influence of totalitarianism 
on subsequent interpretations of civil liberties, see Primus, Language of Rights; Owen Fiss, “The Idea of Political 
Freedom,” in Looking Back at Law’s Century, ed. Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth, and Robert A. Kagan (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), 35–57; Nelson, Legalist Reformation, 120–30. 
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“roaring back ‘Fascist’ and ‘Dictator’ at Hague”—and “out of the tumult, the Mayor of Jersey 
City has suddenly burgeoned big and menacing on the political horizon of America.”133
To make the case for broad popular resistance to Hague’s autocratic policies, Ernst 
enlisted support from such disparate groups as the National Lawyers Guild, the Republican 
Party, the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, and the Teachers Union.
  
134  Organized labor, 
unsurprisingly, was divided.  By late 1937, the AFL and the CIO were embroiled in a bitter 
organizing battle, and the AFL was reluctant to come to its rival’s defense.135  Hague tried his 
best to retain AFL support, citing an honorary membership conferred on him by Samuel 
Gompers and a purported commitment to excluding outside strikebreakers.136 The New Jersey 
State Federation of Labor was so hostile to the CIO that it sided with Hague, notwithstanding his 
policy in the Pulaski Highway strike.  The president of the Hudson County Building Trades 
Council went so far as to call Hague the “protector of the people.”137
                                                          
133 “Mayor Hague: Last of the Bosses, Not First of the Dictators,” Life, 7 February 1938, 45; Otis Peabody Swift to 
Roger Baldwin, 3 February 1938, ACLU papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
 And William Green, 
134 Memorandum on the Jersey City Work, 24 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051.  Help came from 
unexpected quarters.  In early January, Horace K. Robertson, the director of public safety in Bayonne, New Jersey, 
was dismissed from his post after declining to bar a public appearance of Roger Baldwin.  Clipping, Philadelphia 
Record, 16 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020.  As a veteran, Robertson found Baldwin “personally 
objectionable” because of his refusal to serve during World War I.  Still, he considered the rights of free speech, 
press and assembly crucial to preventing the rise of dictatorship in America. Channeling two decades of civil 
liberties propaganda, he described expressive freedom as an “inherent right belonging to all people regardless of 
class or condition,” fiercely protected “from our earliest days as a nation” and never denied to any minority group.  
“We have always recognized the wisdom of freely expressing our opinions on all matters of public interest,’ he 
proclaimed,” so that out of free discussion we could distinguish the good from the bad and adopt those views which 
would work for the general good.” Speech delivered over WEVD by Horace K. Robertson, Bayonne Director of 
Public Affairs, January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
135 The NLRB’s purported CIO favoritism was a major source of the controversy. Tellingly, NLRB member Edwin 
Smith was one of a handful of New Deal officials who openly condemned Hague.  “Hague Attacked by NLRB 
Member,” New York Times, 19 June 1938.  
136 Clipping, Jersey (City) Journal, 12 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020; “Hague Declines Senate 
Seat Because He ‘Has to Fight Reds,’” New York World-Telegram, 17 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 
2020. Hague made calculated concessions to labor during 1938, including qualified support for a New Jersey “little 
Wagner act.” “Hague Supports ‘Little Labor Act,’” New York Evening Post, 12 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 
162, vol. 2020.  Occasionally, the city would deem a strike legitimate and permit labor activity.  E.g., “Hague Police 
Praised,” New York Times, 15 February 1939. 
137 McKean, Boss, 197 (quoting Robert Lynch).  
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president of the AFL, “held his peace.”138  Still, at the CIO’s request, some AFL unions agreed 
to overcome sectarian differences in pursuit of a common goal.139 In January 1938, a gathering 
of AFL and CIO unions demanded that Governor Moore apply the NLRA in Jersey City and 
resolved “that this un-American censorship cease at once, by Federal intervention if 
necessary.”140 The same month, the presidents of three AFL unions sought to revoke Hague’s 
honorary membership in the national organization.  They expressed concern at Hague’s use of 
“the difference between the A. F. of  L. and the C. I. O. to hide his own anti-labor purposes.”141
The CIO may have felt ambivalence toward Ernst’s tactics, but it accepted assistance 
from “progressive and liberal elements,” including consumers’ groups, women’s clubs, and 
fraternal organizations, as “the genuine sentiment of the foremost citizens of the State.”
 
142  That 
sentiment was substantial.  The Liberal Ministers Club cautioned “that Fascism can happen here” 
and issued a resolution “heartily support[ing]” the work of the ACLU.143  The Labor Leader, the 
organ of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, emphasized that Hague was fighting not 
Communism, but the CIO’s attempt “to win a living wage and a little sorely needed economic 
security for the workers of Jersey City and New Jersey.”144
                                                          
138 Thomas, Hagueism Is Fascism. See also “AFL Neutral in Jersey,” New York Times, 15 June 1938. 
  The Newark diocese of the 
Protestant Episcopal Church “call[ed] upon all American citizens who value the precious 
heritage of liberty won for us by our forefathers to stand firm” for the freedom of speech, press, 
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140 Keith Sward to Governor A. Harry Moore, 13 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063 (11 international 
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position.  “Hague Declines Senate Seat Because He ‘Has to Fight Reds,’” New York World-Telegram, 17 January 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. 
142 Congress of Industrial Organizations, “Theatre Nite: Bring Democracy to Jersey City,” 20 February 1938, ACLU 
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assembly and religion, which were “fundamental to our democracy.”145  Even the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses agreed to help; Olin Richmond Moyle, counsel for the Watch Tower Bible and Tract 
Society, noted Hague’s long history of persecuting Witnesses in Hudson County and offered “to 
cooperate in any way in bringing that dictator to time.”146 Reactions like these had little effect on 
Hague, who vowed in early January that the CIO would never come into Jersey City as long he 
was mayor.147
The appeal to civil liberties was all the more poignant in contrast to Hague’s flagrant 
disregard for all criticism.
  
148  The mayor dismissed with a “pshaw!” the suggestion that he was 
acting as a “tyrant and a dictator” in the vein of Mussolini and Hitler. “The answer to all that,” he 
said, “is on election day.” Hague acknowledged that he exercised significant power in Hudson 
County, but he insisted that the people had invested him with it because they trusted him to apply 
it “for the benefit of the people.”149
Certainly Hague had his share of supporters.  The working class electorate of Jersey City 
consistently handed him landslide victories, and his rallies and demonstrations reliably attracted 
massive crowds.
  
150  Skeptics argued that many of the spectators were motivated by fear of job 
loss or retaliation,151 and the New York Post reported that “scores of letters [were] pouring in 
from Jersey readers too scared to sign.”152
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 Privately, however, the ACLU acknowledged that 
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many Hudson County residents favored Hague’s approach.  As Ernst put it in a letter to Hays, 
“despite the feeling of many of our friends the people of Jersey City, through fear and ignorance, 
are to a great extent back of Hague and have been right along.”153
For some, the sense that geographic and cultural outsiders were criticizing their ways 
strengthened their allegiance to Hague.  When Jersey City Rabbi Benjamin Plotkin gave an 
address defending free speech, the Jewish Community Center in which his congregation was 
housed cautioned him not to discuss the Hague administration if he wanted it to remain there.
 
154 
A month later, Plotkin told the ACLU that “retaliatory measures [were] being taken against some 
of the Jewish people, and the wave of vigilante spirit [was] rising.”155 Although Hague carefully 
avoided antisemitic rhetoric,156 the mayor’s supporters did not fail to notice that many of his 
most outspoken detractors—including attorneys Abraham Isserman, Arthur Garfield Hays, and 
Morris Ernst—were Jews.157
                                                          
153 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 18 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
 Rising antisemitic sentiments brought the threat of totalitarian 
violence that much closer to home. 
154 The president of the Jewish Community Center was a Hague organization leader, and its treasurer was a member 
of the Jersey City Board of Education. Outside of Jersey City, the Jewish community was generally hostile to 
Hague.  Manhattan Borough President Stanley Isaacs declared that “[t]he Jew who gives aid to a man like Mayor 
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Release, the Social Justice Committee of the Rabbinical Assembly of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 
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“Free Speech Fight in Jersey City Will Go On,” Sunday Worker, 29 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2021.   
156 In the Plotkin affair, he ensured that only members of the Jewish community would publicly criticize the rabbi. 
McKean, Boss, 158. 
157 Ernst received numerous antisemitic letters. E.g., “A Loyal Patriotic American” to Morris Ernst, 21 June 1938, 
Ernst Papers, box 123 (“[I]f you damned Jews don’t cease your un-American, un-Christian agitation, you’ll get the 
same medicine you are getting in Germany and other parts of the world. As a resident of Jersey City, I want you to 
know that the people of our city are 100% behind Mayor Hague in this fight to keep crackpots, radicals, Bolsheviks 
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Jersey City residents stood by their mayor for less menacing reasons, as well.  Many 
pointed to Hague’s reforms in the fire and police departments, which he achieved by ousting 
corrupt union influences.158  Moreover, the administration had convinced Jersey City workers 
that it was protecting their jobs against competition with neighboring cities.159  And many Jersey 
City residents, in an era of national uncertainty, were simply shy of change.160  The apparent 
fervency of local support led the New York Times ruefully to conclude, “[T]here is in Jersey City 
a large population which is satisfied with things as they are and which really believes that 
radicalism represents a menace to the United States.”161
In the wake of a national CIO organizing campaign marked by radical methods—most 
notably, the sit-down strikes of spring 1937—Hague could plausibly query whether his 
adversaries had “any regard for constitutional rights, or for any law” when they took possession 
of factories or blocked employees from getting to work.  He had ample company in claiming that 
such techniques were not legitimate labor tools and that the CIO was actually “trying to seize 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the greatest Mayor in the U.S., you little sawed-off runt. You are a son-of-a-bitch trying to bore from within, but 
we’re wise to you and your kind, you dirty little kike.”). At the same time, Ernst received “a mass of letters from 
rich Jewish people begging [him] to withdraw from the matter” lest he exacerbate antisemitic tendencies, a form of 
criticism that he evidently found more troubling. Morris Ernst to Hon. Louis Brandeis, 22 June 1938, Ernst Papers, 
box 123.  For example, Otto Abraham advised him that “American Jews of prominence should seriously consider 
whether it is advisable to continuously remain in the limelight and to head movements which, right or wrong, are 
considered by the majority of people as inimical to the best interests of this country.” Abraham explained that he had 
always defended his own rights, “but in this very serious hour of our race, we all must lay aside personal ambitions; 
the quieter the Jews of this country, and the more dignified their behavior will be, the better will be their future lot 
and that of their children.”  Otto Abraham to Morris Ernst, 18 June 1938, Ernst Papers, box 123.  Ernst told 
Abraham that “members of all religious groups should act like Americans” and that “as soon as the Jews or the 
Catholics or the Protestants start to act as if they were not Americans first but Jews, Protestants or Catholics first, 
they are conceding the concept of a divided America.”  He added that he was “proud of [his] Jewish heritage” and 
would not “avoid an act of public service because of that precious treasure.” Morris Ernst to Otto Abraham, 21 June 
1938, box 23. Despite his apparent self-assurance, Ernst wrote to Justice Louis Brandeis for his view of the situation 
and enclosed his correspondence with Abraham.  Brandeis told him his answer was a “good one” and invited him to 
visit and discuss the matter.  Louis Brandeis to Morris Ernst, 24 June 1938, Ernst Papers, box 123.  
158 Clipping, New York World-Telegram, 19 January 1938,  ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020.  
159 “Pledges No Invasion As Long As He Is Mayor,” Hudson Dispatch (Union City, N.J.), 13 January 1938 (“I have 
always been a friend of labor. . . . When industry is driven out of here, thousands lose employment.”). 
160 One Hague devotee was so distressed by the attack on her mayor that she threw a jar of red pepper at Arthur 
Garfield Hays.  The assailant posted as an admirer of Hays and asked to watch him speak during a radio broadcast.  
The radio station offered an award for her arrest. ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020.  
161 “How Does Hague Do It?” New York Times, 12 June 1938. 
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power by creating violence and disorder.”162  Indeed, in a sense, the question is not why so many 
of Hague’s constituents supported him, but rather why so much of America condemned him.163 
After his anti-CIO rally at the Jersey City armory in January 1938, Hague reportedly received 
hundreds of congratulatory letters and telegrams from throughout the United States.164  Had he 
limited his attack to the CIO—had he permitted speeches by liberal groups, members of 
Congress, and the ACLU even while resisting CIO organizing efforts—he would very likely 
have garnered considerable sympathy. When the ACLU challenged his despotic practices, many 
of his advisors encouraged him to do just that.165  Hague, however, ignored their suggestions.  
He adopted policies so extreme as to seem a caricature; Heywood Broun aptly likened Jersey 
City officials to “vulgarized” versions of the characters in Marc Blitztein’s Broadway musical, 
“The Cradle Will Rock” (which, notably, Ernst invoked in court).166  Urged on by business 
groups and the Catholic Church, Hague denounced free speech itself as a Communist ploy.167
 
 In 
1938, that was no longer a palatable strategy. 
The Civil Liberties Campaign 
In the four months before the injunction proceedings commenced, a broad array of groups 
and individuals expressed their support for the ACLU’s civil liberties campaign by attempting to 
                                                          
162 “‘Tyranny’ Charges Resented by Hague,” New York Times, 12 January 1938 (“This was the same defiance of 
constituted authorities, the same flouting of law, that had accompanied C.I.O. strikes in the West.”); “‘Tyranny’ 
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163 On the sit-down strikes and national opinion, see Chapter 6.  
164 “700 Messages Praise Hague for His Talk,” Bayonne (N.J.) Times, 8 January 1938.  
165 For example, his personal attorney, John Milton. 
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speak publicly against Hague and his policies in Jersey City.  The Hague administration reliably 
denied meeting permits to these would-be speakers, whatever their topic or political bent. While 
some were labor and radical groups, others were not. For example, the American Whig-
Cliosophic Society of Princeton University wanted to host a speech by Senator Borah, and the 
Independent Speakers’ Association of New York City, whose members included Thomas Dewey 
and Fiorello La Guardia, sought permission to hold an open-air meeting to discuss free speech.  
These proposals and many others were summarily rejected.168
 In February, the civil liberties forces decided to circumvent the permit requirement and, 
appropriating Hague’s own terminology, “invade” Jersey City.  At a meeting convened by the 
Hudson County Committee for Labor Defense and Civil Rights, an ACLU affiliate, 250 Hague 
opponents crowded into a rented hall (too small, but the only one they could secure) to  
“denounce the Mayor’s campaign of repression.”
   
169 Another 250 listened through amplifiers 
outside.  The featured speakers were United States Representative Jerry O’Connell, a Montana 
Democrat, and John T. Bernard of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party.  Local Hague opponents 
also addressed the audience, including Rabbi Plotkin, John R. Longo, and Jeff Burkitt.  Longo, 
an anti-Hague Democrat, was about to receive a nine-month prison sentence on a specious 
charge of election fraud170—and Plotkin would nearly lose his congregation for serving as a 
character witness at Longo’s trial.171
                                                          
168 Commissioner Casey claimed that Borah had not in fact consented to appear at the meeting. Russell B. Porter, 
“Hague Aide Says He Barred Thomas,” New York Times, 8 June 1938. 
  Burkitt’s history with Hague stretched back to the late 
169ACLU Bulletin 806, 4 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. See also ACLU Press Release, 24 
February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063; “Jersey City Rule Scored,” New York Times, 27 February 1938.  
170 A Hague judge, Robert V. Kinkend, found that petitions filed by Longo on behalf of a slate of anti-Hague 
candidates during the September 1937 Democratic primary contained fictitious names.  Objective evidence was 
lacking and witnesses were reputedly bribed.  “Hague’s Control Extends Even to Jury System,” New York Post, 24 
May 1938; “Sentence of Longo Put Off for Week,” New York Times, 13 May 1938. The New Jersey Court system 
consistently denied relief. In re Longo, 124 N.J.L. 176 (N.J. Err. & App. 1940).  
171 “Defends Ouster of Rabbi in Jersey,” New York Times, 16 May 1938. The Jewish Community Center announced 
its intention to evict Congregation Emanu-El, which was unable to obtain other quarters. William Carney urged an 
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1920s, when he was routinely arrested and beaten by the police for challenging Jersey City 
speech restrictions.172  Many of his allegations against the city were validated by the 
investigation of the New Jersey Senate’s Case Commission,173 and in 1929 the ACLU had 
volunteered to assist him in appealing a 90-day sentence for disorderly conduct based on an 
address to an anti-Hague political meeting.174
After the February meeting, civil liberties groups were even more eager to defy Hague’s 
oppressive policies, including the bans on gathering in public spaces and on circulation of 
handbills.
 The events of 1938 brought Burkitt back to anti-
Hague agitation after a five-year hiatus. 
175 A perfect opportunity arose in March, when the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated a Griffin, Georgia license requirement for the distribution of printed materials. In 
Lovell v. City of Griffin—at the urging of the ACLU as amicus curiae, among other groups—the 
Court overturned the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness for distributing literature without a 
permit, declaring the ordinance constitutionally overbroad.176
                                                                                                                                                                                           
investigation by La Follette of the ouster, which he and Plotkin considered an “infringement of religious liberty.” In 
a telegram, Carney told La Follette: “I predicted some months ago that Hague would take away religious liberty if 
something was not done about his denial of the workers right to organize. Protestant groups who have recently 
criticized Hague will be next to feel the ire of this Jersey Hitler.” “Avers Clergy Will Next Feel Hague Wrath,” 
Newark Sunday Call, 15 May 1938.  In July 1938 the two groups made a quiet arrangement and did not make the 
terms public. McKean. Boss, 158. 
  The ACLU immediately informed 
Hague that Jersey City’s permit requirement was unconstitutional. At first, the city resisted. A 
police captain explained to one representative of the Workers Defense League that Jersey City 
172 “Jeff Burkitt is Back to Plague the Boss,” New York Post, 23 February 1938.  When Burkitt attended a City 
Commission meeting in 1928 to ask the commission to define the limits of his speaking permit, Hague asked 
“What’s the matter with your face?” When Burkitt replied that he had been beaten by Hague’s “thugs,” the Mayor 
told him he could not help laughing because it looked “so funny.” “Charge Hague Men Have Sinecures,” New York 
Times, 18 July 1928. 
173 The Commission, named for Senator Clarence Case of Somerset County, was initiated by the Republican-
controlled Senate after Hague deployed 22,000 democratic voters in the 1928 Republican primary to influence the 
outcome of that election.  McKean, Boss, 22. Karcher considered the hearings to be “the worst type of political 
witch-hunt.” Karcher, Municipal Madness, 185.  
174 “Liberty Union to Aid Burkitt,” Newark Star, 1 May 1929. Burkitt asked his attorneys to confer with counsel for 
the ACLU. 
175 A few earlier meetings were held in private halls without disruption. See, e.g., “Workers Told Jersey City Is 
Defying U.S.,” Washington Post, 22 December 1937 (describing meeting by Workers Defense League).   
176 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
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officials were “enforcing the Jersey City ordinance—not the Constitution.”177  Eventually, 
Corporation Counsel James A. Hammill conceded that the Lovell decision was applicable and 
advised the Department of Public Safety that the orderly distribution of circulars and pamphlets 
should be tolerated.  He nonetheless insisted that unlawful assemblage would be strictly 
prohibited. “Under no circumstances,” he announced, “shall mass demonstrations such as were 
attempted by the C.I.O. and other groups several months ago be tolerated.”178
 Jubilant announcements that Hague was no longer “the law” were premature.
  
179 In mid-
April, Jeff Burkitt was arrested when he attempted to speak publicly against Hague and on behalf 
of John Longo, despite denial of a meeting permit.180  The Jersey City Journal ominously noted 
that an ACLU membership card was found on his body upon his arrest.181 At trial, Judge Antony 
Botti chastised Burkitt for using obscene language and sentenced him to six months in the county 
penitentiary.182
A few weeks later, the International Labor Defense announced a test meeting featuring a 
repeat performance by Representatives O’Connell and Bernard.  The night before the scheduled 
event, two thousand Hague supporters, primarily veterans, gathered at the Jersey City armory at 
the invitation of Colonel Hugh A. Kelly, secretary to New Jersey Governor A. Harry Moore.  
The crowd adopted resolutions demanding that Commissioner Casey take action to prevent the 
   
                                                          
177 “Jersey City Faces New Fight by CIO,” New York Times, 30 March 1938. Jersey City authorities claimed that the 
Supreme Court’s decision applied to the Georgia provision only.  “Jersey City’s Ban Thwarts Radicals,” Hudson 
Dispatch (Union City, N.J.), 30 March 1938; “Hague Faces Test on Handbill Ban,” New York Evening Post, 30 
March 1938.   
178 Telegram to Frank Hague, 20 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063; “Ruling of Corporation Counsel 
James A. Hammill on the Jersey City Ordinance Relating to the Distribution of Literature on the Streets,” ACLU 
Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042.   
179 E.g., Poster, 7 April 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063; “Hague Concedes Death of Leaflet Law in Jersey 
City,” 8 April 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
180 The case was initially handled by the International Labor Defense, although the ACLU offered assistance. Jerome 
Britchey to Jeff Burkitt, 4 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042; Claire Burkitt to Jerome Britchey, 28 
September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042 (passing along her husband’s request for assistance from the 
ACLU after severing relations with Samuel L. Rothbard and the ILD). 
181 “Card Found on Burkitt,” Jersey (City) Journal, 18 April 1938. 
182 “Anti-Hague Crusader Gets 6-Month Term,” New York Times, 24 April 1938.   
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meeting and calling upon all members of patriotic organizations to appear in Journal Square in 
uniform in case the speakers nonetheless appeared.  They implicitly threatened vigilante violence 
if the meeting were allowed to proceed.183  At first, the ILD and its guests refused to back down. 
“We are going,” Bernard announced, “because we believe that this is still America and not Nazi 
Germany.”184 The following evening, however, a huge crowd of public employees, veterans, 
AFL members, and other Hague supporters assembled in Journal Square to overwhelm the ILD’s 
audience.185
After conferring at the ILD offices in Manhattan for more than three hours, the two 
representatives decided to cancel their appearance.  Observers for the ILD and the National 
Committee for People’s Rights, including a delegation of twenty “prominent writers and 
liberals,” concluded that attacks by the crowd were inevitable.
   
186 Vito Marcantonio, ILD 
president and a former United States Representative for New York, explained that the organizers 
would have happily risked arrest, but the situation had become more dire in light of the “armed 
mob instigated and directed by Hague himself through his stooges.” Noting that the police had 
taken measures to facilitate rather than prevent violence, Marcantonio contrasted the vigilantism 
and corruption of Jersey City with the ILD’s commitment to “the democratic and civil rights of 
the American people,” and he called upon President Roosevelt to “restore law and order.”187
                                                          
183 “Veterans Pledge Demonstration To Halt Reds’ Rally,” Hudson Dispatch (Union City, N.J.), 16 May 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2021; “2,000 Hague Allies Protest at Rally,” New York Times, 6 May 1938.  
  
According to the New York Daily News, a majority of those involved had been “won over to the 
184 “Congressmen Stand on Bill of Rights, Defy Hague,” Daily Worker, 5 May 1938. 
185 Jersey City newspapers claimed a crowd of fifty thousand or more; the New York Times estimated fifteen to 
twenty thousand. “Balked Hague Foes Plan New Attacks,” New York Times, 9 May 1938.  
186 National Committee for People’s Rights, 14 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
187 Statement by Vito Marcantonio, 7 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063; “Invasion of Jersey City Halts 
as Hague Crowds Gather To Bar Speeches,” New York Times, 8 May 1938. Marcantonio referenced the Chicago 
Memorial Day Massacre and predicted that in the event of violence, no Hague-controlled jury would return a 
conviction. Representative O’Connell made similar comments in a letter to President Roosevelt. Jerry O’Connell to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 9 May 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, folder Civil Liberties 1933–
1945. 
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theory that direct action should be abandoned and an appeal made to the Federal courts to 
enforce the rights of free speech in Hague’s dominion.”188  Although the retreat garnered its 
share of criticism, the press and even a few Hague constituents accepted the decision as the 
responsible move in the face of mass hysteria.189  A New York Times editorial cautioned that the 
true threat of totalitarianism in America came not from Hague himself, but from the mobs that 
enforced his will—that is, from the “substantial number of persons so short-sighted that they 
have as little respect for constitutional rights as he has.”190
 Still, the spring’s most celebrated free speech incident involved not mob action, but 
police action.  A week before the ILD’s attempted meeting, the deportation of Norman Thomas 
at a Socialist Party rally made national headlines.
  
191
                                                          
188 Warren Hall, “Hague’s Foes Fail 50,000 Awaiting Jersey City Battle,” New York Daily News, 8 May 1938.  
Despite the change of tack, O’Connell vowed to return to Jersey City to deliver his speech; when he appeared before 
an equally hostile crowd of 10,000 to 15,000 people in late May, he was promptly whisked away by the police. 
“Jersey City Police Seize, Then ‘Deport’ O’Connell,” New York Times, 28 May 1938. O’Connell subsequently 
announced that he would petition for Hague’s removal as vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee and 
request an investigation by the Senate Civil Liberties Committee. 
  Thomas tried to address a May Day Eve 
meeting at Journal Square, for which Casey had denied a permit.  He was immediately seized by 
police, pushed into a car, driven to the ferry dock, and eventually forced onto a boat bound for 
189 In the aftermath of the rally, the New York Times noted “some dissension among Mayor Hague’s own 
constituents”; when Hague solicited letters from local clergy members stating their views of his public meeting 
policy, two Protestant churches offered qualified support for the tolerance of minority views. “Balked Hague Foes 
Plan New Attacks,” New York Times, 9 May 1938. A third pastor told Hague that he supported his policy but would 
not ask his church to adopt the resolution Hague had requested.  
190 “Mr. Hague’s Supporters,” New York Times, 9 May 1938. But see “Liberty in Journal Square,” New York Herald-
Tribune, 9 May 1938 (“With the championship of civil liberties successfully pre-empted by the International Labor 
Defense, whose sinuous interventions have managed to wreck so many other good causes before now, and with the 
two Congressmen retreating in an atmosphere of ignominious fiasco under cover of a not too convincing propaganda 
statement by Mr. Marcantonio, the technical victory may perhaps rest with Mayor Hague. . . . We do not know who 
won. But we do know that the rather simple but native American faith in the constitutional guaranties and sound 
police administration suffered a disastrous loss.”). 
191 See, e.g., “Hague Police Oust Thomas from City,” New York Times, 1 May 1938; “Thomas Ejection Seen as Due 
for National Airing,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 May 1938; “Landon and Sinclair—Both Against Hague,” New 
York Evening Post, 3 May 1938; “Let ‘Em Talk, Mayor Hague,” Chattanooga Free Press, 9 May 1938 (attacking 
the ACLU as exclusively pro-labor, but condemning Hague’s tactics as un-American and unwise and professing 
“irrevocabl[e]” commitment to the “American principle of free speech”); George Sokolsky, “Hague Must Stop,” 
New York Herald-Tribune, 9 May 1938 (“Mayor Hague of Jersey City is not fighting Socialism and Communism. 
He is fighting against the capitalist system. He is attacking the justification for democracy.”). 
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New York.  Spectators fared little better; many were beaten or escorted to the city borders, and 
Thomas’s wife Violet was allegedly punched in the jaw.  Thomas returned later in the evening 
“to find out what happened to [his] wife and other American citizens in Hitler-Hague 
fiefdom.”192  He was again escorted from the city, this time by the Hudson Tube.193
The episode triggered a flood of newspaper editorials condemning Hague. Public figures 
expressed outrage, including Alf M. Landon, the 1936 Republican presidential nominee, who 
told Thomas that he was shocked by “such a gross violation of our sacred right of free 
speech.”
   
194 According to the New York Post, critics were Republicans and Democrats, 
conservatives and radicals.195  The Board of Governors of the New York Republican Club 
unanimously adopted a resolution condemning Hague.196  The annual conference of Democratic 
women, though it did not target Hague by name, declared its support for “freedom of speech and 
thought in the United States, so that all Americans may retain their priceless heritage as free 
citizens of a free democracy.”197  Within a few weeks, the Workers Defense League asserted 
confidently that “Mayor Hague’s regime was now on the defensive.”198
Critics clamored all the more loudly because Arthur T. Vanderbilt’s Newark law firm 
agreed to represent Thomas in the matter, without financial compensation.
  
199
                                                          
192 “Thomas Charges Police Kidnaping,” Boston Globe, 1 May 1938; “Hague Police Oust Thomas from City,” New 
York Times, 1 May 1938.  
  Vanderbilt, who 
was serving as president of the American Bar Association, was a prominent Republican lawyer 
193 One month later, after securing a permit, Thomas attempted to deliver the speech he had prepared for Jersey City 
in Newark. The speech was drowned out by music and the platform was pelted with rotten eggs and tomatoes.  
“Thomas Is Routed As Riot Halts Speech in Newark,” New York Times, 5 June 1938. Newark officials expressed 
regret and agreed to set aside a downtown park for public speeches for a ninety-day test period. “Newark to Set 
Aside a ‘Hyde Park’ As Sequel to Attack on Thomas,” New York Times, 9 June 1938.  
194 “Ousting of Thomas Assailed by Landon,” Boston Globe, 2 May 1938. Although Landon was mostly celebrated 
for his stand, critics labeled him a Socialist. “Landon Branded Socialist for Defense of Speech Right,” Los Angeles 
Times, 29 July 1938.  
195 “Landon and Sinclair—Both Against Hague,” New York Post, 3 May 1938. 
196 “Republicans Assail Hague,” New York Times, 20 May 1938. 
197 “Women of Party Clash Over Hague,” New York Times, 3 June 1938. 
198 “Hague is denounced at Jersey City Meeting,” New York Herald-Tribune, 23 May 1938. 
199 “Thomas Defenders Consult Bar Head,” New York Times, 3 May 1938.   
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and academic (and future drafter of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution, under which he was 
appointed Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court).200  The New York Post labeled him 
“an extremely conservative man,”201 but in reality, he was no stranger to civil liberties fights.  At 
the urging of Felix Frankfurter, the ACLU had approached him for legal assistance in 1928, after 
Roger Baldwin was convicted of breaching the peace for his part in organizing a protest on 
behalf of striking silk workers in Paterson, New Jersey.202  Vanderbilt agreed to take the case for 
the cost of his office overhead, and much to the organization’s surprise, he argued it successfully 
before the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals. The speech-protective decision—for which 
Baldwin thought Vanderbilt deserved “a large part of the credit”—was regarded as the ACLU’s 
first important judicial victory.203
Vanderbilt’s demonstrated commitment to individual rights had leant credibility to the 
ABA’s position during the judiciary reorganization controversy.  Indeed, Morris Ernst, one of the 
principal architects of the National Lawyers’ Guild, told him that his nomination as ABA 
president had undercut the Guild’s recruitment and organizing efforts; the Guild had been hoping 
to “launch[] an attack on the ABA as being wholly reactionary,” but Vanderbilt’s election 
spoiled that plan.
   
204
                                                          
200 Vanderbilt was born in Newark, New Jersey in 1888 and attended the Newark public schools. He received a 
Bachelor of Laws from Columbia Law School in 1913. He became a full professor at NYU Law School in 1918 but 
remained an active and highly successful litigator and served as director for several financial institutions.  
Biographical note, 18 October 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 130, folder 1938.  He became dean of NYU Law 
School in 1943 and was named first Chief Justice of the newly organized New Jersey Supreme Court under the 1947 
New Jersey Constitution.  
 “It just so happens that I have spent a good many years in liberal movements 
and have taken more body blows in these fights than have most of the men who are leading the 
201 “The Real Issue Behind ‘Hague Terror,’” New York Post, 16 May 1938. 
202 Felix Frankfurter to Roger Baldwin, 24 January 1928, ACLU Papers, reel 58, vol. 346; Roger Baldwin to Felix 
Frankfurter, 2 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 58, vol. 346.  The silk strike and subsequent meeting took place in 
1924.  
203 Roger Baldwin to Felix Frankfurter, 17 May 1928, ACLU Papers, reel 58, vol. 346; Roger Baldwin to Arthur T. 
Vanderbilt, 14 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 58, vol. 346 (“I credit the victory in the case outside its obvious merits 
to your skill in presentation.”); Walker, American Liberties, 77.  
204 Arthur Vanderbilt to John H. Riordan, 7 December 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 130, folder National Lawyers 
Guild. 
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National Lawyers’ Guild,” Vanderbilt explained to an ABA colleague. “I have even been so 
brash as to represent the American Civil Liberties Union in our court of last resort. Think of 
that!”205 A 1937 biographical sketch for the ABA attributed to Vanderbilt “an enlightened and 
progressive view of the lawyer’s duty to protect the rights of individuals against the 
encroachments of arbitrary power in public or private hands.”  The new president firmly believed 
in “personal and civil liberties” and had “given freely of his services to defend these rights in the 
Courts.”206  Vanderbilt, in short, was the ideal spokesperson for a content-blind model of free 
speech.  Just as his track record in civil liberties cases had allowed him to champion the Bill of 
Rights without provoking charges of hypocrisy from the New Dealers, his status as head of the 
eminently conservative ABA belied Hague’s claim that free speech was simply a vehicle for 
Communist agitation.  Vanderbilt confidently brushed aside such allegations (along with 
Hague’s accusation that Vanderbilt had taken Thomas’s case for “a large fat fee”), explaining 
that “Mr. Hague does not yet understand that the lawyers of the country are deeply concerned 
with the preservation of civil liberties guaranteed by our Federal and State Constitutions.”207
Lawyers at Vanderbilt’s firm organized a comprehensive legal challenge on Thomas’s 
behalf.  In federal court, they sought damages from city officials totaling 20,000 dollars.
  
208 They 
also filed new permit applications with the city, and when those were denied by Commissioner 
Casey—who cited a threat of violence by hostile spectators, anticipating decades of municipal 
reliance on the so-called “heckler’s veto”209—they sued in state court for a writ of mandamus.210
                                                          
205 Arthur Vanderbilt to Reginald Heber Smith, 8 July 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 121. 
 
206 Biographical note, 18 October 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 130, folder 1938. 
207 “Vanderbilt Denies Hague ‘Fee’ Charge,” New York Times, 25 December 1938. 
208 The suit charged that the police “by force of arms did assault the plaintiff, seized and pulled him, and compelled 
him to go with them to a ferry slip and board a ferryboat for Manhattan.” It also charged infringement of Thomas’s 
rights as a citizen to go where he wished. “Broader Inquiry on Hague Urged,” New York Times, 22 May 1938.   
209 See Harry Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).  The 
“heckler’s veto” was upheld by the Supreme Court in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), but later implicitly 
repudiated. E.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).  
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At oral argument, Vanderbilt insisted that Thomas should be permitted to speak “even if a riot 
were to ensue,” but the New Jersey Supreme Court deemed the permit ordinance constitutional 
and upheld Casey’s right to exclude him (“the people are entitled to their tranquility,” the court 
explained, and the fact that “the police could quell any disorder is no reason to grant a 
permit”).211 Vanderbilt appealed to the state high court, which refused to hear the case before the 
following spring.212
Most notably, Vanderbilt’s firm pursued a federal prosecution under a Reconstruction-era 
civil rights law. Immediately after the April 30 incident, Thomas, with the assistance of the 
Workers’ Defense League, requested an investigation by the La Follette Committee and urged J. 
Edgar Hoover and the Department of Justice to investigate the applicability of the 1932 
Lindbergh law, Title 18, Section 408-A of the United States Code, which made it a federal crime 
to transport a kidnapping victim across state lines.
  
213  A few days later, J. Dixon Speakman of 
Vanderbilt’s office filed complaints not only under the Lindbergh Law, but also an 1870 civil 
rights statute.214
The Department of Justice was skeptical of the kidnapping claim. Even sympathetic 
reporters acknowledged that the law required ransom or torture, neither of which was involved in 
Thomas’s ejection from New Jersey.
   
215
                                                                                                                                                                                           
210 “Roosevelt Avoids Comment on Hague,” New York Times, 11 May 1938.  After the May Day incident, Thomas 
applied for permits to speak in Journal Square on May 17 or 24 and then to speak on any street on May 24 or June 7.  
Casey denied the permits but invited a legal challenge. “Jersey City Bars Thomas Talk Again,” New York Times, 21 
May 1938.  
  Attorney General Homer S. Cummings agreed to 
211 “Ban on Thomas Rally in Jersey City Upheld,” New York Times, 19 October 1938. Thomas appealed to the Court 
of Errors and Appeals.  ACLU Press Release, 19 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042. 
212 “Thomas Loses Point in Court,” New York Times, 21 October 1938; “Appeals Speech Ban,” New York Times, 21 
January 1939; “Jersey High Court Gets Thomas Case,” New York Times, 10 February 1939.  In November 1939, the 
Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the State Supreme Court’s refusal to grant a writ, claiming that the issue had 
become moot. “Jersey High Court Ends Thomas Suit,” New York Times, 30 November 1939.  
213 “Thomas Asks U.S. to Sift Ousting,” New York Times, 2 May 1938; “Hague Police Oust Thomas From City,” 
New York Times, 1 May 1938.   
214 “Hague and Thomas Almost Collide,” New York Times, 4 May 1938. 
215 “More Light Needed,” New York Times, 10 September 1938. 
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consider the argument, given that Thomas had employed “very eminent counsel.”216  The more 
plausible avenue for prosecution, however—one which was the Workers Defense League had 
advocated in Jersey City as early as December 1937217—was Title 18, Section 51 of the criminal 
code.  Section 51 and its companion provision, Section 52, were passed during Reconstruction to 
protect black southerners from vigilante violence and from other forms of interference with the 
rights newly secured to them by the federal government.218  In 1938, they were among just a 
handful of federal statutes criminalizing the deprivation of civil liberties.  As Dean Dinwoodey 
commented for the New York Times, their use raised “the problem of the affirmative powers of 
the Federal Government to protect constitutional guarantees against alleged infringement.”219
Section 51 provided for a five thousand dollar fine and up to one year in prison for 
conspiracy “to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or 
enjoyment” of any right “secured by” the United States Constitution or a federal statute. 
Although the law seemingly implicated a broad range of private interference with such rights, the 
courts had interpreted it narrowly. In 1938, it was thought to reach only such manifestly national 
rights as voting in congressional elections, performing the duties of public office, reporting 
violations of federal law, and freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude. It had been 
employed primarily in voting rights cases (most notably, in Kansas City), but on one occasion, in 
 
                                                          
216 “Kidnapping Data on Thomas Sought,” New York Times, 21 September 1938. 
217 Lucile Milner to Roger Baldwin, 31 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051 (“David Clendenin 
phoned to suggest that action be brought at Jersey City under the federal civil rights statute and they wanted you to 
take it up either with the Department of Justice or put it up to Morris Ernst.”). 
218 See generally 162 A.L.R. 1373 (1946); Adam G. Safwat, “Note: Section 241 and the First Amendment: Avoiding 
a False Conflict through Proper Mens Rea Analysis,” Duke Law Journal 43 (1993): 625–70.  For an analysis of why 
the Civil Right Section eventually abandoned reliance on Section 51, see Risa Lauren Goluboff, The Lost Promise of 
Civil Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 136–38.  In 1948, the provisions were recodified as 18 
U.S.C. 241 and 242.  They were interpreted by the Supreme Court in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); 
United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951) (prosecution under Section 241); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 
97 (1951) (prosecution under Section 242); and United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1965).  
219 Dean Dinwoodey, “Basic Law Is Examined in Light of Hague Ban,” New York Times, 29 May 1938. Dinwoodey, 
an intellectual property scholar, was the first president of the Bureau of National Affairs.  
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United States v. Wheeler, it had been invoked under circumstances much like Jersey City’s.220 
The ACLU had good reason to be familiar with that case, which involved the perpetrators of the 
1917 Bisbee deportation of IWW miners.221  Federal prosecutors alleged in Wheeler that the 
sheriff and townspeople who deposited the Arizona miners in neighboring New Mexico, and 
threatened them with death should they return, had violated the “right and privilege pertaining to 
citizens of [Arizona] to be immune from unlawful deportation from that state to another state.”222  
The Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument, holding (without discussing the fact 
that local law enforcement was instrumental in the episode) that the ejection of the miners by 
individuals was a matter for state law. The District Court had emphasized that no federal statute 
had been violated, as the federal kidnapping statute applied only to abductions into slavery, 
involuntary servitude, and peonage223
The Department of Justice rescued Section 51 from disuse in the fall of 1937, when it 
obtained an indictment against dozens of coal companies, executives, and public officials in 
Harlan County, Kentucky for conspiracy to violate the NLRA.  According to one ACLU board 
member, it was an ACLU pamphlet that supplied the idea.
—a failing that was not remedied until passage of the 
Lindbergh Law.  
224 The Pittsburgh Courier, a 
prominent black newspaper, wryly pronounced it “rather singular that neither Mr. Cummings 
[nor] any of his predecessors, Republican or Democratic, have ever previously been able to find 
this law or to talk about using it where and when colored people were concerned.”225
                                                          
220 Ibid. 
  Still, 
221 United States v. Wheeler, 254 F. 611 (D. Ariz. 1918), affirmed, United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).  
See Chapter 2. 
222 Wheeler, 254 F. at 613.  
223 Ibid., 616.  
224 William Fennell to Roger Baldwin, 19 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078 (“[T]he use which the 
Department of Justice is making of the ‘Deprivation of Civil Rights Statute,’ as enacted in Reconstruction days, in 
the Harlan trial and, as announced yesterday, in Jersey City, was suggested in our pamphlet.”). 
225 “Mr. Cummings Uncovers A Law,” Pittsburgh Courier, 28 May 1938.  
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Harlan County was a good candidate for application of the statute.  It had been the site of 
publicly sanctioned anti-union terrorism for a decade, and in 1937, the La Follette Committee 
had uncovered murders, assaults, and interference with UMW organizing efforts on the part of 
the county’s “coal barons and deputized thugs.”226 All efforts to curb the violence and secure 
miners’ rights in state courts—by the ACLU, among other actors—had failed.227  As the 
Department of Justice considered possible courses of action in the Thomas case, its attorneys in 
Harlan County were about to go to trial.228
On May 18, Cummings announced that he had ordered a federal assessment of the Jersey 
City situation to determine “whether any persons in Jersey City were being deprived of civil 
rights guaranteed by Federal law.”
   
229 Assistant Attorney General Brien McMahon, chief of the 
criminal division and an instrumental figure in the Harlan County prosecution, was assigned to 
head the investigation. The ACLU and CIO both eagerly offered their assistance. The chair of a 
New Jersey legislative committee that had examined Hudson County elections requested that its 
findings be incorporated into the civil rights inquiry.230
                                                          
226 On Harlan County, see “Labor: Case of Mary Helen,” Time, 30 May 1938. 
  The New York Post, which had recently 
filed in federal court for an injunction against interference with the distribution of its papers, 
celebrated the Department of Justice investigation as “the action that we have been expecting 
227 Throughout the 1930s, the ACLU had been actively engaged in combating anti-union violence in the coalfields of 
Harlan and Bell Counties in southeastern Kentucky.  In 1932, Arthur Garfield Hays announced that he was 
dispatching an ACLU delegation to the area; when a local prosecutor threatened violence, he sought an injunction in 
federal court, which was denied on the basis that Bell and Harlan Counties had a right to be “protected from free 
speech.” When an ACLU party nonetheless attempted to enter Bell County, it was blocked at the border. Hays sued 
in federal court for damages. American Civil Liberties Union, “Sweet Land of Liberty,” 1931–1932 (New York: 
American Civil Liberties Union, 1932), 4.  
228 “69 Must Stand Trial,” New York Times, 27 January 1938 (“The case represents the first criminal action 
undertaken against corporations and individuals accused of conspiracy to deny to workers the right of collective 
bargaining and other privileges guaranteed under the Wagner act.”); Raymond Daniell, “Harlan Mine Trial Opens in 
Tense Air,” New York Times, 17 May 1938; “U.S. Opens Inquiry To Find If Hague Bars Civil Rights,” New York 
Times, 19 May 1938. 
229 “U.S. to Investigate Hague’s Rule To Learn If It Flouts Civil Rights,” New York Herald-Tribune, 19 May 1938. 
230 “Broader Inquiry on Hague Urged,” New York Times, 22 May 1938. 
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from an Administration led by a man who now stands as the world’s foremost exponent and 
defender of the principles of democracy.”231
 In practice, however, the Jersey City investigation proceeded half-heartedly.  According 
to Thomas, the Roosevelt administration was reluctant to antagonize Mayor Hague, who had 
become one of the staunchest and most reliable supporters of the President and his agenda.  A 
federal grand jury considered indictments under the Lindbergh Law and Section 51 in July and, 
at Thomas’s urging, requested further investigation by the Department of Justice and the FBI.
 
232  
In early September, newspapers reported that the Department was dropping the case.233 A few 
weeks later, Cummings’s office—which, in Thomas’s assessment, was pursuing the case “like a 
man who is looking for a job but hopes he will never find one”—announced that the inquiry was 
still ongoing.234 The New York Times surmised that allegations of “political influence” had 
exerted “strong pressure” on the Department of Justice; even New Deal liberals had “loudly 
clamored for action.”235 In the end, two special assistant attorneys general, Welly K. Hopkins 
and Henry Schweinhaut (both of whom had assisted in the Harlan County prosecution), 
assembled well supported indictments.236 The grand jury, which was drawn from Hudson 
County, declined to indict, but Hopkins and Schweinhaut promised a new and more sweeping 
investigation before jurors from the entire state.237
                                                          
231  Ibid.; “Washington Begins to Move Against Hague,” New York Post, 19 May 1938. 
  At the Department’s request, the ACLU and 
232 “FBI Asked to Sift Thomas ‘Seizure,’” New York Times, 6 July 1938. 
233 “Hague Is Cleared in Federal Inquiry,” New York Times, 8 September 1938; “More Light Needed,” New York 
Times, 10 September 1938. 
234 “Kidnapping Data on Thomas Sought,” New York Times, 21 September 1938. When Arthur Garfield Hays wrote 
to Attorney General Cummings, he was informed that the press report was unauthorized and “entirely erroneous.” 
Arthur Garfield Hays to Homer S. Cummings, 8 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041; Gordon Dean 
(Special Executive Assistant to the Attorney General) to Arthur Garfield Hays, 10 September 1938, ACLU Papers, 
reel 165, vol. 2041. 
235 “Thomas’s Charges Go to Grand Jury,” New York Times, 29 September 1938; “Hague Linked to Roosevelt,” Los 
Angeles Times, 3 June 1938 (“Hague’s Congressmen have a record of supporting Roosevelt legislation and Hague’s 
control of the W.P.A. in Jersey City gives him one of the greatest sources of power.”).  
236 “Federal Grand Jury Will Hear Thomas,” New York Times, 16 October 1938. 
237 “No Charges Voted in Hague Inquiry,” New York Times, 19 November 1938. 
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New Jersey Civil Liberties Union sent the Attorney General a 60-page report listing 89 court 
cases, directly involving nearly two thousand people and organizations, related to civil liberties 
violations in Hudson County between 1930 and 1938. The authors emphasized that the cases 
included were representative but by no means exhaustive, as many local lawyers had not 
responded to the organization’s survey.238 The ACLU was frustrated with the pace of the federal 
investigation but confident that the Department would give the report appropriate 
consideration.239
 Civil liberties advocates applied equivalent pressure to other political bodies and 
officials, with similarly unimpressive results. Thirty-two members of Congress called for 
Hague’s appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, presumably 
without expectation of his compliance.
 
240 Meanwhile, the Workers Defense League and other 
groups asked President Roosevelt to censure Hague publicly for his “lawless conduct.”  
Representative O’Connell described Hague’s “mobsters, thugs and gunmen” and asked the 
President to intervene.241
                                                          
238 Sol D. Kapelsohn to New Jersey Civil Liberties Union, 9 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041; 
Sol. D. Kapelsohn to Homer S. Cummings, 7 November 1938, ACLU Papers,  reel 165, vol. 2041. 
 Roosevelt was sufficiently disturbed to request a meeting with the 
239 Categories of oppression included in the report were interference, disbandment, or prevention of public meetings; 
censorship of publications; interference with leaflet and pamphlet distribution, often through arrests under local 
ordinances already declared invalid; interference with newspaper distribution and confiscation of newspapers; 
arrests for possession of printed matter; arrests for refusal to resign from targeted organizations; search and seizure 
of persons and property; arrests for requesting information about people previously arrested; police brutality; 
“deportation” of undesirable people from Jersey City; illegal police confiscation of restaurant licenses and closing of 
retails stores without hearing; prevention of parades; denial of right to counsel; excessive bail and denial of bail; 
prevention of picketing and arrest of peaceful pickets during strikes; and interference with union management. 
American Civil Liberties Union and New Jersey Civil Liberties Union, Report to the Attorney General of the United 
States on Interference with Labor and Civil Rights in Hudson County, New Jersey, November 1938, ACLU Papers, 
reel 165, vol. 2041. 
240 “‘Free Speech’ Test Trial Opens Today,” Jersey (City) Journal, 1 June 1938. 
241 Jerry O’Connell to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 9 May 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, folder 
Civil Liberties 1933–1945. O’Connell called upon Roosevelt to demand Hague’s immediate resignation from his 
position as Vice-Chair of the Democratic National Committee.  After receiving the letter, the President requested a 
meeting with the Attorney General Cummings about the case. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Memorandum, 14 May 1938, 
Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, folder Civil Liberties 1933–1945.  Cummings thought it would be undesirable 
for the President to respond to the letter and advised him to ask a staff member to acknowledge its receipt and 
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Attorney General, but Cummings advised him not to become directly involved.242  A few days 
later, when Upton Sinclair wrote to suggest prosecution of Hague for conspiracy to deprive 
citizens of their civil rights, the President’s Appointments Secretary, Marvin H. McIntyre, was 
tempted “just to file [the] telegram.”243  In late June, a group of clergy members, including one 
of Roosevelt’s Harvard classmates, requested an audience to discuss Hague’s policies. McIntyre 
wired that it would be impossible to arrange a conference with the President in the foreseeable 
future, and the delegation was invited to meet with the Attorney General instead.244
The ACLU was hesitant to pressure Roosevelt directly.
  
245  Many board members were 
staunch New Dealers, and Morris Ernst was a frequent correspondent and informal advisor to the 
President, as well as an occasional houseguest in Hyde Park.246  But in early May, when 
Roosevelt dismissed the issue as a “local police matter,” a vocal minority within the organization 
demanded an ACLU response.247 William Fennell, who regularly chastised the administration 
for its infringements on the “civil liberties” of New Deal critics (including employers regulated 
by the NLRA248
                                                                                                                                                                                           
propose a future meeting. Homer Cummings to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 18 May 1938, Roosevelt Papers, Official File 
1581, folder Civil Liberties 1933–1945. 
), denounced the President’s “weasel words” and admonished the ACLU to 
242 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Memorandum, 14 May 1938, Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, folder Civil Liberties 
1933–1945; Homer Cummings to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 18 May 1938, Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, folder 
Civil Liberties 1933–1945. Cummings suggested that a member of the President’s staff acknowledge receipt of the 
letter and propose a future meeting with O’Connell to discuss the matter. Roosevelt followed his advice.  
243 M. H. McIntyre to Attorney General, 16 May 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, folder Civil 
Liberties 1933–1945. Cummings thought there would be no harm in acknowledging receipt and indicating that the 
matter had been referred to the Department of Justice for consideration. Upton Sinclair to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 
May 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official 1581, folder Civil Liberties 1933-1945; M. H. McIntyre to Homer 
Cummings, 16 May 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, folder Civil Liberties 1933–1945; 
Homer Cummings to M. H. McIntyre, 17 May 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, folder Civil 
Liberties 1933–1945. 
244 William Spofford to Roger Baldwin, 25 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042.  
245 E.g., Roger Baldwin to William Fennell, 17 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078 (“Our Board came to 
the conclusion yesterday that Mayor Hague’s political position in the Democratic Party is none of our business.”). 
246 See Guest Log, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.  
247 “Roosevelt Sees Hague Fight as ‘Local Matter,’” New York Herald-Tribune, 11 May 1938. 
248 See Chapter 6.  
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“plac[e] blame where it belongs,” lest it become a “party to this buck-passing game.”249 Fennell 
was adamant that while Roosevelt was “making a tremendous mistake,” the ACLU would be 
making “even a greater one if it passes by this ‘wink and a nod’ attitude of the President to the 
flagrant conditions in Jersey City.”250  The board was evidently persuaded, because on May 26 it 
urged Roosevelt, as well as Postmaster General and DNC chair James Farley, “to ‘consider the 
propriety’ of retaining Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City as Vice-Chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee in the light of his ‘flagrant opposition to the policies of the National 
Administration.’”251  Eventually the President addressed the situation, but only obliquely.  In a 
move with which the New York Times thought “all thoughtful Americans, ‘conservatives’ and 
‘liberals,’ supporters and opponents of the Administration, [could] wholeheartedly agree,” he 
announced in a fireside chat that “the American people [would] not be deceived by any one who 
attempts to suppress individual liberty under the pretense of patriotism.”252  Although there was 
“no possibility of misunderstanding” the passage, the President refused to rebuke Mayor Hague 
by name.253
The La Follette Committee, too, disappointed the free speech forces.  After repeated pleas 
from Norman Thomas and the ACLU, the Committee indicated that it would launch an 
investigation over the summer if funds permitted.
  
254
                                                          
249 William Fennel to Roger Baldwin, 11 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078.  
 When the Senate approved the Committee’s 
requested appropriation (with significant help from an ACLU publicity campaign), Baldwin 
250 William Fennel to Morris Ernst, 18 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078.  
251 ACLU Bulletin 818, 26 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063; ACLU to James A. Farley (Chair, 
Democratic National Committee), 24 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
252 Brendan Sexton, Workers Defense League, to Members, 23 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 17, vol. 2063; “The 
President’s Address,” New York Times, 26 June 1938. 
253 “The President’s Address,” New York Times, 26 June 1938 (“It means Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City and 
those who may be tempted to employ his policies in other sections of the country.”). 
254 “Jersey Fuehrer Slipping,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (June 1938), 1; “Senate Plans Hague Inquiry This Summer,” 
New York Herald-Tribune, 22 May 1938. 
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assumed that its future work would cover Jersey City.255  By September, however, there was no 
indication that the Committee intended to act.  A letter from sixty prominent liberals “earnestly 
request[ing]” an investigation of the “extraordinary and open defiance of constitutional 
guarantees” in Jersey City was similarly fruitless, despite the inclusion of eight members of 
Congress.256 In November, Baldwin stated that he had “canvassed [the] situation thoroughly” 
and concluded that no Senate inquiry was forthcoming. He related the Committee’s explanation 
that “funds [were] limited and that they had other work previously scheduled.” He also accepted 
La Follette’s professed desire not to step in where other federal agencies, that is, the Department 
of Justice and Judge Clark, were already involved. Despite the ACLU’s utmost efforts in the 
public arena, the Jersey City situation was a matter for the federal courts.257
 
  
Hague v. CIO 
 By the spring of 1938, Jersey City was a stomping ground for individuals and 
organizations determined to make their mark in the civil liberties fight.  Roger Baldwin, though 
he advocated greater coordination of the anti-Hague forces, was heartened by the widespread 
interest.258  When one ACLU board member (and Communist sympathizer) advised a civil 
liberties sympathizer to direct his donations toward the ACLU instead of Norman Thomas259
                                                          
255 Roger Baldwin to Robert La Follette, 24 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
—it 
made him “rather tired to see Norman and the Workers Defense crashing in and refusing all the 
256 Letter to Hon. Robert La Follette, Jr., 13 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041; ACLU Press 
Release, 16 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
257 Roger Baldwin to John Longo, 4 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042. 
258 Board Minutes, 2 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. The Board voted to extend an offer of 
cooperation to Vanderbilt if he represented Norman Thomas on the deportation issue.  
259 Thomas intended to take his state court case to the United States Supreme Court, if necessary, and he was 
soliciting funds for court fees and other expenses. Norman Thomas to William Cochran, 4 November 1938, ACLU 
Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
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time to play the game in a united front,” he explained—Baldwin demurred.260 Indeed, he felt that 
a “diversified attack is all to the good.”261
Morris Ernst, however, had a different view of the situation. When Arthur Garfield Hays 
invited arrest by making an impromptu address from the roof of a car in late May, the press 
hailed him “as the first man to defy the Hague ban on free speech in Jersey City and get away 
with it.”
   
262
 Although Ernst opposed Hays’s involvement in the realm of legal as well as direct action, 
he considered it important to enlist the assistance of local counsel.
  Ernst did not share the general enthusiasm.  “I have all along been opposed to small 
groups going in here to speak,” he told a reporter.  Ernst thought such small-scale displays 
merely played into Mayor Hague’s hands.  For Ernst, the heart of the Jersey City campaign was 
the injunction proceeding in the federal district court, and he did not want other parties, even his 
co-counsel at the ACLU, meddling with his plans.   
263  To that end, it was Dean 
Spaulding Frazer of the Newark Law School who filed the ACLU and CIO’s complaint.264
                                                          
260 William Spofford to Roger Baldwin, 14 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041.  
  The 
plaintiffs claimed that the CIO’s sole objective in Jersey City was to educate workers regarding 
their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. The ACLU had offered to assist the CIO in 
light of its own mission, namely, to protect “the rights to freedom of speech, the press, and 
261 Roger Baldwin to William Spofford, 15 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
262 Hays repeatedly asked a police officer to arrest him, but the officer, after phoning headquarters, refused to do so. 
The car-top speech followed an address to the outdoor overflow crowd at an anti-Hague rally in Fairmount Hall. 
“CIO Seeking Truce with Hague, Based on Park for Free Speech,” New York World-Telegram, 20 May 1938, ACLU 
Papers, reel 162, vol. 2021; “Hague Cop Silent As Hays Delivers Speech in Street,” New York Post, 20 May 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020.  
263 Roger Baldwin to Lucile Milner, 25 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063 (asking Milner to notify Hays 
that Ernst would be representing the ACLU in the Jersey City case and was “opposed to any more lawyers coming 
in,” though noting that there was no animosity between Hays and Ernst). Early on, Ernst and Frazer were both 
angered when Abraham Isserman and Samuel Rothbard claimed to be CIO counsel and announced plans to file a 
suit in federal court. Morris Ernst to Lee Pressman, 28 December 1937, Ernst Papers, box 273, folder 3. 
264 Suit was filed in January 1938, in the wake of Hague’s promise at the armory rally to bar “subversive 
Communist[s]” from Jersey City. “C.I.O Seeks Writ to ‘Stop’ Hague, New York World-Telegram, 7 January 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2020. The plaintiffs were the ACLU, the CIO, three New Jersey CIO unions, and six 
CIO organizers. Attorneys for the plaintiffs were Frazer, Ernst, David Stoffer, and Benjamin Kaplan. The defendants 
were represented by James Hamill, Charles Herschenstein, Edward O’Mara, Joseph Glaving, and John Matthews.  
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assembly, as guaranteed to the people by the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitutions of the respective states.”265
The complaint named as defendants Mayor Hague, Daniel Casey, and Harry Walsh, 
individually and in their official capacities, along with the Board of Commissioners. It described 
in detail the thwarted CIO organizing drive of November 1937—with its deportations, illegal 
searches, and confiscation of CIO literature—along with other efforts by the ACLU and CIO to 
hold meetings and distribute materials in Jersey City (it was subsequently amended to include the 
attempted speeches by Representative O’Connell and Norman Thomas as well
 No one, they emphasized, had intended to advocate the 
overthrow of the local or United States governments.  
266). The plaintiffs 
argued that Jersey City’s leaflet and meeting ordinances were unconstitutional, and they sought 
to enjoin municipal officials from interfering with public and private meetings, picketing, the 
distribution of literature, and lawful CIO labor activity.267 The actions of Jersey City officials, 
they claimed, violated the Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution; the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the National Labor Relations Act; and the “Civil Rights Act of the United States, 
which declares criminal conspiracies to injure persons in the exercise of their civil rights secured 
to them by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”268
 Hague v. CIO went to trial on June 1, 1938, after early attempts to reach a settlement fell 
apart.
     
269
                                                          
265 Complaint, 3.  
  The case was heard by Judge William Clark, the same judge who had decided Hays’s 
266 Russell B. Porter, “Court Will Bar Hague Reprisals,” New York Times, 3 June 1938.  
267 Complaint, 18; ACLU Bulletin 798, 15 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
268 Complaint, 15–16.  
269 On May 21, newspapers reported that John L. Lewis, head of the CIO, had agreed to Ernst’s proposed creation of 
a free speech park and that officials close to Hague had encouraged him to accept a settlement. “Jersey City Free 
Speech Arena Urged,” New York Daily News, 21 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 162, vol. 2021. Negotiations soon 
fell apart, however, as Hague refused to budge and many of Ernst’s allies opposed the compromise measure.  “Foes 
of Hague Are Split on Tactics to Bring About a Settlement,” New York World-Telegram, 21 May 1938, ACLU 
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injunction suit in the ACLU’s favor the previous year.  As a concession to civil liberties 
advocates, President Roosevelt had promised Morris Ernst that he would nominate Clark to the 
Court of Appeals; the appointment was confirmed in the midst of the trial, and Clark had to 
obtain permission from the Third Circuit to sit as a district judge in order to finish hearing the 
case.270  Unsurprisingly, Clark was sympathetic to the anti-Hague forces. He repeatedly 
admonished Hague and the defense team to adopt a more respectful tone, and he made a number 
of interjections on behalf of the plaintiffs. On one occasion, reflecting on “the difference between 
actual government and paper constitutions,” he quoted the free speech provisions of the Soviet 
constitution. “I don’t know whether I will be accused of being a Communist,” he added 
tellingly.271
The courtroom testimony unfolded along predictable lines. Witnesses recounted 
numerous episodes of interference with CIO meetings, leaflet distributions, and other organizing 
activities, and the deportations, violence, and other abusive practices employed by the Jersey 
City police. They described court proceedings in which CIO organizers were deprived of basic 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Papers, reel 162, vol. 2021.  It is unclear what talks actually occurred. Ernst disputed the representations in the New 
York World-Telegram; he claimed in private correspondence that the story was “a basic absurdity” and that the CIO 
would never have permitted an article claiming that the CIO was seeking a settlement.  Morris Ernst to Abraham 
Isserman, 23 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063; Abraham Isserman to Morris Ernst, 31 May 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063.  On May 26, Jersey City counsel James Hamill urged the court to issue a consent 
decree on points that he claimed were undisputed.  He was willing to make significant concessions (presumably to 
avoid the negative publicity of a trial) and was firm only on the city’s authority to require permits for street 
meetings.  Frazer insisted on his right to try the case, but at Judge Clark’s urging, he agreed to draft an injunction 
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if every allegation of their bill were sustained.”  Stenographer’s Minutes, 26 May 1938, Hague District Court 
Papers. Hamill presented it to Hague, who indignantly refused to “enter into any compact whatsoever with these red 
and radical groups.” “Civil Rights Pact Rejected by Hague,” New York Times, 28 May 1938.  
270 William Fennel to Morris Ernst, 18 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078; Russell B. Porter, “Hague 
Holds Reds Lack Civil Rights,” New York Times, 17 June 1938. Clark was sworn in on July 5. “Clark Takes Oath as 
Appeals Judge,” New York Times, 6 July 1938.  
271 Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 1255–56.  
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legal rights.  They reported conversations with private hall owners who were unwilling to rent 
their facilities after receiving threats from city officials.272
Daniel Casey, called as a witness for the plaintiffs, testified that as Commissioner of 
Public Safety he was solely responsible for decisions whether to grant meeting permits.
  
273 To 
Ernst, Casey’s prophylactic denial of permits to forestall rioting was a patently unconstitutional 
example of prior restraint. It was also a bridge to totalitarianism. “[T]he operation of preventive 
devices in anticipation of overt acts is the threshold of a dictatorship, no question about it,” he 
declared. “It is the Hitler, the Stalin, the Mussolini, the Japan of today; they all start in the same 
pattern. They say ‘We have got to prevent disorder; we have got to do it in advance.’”274
The climax of the trial was the four-day “direct examination” of Hague, who appeared as 
the plaintiffs’ principal witness.  Ernst and Frazer hoped that Hague’s sense of infallibility would 
prove self-defeating, and they were not disappointed. The mayor frequently referred to himself in 
the third person, and he routinely answered questions over the objections of his own counsel.
 
275 
Though he professed to “have no desire to stop anybody from talking,”276 he openly conceded 
his restrictive policies and practices, with the sole exception of coercing halls owners to rent to 
CIO speakers (he explained that a “mere expression” of displeasure would be sufficient to induce 
proprietors to close their doors).277
                                                          
272 Russell B. Porter, “Hague at Hearing on His CIO Ban,” New York Times, 2 June 1938.  
 In his view, the seizure of subversive literature and the 
prevention of radical meetings were wholly justified in the interest of public safety.  The proper 
means of dealing with potential insurgents was to “suppress them,” he explained, “just as we are 
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suppressing them in this case.”278
Hague adopted a largely cooperative stance on the witness stand as long as Frazer 
handled the questioning.  Once Ernst took over, however, Hague abandoned the “congenial 
manner” he had assumed during the first two days.  When his lawyer tried to prevent him from 
answering a potentially damaging line of inquiry, Hague ignored him and challenged Ernst to 
“go to the limit.” Borrowing a metaphor from his favorite pastime, he told Ernst to “go right after 
it” and “take the gloves off.”
  On the issue of deportation, he insisted that eviction was “a 
favor” compared with arrest.   
279  “At times the scene took on the aspect of a Donnybrook fair,” 
wrote New York Times correspondent Russell Porter, “with the Mayor and Mr. Ernst both 
shouting at each other, and the Mayor’s lawyers also yelling at the top of their voices in a bedlam 
through which nothing could be clearly heard.”280 According to Hague, Ernst had fooled 
President Roosevelt and the New York Governor Herbert Lehman into thinking he was a liberal. 
Hague, however, would not be duped. When Ernst attempted to contain Hague’s longwinded 
answers, Hague scornfully accused the lawyer of attempting to curtail his freedom of speech.281
To Hague (as the New York Times put it), “Americanism and law and order, not free 
speech and constitutional rights” were the values at stake in Jersey City.
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280 Ibid. 
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issue” and argued that “the right of free speech is not and never was involved.” Ibid., 2148–49. Interestingly, in 
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court that the “question of free speech . . . [was] not involved in this controversy.”283  He was 
unmoved by Ernst’s suggestion that he, as a Jew, and Hague, as a Catholic, should be 
particularly mindful of the First Amendment’s protection of minority rights.284  To Hague, those 
who advocated revolution were simply not entitled to the protections of the Constitution—
anyone who demanded civil rights could be expected to have “a Russian flag under his coat.”  A 
broad range of organizations came within Hague’s definition of Communism, from the American 
Labor Party to the IWW.285  Indeed, according to Hague all of the CIO’s leaders were 
Communists, with the inexplicable exception of founder John L. Lewis.286 So were Norman 
Thomas, Representatives O’Connell (who was “ten communists287”) and Bernard, Roger 
Baldwin, and the worst offender, Morris Ernst.288
Hague insisted that his peculiar classifications were grounded in experience. After 
spending a few days in Russia in 1936, he professed to be an expert on all things Communist.  
He also relied heavily on the report of the 1930 Fish Congressional Committee, which identified 
the ACLU and the Garland Fund as pivotal Communist organizations (notably, even Hamilton 
Fish was critical of Hague’s anti-speech policy).
   
289
                                                                                                                                                                                           
arguing against federal jurisdiction, Hershenstein claimed that the rights to organize, rent halls, and picket were 
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  Hague claimed that the true purpose of the 
attempted CIO meetings was to overthrow the government—an effort that the organization 
283 Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 1077.  
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American Labor Party to the IWW.  
287 “Civil Liberties Hour: Civil Rights and Mayor Hague,” WEVD Broadcast, 27 November 1938, ACLU papers, 
reel 161, vol. 2014. 
288 Ernst and Hague sparred over Ernst’s purported Communist affiliation.  Ernst admitted to founding the 
Newspapers Guild and the National Lawyers Guild, but emphasized that Franklin Roosevelt, while Governor of 
New York, had appointed him to the Banking Commission and that Governor Herbert Lehman had also appointed 
him to high office. Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 1262, 1267.  
289 “Thomas Sees Law Defeating Hague,” New York Times, 25 November 1938. The Garland Fund was established 
at Baldwin’s instigation, and Ernst and Thomas were both board members. On the Garland Fund, see Samson, 
American Fund for Public Service.  
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initiated during the 1936–1937 (AFL) seamen’s strike, when it dispatched five hundred “strong-
arm men and killers” to the city, of which Morris Ernst was the alleged “master mind.”290 
Indeed, Hague was sufficiently concerned by the imminent threat of Communist invasion to 
advocate the deportation of alien radicals from the United States and the creation of a 
concentration camp in Alaska for citizen “Reds.”291
Hague intended to buttress his claims that the plaintiffs in the case were Communist 
operatives (and thus came to the court with unclean hands
  
292). His attorneys issued sweeping 
subpoenas to the CIO, the ACLU, and many of the individuals who had been denied permits by 
Commissioner Casey.293  Hague promised in his testimony to prove that Ernst, as treasurer of the 
Garland Fund, was responsible for supplying “all the funds to the active Communistic groups in 
the country” and to expose Ernst as a “known Communist” in the process. In fact, he claimed 
confidently that Ernst, “when he gets on this stand,” would be “made to admit [it].”294 In the end, 
however, the defendants declined to call any witnesses, hinting out of court that there was no 
need to mount a defense in light of the patent inadequacy of the plaintiffs’ case. Baldwin 
countered that Hague “did not dare put any of his witnesses on the stand, for fear that the 
reckless charges he has so elaborately built up and smeared on the record would collapse.”295
After such a strong showing, the plaintiffs hoped for a quick decision.  Much to their 
disappointment, Judge Clark announced that he would not issue a decision in the case before 
   
                                                          
290 Russell B. Porter, “Hague Holds Reds Lack Civil Rights,” New York Times, 17 June 1938. 
291 Russell B. Porter, “Hague Urges Exile of ‘Reds’ to Alaska to Bar Revolution,” New York Times, 15 June 1938. 
He recommended the same mechanisms for Fascists and Nazis. 
292 Hague was expected to rely on the 1902 New Jersey anti-anarchist statute. Russell B. Porter, “Hague Subpoenas 
all CIO Records,” New York Times, 10 June 1938.  
293 Subpoenas were served on Ernst for the Garland Fund, Carney for the CIO, and Harry Ward, Baldwin, and Hays 
for the ACLU. Russell B. Porter, “Hague Rests Case, Uses no Witnesses,” New York Times, 24 June 1938.   
294 Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 1051. 
295 ACLU Press Release, 23 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
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fall.296 In the interim Mayor Hague’s spin fell just as flat outside the courtroom as it had within 
it.  In early June, the Hague administration mounted a massive “Americanism” demonstration 
(“Against Communism and Against the Red Invasion”) to display its continued popularity in 
Jersey City.297 With the exception of a few stunts—the word “Bunk” was painted across some of 
the posters advertising the demonstration, and swastikas were painted under Hague’s photos298—
locals did not let their mayor down.  The New York Times estimated that half of Jersey City’s 
300,000 residents turned out for the two-hour event. Nationally, however, Hague faced 
increasing criticism across the political spectrum. Newspaper rhetoric comparing Hague to Hitler 
and Mussolini was ubiquitous during the trial, and the Americanism rally only exacerbated 
matters.299 A Washington Post editorial predicted that “those who have studied the development 
of modern dictatorship [would] find a distinctly ominous note” in the demonstration, which 
“contained, in embryonic form, many of the attributes of those Fascist or Nazi demonstrations 
which accompanied the overthrow of democracy in Italy and Germany.”  Despite its “liberal 
display of American flags,” cautioned the author, the mass display of loyalty (by a largely 
immigrant population) was distinctly un-American.300
                                                          
296 Several issues were briefed over the summer, including the defendants’ claim that the plaintiffs came to the court 
with “unclean hands.” ACLU Bulletin 829, 13 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079. 
 Hague’s credibility further plummeted 
when a Nazi radio broadcast praised Hague as a “man fighting for the cause in the United 
297 The Hudson Dispatch reprinted Hague’s “Appeal to the People,” which invited Jersey City residents to “take part 
in the greatest demonstration for Americanism ever held.” The notice also advised all homes and buildings to 
display the American flag. Hudson Dispatch (Union City, N.J.), 3 June 1938. The June 6 demonstration was 
intended “to display to the whole world that ‘America first’ is the motto of Jersey City” and to “determine whether 
communism or Americanism is to prevail in Jersey City.” “Hague Proclaims ‘Americanism’ Fete,” New York Times, 
4 June 1938. 
298 “‘Bunk’ Daubed on Posters of Hague Anti-Red Fete,” New York Times, 5 June 1938. 
299 See, e.g., “Desecration,” Baltimore Sun, 6 June 1938; “Bei Jersey-am-Hudson,” Washington Post, 6 June 1938.   
300 “New Jersey Fascists,” Washington Post, 8 June 1938.  
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States.”301 Even veterans groups began to denounce Hague for his un-American suppression of 
constitutional rights.302
For the ACLU, on the other hand, the courtroom proceedings and surrounding publicity 
were a tremendous success.  Press coverage of the trial was overwhelmingly favorable to the 
plaintiffs, and the ACLU received a “flood” of congratulatory letters from throughout the 
country, many of which were accompanied by contributions.
  
303 The challenge for the ACLU was 
to maintain its momentum over the summer. Despite widespread optimism about the outcome, 
holding the various civil liberties groups together was proving to be increasingly difficult.  Ernst 
left for vacation in July and beseeched Baldwin to “keep them all cool” in his absence. “It’s our 
luck,” he confided in Baldwin, “that Hague’s attorneys never understood all the petty jealousies 
of those organizations that want to build organizational strength on the Jersey fight, with a loss 
of sight at times as to the real objective, that is opening Jersey City.”304
Ernst thought it important that no new test cases be filed pending the decision, and the 
ACLU board urged compliance with his recommendation.
  
305
                                                          
301 Workers Defense League News Bulletin, May–June 1938, 1, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties. 
  He also thought it ill-advised to 
hold additional meetings or to spend significant funds on publicity efforts over the summer 
months.  Instead, Ernst asked Baldwin to begin preparations for disseminating the decision once 
it was handed down.  For Ernst, the greatest challenge was not the legal battle (he had “no doubt” 
about a “swell decision”), but convincing Jersey City residents that they could safely disregard 
302 See Maurice Simmons (Past commander-in-chief, United Spanish War Veterans), to Roger Baldwin, 27 May 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042; Press Release, Council of United States Veterans, 4 January 1938, Ernst 
Papers, box 275, folder 2.  A Newark American Legion post asked that the charter of the Jersey City post be revoked 
if its members appeared at the Americanism rally in their Legion regalia, invoking a charter provision proscribing 
participation in any dispute of a racial, religious, political or industrial nature. Resolution Presented to Newark Post 
1, American Legion, Newark, 7 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042. 
303 ACLU Press Release, 24 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
304 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 18 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
305 Board Minutes, 11 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078; Roger Baldwin to Morris Ernst, 7 July 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
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Hague’s will.  He wanted 100,000 copies distributed as leaflets and by mail, which would take 
“money and some real planning,” and he thought the task should be coordinated by Carney and 
“any Jersey City people or committees who will really work at the program.”306 In the meantime, 
he suggested circulating anti-Hague pamphlets to workers at the factory gates (“After all the 
courts are sounding boards working on the public and affected by the public opinion”).307
The ACLU adopted Ernst’s proposal, and in August, it initiated a “campaign to acquaint 
the people of Jersey City with the reaction throughout the nation to Mayor Frank Hague’s 
wholesale suppression of civil rights.”
  
308 Volunteers received detailed instructions on legal 
compliance and were advised not to disrupt traffic, argue with police officers, force pamphlets on 
uninterested pedestrians, or distribute pamphlets without an observer present.309 Among the 
leaflets handed out were 50,000 copies of a compilation of editorial cartoons, entitled “Candid 
Views of Mayor Hague,” lambasting Hague’s dictatorial practices.310 When local Hague 
supporters attempted to interfere, “Frankie’s police came along, ‘broke it up,’ and stood by to 
insure the peaceful distribution of the leaflets.”311
 Two months later, on October 27, 1938, Judge Clark issued an opinion in Hague v. 
CIO.
 
312 The front page of the New York Times announced, “Hague Loses CIO Fight,” and 
congratulatory letter flooded into the ACLU offices.313
                                                          
306 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 18 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
  In the days that followed, however, both 
307 Ibid.  
308 ACLU Press Release, 8 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
309 Instructions for distribution of pamphlets in Jersey City, 8 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
310 ACLU Bulletin 829, 13 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079; Lucille Milner to Morris Ernst, 12 
August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042. The ACLU published and distributed a total of four leaflets. Three 
contained excerpts from newspaper editorials, statements by prominent Americans, and newspaper cartoons, 
respectively. The fourth was a compilation of Hague’s public statements and testimony at trial. “Jersey City Court 
Decision Awaited,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (September 1938). 
311 Jerome Britchey to Morris Ernst, 17 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2042. 
312 Hague v. CIO, 25 F. Supp. 127 (D.N.J. 1938).  
313 E.g., Solomon Golat to Morris Ernst, 31 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
370 
 
sides declared victory.314 As expected, the court decided in the plaintiffs’ favor on the issues of 
deportation,315 literature distribution,316 and the right to carry placards.317  It also held that the 
city’s past policy for allocating meeting permits was impermissible. According to Ernst however, 
there was “only one point really open as a matter of law”318—and on that issue, Clark’s language 
was discouraging.319
 To Ernst, holding that the meeting ordinance was unconstitutionally administered was not 
enough. Rather, he saw the Hague case as a “chance to upset all of the damn ordinances.”
  
320 He 
conceded that municipalities could legitimately consider traffic in regulating public gatherings, 
but in his view, that was the limit of their discretion.321  Ernst argued at trial that the recent First 
Amendment cases—Near, DeJonge, and Lovell—had rendered any law providing for 
“precensorship of what a man may say” unconstitutional.322 He conceded that the law had not 
always been on his side,323 but he assured Judge Clark that the Supreme Court would strike 
down the Jersey City ordinance as unconstitutional.324
                                                          
314 “Hague Loses CIO Fight,” New York Times, 28 October 1938; “Clark Tells Hague,” Newark Sunday Call, 30 
October 1938. 
 Clark was was impressed by the gravity of 
the problem before him. In fact, he thought that the preservation of a “democratic form of 
government” depended on its “sound solution,” and he expressed his hope that the Supreme 
315 Hague, 25 F. Supp. at 142 (“[N]either a city, a state, not the nation can resort to the banishment of its citizens 
even after a compliance with the due process and fair trial requirements and even as a punishment for crime.  Any 
such drastic power is manifestly an attribute of sovereignty. . . . Any contrary doctrine would destroy our national 
unity and relegate us to the passport system of earlier times.”). 
316 That issue was resolved by Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
317 Hague, 25 F. Supp. at 151 (“[T]he prohibition of placards must be restrained.”). 
318 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 18 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
319 The court did not consider the plaintiffs’ claims under the NLRA in light of its decision on the same claims in the 
context of the 1937 injunction, which was still pending in the Third Circuit. That case was dismissed as moot in 
December 1938.  “Old Curb on Hague Voided on Appeal,” New York Times, 14 December 1938. 
320 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 18 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
321 The court’s decision left open the question whether street meetings could be denied, as the plaintiffs had 
requested access to public parks. Clark assumed, however, that a city could deny access to all speakers. 
Communication to attorneys, 7 November 1938, Hague District Court Papers. 
322 Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 2173. 
323 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
324 Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 2259. 
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Court would settle the issues before him swiftly and surely.325
Judge Clark’s decision opened with a theoretical treatment of free speech, which featured 
excerpts from such diverse thinkers as Spinoza, Machiavelli, John Locke, Aristotle, Herbert 
Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson, and Oliver Wendell Holmes.
  In the meantime, however, he 
arrived at a compromise solution.   
326  Clark seemingly 
embraced Zechariah Chafee’s assessment that “one of the most important purposes of society 
and government is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern.”  That aim 
was made possible only by “absolutely unlimited discussion,” as force might be as easily 
asserted on the side of falsehood as of truth.  Following Chafee, Clark acknowledged that 
unfettered expression might interfere with other legitimate purposes of government (including 
“order, the training of the young, [and] protection against external aggression”) but believed that 
“freedom of speech ought to weigh very heavily” in the equation.327 “As in many matters of 
political science,” he explained, “there exists a necessity for balance,” and the trouble was to 
strike the right “adjustment of the scales.”328
                                                          
325 Ibid. See also Communication to attorneys, 7 November 1938, Hague District Court Papers. 
 That the issue was one of political science, not mere 
legal doctrine, was significant. In the years since the First World War, political scientists had 
traded in their idealistic vision of the public welfare for a hardboiled model of interest group 
pluralism.  In fact, to many, the erasure of difference in the public interest was the distinguishing 
326 Clark considered the most important book-length texts on free speech in the United States to be Schroeder, 
Constitutional Free Speech; Chafee, Freedom of Speech; Zechariah Chafee, The Inquiring Mind (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1928); Phelps, Civil Liberty; Samuel A. Dawson, Freedom of the Press: A Study of 
the Legal Doctrine of “Qualified Privilege” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924); and Lamar T. Beman, 
Selected Articles on Censorship of Speech and the Press (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1930). Hague, 25 F. 
Supp. at 136.  
327 Ibid., 129.  
328 Ibid.  
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feature of totalitarianism.329
Clark was no relativist. He believed that some ideas, some forms of government, were 
better than others.  In particular, he considered Communism “economically unworkable” and the 
methods employed in its propagation “abhorrent to all true believers in democracy”—though he 
was loathe to make martyrs of its advocates.
 Fragmentation and friction were fundamental to American 
democracy, and they were best facilitated by freedom of speech.  
330  He also believed that abusive epithets or 
inflammatory rhetoric were unlikely to persuade, and it was senseless to countenance bloodshed 
“in the effort to convert those possibly impervious to conversion.”331 In other words, productive 
political conversation required civilized public discourse, and to that end, he thought the state 
might be justified in curtailing speech where riot was truly likely to ensue.  The right of access to 
public places for the purposes of “mental recreation,” that is, “the opportunity to impart and 
receive instruction,” was limited by “the sovereign’s interest in the public peace.”332
Judge Clark was clear that Jersey City’s existing practice of denying permits to all CIO 
and ACLU speakers—a “deliberate policy” of discrimination to which Hague and Casey freely 
admitted
  
333—violated the constitutional right to free assembly.334
                                                          
329 Rodgers, Contested Truths, 208–10.  
 The CIO was pursuing the 
organization of workers into labor unions consistently with federal law, and the ACLU was 
devoted to “enforcement of the rights secured by the First Amendment and the Fourteenth 
330 Hague, 25 F. Supp. at 152.  
331 Ibid., 147.  
332 Ibid., 146.  
333 Ibid., 129 (“It has not been necessary to seek for proof of that policy in the usual unsatisfactory process of 
weighing the conflicting testimony of witnesses or in the even more unsatisfactory study of counsel’s conflicting 
interpretations of that testimony.”). 
334 Clark considered the right of assembly to be a “special form” of free speech to which the rules governing free 
speech were generally applicable. 
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Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”335
Clark was equally explicit, however, that a municipality was entitled to require permits 
for meetings in order to ensure public enjoyment and safety.
  Neither group was after radical social 
change. 
336  Relying on English case law, he 
concluded that if a speaker’s past conduct was sufficiently provocative, the city could require a 
copy of the speech to be delivered and censor it “in the light of the reasonable apprehension of 
disorder of ‘firm and courageous’ city officials.’” Alternatively, the speaker could be “bound 
over to keep the peace and be of good behavior.”337  On the other hand, a speaker who had 
observed “the decencies of discussion” in the past “should be given the full protection consistent 
with the strength of the local guardians of public safety.”338  Whether mob violence was in fact 
likely to ensue was bound to be difficult to judge.  “The effect of opinion upon the human mind 
lies in the field of psychology,” Clark conceded, and was “not an exact science.”339 Moreover, 
the danger of “mob censorship” was troubling.340  Still, the city’s determinations would be 
reviewable in the courts, and the question was “again that matter of balance.”341
                                                          
335 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 7 November 1938, 2, Hague District Court Papers.  
 Judge Clark had 
expressed the same sentiment more colloquially during the trial: “As far as public meetings are 
concerned, it might be the law, or it should be the law, rather, that if the persons who live in the 
city object to the views, and really object, I mean without fomentation or anything of that 
character, from what the speakers either have in the past expressed or say that they are about to 
express, the authorities need not permit those views to be expressed on the public streets or the 
336 Access was limited by a “municipal right of regulation” to ensure enjoyment by the public.  The city could 
require designated public spaces to be left open for recreational activities and could limit speaking engagements to 
reduce congestion.  
337 Hague, 25 F. Supp. at 146.  
338 Ibid., 147. 
339 Ibid., 130.  
340 Ibid., 147.  
341 Ibid.  
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public parks.”342
 To the Jersey City authorities, Judge Clark’s decision was an invitation to continue 
denying meeting permits to the ACLU and CIO.  In the days after the opinion was issued, the 
city announced that there would be “no let up” in the drive to exclude “radicals and Red.”
 In his opinion, Judge Clark laid down precisely that rule, though without 
addressing the issue of “fomentation.” Although the problem was posed by the Hague case itself, 
he made no provision for a municipality that actively promoted vigilantism in order to justify 
denial of a permit.  
343 
According to James Hamill, corporation counsel, Judge Clark had declared the ordinance 
constitutional. Hamill added that where the district court’s opinion differed from that of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, upholding the same ordinance in the Thomas matter, the city would 
follow the latter—a position that Spaulding Frazer cautioned would put the Jersey City 
authorities in contempt of court.344  When the New Jersey Civil Liberties Committee (on behalf 
of the Hudson County Committee for Labor’s Defense and Civil Rights) requested a permit for a 
meeting celebrating Judge Clark’s decision, Commissioner Casey denied the application.345 
Because Judge Clark had not yet filed his final order, there could be no proceedings for 
contempt. Still, Baldwin chastised Hague for “flout[ing] the dignity of the Federal Courts.”346
 As the shortcomings of Judge Clark’s opinion became clear, the ACLU abandoned its 
initial celebratory posture.  The board expressed gratification “with the general attitude 
expressed by Judge Clark” but formally instructed its counsel to oppose inclusion of the 
  
                                                          
342 Hague trial transcript, vol. 2. 
343 “Jersey Red Ban to Stay, Says Hague,” New York Journal American, 28 October 1938. 
344 “Hague Loses CIO Fight,” New York Times, 28 October 1938; “CIO Plans Contempt Action If Hague Denies 
Rally Permits,” New York Times, 29 October 1938. Frazer explained that the writ of mandamus involved in the 
Thomas case was a prerogative writ of grace, and that the federal court’s decision “when matured in a formal 
injunctive order” would be binding on Jersey City officials.  
345 Morris Ernst had not approved the application and was frustrated that it was filed prematurely.  Morris Ernst to 
Lucille Milner, 28 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
346 “Hague Aid Denies Permit for Rally,” New York Times, 30 October 1938.  
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censorship provision in the final decree. Requiring manuscripts in advance, it announced in a 
press statement, was “contrary to the principle of free speech,” “wholly unnecessary to preserve 
public order,” and “without precedent in American law.”347
 Other civil liberties advocates were equally anxious.  The International Juridical 
Association (IJA), a leftist legal organization devoted to labor law and civil liberties issues, was 
unwilling to defer to the ACLU and opted instead to take matters into its own hands.  At the 
Newark courthouse, Ernst bumped into Morris Cohen, who was carrying papers for a petition to 
intervene—prepared by IJA attorney and ACLU board member Nathan Greene.
  
348  Cohen was 
cooperative, and Ernst convinced him that “intervention could do no good and might hurt.”  Still, 
he was concerned once again by the lack of coordination.  The various groups involved in Jersey 
City were operating at cross-purposes. “What with Norman proceeding in a state court action 
bound inevitably for defeat, and other groups proceeding with intervention and other collateral 
moves, the situation is greatly confused,” he complained. “Can’t you get the group to have 
patience? They have gone for a decade with nothing but total defeats.”349  He expressed the same 
sentiment to ACLU secretary Lucille Milner. “If we only had a united front in civil liberties in a 
case like this,” he lamented, “life would be fairly simple.”350
                                                          
347 Board Minutes, 31 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080; ACLU Press Release, 31 October 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
  Ernst was “entirely convinced” that 
the “obiter dicta in regard to the reading of speeches in advance was merely dicta,” and that final 
348 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 3 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. Nathan Greene attributed 
the decision to miscommunication with the ACLU office.  Lucille Milner to Morris Ernst, 4 November 1938, ACLU 
Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. Ernst eventually dismissed the issue as “another one of these constant difficulties that 
arise which we will just have to accept as inevitable as long as some people are crusading for what appears to be, on 
the face of it, civil liberties but actually for other ends.” Morris Ernst to Lucille Milner, 5 November 1938, ACLU 
Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. On Greene and the division between liberals and radicals within the ACLU board, see 
Chapter 6. On Morris Cohen, see David A. Hollinger, Morris R. Cohen and the Scientific Ideal (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1975). 
349 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 3 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041.  
350 Morris Ernst to Lucille Milner, 28 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
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decree would be “satisfactory.”  Indeed, he told Baldwin, Clark had said as much from the 
bench.351
 Ernst turned out to be right.  The final order enjoined city officials from excluding or 
deporting the plaintiffs; from restraining them except in connection with a lawful search or 
seizure; and from interfering with their rights to distribute leaflets, converse with passersby in 
public places, or carry placards.
   
352 On the crucial issue of public meetings, it forbade the city 
“from placing any previous restraint upon or in any other manner whatsoever directly or 
indirectly interfering” with the right of the plaintiffs to hold meetings and assemblies in the open 
air and parks, “provided that an application for a permit to hold such meetings . . . has been made 
three days in advance.”353
In fact, he got more. Judge Clark did not merely require the city to stay out.  He set the 
further condition, unprecedented in the federal courts and rarely followed in subsequent 
decisions until the Civil Rights era,
  The city could refuse a permit only if the designated time or place for 
the meeting would undermine the public recreational purpose of the parks, reasonably construed.  
Morris Ernst got everything he requested. 
354
                                                          
351 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 3 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
 that the city actively prevent “interruption by such persons 
as may be present.”  In other words, he required the police to protect the plaintiffs against 
interference by hostile spectators, “provided only that such protection is reasonably consistent 
with the ability of defendants to carry out their obligations in regard to the safety of the residents 
352 Final Judgment and Decree, 7 November 1938, Hague District Court Papers. Because the court entered a 
permanent injunction (rather than a temporary injunction, as it had in the 1937 case), it could not be stayed except 
after full hearing by the Court of Appeals. ACLU Bulletin 841, 5 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 
2041. 
353 Final Judgment and Decree, 7 November 1938, Hague District Court Papers. 
354 See Owen Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State Power (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1996), 121–38.   
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of Jersey City.”355 Judge Clark’s affirmative guarantee of access had its limits. He implied that 
the city could lawfully adopt a policy of “forbidding meetings of any kind” on the public streets 
and thoroughfares.  But in those public parks that were “dedicated for the purposes of the general 
recreation of the public,” the plaintiffs were entitled to speak their minds.356
 This time, civil liberties groups were justifiably elated. The ACLU called the injunction a 
“clear-cut victory.”
  
357 The New York Post, which (to Ernst’s dismay358) had harshly criticized 
Judge Clark for his initial opinion, was “happy to pay tribute to him . . . for his splendid and 
unequivocal final decree.”359 Although the fight against Hague’s “dictatorial lawlessness” was 
not yet over, the ACLU was confident that “the power of a federal court order [would] go far 
toward winning it.”360 Judge Clark evidently shared the organization’s optimism.  In a 
communication to the attorneys involved in the case, he implicitly repudiated Hague’s posturing 
of the previous weeks.  Noting that “the passions aroused by this sort of controversy are 
disruptive of democracy,” he told the lawyers that he expected his opinion would “carr[y] 
sufficient convictions to the clients to effect a reasonable modification of their conflicting points 
of view.”361
 
 
                                                          
355 Final Judgment and Decree, 5, 7 November 1938, Hague District Court Papers. The city’s obligation would be 
terminated “by words or conduct of the plaintiffs or any of them in violation of existing law.” 
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invalid, without providing guidance for future administration.  On Hague’s application to “hostile audiences” 
problems, see Ruth McGaffey, “The Heckler’s Veto: A Reexamination,” Marquette Law Review 57 (1973): 43–48. 
357 ACLU Bulletin 842, 12 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
358 Morris Ernst to Lucille Milner, 28 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
359 “Civil Liberties Win,” New York Post, 8 November 1938. 
360 ACLU Bulletin 842, 12 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
361 Communication to Attorneys, 7 November 1938, Hague District Court Papers. 
378 
 
The ABA Committee on the Bill of Rights 
 The ACLU opted not to test the city’s compliance with Judge Clark’s warning. In mid-
November, Baldwin reported that the only activities the ACLU would pursue pending appeal 
were the distribution of the court decree and a possible meeting in New York.362 Hague 
continued his public relations campaign against the “invaders”; he accused Arthur Vanderbilt of 
unethical conduct, and he called Baldwin, Ernst, and Thomas “the three Communist leaders of 
the country.”363
On that front, the months between Judge Clark’s decree in November and the Third 
Circuit’s decision in January were momentous ones.  Procedurally, a few unusual developments 
attracted newspaper attention (for example, when the plaintiffs challenged an effort to “pack” a 
Third Circuit panel with Hague supporters).
 On the whole, however, the parties’ attention was focused on the legal 
campaign. 
364
                                                          
362 Board Minutes, 14 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
 In December, the Court of Appeals ruled that 
Judge Clark’s injunction in the Boot and Shoe Makers Union case was moot.  The Camden Post 
cited the decision as evidence of the importance of observing a national Bill of Rights week. “No 
one ever openly attacks the Bill of Rights,” it reflected, “yet it is in danger from officials and 
363 “Hague Lays Attack by Bar of 3 ‘Reds,’” New York Times, 27 December 1938; “Thomas Issues Reply to Hague 
Criticism,” New York Times, 1 January 1939 (“I am not a Communist and sharply disagree with Communists at 
many points, largely because Stalin in Russia treats liberty very much as you do in Jersey City. For this reason we 
Socialists did not have a joint May Day meeting with the Communists in New York City.”). 
364 The District Court denied Hague’s motion for a stay pending appeal. Hague then made a request for supersedeas 
in the Third Circuit.  Appellants’ Memorandum on Application for Supersedeas, in Hague v. CIO, Third Circuit 
Case No. 6939, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, National Archives and Records Administration 
Mid Atlantic Region, Philadelphia, Penn. (hereafter NARA Mid Atlantic Region), Record Group 276. The presiding 
Judge, J. Warren Davis, replaced the ordinary three-judge panel with five judges, two of whom were retired.  
Alleging that this “extraordinary behavior” had “shaken public confidence in . . . the Circuit Court of Appeals,” 
Ernst and Frazer requested a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court preventing the judges from considering the 
motion.  “Hague Foes Charge ‘Packing’ of Court,” New York Times, 20 November 1938. The Supreme Court 
declined jurisdiction in the matter.  ACLU Board Minutes, 28 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
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courts who tacitly disregard it and evade enforcement of it.” The Third Circuit’s decision was a 
“perfect example” of this phenomenon.365
But the truly noteworthy development came in the form of an amicus brief in Hague v. 
CIO.  According to the New York Times, it was a brief that “ought to stand as a landmark to 
American legal history.” It offered a lucid and compelling argument for constitutional rights, and 
it was worthy of being “spread about in all communities in which private citizens, private 
organizations or public officials dare threaten or suppress the basic guarantees of American 
liberty.” It was submitted by the American Bar Association’s Committee on the Bill of Rights.
 
366
 That committee had its origins in a public relations initiative under the presidency of 
Arthur Vanderbilt, in the wake of Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization proposal. Vanderbilt 
began contemplating proposals to improve the ABA’s image in early 1937.  In February of that 
year, Reginald Heber Smith of the Association’s Committee on Legal Aid Work wrote to request 
additional funds for his committee’s work.  He advised Vanderbilt that the ABA, out of a gross 
income of almost 250,000 dollars, “devotes to the whole subject of legal aid for poor persons the 
sum of $500.”  Smith thought people would be appalled by the figure if it were made public. He 
also speculated that increased expenditures would pay for themselves in good will.
 
367  Vanderbilt 
felt constrained to turn him down.  He explained that in light of a budget deficit made worse by 
the court packing controversy, no additional funds would be available in the foreseeable 
future.368
                                                          
365 “Why We Need a Bill of Rights Week,” Camden (N.J.) Post, 15 December 1938. 
  Still, Smith persisted. In July, he tried to convince Vanderbilt that increasing legal aid 
(and advertising the step in a “manifesto” to be printed in the nation’s newspapers) would detract 
366 “A Brief for Free Speech,” New York Times, 23 December 1938. 
367 Reginald Heber Smith to Arthur Vanderbilt, 15 February 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 115, folder Legal Aid; 
Reginald Heber Smith to Arthur Vanderbilt, 10 March 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 115, folder Legal Aid. He also 
noted that Chief Justice Hughes was the first chairman of the ABA Committee on Legal Aid Work.  
368 Arthur Vanderbilt to Reginald Heber Smith, 23 February 1937. Vanderbilt Papers, box 115, folder Legal Aid. 
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attention from the newly created National Lawyers Guild.369  The Guild, he emphasized, had 
already formed a Committee on Legal Aid and approached the National Association of Legal 
Aid Organizations to offer its assistance. Smith hoped the ABA would not “fumble the ball and 
let the Guild pick it up.”370
Although Vanderbilt never acted on Smith’s request, he found his argument compelling. 
The National Lawyers Guild posed a seemingly significant threat to the continued vitality of the 
American Bar Association.  The Guild distinguished itself from the ABA by endorsing programs 
and reform proposals “designed to promote human welfare,” such as the Child Labor 
Amendment, social security legislation, minimum wage laws, and protections for collective 
bargaining—all of which the ABA had opposed.
 
371 Its early executive committee included many 
prominent officials, academics, and politicians, including Jerome Frank, Wisconsin Governor 
Philip La Follette, and Washington Senator Homer T. Bone, as well as counsel for both the AFL 
(Charlton Ogburn) and the CIO (Lee Pressman).372
 Also on the executive committee was Morris Ernst, who was instrumental in founding 
and promoting the new organization.
  Its first president—who lived to see many of 
his most idealistic ambitions championed by prominent lawyers and implemented by the 
Roosevelt administration, before his death from a heart attack in 1939—was Frank P. Walsh.  
373
                                                          
369 The new organization was announced December 15, 1936. “Liberal Lawyers Form a New Guild,” New York 
Times, 16 December 1936.  
 Ernst was an outspoken critic of the ABA, which he 
considered a force of reaction.  He had refused to join as a young lawyer when he learned that a 
370 Reginald Heber Smith to Arthur Vanderbilt, 9 July 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 115, folder Legal Aid; Reginald 
Heber Smith to Arthur Vanderbilt, 1 July 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 115, folder Legal Aid. 
371 John Devaney, “The Quarterly,” National Lawyers Guild Quarterly 1 (December 1937): 1. The ABA’s position 
on the Child Labor Amendment was seen as particularly harmful to its reputation. George Maurice Morris to 
Frederick M. Stinchfield, 4 February 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 114, folder Correspondence Re Committee 1937.  
372 “Law Guild Is Seen in Clash with Bar,” New York Times, 1 February 1937.  
373 The New York Times reported Morris Ernst and Frank P. Walsh as the “national sponsors” and “associate 
organizers” of the Guild. “Uproar at Session of New Law Guild,” New York Times, 8 January 1937. 
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black candidate had been admitted to membership “by mistake.”374 Ernst imagined the National 
Lawyers Guild as an opportunity for a segment of the legal profession to advance the causes that 
he himself promoted in his private legal work and public service for such groups as the NAACP, 
the CIO, and the ACLU.   As the Guild’s “Call to American Lawyers” explained: “the civil 
rights of the American people are under wide-spread attack. . . . Millions of people are actually 
wanting of the necessities of life.” Lawyers were well equipped to improve social conditions, but 
the organized bar had shirked its responsibility. Worse, it had acted to block the will of the 
people as expressed in popular legislation.  It had pandered to the interests of a minority of the 
profession, for whom “concern for liberty” was “secondary to its concern for property.”375
Vanderbilt was determined to soften this widely shared perception of the ABA.  In the 
winter of 1937–1938, he launched a “Public Relations” program on behalf of the ABA,
 
376 and in 
January, a conference on the issue was convened at his request.377 To Vanderbilt, the ABA’s 
public relations problem was twofold. The first problem was the relationship between the 
Association and the membership of the bar. The ABA leadership was formulating strategies for 
undercutting the Guild’s recruitment in law schools (where students were favorably disposed to 
the “revolutionary movement at the bar”) and among economically dissatisfied attorneys.378
                                                          
374 According to the New York Times, every year “the association sends him a letter soliciting his membership; he 
writes back inquiring whether Negroes are accepted as members; and receives the reply, ‘We’re sorry, we didn’t 
know you were a Negro.’” “The Bar Association Held Reactionary,” New York Times, 23 December 1936. 
  But 
the second, more pressing problem, was the negative perception of lawyers, and the ABA in 
375 National Lawyers Guild, “A Call to American Lawyers,” Vanderbilt Papers, box 130, folder National Lawyers 
Guild. The ABA leadership believed that the organization’s policy was representative of lawyers’ views. See, e.g., 
George Maurice Morris to Charles Racine, 2 February 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 114, folder Correspondence Re 
Committee 1937 (“Views of the House of Delegates are much more likely to be representative, than either the 
Lawyers Guild or the Liberty League Committee are, of what the American  lawyers are thinking and want done.”). 
376 See, e.g., M.L.R. to Arthur Vanderbilt, 3 January 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 369, folder Supreme Court of the 
United States: Controversy of 1937. 
377 Report on the Conference on Public Relations, 8 January 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 369, folder Supreme 
Court of the United States: Controversy of 1937. 
378 George Morris to Arthur Vanderbilt, 9 December 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 369, folder Supreme Court of the 
United States: Controversy of 1937. 
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particular, among the general public.379
The idea for the committee came not from Vanderbilt, though it had his enthusiastic 
support, but from Grenville Clark. Clark was a Wall Street lawyer, self-described conservative, 
and frequent correspondent of Felix Frankfurter’s, who was actively involved in public service 
throughout his life.
 Increasing legal aid was one potential solution to this 
problem, but the ABA eventually opted for a more glamorous (and less expensive) way to 
redirect the National Lawyer Guild’s positive press: creation of a new and high-profile 
Committee on the Bill of Rights.  
380  In June 1938, Clark delivered an address on “Conservatism and Civil 
Liberty” to the Annual Meeting of the Nassau County Bar Association.381 Clark told his 
audience that the problem of civil liberties in America had “entered upon a new and crucial 
phase.” The importance of “reconciling authority with individual freedom” stemmed not 
primarily from the “growth of dictatorships abroad,” but from the “growth, largely inevitable, of 
governmental interference with the social and economic life of citizens.”  True civil liberty, he 
explained in terms much like Morris Ernst’s, required both democratic self-government and the 
“reign of law,” that is, the absence of arbitrary government action.382
According to Grenville Clark, it was up to conservatives, not liberals or radicals, to strike 
the appropriate balance.  Conservatives wanted reform to come “gradually and with a minimum 
  
                                                          
379 See Report of the Public Relations Committee of the Section of Bar Organizations Activities of the ABA, 1936–
37, Vanderbilt Papers, box 369, folder Publicity: Committee on Public Relations (describing “lay hostility”).  
380 On Clark and his role in creating the ABA Committee on the Bill of Rights, See Gerald T. Dunne, Grenville 
Clark: Public Citizen (New York: Farrar, 1986). 
381 Grenville Clark, “Conservatism and Civil Liberty,” Address at Annual Meeting of the Nassau County Bar 
Association, 11 June 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties. 
382 Ibid. Later, Clark would revise his theory of civil liberties. In 1939, he justified free speech in terms of 
democratic decision-making and legitimacy. He explained: “The basic conception on which our institutions rest is 
that all government should rest on ‘the consent of the governed.’ . . . But ‘consent of the governed’ is no mere 
phrase. It implies that consent shall be real. And this in turn implies two conditions—first, that the consent shall not 
be coerced, and second, that it shall be reasonably well-informed.” He also noted that the rights protecting free 
expression were inconsistent, having evolved through application in particular cases, but on the whole were 
workable.  Grenville Clark, “The Limits of Free Expression,” Lecture at the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, 23 May 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties.  
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of friction.” They recognized that “vast changes” in society necessitated “new methods and 
devices in government and new relations between the government and the individual,” but they 
also desired to retain “the best of those values that have been brought out of the past.”  In 
practice, however, “the active defense of civil liberty [had] been allowed to drift very largely into 
the hands of the elements of ‘the left.’”383
Conversely, many Americans had come to believe leftist claims that conservatives were 
more interested in the protection of property, not the “great rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.” Clark emphasized that the ACLU, notwithstanding the “admittedly radical views” 
of much of its leadership, deserved credit for serving the “underdog” and defending unpopular 
causes.
  
384 He believed, however, that by cornering the field of civil liberties so completely, the 
organization had created the “public impression that the active defense of civil liberties is not a 
matter of primary concern with those of more moderate views.”385
The time had come, in Clark’s view, for conservatives to reclaim the mantle of civil 
liberties.  That conservatives themselves, under the New Deal, were facing the purported 
deprivation of civil rights for the first time was evidence of the need for a neutral defense of 
  In other words, he suggested 
that conservatives might have defended civil liberties more vigorously if the ACLU had not so 
strongly stamped the cause with the taint of radicalism.  
                                                          
383 Grenville Clark, “Conservatism and Civil Liberty,” Address at Annual Meeting of the Nassau County Bar 
Association, 11 June 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties. 
384 Ibid. The Junior Bar Report on civil liberties later praised the ACLU for its “hard, intelligent and often thankless 
work.” It felt that the ABA’s participation was important for two reasons. First, the ACLU had an operating budget 
of only 25,000 dollars and could not handle all cases warranting attention. Second, the perception of the ACLU was 
that it was “left of center.” By contrast, “The Junior Bar Conference is neither a left-wing nor an ultra-conservative 
group. It supports no ‘isms’ and grinds no ‘axes.’ Its entry into the field should arouse in many a new interest in 
helping to preserve civil rights.” “Report of the Sub-Committee on Civil Rights of the Executive Council of the 
Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar Association,” 27–28, 26 July 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder 
Civil Liberties 1939–1940. 
385 Grenville Clark, “Conservatism and Civil Liberty,” Address at Annual Meeting of the Nassau County Bar 
Association, 11 June 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties. 
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constitutional rights.386 American conservatives could not “have it both ways,” Clark cautioned. 
They could not countenance the oppression of minorities while conservatives were “in the 
ascendant,” lest their own rights be suppressed when the situation reversed.387  The only feasible 
position was a “firm and impartial” defense of all constitutional rights, in all cases, “irrespective 
of whether we approve or disapprove the sentiments and policies of the persons affected.” In 
promoting that ideal, lawyers had a particularly crucial role to play. After all, lawyers were 
conservative by nature and training. They had led the defense of civil liberties for generations, 
and despite their quiescence of the past decades, they had recently rediscovered the central 
importance of constitutional rights. What, he asked, was the secret of the legal profession’s 
“united and powerful movement” to defeat the court-packing plan? “It was their conviction, 
arrived at both by reason and instinct, that the proposal . . . was fundamentally a threat to our 
civil liberties.”  He concluded with an exhortation: “this zeal and power that manifested itself in 
the crisis of a year ago ought not to be permitted to lapse but should be better organized for 
opposition to other attacks on civil liberty that are constantly occurring.”388
 Grenville Clark’s pronouncements resonated within and outside the bar, and they were 
widely publicized in professional journals and the popular press.
 
389
                                                          
386 Ibid. Clark cited the example of Sherman Minton’s Senate committee, which had ordered corporate tax returns 
from the Treasury Department in a move that prompted the companies under investigation to decry the violation of 
their civil liberties.  
 In the days after his address, 
Clark received numerous letters applauding his suggestion, and he wrote Arthur Vanderbilt to 
advocate the creation within the ABA of a committee on civil liberties or civil rights.  The 
District of Columbia bar association had already created such committees, he advised Vanderbilt, 
387 Ibid. For example, Clark criticized the D.A.R. for promoting and passing “teachers’ oath laws” in 22 states, and 
he celebrated Governor Lehman’s veto of the New York State McNaboe bill, which would have barred communists 
from public office. 
388 Ibid.  
389 E.g., “Bar Urged to Fight for Civil Liberties,” New York Times, 12 June 1938. The speech was reprinted in the 
August issue of the ABA Journal.  
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and other local associations (for example, in Chicago and New York County) were 
contemplating similar proposals. Perhaps most important, the National Lawyers Guild had 
one390; creating it was among the organization’s first priorities, and it was approved in February 
1937, at the Guild’s inaugural national convention.391
Vanderbilt was convinced. When the ABA’s Board of Governors met in Cleveland in 
July 1938, he put the matter on the agenda—though at the request of his successor, Frank Hogan, 
he “laid the matter over until the new Board took office.”
  
392 The new board, in turn, acted 
promptly to implement Clark’s proposal. In his inaugural address as ABA president, Hogan 
admonished the organization’s membership to be “alert and vigilant” in defending the “rights 
and liberties of the individual.”393  The protection of these rights, he insisted, was a historic 
obligation of the bar.  Hogan himself claimed a lifelong commitment to civil liberties work.  
Twenty years earlier, he had delivered an address called “The Bill of Rights and What It means 
to You,” and in the intervening decades he had “observed with increased regret” that individuals 
were alert to the suppression of liberties only when their own views were suppressed.394 Hogan 
echoed Clark’s statement that civil liberties were worth protecting even when the underlying 
speech was offensive or its proponents unlikable. He insisted that “violations of the Bill of 
Rights are intolerable, no matter whom they affect.”395
                                                          
390 Grenville Clark to Arthur Vanderbilt, 30 June 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 114, folder Correspondence Re 
Committee, 1936–1938. 
  Rhetorically, he adopted precisely the 
same line as the “liberals” on the ACLU board, who were constantly called upon to justify their 
391 “Guild Secretary Points Bar’s Way in Investigation,” Buffalo Daily Law Journal, 20 August 1938.  
392 Arthur Vanderbilt to Grenville Clark, 8 August 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 115, folder Correspondence A–C. 
393 American Bar Association, “The American Bar Association’s Committee on the Bill of Rights,” Bill of Rights 
Review 1 (Summer 1940): 64 (published by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association). 
394 Frank Hogan to Arthur Garfield Hays, 22 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079. 
395 “Editorial Comment: The Bar Looks at Civil Rights,” Buffalo Daily Law Journal, 6 September 1938 (quoting 
Hogan). 
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defense of conservatives and reactionaries (most notably the Nazi Party) to their leftist 
colleagues.   
For Hogan, however, economic rights clearly still remained within the ambit of 
constitutional protection.  Indeed, Hogan portrayed the businessmen whose interests were 
jeopardized by reform initiatives at the turn of the century as the unheralded victims of gross 
authoritarian abuses.  “Perhaps, because the trampling recently sometimes has been upon well-
worn shoes,” he mused, “the hurt done thereby has been considered more important than when 
the crushed toes were encased in patent leather footwear of the wealthy, or the rights denied or 
the privacy invaded were those of the business corporation.”396  It is little wonder that initial 
reactions to the ABA’s announcement evinced skepticism toward its underlying objectives.397
Still, Hogan’s examples achieved their effect. Later that day, the ABA House of 
Delegates adopted a resolution creating a Special Committee on the Bill of Rights.  Its mission 
was to ensure that “whenever rights or immunities secured by the Bill of Rights are anywhere 
denied to any citizen or threatened with denial, there shall be a speedy and impartial 
investigation of the facts, and where the facts warrant it, there shall be certainty of the assistance 
of competent lawyers and defense in protection of such rights.”
  
398 The new committee would 
intervene, where necessary, to protect civil liberties by filing amicus briefs, educating the public, 
and cooperating with state and local bar associations.  Zechariah Chafee agreed to serve on the 
committee, and Grenville Clark was appointed committee chair.399
                                                          
396 Ibid. (quoting Hogan).  
 Clark was not personally 
acquainted with all of the members, most of whom were conservative in their political views, but 
397 Ibid.  
398 ABA, “Committee on the Bill of Rights,” 64. 
399 Ibid. 
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he thought it was a “good committee which will be really interested in the subject.”400
The ACLU, while cautious, was gratified by the ABA’s emerging interest in civil 
liberties. As rightwing critics quickly realized, the ABA’s involvement promised to make civil 
liberties work truly respectable, with evident implications for ACLU fundraising and advocacy 
work.
  Perhaps 
its most notable member, aside from Chafee and Clark, was Joseph A. Padway, general counsel 
for the American Federation of Labor.  
401  In a press statement, the ACLU offered its “full cooperation” with the new 
committee—though it pointedly suggested that the ABA “lift its membership ban on Negroes as 
the initial act on behalf of minority rights,” much to the distress of ABA members already 
nervous about the ABA’s new venture, including Robert Carey, a vocal Jersey City lawyer.402 
Arthur Garfield Hays wrote Hogan personally to “welcome the American Bar Association’s 
long-delayed recognition of its responsibility in this field” (he, too, mentioned the discriminatory 
membership policy, and he threatened to resign from the ABA unless the issue was 
addressed403
                                                          
400 Grenville Clark to Arthur Garfield Hays, 1 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079.  For reports on 
the personnel, see ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079.   
). 
401 Robert Carey, writing to the ABA Board of Governors in opposition to the Committee’s work, quoted Morris 
Ernst’s statement in court that  the “American Bar Association can’t be deemed radical and is now a party to these 
proceedings.” Robert Carey to members of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 2 March 1939, 
Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder Correspondence September 1938–July 1939. 
402 Board Minutes, 8 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079. See, e.g., Robert Carey to Grenville Clark, 30 
December 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder Correspondence September 1938–July 1939 (“[O]ne of the next 
things they are going to dump in our lap is going to be the question of the exclusion of colored men from 
membership in the American Bar Association. One of these things leads to another, of course.”). 
403 Arthur Garfield Hays to Frank Hogan, 10 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079. Hogan 
disingenuously claimed in a return letter that there was no provision in the bylaws or the Constitution of the ABA 
for exclusion on the basis of race, color or creed, but that membership in the Association was “selective” and many 
applications were therefore rejected that deserved to be approved.  He was critical of Hays’s threat to resign, 
reasoning: “Often you and I have differed with those who for the time being were in control of the government, 
either of nation or state, or both; but we did not pack up and leave the country; we worked for the views we believed 
in, in the rank and file of citizens.” Frank Hogan to Arthur Garfield Hays, 22 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, 
vol. 1079.  Hogan’s commitment to individual rights appears to have been genuine. See, e.g., Frank Hogan to Robert 
Carey, 23 January 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties (“[I] cannot take the view that crass 
violations of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are of mere local concern and that hence the striking down of the 
liberty of the press provision in Louisiana and Minnesota, the sentencing to death of nine men, irrespective of their 
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The Committee on the Bill of Rights reciprocated the ACLU’s interest.  Immediately 
after the announcement of the new committee, its members were flooded with requests from 
criminal defendants complaining about denial of process. The committee considered these cases 
to be of primarily local concern, however, and it recommended the appointment of local 
committees to assume responsibilities for such matters.404 The national committee, by contrast, 
wanted to reserve its services for issues of national significance.405  To that end, Clark asked 
Hays to suggest areas in which it could most usefully intervene.406 The ACLU board, after 
discussion, recommended a few areas of particular importance, including the appeal of the 
Minersville, Pennsylvania flag salute case, radio censorship, and third degree legislation.  The 
first and most pressing concern, unsurprisingly, was Jersey City.407
 At the ACLU’s urging, the Committee agreed at its first meeting, in November 1938, to 
file an amicus brief in Hague v. CIO. Although Hague presented many issues, the Committee 
was concerned only with one: the city’s arbitrary refusal to issue meeting permits. For the 
Committee, the central problem was “the right of public assembly,” a “vital” civil liberty not yet 
considered by the Supreme Court.
  
408
                                                                                                                                                                                           
color, in Alabama, at the conclusion of a trial characterized by an utter disregard of one of the most sacred of 
constitutional guarantees, and the rifling of the mails or the telegraphic files in utter disregard of the prohibition 
against unreasonable search and seizure, are of purely local concern and should not interest, actively interest, a 
professional organization dedicated to the upholding of the Constitution and to the equal and impartial 
administration of justice throughout the land.”).  
  The brief was written primarily by Zechariah Chafee and 
404 By the summer of 1940, there were fifty-five such committees in operation. ABA, “Committee on the Bill of 
Rights,” 65. 
405 Roger Baldwin, Memorandum on conference with Grenville Clark, 28 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, 
vol. 1079. 
406 Grenville Clark to Arthur Garfield Hays, 1 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079. 
407 They also recommended the “Oklahoma Negro primary case.” They may have meant Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 
268 (1939), which involved the Oklahoma grandfather clause (not its primary).  Board Minutes, 3 October 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1079. The previous week, the board suggested asking the ABA to urge Attorney 
General Cummings to continue his investigation in Jersey City. Board Minutes, 26 September 1938, ACLU Papers, 
reel 156, vol. 1079.  
408 ABA, “Committee on the Bill of Rights,” 65. 
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Grenville  Clark.409 Doctrinally, it considered the Supreme Court’s recent First Amendment 
decisions—Fiske, Stromberg, Near, Grosjean, Herndon, and Lovell—to have altered the 
constitutional balance between state authority and liberty of expression. One case, DeJonge, 
dealt specifically with the right of assembly in so far as it prohibited punishment for mere 
participation in a meeting. Davis v. Massachusetts, upon which the city relied, was 
distinguishable on the facts.410
On the whole, however, the authors were more concerned with free speech theory and 
policy than with case law.  With respect to the latter, they deferred to the lengthy brief submitted 
by the ACLU, which covered such issues exhaustively and—in stark contrast to the ABA’s 
brief—with barely any reflection on the more capacious values at stake.  By contrast, the ABA 
committee’s brief argued that freedom of assembly was worthy of constitutional protection 
because it was essential to the “American democratic system.”  That system, in turn, was 
premised on the “consent of the people,”
  
411 which was only meaningful when secured through 
“adequate information and discussion.”412  Legislation passed in the absence of robust debate 
could not command popular support and would not be “law in a real sense.”  Moreover, 
oversight by an engaged constituency provided a check on administrative abuses. In short, it was 
“only through free discussion” that democracy could “function at all.”413
                                                          
409 Jerome Britchey told Clark that despite rumors that Chafee had written the brief, there were “whole paragraphs” 
that Britchey recognized from Clark’s course at the New School.  Jerome Britchey to Grenville Clark, 26 December 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. Clark responded that he and Chafee had written the brief “in collaboration, 
dividing it up but each being responsible for the whole.” He also credited the other committee members with making 
several suggestions that were incorporated into the final version, “so it is really the brief of the eight members.” 
Grenville Clark to Jerome Britchey, 4 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133. 
  While there were many 
410 Brief of the Special Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association As Friends of the Court 
(hereafter ABA Third Circuit brief), Hague v. CIO, Third Circuit Case No. 6939, 4, NARA Mid Atlantic Region, 
Transcript of Record, Vol. 4. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), was decided prior to the incorporation of 
the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Davis asserted a property rather than liberty 
interest in the use of the Boston Commons to deliver a speech. 
411 Cf. Post, “Reconciling Theory and Doctrine” (describing the “democratic theory’” of free speech). 
412 ABA Third Circuit brief, 6. 
413 Ibid., 7. 
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available forums for public debate—including print media, radio, and movies—the face-to-face 
encounter of a meeting on the street corner or at the town square performed a unique and crucial 
role in the production of public opinion. This was particularly true in the context of unpopular 
minorities, who often had limited financial resources and whose ideas were otherwise unlikely to 
be heard.   
The brief’s authors were adamant that the unpopularity of an idea could not be cited as 
justification for suppressing it.  Indeed, they considered “the right to express unpopular opinions 
and to hold unpopular meetings” to be the “essence of American liberty,” which was 
fundamentally premised on tolerance.414  This principle, the brief emphasized, applied not only 
to determinations by officials that a particular idea was dangerous or undesirable, but also to the 
perceived hostility of a crowd.  A threat of disorder by opponents of a speaker (as opposed, 
potentially, to a threat by the speakers themselves) was no reason to prohibit a public 
appearance, whether spontaneous or contrived.415 Rather, the appropriate response on the part of 
the authorities was to schedule the meeting at an appropriate time and place and, more important, 
to ensure adequate police protection in the event that violence indeed occurred.416
                                                          
414 “[T]olerance is of the essence of the American system and of the American way of life—not only tolerance in 
matters of religion, but also tolerance in matters of political, economic and social belief; tolerance not only of views 
that we can approve, but also (as Mr. Justice Holmes said) of views that we hate; tolerance not only of views that 
accord with our interests but also of views that are inimical to our interests.” Ibid., 37. 
 Government 
actors were bound not only to tolerate dissenting speech, but to take reasonable measures to 
protect it from private disruptions. “Surely a speaker ought not to be suppressed because his 
415 The brief noted that the claim that the Hague administration had in fact fomented the threatened disorder was 
“interesting but . . . not essential to the rightness of the decree.” Ibid., 18.  
416 On this issue, the brief cited New York Police Commissioner Arthur Woods. Arthur Woods, Policeman and 
Public (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 73–78. It left open the possibility that denial of a permit might be 
constitutionally permissible on an “extreme state of facts,” in which the police were demonstrably incapable of 
controlling public unrest. It explained: “The constitutional doctrine for which we contend is that the public 
authorities have the obligation to provide police protection against threatened disorder at lawful public meetings in 
all reasonable circumstances. It is, we submit, their duty to make the right of free assembly prevail over the forces of 
disorder if by any reasonable effort or means they can possibly do so.” ABA Third Circuit Brief, 17.  
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opponents propose to use violence,” the brief proclaimed. “Let the threateners be arrested for 
assault, or at least put under bonds to keep the peace.” After all, “It is they who should suffer for 
their lawlessness, not he.”417
For the authors, the purpose of free speech was to facilitate discussion of pressing social 
issues, to ensure both the legitimacy and optimal outcome of the democratic process. It was not 
enough, then, merely to prohibit state discrimination against unpopular speakers; the government 
needed to prevent interference by hecklers, too.  By the same token, a city could not elect to 
close all of its property to public meetings.
 
418 In the Supreme Court, the ABA would argue that 
to “safeguard the guaranteed right of public assembly,” the government was obligated “to 
provide adequate places for public discussion.”419
 As Clark had hoped, the Committee’s involvement in the Hague case was “favorably 
received.”  In fact, editorial comments were “unanimous in commending the intervention as a 
constructive public contribution by the American Bar Association.”
 The Committee wanted the state to do more 
than stay out. It was advocating an affirmative role for government in providing unpopular 
speakers with an opportunity to air their views, if not the means to make them heard. 
420 Jerome Britchey, for the 
ACLU, called it “one of the finest and clearest briefs [he had] had the pleasure of reading.”421
                                                          
417 Ibid., 19.  
 
William Ransom, president of the ABA from 1935 to 1936, despised Ernst, Baldwin, Thomas, 
and the CIO “for their incessant warfare against individual rights and in favor of an obnoxious 
418 On this issue, the authors suggested in the Supreme Court that “the sound constitutional doctrine which should 
control this problem is that a city must in some adequate manner provide places on its property for public 
meetings—as distinguished from a more rigid doctrine that would compel both its streets and its ordinary parks to be 
made available,” as the District Court and Court of Appeals had each endeavored to do (arriving at different rules).  
“Under such a doctrine,” the brief continued, “the basic constitutional requirement of protecting freedom of 
assembly would be fulfilled, but without imposing rigid specific requirements as to either streets or parks that might 
in practice prove difficult or unworkable.” Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar 
Association as Friends of the Court, Hague v. CIO, U.S. Supreme Court, 31.  
419 Ibid., 30.  
420 ABA, “Committee on the Bill of Rights,” 65. 
421 Jerome Britchey to Grenville Clark, 26 December 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
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collectivism.” Nonetheless, he thought the Committee’s brief was “one of the finest things the 
American Bar Association has ever done,” and he told Clark that it would stand “for years to 
come an historic document, often referred to and quoted by those who are trying to fulfill the 
responsibility of so-called conservatives for the maintenance of civil liberties and free 
institutions.”422
 On the legal front, too, the ABA’s intervention was a success. On January 26, 1939, the 
Third Circuit sustained Judge Clark’s injunction. On the issues of deportation, searches and 
seizures, unlawful arrests, the posting of placards, and the distribution of leaflets, the Court of 
Appeals unanimously approved Judge Clark’s reasoning and considered his findings to be amply 
supported by the record.  The central question, about which the judges on the panel disagreed, 
was the constitutionality of the meeting ordinance.  The dissenting judge thought the issue was 
not “primarily free speech at all”; if it were, he surmised, the American Legion and Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, many of whose members “risked their very lives . . . ‘to make democracy safe for 
the world,’ would not be opposing the plaintiffs.
  
423
In his majority opinion, Judge John Biggs, Jr., a recent Roosevelt appointee, held that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional as administered.
  Conversely, the decision of the two-judge 
majority was even more deferential to free speech than the district court’s.   
424
                                                          
422 William Ransom to Grenville Clark, 28 December 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties. 
  There was no tangible threat of rioting, 
despite Hague’s effort to “build up a dangerous situation,” and no evidence that the police would 
have been unable to maintain order at any of the meetings for which the plaintiffs requested 
423 Hague, 101 F.2d at 808 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).  
424 Judge Albert Maris joined in Biggs’s decision. Maris, a Quaker, was also appointed by Roosevelt (first to the 
district court, in 1936, and then in 1938 to the Court of Appeals).  He wrote the majority decision in Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939), which was overturned by the Supreme Court. The dissenting 
judge was John Warren Davis, a Wilson appointee, who was about to face federal charges for bribery (prosecution 
resulted in two hung juries, and Davis retired from the bench).  
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permits.425
More boldly, the majority considered the ordinance unconstitutional on its face.  Freedom 
of speech and of the press were “fundamental civil rights,” the hallmarks of “democratic 
governments.”
  Nor had the plaintiffs intended at those meetings to advocate the overthrow of the 
government, which might have complicated the issue.   
426 The ordinance permitted city officials to curtail those rights in a manner 
inconsistent with the due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment.  Citing Near, Judge Biggs 
condemned the prior restraint of speech as patently unconstitutional.  The threat of violence was 
not a legitimate basis for “prevent[ing] speakers from presenting their views.” Rather, it was the 
function of the police to “preserve order while they speak.” The defendants’ interpretation of free 
speech and assembly was “shocking,” in that it “place[d] these rights in the hands of those who 
would destroy them.”427  Indeed, following the defendants’ reasoning to its local conclusion 
“would result eventually in the existence of but one political party as is now the case under 
totalitarian governments.”428
As for the District Court’s suggestion that Jersey City could close all streets to public 
meetings, the Third Circuit majority disagreed.  In Judge Biggs’s view, a municipality owned 
and administered its streets and parks as trustees for the people. The people had an affirmative 
right of access to public spaces for the purpose of public debate.  Accordingly, the court required 
Jersey City to open its streets in the same manner as the parks. “Minorities, however unpopular, 
must be allowed to make their voices heard,” the court concluded. “Fundamental civil liberties 
must not be tampered with if our system of democratic government is to survive.”
  
429
                                                          
425 Hague, 101 F.2d at 786.  
 
426 Ibid., 787.  
427 Ibid., 784.  
428 Ibid.  
429 Ibid., 786.  
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 Like the ABA’s brief, the Third Circuit’s decision was hailed by the press.430  It was 
clear, however, that the true test would take place in the Supreme Court, which promptly granted 
certiorari in the case.  Until then, there was plenty to keep the parties busy.  A week before oral 
argument, New Jersey Governor Harry Moore nominated Frank Hague, Jr., Hague’s thirty-four 
year old son, to serve as a lay judge on New Jersey’s highest court.  Thomas Glynn Walker, the 
former Democratic leader in the New Jersey Assembly, resigned to create the vacancy, and he 
was appointed to a newly created opening on the Hudson County Court of Common Pleas.431
That the young Hague (who was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1936) had never 
earned an undergraduate degree, let alone a law degree, did not stop his sponsors from pushing 
his appointment through. Neither did vocal protest by the ACLU, CIO affiliates, the Workers 
Defense League, or outraged citizens.
 
Hague, in turn, persuaded President Roosevelt to appoint Walker to the federal district court, 
much to the distress of the ACLU.   
432 Reportedly, many state senators opposed the 
nomination but were unwilling to risk reprisals from the court, before which most of them 
regularly practiced as lawyers.433 The Governor, cognizant of his many debts to the Mayor, was 
unselfconscious about his motivations: “I know this appointment will make his dad happy,” he 
said.434
                                                          
430 E.g., “Civil Rights Upheld,” Washington Post, 28 January 1939; “Defense of Liberties,” Christian Science 
Monitor, 1 February 1939 (commending ABA for its defense of constitutional rights). 
  
431 Judge Thomas F. Meany, in turn, resigned to become counsel in a private matter. 
432 ACLU Board Minutes, 27 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133 (recording resolution condemning 
appointment); “New Jersey: Happy Dad,” Time, 6 March 1939; “Hearing Sought on Young Hague,” New York 
Times, 22 February 1939. Hague, Jr., attended school for eight years at Princeton, the University of Virginia Law 
School, and Washington & Lee without attaining a degree. He was confirmed by a vote of 14 to 6.  
433 “Governor Defense Hague, Jr., Job,” Christian Science Monitor, 26 February 1939.  Several days later, the 
Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly introduced a resolution to reduce the number of judges on the court from 
sixteen to seven and to eliminate lay judges. He claimed that there was no connection between his proposal and the 
Hague, Jr., nomination. “Denies Court Bill Hits at Hague Jr.,” New York Times, 27 February 1939.  
434 “Hague’s Son Named a Lay Judge,” New York Times, 21 February 1939.  
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 While Hague made arrangements for his son’s future livelihood, the ABA was building 
on its newfound popularity.  In the January 1939 issue of the American Bar Association Journal, 
the Committee on the Bill of Rights urged all state and local bar associations to form their own 
committees to operate in local matters.  The announcement advised the new committees to 
secure counsel in meritorious cases, to protest legislative or administrative violations of civil 
liberties, and to conduct discussions and disseminate information.  It also suggested that 
“considerable representation” should be given to the members of the Junior Bar.435
 The national committee, meanwhile, was eager to continue its efforts in Hague.  The next 
step was to file an amicus brief in the Supreme Court (Joseph Padway, AFL general counsel, was 
“particularly anxious” to do so).
   
436 Both Arthur Vanderbilt and Frank Hogan supported the 
endeavor,437 and with minimal internal opposition and the approval of both parties to the 
litigation, the Committee submitted a brief that was substantially identical to its earlier 
version.438
                                                          
435 Baldwin corresponded with the Junior Bar Committee on Civil Rights and commended the members on their 
suggested programs of action. Paul Hannah to Roger Baldwin, 7 December 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2141; 
Roger Baldwin to Louis Powell, Jr., 28 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2141.  
  
436 Frank Hogan to members of the Board of Governors, 14 February 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder 
Correspondence September 1938–June 1939. 
437 Arthur Vanderbilt to Frank Hogan, 16 February 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder Correspondence 
September 1938–June 1939. 
438 Robert Carey, the New Jersey lawyer who had earlier expressed his opposition to the admission of black 
candidates to ABA membership, was vehemently against the Committee’s participation in the case. In personal 
correspondence with Hogan as well as an open letter to the House of Delegates, Carey explained his position. Robert 
Carey to members of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 2 March 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, 
box 123, folder Correspondence September 1938–July 1939 (warning, for example, that the ABA would “now be 
sought out as window dressing by radicals from one end of our land to the other”).  Hogan dismissively rejected 
Carey’s objections.  Frank Hogan to Robert Carey, 7 February 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder 
Correspondence September 1938–June 1939  (“Just why the lawyers in New Jersey should fear to proclaim that they 
stand for a militant defense of the most sacred guarantees which the American people have, and, so standing, are 
willing to lend their aid to the maintenance of those guarantees, is beyond me. . . . You seem to be worried that 
radicals will be found going arm in arm with the American Bar Association or its Committee. That doesn’t bother 
me for a moment. I prefer to walk arm in arm with an angel in support of the guarantees I have referred to, but I am 
willing to walk arm in arm with the devil if doing so will help keep the American people eternally vigilant with 
regard to the importance of those guarantees and of the necessity of standing up for them.”). At the ABA’s Annual 
Meeting in July 1939, Carey again objected to the Committee’s intervention in Hague and proposed a resolution 
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 The ABA Committee on the Bill of Rights had accomplished precisely what it was 
supposed to.  In February, Hogan noted to Vanderbilt that the National Lawyers Guild, for all its 
publicity, was shrinking rather than growing.439 Vanderbilt attributed the Guild’s failure in large 
part to “the stand taken this year . . . on civil rights.”440 Hogan agreed, and he wholeheartedly 
endorsed the committee’s work in a letter to the Board of Governors. “Numerous editorials, 
many of them contained in the leading newspapers of the country,” had commended the ABA for 
its Third Circuit brief.  The brief was expertly written and a genuine contribution to the 
development of constitutional law. It had prompted praise from “all parts of the United States”: 
the Deep South and the “Far West” as well as the Midwest and East.441
 To Hogan and Vanderbilt, the Hague brief was only the beginning. In the spring, the 
Carnegie Foundation (whose President was none other than Frederick Keppel, the NCLB’s 
correspondent in the War Department during World War I) made a substantial grant to the ABA 
to support the “editorial and publication program” of the Special Committee on the Bill of 
Rights.
 In fact, there had been no 
press criticism whatsoever. 
442
                                                                                                                                                                                           
prohibiting the Committee from participating in litigation.  The resolution, however, garnered very little support. 
ABA, “Committee on the Bill of Rights,” 65.  
  That grant funded the ABA’s Bill of Rights Review, which was intended not so much 
to raise awareness of civil liberties—that job, the introduction emphasized, had already been 
done—as to connect the hundreds of lawyers and dozens of bar committees devoted to civil 
439 Frank Hogan to Arthur Vanderbilt, 17 February 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder Correspondence 
September 1938–June 1939. 
440 Arthur Vanderbilt to Henry Armistead, 10 February 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder Correspondence 
September 1938–June 1939. 
441 Frank Hogan to members of the Board of Governors, 14 February 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder 
Correspondence September 1938–June 1939. 
442 Frank Hogan to the Board of Governors, 8 June 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder Correspondence 
September 1938–June 1939 (reporting that the grant was 24,000 dollars, approximately equivalent to the operating 
budget of the ACLU). 
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liberties work.443  Meanwhile, the Committee’s legal work continued.  In the coming months, it 
would intervene in a variety of important cases, including Minersville v. Gobitis.444 “It is not too 
much to say,” Hogan wrote in reference to the Committee’s involvement in Hague, “that the 
good ‘public relations’ reaction which has come to the Association from (a) the creation of the 
Bill of Rights Committee, (b) the personnel of that Committee, and (c) its brief, has been of more 
value, along the much discussed line of public relations, than anything since our stand in 
opposition to the proposal to pack the Supreme Court.”445 By the summer, he went even further. 
He told the board that nothing the American Bar Association had done in recent years, not even 
its “remarkably fine work” in opposition to the court-packing proposal, had produced “such 
excellent public relations.”446
 
  
The Civil Liberties Unit 
 One particularly noteworthy development took place in the months before the Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Hague v. CIO. On January 3, 1939, Frank Murphy succeeded Homer 
Cummings as Attorney General of the United States. Murphy was accustomed to public office. 
                                                          
443 American Bar Association, “A New Venture and Its Purposes,” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Summer 1940): 3. At the 
time of publication, the Review reported fifty state and local bar committees, comprising 450 lawyers. 
444The ABA first intervened in Johnson v. Town of Deerfield, 25 F. Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939), which challenged 
the compulsory flag salute law in Massachusetts.  Because the Supreme Court had dismissed two appeals in similar 
cases for lack of a substantial federal question, the Bill of Rights Committee filed a Memorandum in Support of 
Jurisdiction in April 1939.  The Supreme Court nonetheless issued a per curiam opinion affirming the lower court’s 
judgment upholding the law.  In October 1939, the Committee resolved to participate in Gobitis v. Minersville 
School District, which was then pending in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In that case, the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania had deemed compulsory flag salute to be unconstitutional.  Gobitis v. Minersville School 
District, 24 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1938). When the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, it was 
clear that Gobitis was bound for the Supreme Court.  Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 
1939). The Committee, concluding that the case raised issues of “personal freedom and religious liberty,” chose to 
file an amicus brief. The House of Delegates authorized that action, albeit by a close vote. ABA, “Committee on the 
Bill of Rights,” 66–68. The Supreme Court, of course, disagreed with the ABA. Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
445 Frank Hogan to members of the Board of Governors, 14 February 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder 
Correspondence September 1938–June 1939. 
446 Frank Hogan to the Board of Governors, 8 June 1939, Vanderbilt Papers, box 123, folder Correspondence 
September 1938–June 1939. 
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As mayor of Detroit from 1930 to 1933, he had been a strong advocate for the unemployed. He 
was also one of the New Deal’s “most enthusiastic supporters,”447 for which the President 
rewarded him with an appointment as governor-general of the Philippines (and subsequently, 
United States Commissioner). In 1937, Murphy was elected governor of Michigan. Shortly after 
he took office, he refused to call in state troops to break a sit-down strike by the fledgling 
UAW.448 That decision was influential in the subsequent rise of the CIO. It was also sufficiently 
unpopular to prompt Murphy to request a hearing before the Senate subcommittee assigned to 
assess his fitness for office, even though it had already approved his nomination. In a prepared 
statement, Murphy explained that workers in Michigan had been angry at the failure of 
employers to abide by the Wagner Act, as well as the prevalent use of industrial espionage to 
defeat unionization.  In seizing control of industrial property, thousands of misguided but 
“honest citizens” had acted to “defend[] their own rights against what they believed to be the 
lawless refusal of their employers to recognize their unions.” Murphy emphasized that he had 
never condoned sit-down strikes, and he had advised union representatives that they were illegal 
and imprudent. He nonetheless believed that in the face of widespread disobedience, it was 
necessary to “weed out the cause,” not merely to “enforce the law.”449
 Murphy brought the same sensibilities to his duties as Attorney General. He was 
intimately familiar with the work of the La Follette Committee in his home state and elsewhere, 
and he was convinced that the abridgement of workers’ “civil liberties” by employers and their 
government collaborators was a major source of class strife.  But Murphy’s commitment was not 
 
                                                          
447 “Murphy Appointed Attorney General,” New York Times, 2 January 1939.  
448 See Chapter 6.  
449 Statement of Honorable Frank Murphy, Attorney General of the United States, Before a Sub-Committee of the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, in National Archives and Records Administration, College 
Park, Md., Record Group 60, General Records of the United States Department of Justice, Records of the Special 
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 1933–40, Subject Files, 1933–1940 (hereafter Attorney General 
Papers), box 5, entry 132, folder Murphy (Attorney General—Items about Him).  
399 
 
limited to workers’ rights. He considered civil liberties to be fundamental to every part of life, 
“social, political, and economic.” They extended to such far-ranging ideals as “the right of self-
government, the right of every man to speak his thoughts freely, the opportunity to express his 
individual nature in his daily life and work, [and] the privilege of believing in the religion that 
his own conscience tells him is right.”  The American model of civil liberties represented a 
crucial compromise between governmental regulation, which was “necessary for an orderly 
society,” and the unbounded freedom of nature.  More basically, the rights to speak freely, to 
practice one’s religion, to assemble peaceably and to petition government for the redress of 
grievances were essential to a functioning democracy.  They applied with equal force to “the 
business man and the laborer,” to “the Jew and the Gentile,” to “people of all racial 
extractions.”450
Murphy, in short, believed passionately in civil liberties, and from his first day in office, 
it was clear that he would make them a priority.  Shortly after his confirmation, Murphy’s special 
assistant in charge of public relations helped him arrange a radio program on the protection of 
civil liberties by the Federal Government (as well as a speaking engagement with the National 
Lawyers Guild).
  
451
                                                          
450 “Civil Liberties,” radio address by Hon. Frank Murphy, National Radio Forum, 27 March 1939, Attorney 
General Papers, box 5, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties. 
 He declined an invitation to attend the ACLU’s Bill of Rights celebration, but 
he was “very sorry” to do so. He told Roger Baldwin that the subject was “one of the things that 
interest[ed him] most keenly,” and that the opportunity to pursue it was one of the “great 
satisfactions” of his service as Attorney General. Indeed, he was “anxious that the weight and 
451 Gordon Dean, Memorandum for the Attorney General, 27 January 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 5, entry 
132, folder Murphy (Attorney General—Items about Him) (suggesting Murphy speak with the director of America’s 
Town Meeting of the Air); Gordon Dean, Memorandum for Miss Bumgarnder, 27 January 1939,  Attorney General 
Papers, box 5, entry 132, folder Murphy (Attorney General—Items about Him) (“The Attorney General knows all 
about the Lawyers Guild and that it is the liberal national lawyers’ group.”).  
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influence of the Department of Justice should be a force for the preservation of the people’s 
liberties.”452
On February 3, one month after he was sworn in, Murphy’s office made an 
announcement.  Within the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, a new entity had 
been established, to be known as the Civil Liberties Unit. Headed by former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney Henry A. Schweinhaut—who had distinguished himself during investigations in both 
Harlan County and Jersey City—its principal function was to prosecute violations of the 
constitutional and statutory provisions “guaranteeing civil rights to individuals.”
 
453 In particular, 
it would pursue cases of beatings and violence, denial of workers’ rights under the NLRA, and 
deprivation of freedom of speech and assembly.454  Murphy explained that in a democracy, the 
enforcement of law entailed the “aggressive protection of the fundamental rights inherent in a 
free people.” The Civil Liberties Unit, consistent with the recommendations of the La Follette 
Committee,455 would undertake “vigilant action” in ensuring that those rights were respected.456 
For the first time, it would throw the “full weight of the Department” behind the “blessings of 
liberty, the spirit of tolerance, and the fundamental principles of democracy.” In Murphy’s 
estimation, the creation of the Civil Liberties Unit was “one of the most significant happenings in 
American legal history.”457
The ACLU board wrote immediately to express its appreciation and to offer its “hearty 
support and complete cooperation in an undertaking so significant as a development in the 
 
                                                          
452 Frank Murphy to Roger Baldwin, 3 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 168, vol. 2070. 
453 Order No. 3204, Office of the Attorney General, 3 February 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, e132, folder 
Civil Liberties.  
454 “‘Civil Rights’ Unit Set Up By Murphy,” New York Times, 4 February 1939. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Press Release, 3 February 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties. 
457 Frank Murphy to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 7 July 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 5, entry 132, folder Murphy: 
6 Months Report.  
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application of federal law.”458 It expressed confidence that the Department of Justice could 
“render immense service” in redressing deprivations of the “rights of citizens under federal 
law.”459  The organization had often sought to involve the Department of Justice in cases that 
seemingly fell under federal jurisdiction, but the lack of a “special machinery of investigation” 
had hampered effective action.  The Department’s recent efforts in Harlan County and Jersey 
City were “most gratifying” and hinted at what the Civil Liberties Unit might accomplish with 
the appropriate internal support.460
By the spring of 1939, there were many bodies devoted to advancing civil liberties, 
including the La Follettee Committee and the ABA Committee on the Bill of Rights, in addition 
to the ACLU.  Still, the Civil Liberties Unit was particularly important. It had the authority not 
only to identify violations of civil liberties, but to redress them.  And its mechanism for 
enforcement was unique. The NLRB, too, could command compliance with the law (at least in 
cooperation with the injunctive authority of the court), but only the Civil Liberties Unit had the 
power to prosecute violations.  At a nationwide gathering of U.S. Attorneys in Washington, D.C. 
(the first such conference ever held), Murphy enjoined the federal prosecutors to wield that 
power responsibly—to enforce the civil rights statutes “not just for some of the people but for all 
of them,” “no matter how humble.”
 
461
                                                          
458 ACLU Bulletin 855, 11 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133. 
 Civil liberties, he told them, were more important than at 
any previous time in history. The Depression had brought with it “the usual demands for 
459 Board to Frank Murphy, 6 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 168, vol. 2070. 
460 Ibid. 
461 At the press conference following his swearing in as Attorney General, Murphy held up a Bible given to him by 
his mother for his grammar school graduation and from which he claimed to have read an hour every day since. He 
read aloud from his “favorite text,” Isaiah XI: “But He shall judge the poor with justice and shall approve equity for 
the meek of the earth.” “Murphy Sworn in at the White House,” New York Times, 3 January 1939.  
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repression of minorities,” and it was up to the federal government to stave off the rampant 
incursions.462
Murphy’s plans for the civil liberties unit were ambitious. Among other functions, it 
would alert local officials that the federal government would not tolerate arbitrary and abusive 
conduct, alone or in conjunction with private interests.
 
463 It would also raise awareness and 
influence public opinion. Murphy was adamant that the federal government could “take the 
initiative,” but it could not “do the whole job.” The problem was partly jurisdictional; some 
rights inhered in individuals as residents of the separate states, and they could not be vindicated 
by federal authorities. The threats to American freedom came not only from city ordinances and 
the arbitrary exercise of state power, but from mob murder, lynchings, and vigilante violence.  
More basically, however, “the great protector of civil liberty, the final source of its enforcement” 
was the “invincible power of public opinion.” The courts could provide a remedy for 
lawlessness, but they could not prevent it.  The Golden Rule, Murphy quipped, could not be 
implemented by United States Marshals. The only true solution was “an overwhelming public 
determination that it must not happen here.”464
In the immediate term, the Civil Liberties Unit had a concrete program. It would study 
and evaluate (and eventually prosecute under) the potential constitutional and statutory 
provisions applicable to civil rights enforcement, including laws prohibiting kidnapping, 
peonage, and mail fraud.
 
465
                                                          
462 “Murphy Tells Aides To Guard Civil Rights,” Washington Post, 20 April 1939.  
  The most important of the potential causes of action, at least for the 
463 In 1940, Solicitor General Francis Biddle told the Junior Bar Conference that this deterrent effect was the most 
important function of the Civil Liberties Unit. “Civil Rights Protection,” Buffalo Daily Law Journal, 14 September 
1940. 
464 “Civil Liberties,” radio address by Hon. Frank Murphy, National Radio Forum, 27 March 1939, Attorney 
General Papers, box 5, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties. 
465 Order No. 3204, Office of the Attorney General, 3 February 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, 
folder Civil Liberties; “Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Tentative Proposal for Attorney General’s 
Conference on Civil Liberties,” 23 February 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil 
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time being, were under Title 18, Sections 51 and 52 of the criminal code.466  The Department 
expected to make generous use of the statutes, though it recognized their limitations. Section 52 
was applicable only to deprivations of civil liberties under color of State laws.  It also suffered 
“from the malady of old age”; after many years of disuse, it was likely to face significant 
resistance.  Section 51 was similarly limited in its usefulness. It was passed to rein in the Ku 
Klux Klan, “and by reason of that fact, together with its severe punishment, it [was] a somewhat 
difficult statute, for psychological reasons, to prosecute under.” Moreover, although it permitted 
prosecution for violation of constitutional rights, few constitutional provisions could be 
construed to limit private action. Finally, both sections faced an additional obstacle, in that both 
criminalized conduct in violation of rights “secured by” the Constitution or federal statutes. 
Defendants were apt to argue, as they had (unsuccessfully) in Harlan County, that Section 51 
applied only to rights “created,” not “guaranteed,” by the Constitution, and that the rights of free 
speech and assembly preexisted the federal government.467  In light of these obstacles, the Civil 
Liberties Unit expected to make recommendations for “some modern legislation on civil 
rights.”468
Until such legislation was passed, however, the Civil Liberties Unit would make do with 
existing options.  Within its first month of operation several hundred complaints were referred to 
the Civil Liberties Unit, including lynchings, interference with meetings, illegal police practices, 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Liberties. Frank Murphy and Senator Robert Wagner were also on the program. Program, National Conference on 
Civil Liberties in the Present Emergency, 13 October 1939, Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3.  
466 The peonage laws would in fact prove more useful, in light of the state action requirements of Section 51 and 51. 
See Goluboff, Lost Promise of Civil Rights.  
467 Memorandum for Mr. Dean, Attorney General Papres, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties. On the origins 
and implications of this interpretation of “secured by” in the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, see Lynda Dodd, 
“Constitutional Torts in the Forgotten Years” (forthcoming).  
468 Gordon Dean to Leigh Danenberg, 6 March 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil 
Liberties.  For example, the Unit was considering recommending legislation that would allow the federal 
government to seek injunctive relief as an alternative to criminal action. “This would overcome the difficulties 
pointed out above and would also free the case of local prejudice on the part of citizenry from which jurors must be 
selected.” “Memorandum for Mr. Dean,” Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, Folder Civil Liberties. 
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deportations, and voting rights violations.469 The Department also contemplated prosecutions 
under Section 51 for violations by employers of the Wagner Act.470  Among the many requests 
that the Civil Liberties Unit received, one was particularly tempting.  A week after the new body 
was announced, delegates from the Workers Defense League of New Jersey met with Henry 
Schweinhaut to discuss the situation in Jersey City.471
 Jersey City, of course, was very much on Murphy’s mind. He considered filing an amicus 
brief in the Hague case, with an eye to action in future civil liberties cases.
 They asked the Department to continue its 
investigation of the Hague administration and to pursue an indictment for, among other things, 
the deportation of Norman Thomas.  
472 In the end, he 
decided not to, reportedly because a favorable outcome was expected without government 
intervention.473
 
 Still, the interest of the Civil Liberties Unit was evident to all involved, including 
the Supreme Court.   
                                                          
469 Gordon Dean to Leigh Danenberg, 6 March 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil 
Liberties.  
470 Joseph Matan, Memorandum to Assistant Attorney General Brien McMahon, 14 May 1937, Attorney General 
Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Rights (“[T]he provisions of the Wagner Act as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court now secures to those laborers, who are engaged in interstate commerce, a right to organize and to bargain 
collectively and that a conspiracy to injure, etc., them in the exercise of their right to organize would be within the 
statute.”). 
471 “Labor Group Asks Hague Indictment,” New York Times, 12 February 1939. The delegates had scheduled an 
appointment with the Attorney General himself, but Murphy was too sick to attend.  
472 “Supreme Court May Clarify Civil Liberties,” Washington Post, 9 February 1939; “Asks Prosecution of Hague 
Officials,” New York Times, 9 February 1939; “Supreme Court May Clarify Civil Liberties,” New York Post, 9 
February 1939. The Civil Liberties Unit prepared the brief, but did not file it. Goluboff, Lost Promise of Civil 
Rights, 118 n. 14.  
473 “Murphy Bars Hague Case Brief,” New York Times, 17 February 1939.  Murphy did suggest that the Department 
might institute new grand jury proceedings after the Supreme Court issued its decision. “New Hague Inquiry Hinted 
by Murphy,” New York Times, 22 April 1939.  
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The Supreme Court Decision 
 In its brief to the Supreme Court, Jersey City disputed only two significant points: federal 
jurisdiction and the constitutionality of the meeting ordinance (both facially and as applied).474  
On the latter issue, it repeated the same arguments it had made in the two courts below. 
Municipal officials, it claimed, have the authority and duty to maintain public spaces for the 
enjoyment and tranquility of the public.  Relying heavily on the Davis decision, it insisted that 
there was no “catch-all” concept of “free expression” in the Constitution, as the ACLU and CIO 
implied.  Rather, rights were specific and idiosyncratic, tied to the “particular time, place and 
circumstance of the particular attempted type of ‘expression.’”475
 Ernst and Frazer likewise reiterated their earlier arguments.  They rehearsed the many 
abuses to which the ACLU and CIO were subjected and argued that broad injunctive relief was 
justified notwithstanding the city’s concessions.  They reviewed the Supreme Court’s recent First 
Amendment decisions to make a case for a robust freedom of assembly.  And they argued that 
the right to speak in public places was a basic feature of democratic governance. In fact, it had 
become “so integral a part of American democracy” that a number of state courts had already 
moved to protect it by striking down permit requirements much like the one in Jersey City.
 In public places, the 
boundaries of acceptable communication were constrained by the rights of the greater 
community. 
476
The Supreme Court, which issued a decision in Hague on June 5, 1938, barely touched 
upon these arguments. The monthly bulletin of the International Juridical Association lamented 
that the Court’s reasoning was largely technical and lacked the lucidity and urgency of the great 
free speech cases.  Unlike Holmes’s and Brandeis’s dissents and the Court’s recent decisions in 
  
                                                          
474 They also argued that the decree exceeded the court’s power and was impracticable of enforcement. 
475 Petitioners’ Supreme Court Brief, Hague v. CIO, 41.  
476 Respondents’ Supreme Court Brief, Hague v. CIO, 63.  
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De Jonge, Herndon, and Lovell, “not half a dozen paragraphs,” over five separate opinions, were 
“devoted to a discussion of the scope of the civil rights involved and their significance in our 
scheme of government.”477
Of the seven justices who participated in the case (the recent appointments, Justices 
Frankfurter and Douglas, did not take part), five voted to modify but affirm the district court’s 
order, and two, Justices Butler and McReynolds, dissented.
 The article declined to add that the opinions were as muddled as they 
were dry—a feature that likely explains the relative obscurity of the case in the subsequent 
development of First Amendment law.   
478  Two competing theories were 
advanced on behalf of the majority’s conclusion that the meeting ordinance was facially 
unconstitutional. Justice Stone, in an opinion joined by Justice Reed, considered the city’s policy 
to be an abridgment of the privileges or immunities of United States citizenship.  Justice Roberts, 
in a decision joined by Justice Black, analyzed the case through the lens of due process instead.  
Justice Hughes split the difference.479
Both opinions focused on the applicable cause of action and the district court’s 
jurisdiction over the case, not the meaning or importance of freedom of assembly. Both began by 
asserting that general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) was lacking.
  
480
                                                          
477 “The Hague Case in the Supreme Court,” International Juridical Association Monthly Bulletin 8 (July 1939), 
Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties. 
 
Although the case was clearly one “arising under” federal law, the plaintiffs had failed to meet 
478 Justice McReynolds thought the issue was properly one for the state courts, and Justice Butler thought Davis v. 
Massachusetts was controlling. With respect to the meeting ordinance, the majority concluded that the District Court 
should simply have struck down the ordinance, without issuing instructions for future administration of permit 
applications. “The courts cannot rewrite the ordinance, as the decree, in effect, does.” Hague, 307 U.S. at 518. 
479 Hughes agreed with Roberts “with respect to the merits.” Hague, 307 U.S. at 532 (Hughes, J., concurring). He 
also approved Roberts’s reasoning with respect to jurisdiction but believed that it was not adequately supported in 
the record.  On that issue, he concurred in the opinion of Justice Stone.  
480 Federal question jurisdiction is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
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the amount in controversy requirement of 3000 dollars.481 The lower courts, however, had 
located jurisdiction on alternative grounds as well.  A provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
§ 24(14) of the judicial code (28 U.S.C. § 41(14)), conferred jurisdiction over suits at law or in 
equity to redress the deprivation “of any privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the 
United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States providing for equal rights” 
of citizens of the United States or others within its jurisdiction.482  A subsequent measure, R.S. 
§ 1979—then codified at 8 U.S.C. § 43 and now familiar to civil rights lawyers as 42 
U.S.C. § 1983—originated in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871.  It provided a 
private cause of action for the denial of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws.”483
 Both Justice Roberts and Justice Stone concluded that the plaintiffs—with the exception 
of the ACLU, which was not a natural person
 
484
                                                          
481 Roberts explained that “a mere averment of the amount in controversy” would not confer jurisdiction. The 
plaintiffs had failed to establish the value of the rights they asserted. Hague, 307 U.S. at 507.  
—had stated a cause of action under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 43.  Both also concluded that the district court appropriately asserted jurisdiction over the 
claim under § 24(14). From there, however, the two opinions diverged widely. Justice Roberts—
nervous, perhaps, about a broad expansion of federal jurisdiction—limited his analysis to a 
482 The section was reenacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1870. In full, it provided jurisdiction for any suit “at law or 
in equity authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State, of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the 
Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States providing for equal rights 
of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”  
483 That section provided: “Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State, or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.” 
484 Both justices (Roberts under the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Stone under the Due Process Clause) 
concluded that only natural persons were entitled to sue and thus barred the claim of the ACLU, which was 
incorporated.  Hague, 307 U.S. at 514; ibid., 527 (“the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of 
natural, not artificial, persons.”). The ACLU considered Justice Stone’s conclusion to be incompatible with freedom 
of the press.  Respondents’ Supreme Court Brief, 151–52 (“A ruling that corporations are not entitled to the benefit 
of the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in so far as freedom of speech and press are concerned would be 
unthinkable. Three-quarters of the nearly 1,000 publishers of daily and Sunday newspapers in the United States are 
corporate entities.”). The Equal Protection Clause, upon which none of the Justices relied, had been held clearly to 
apply to corporations. 
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“narrow question.”485 The relevant inquiry, he reasoned, was whether freedom to disseminate 
information about the Wagner Act and its advantages was within the scope of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore among the rights for which 
the Civil Rights Act provisions “afford[ed] redress in a federal court.” According to Roberts, 
there was no need to consider the larger questions briefed by the parties, including the scope of 
freedom of assembly. “[T]he respondents had no other purpose,” he claimed, “than to inform 
citizens of Jersey City by speech, and by the written word, respecting matters growing out of 
national legislation.”486  It was similarly unnecessary to address the city’s contention that 
jurisdiction was lacking because the rights at stake preexisted the United States and were thus 
not “secured by” it within the meaning of the statute.487 It was indisputable, even under the 
Court’s narrow interpretation of the Civil Rights Act in the Slaughterhouse cases and United 
States v. Cruikshank, that “the right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of 
petitioning Congress” on issues implicating the power of the federal government was an attribute 
of national citizenship, and thus safely within the protective ambit of the federal courts.488  On 
the merits, Jersey City’s meeting ordinance was unconstitutional because it gave city officials 
arbitrary authority to refuse a permit.  Accordingly, it infringed the right of the public to use the 
streets and parks “for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions”—and in particular, the privilege of a citizen to use them “for 
communication of views on national questions.”489
 Relying on the Privileges and Immunities Clause had a number of pitfalls, as Justice 
Stone was quick to point out.  First, the provision applied only to citizens of the United States 
  
                                                          
485 Hague, 307 U.S. at 512.  
486 Ibid.  
487 See Petitioners’ Supreme Court Brief; Dodd, “Constitutional Torts.”  
488 Hague, 307 U.S. at 513–14.  
489 Ibid., 515–16.  
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and thus limited freedom of speech in an unprecedented fashion.490  Second, there was no basis 
in the record for assuming that the plaintiffs were in fact citizens—nor, for that matter, that they 
had intended to discuss the Wagner Act at the prohibited meetings.  For that reason, Justice 
Robert’s decision seemingly opened the door to an expansion of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause beyond the rule laid down in the Slaughterhouse Cases, which had confined its 
application to rights arising out of the relationship of United States citizens to the national 
government.  The injunction, which the Court had resolved to sustain, was not limited to 
interference with meetings pertaining to national labor legislation.  Rather, it protected the right 
to hold any lawful meeting and to circulate any lawful information. Justice Roberts, by loosely 
construing the rights of “national citizenship,” was inadvertently “enlarg[ing] Congressional and 
judicial control of state action” and endangering the “rightful independence of local 
government.”491
 Instead of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice Stone based his opinion squarely 
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Freedom of speech and assembly 
were rights of personal liberty, and “no more grave and important issue” could be brought before 
   
                                                          
490 The Department of Justice worried that Justice Roberts’s opinion might be used to justify anti-alien measures that 
implicated civil liberties. Address by O. John Rogge, National Conference on Civil Liberties, 14 October 1939, 
Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Rights. 
491 Hague, 307 U.S. at 520 n. 1. An IJA Monthly Bulletin explained the issue clearly: “Justice Roberts has either 
gone beyond the facts in the record before him or has in fact, though not in terms, overruled the Slaughter-House 
and Cruikshank cases . . . If Mr. Justice Roberts thought that the C.I.O.’s meetings would be forum discussions on 
the merits of the Labor Act, the answer is that he was probably wrong as a matter of fact and that not an iota of 
record evidence points in that direction. If, as some language in the opinion indicates, he thought the Constitutional 
provision to be applicable because the C.I.O was seeking to exercise the right of collective bargaining which is 
implemented by the Labor Act (but also by state law) then it is plain that the operation of the Constitutional 
provision has been broadened far beyond the scope assigned to it by the Slaughter-House Cases. For it could as well 
be said that one who carries on a business with the aid of an RFC loan, or who by making interstate shipments 
brings himself within the protection accorded shippers by the Interstate Commerce Act, is exercising a privilege or 
immunity of federal citizenship which the Fourteenth Amendment protects from state interference.” “The Hague 
Case in the Supreme Court,” International Juridical Association Monthly Bulletin 8 (July 1939), Vanderbilt Papers, 
box 127, folder Civil Liberties, 6–7.  That the IJA, a leftist organization, criticized Roberts’s extension of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause stems most likely from concern that it could be construed to provide an alternative 
justification for invalidating New Deal labor legislation. Justice Stone presumably shared those fears.  
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the Supreme Court.  They were, moreover, rights that applied to all persons, regardless of their 
citizenship.  And they were squarely among the rights for the vindication of which 8 U.S.C. § 43 
provided a federal cause of action; as Ernst and Frazer had argued in their brief, earlier cases to 
the contrary (including United States v. Wheeler, the IWW case) were inapposite, because they 
predated the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth.492 The 
only open question, according to Justice Stone, was whether due process claims could be 
maintained in the federal courts under § 24(14).  After reviewing the legislative history of that 
provision, he concluded that they could.493
That the ACLU and other organizations could sue in federal court for injunctive relief 
had obvious implications for future litigation strategy. Previously, the vast majority of ACLU 
cases had originated in the state courts, generally as criminal defenses. The new rule gave the 
ACLU an option to initiate test case litigation in federal court.  Except in criminal cases, the 
organization and its allies could henceforth avoid the state courts when their independence was 
compromised—not just under circumstances like Hague, but in cases involving the civil rights of 
racial minorities, particularly in the South. When the ACLU was founded, one of its central 
objectives was to curb the injunctive power of the federal courts.  Twenty years later, it was 
responsible for a momentous extension of that precise power—which it would invoke often in 
the years to come when seeking vindication of civil liberties claims.  
  
 The Supreme Court’s decision had ramifications for another body, as well.  Henry 
Schweinhaut, head of the Civil Liberties Unit in the Department of Justice, was “elated” by the 
                                                          
492 Respondents’ Supreme Court Brief, 133–36.  
493 “The conclusion seems inescapable that the right conferred by the Act of 1871 to maintain a suit in equity in the 
federal courts to protect the suitor against a deprivation of rights or immunities secured by the Constitution, has been 
preserved, and that whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon 
the infringement of property rights, there is jurisdiction in the district court under s 24(14) of the Judicial Code to 
entertain it without proof that the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000.” Hague, 307 U.S. at 531–32.  
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Court’s decision in Hague and regarded it as a strong endorsement of the Civil Rights Act.494 
The Court’s interpretation of the jurisdictional and private action provisions were a seeming 
invitation for criminal prosecutions under Sections 51 and 52.  Justice Stone’s opinion implicitly 
rejected the narrow interpretation of Section 51 in United States v. Cruikshank, an 1876 case 
growing out of the mob murder of more than a hundred black Republicans in Reconstruction 
Louisiana.495  Cruikshank was just the sort of case that Section 51 was designed to cover.  The 
defendants were convicted of conspiracy to deprive citizens of the United States of their rights to 
assemble and bear arms, among other charges. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on 
the theory that such rights were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Stone’s 
opinion suggested that Cruikshank was no longer good law.496
 Of course, the court’s decision left one fundamental limitation of the Civil Rights Act 
intact.  As Assistant Attorney General O. John Rogge told the ACLU’s National Conference on 
Civil Liberties in October 1939 (which was designed to “honor the men in government service 
who have done most to advance the cause of civil liberties in the United States”
   
497
                                                          
494 Lewis Wood, “Hague Ban on C.I.O. Voided by the Supreme Court,” New York Times, 6 June 1939. 
): “No matter 
how much the content of the due process clause has been expanded, rights under the due process 
clause are not protected against mere individual action, on the standard interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a restriction on State action only.” The state action requirement 
expressed in such cases as Cruikshank and Wheeler meant that the statute was inapplicable to 
“the great mass of civil liberties cases” the Department would otherwise have pursued.  Rogge 
495 The victims had assembled at the courthouse to ward off its takeover by Democrats after the disputed 
gubernatorial election of 1872. 
496 “The observation of the Court in United States v. Cruikshank [] that the right of assembly was not secured against 
state action by the Constitution, must be attributed to the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases that only privileges 
and immunities peculiar to United States citizenship were secured by the privileges and immunities clause, and to 
the further fact that at that time it had not been decided that the right was one protected by the due process clause.” 
Hague, 307 U.S. at 526.  
497 “Civil Rights Conference,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (September 1939), 1, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2061. 
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assured the audience that the Criminal Division was evaluating those cases to determine whether 
they represented “sound law.” If they did not, the Civil Liberties Unit would have “no hesitation” 
in asking the Supreme Court to overrule them.498
There was one category of private action that Section 51 could be made to reach without 
a radical revision of existing case law.  The Department of Justice read the Court’s decision in 
Hague to mean that “if a Federal statute otherwise constitutional gives a private right to a citizen, 
Section 51 will serve for prosecution of any group of persons who attempt to take it away from 
him.”  This reasoning arguably applied to private acts of violence affecting statutory rights 
“under the recently extended commerce clause.” The NLRA was the most prominent such 
example, and its curtailment by employers was the theory of the Harlan County case.
  
499 In the 
Department’s view, Hague was an invitation to seek additional indictments under the statute.500  
The CIO quickly announced that it would “request the Department of Justice to take steps for 
criminal prosecution of all who interfere with its organizing activities by violating the civil rights 
of workers.”501 Over the coming years, the Department vigorously pursued the new strategy, 
albeit with uneven results.502
                                                          
498 Address by O. John Rogge, National Conference on Civil Liberties, 14 October 1939, Attorney General Papers, 
box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Rights. 
 
499 Ibid. (citing Hague as well as the Pennsylvania System case, which arose under the 1930 Transportation Act). 
The Harlan case itself never reached the court, because it was nolled as part of a negotiated settlement.  
500 See Goluboff, Lost Promise of Civil Rights, 116–17, for a discussion of the Department’s labor focus in these 
cases. 
501 Lewis Wood, “Hague Ban on CIO Voided by the Supreme Court,” 6 June 1939 (quoting Lee Pressman).  
502 “Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1939,” 63, Attorney General 
Papers, box 30, HM 1994 (reporting cases prosecuted by the Civil Liberties unit in 1939 and 1940, including United 
States v. Sam B. Powe (S. District of AL), in which defendants were charged with conspiring to deprive a newspaper 
editor of the rights of free speech  press in violation of Section 51, which was reversed by the Fifth Circuit); see also 
“Recent Development: Conspiracy To Coerce Employees into Union Activity Not Indictable Under 18 U.S.C. 241,” 
Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 103–06 (noting that indictments against employers for conspiring to deprive their 
employees of their statutory rights to organizer under the NLRA were sustained by district courts in two unreported 
cases); Tom C. Clark, “A Federal Prosecutor Looks At the Civil Rights Statutes,” Columbia Law Review 47 (1947): 
175–85;  “The Press: In Mobile,” Time, 22 May 1939 (describing use of Section 51).  
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In the meantime, Frank Murphy, was confident that the Court’s decision would bolster 
efforts by the Department of Justice to prosecute infringements of constitutional rights. Indeed, 
he predicted that the Civil Liberties Unit would soon “grow into something very important.” 
Americans had come to recognize the importance of the fundamental rights the unit was 
designed to protect.  “It has been obvious for some time in our country,” he observed, “that our 
people are becoming increasingly civil liberties conscious, as they should.”503
Murphy was right. By the spring of 1939, civil liberties had a popular cogency that would 
have astounded World War I dissenters.  Public approval of the outcome in Hague was a 
foregone conclusion. The dominant sentiment in press coverage of the decision was that the 
Supreme Court had not gone far enough.
 
504
 
  
Aftermath 
 In the wake of their Supreme Court victory, the civil liberties forces were uniformly 
jubilant. On June 12, the ACLU convened a “monster public meeting” to celebrate free speech in 
Jersey City.505
                                                          
503 “Murphy Acclaims Hague Case Ruling,” New York Times, 8 June 1939. 
  The announcement for the celebration called the Court’s decision “a clear 
mandate to American citizens to exercise their rights of freedom of speech and assembly,” as 
well as “a mandate to local officials not to interfere with those rights.” Most of the participants 
would be New Jersey residents, the ACLU emphasized, and the purpose of convening was not to 
espouse “radicalism or foreign doctrines.”  Rather, the audience would include Republicans and 
504 E.g., “The Jersey City Case,” Washington Post, 6 June 1939 (commending the result but noting that Justice 
Stone’s decision was more expansive and thus preferable); “Affirming the Obvious,” Baltimore Sun, 7 June 1939 
(“The court’s decision in the Hague cases might have been more reassuring if the majority had accepted Justice 
Stone’s view.”). Some editorials were strictly celebratory, e.g., “The Basic Freedom,” Christian Science Monitor, 6 
June 1939 (“In affirming the injunction against Mayor Hague’s ordinance which arbitrarily limited freedom of 
speech in Jersey City, the United States Supreme Court has upheld again—and impressively—the right which is 
fundamental to all others in a Democracy.”). 
505 Handbill, “Monster Public Meeting,” ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2134.  
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Democrats; Catholics, Protestants and Jews. “This,” the statement declared, “is fundamental 
Americanism.”506
At the meeting, the speakers echoed the sentiments expressed in the announcement. That 
civil liberties captured the true “spirit of America” was the theme of Rabbi Benjamin Plotkin’s 
address.
 
507  Norman Thomas, true to his ministerial roots, stressed the importance of individual 
conscience, as he always had.508  He also argued that civil liberties were crucial to a functioning 
democracy—that free discussion provided the opportunity for minorities to “become majorities 
by persuading their fellow man,” and thereby to correct the country’s mistakes. The Jersey City 
battle, he concluded, had “helped to assert the principle of liberty in which America has found its 
true greatness.”509  Roger Baldwin emphasized that while the controversy was pending he had 
never attempted to make a speech in Jersey City. He was finally doing so, he said, “merely to 
express a conception of Americanism which the Supreme Court has approved.”510
 Seven or eight thousand people attended the meeting, by Jerome Britchey’s estimate, and 
the crowd was overwhelmingly sympathetic to the civil liberties cause.  The Hague 
administration, at last, had determined that it was time to cut its losses.  Daniel Casey assured 
that preparations for the meeting proceeded smoothly, and on the evening of the event, city 
representatives offered their full cooperation (according to Britchey, it was a “wholly different 
show and a totally different attitude”).
 
511
                                                          
506 ACLU Press Release, 7 June 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133. 
  The whole evening, there were only a “few lone 
507 Statement of Rabbi Benjamin Plotkin, 12 June 1930, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2134.  
508 On Thomas’s theory of individual conscience and its relation to his theology, see Thomas, Conscience.  
509 Statement by Norman Thomas at Journal Square Meeting, 12 June 1930, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2134. 
510 Remarks of Roger Baldwin at Meeting, Jersey City, 12 June 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2134. Among the 
other speakers were Rev. Archey Ball, chair of the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union, and Morris Milgram, secretary 
of the Workers Defense League. 
511 See also Telegram from Daniel Casey to Arthur Garfield Hays, 7 June 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2134 
(advising Hays that the city would make “whatever requirements [were] necessary” to facilitate the event). 
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hoots.”512  Britchey thought the effect was better, even, than the newspapers described. “It was a 
wondrous sight to behold,” he mused, “all those heads close together and not a nightstick coming 
down on any one of them; all the police on hand to help—not to pull down a speaker.”513
This accommodating posture persisted through the summer. In July, Jersey City adopted 
a new ordinance—the ABA called it “a model municipal enactment”
   
514—authorizing the 
issuance of meeting permits in public places (it required four days notice in the city’s four major 
parks, where “unfettered discussion” would be permissible, and twenty-four hours elsewhere).515 
Mayor Hague announced deferentially that “the Supreme Court [had] spoken” and that the city 
desired “to comply in every way with the decision of the court.”516
The Washington Post thought that Hague’s capitulation to the Supreme Court’s decision 
was an “occasion for rejoicing.” The distinguishing feature of a democracy, according to an 
editorial, was “the readiness of the people voluntarily to submit to the law’s dictates.” The 
coercive authority of the democratic state lay primarily in rule of law, not in physical force. 
Hague, in capitulating to the Court’s decision, showed that he was “mindful of this fundamental 
fact and fully prepared to live up to it.”
 City officials administered 
the ordinance liberally, and mass meetings (as well as literature distribution, picketing, and labor 
activity) were allowed to proceed without interference.   
517
                                                          
512 The New York Times’ assessment was less optimistic.  It estimated that a “hooting, jeering crowd” of a thousand 
people, mostly teenagers, followed Norman Thomas to the tube station. “Hague Safeguards Rally of His Foes,” New 
York Times, 13 June 1939. The Times also noted the presence of agents of the Department of Justice, “presumably 
gathering material for a report to the recently established Division of Civil Liberties of the department.” Ibid. 
  That Hague’s about-face was strategic rather than 
ideological did not render his retreat less significant; the important thing was that democratic 
liberties had been restored.  By September, an update in the ACLU’s Civil Liberties Quarterly 
513 Jerome Britchey to Morris Ernst, June 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133. Ernst missed the meeting 
because he was away on vacation, but the crowd cheered him in his absence.  
514 ABA, “Committee on the Bill of Rights,” 66. 
515 Lucille Milner, Memorandum, 10 July 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2134.  
516 “Jersey City Open to Free Assembly,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (September 1939), 2. 
517 “The Rule of Law,” Washington Post, 14 June 1939. 
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was titled “Jersey City Open to Free Assembly” and began with a heartening assessment: “All’s 
quiet on the Jersey City front.”518
 In addition to its implications for free speech generally, the Hague decision was an 
unmistakable “go signal” (as California’s state bar journal put it) for labor organizing in Jersey 
City and elsewhere.
  
519  In the days after the decision, the CIO launched a massive organizing 
campaign in Hudson County.  The program, which it developed in consultation with Morris 
Ernst, was months in the planning.  In addition to a general literature distribution, it entailed 
stationing CIO organizers at the factory gates, serving the court’s decree on government 
employees (Ernst hoped official-looking papers would scare them into submission), radio 
broadcasts, renting halls, outdoor meetings, and the relocation to Jersey City of the main CIO 
offices.520
As it turned out, the parties came to terms much more easily than Carney expected.  
According to Hague’s biographer, the CIO’s “defiant, anti-Hague attitude” lasted a month.
 William Carney, in his public statement on June 5, announced that the 30,000 CIO 
members in Hudson County had “enlisted for the duration of the war” and would not give up 
until Hague was “either in jail or in political oblivion.”  
521 On 
August 1, CIO representatives visited Mayor Hague’s office and emerged with assurances that 
“the doors of City Hall [were] always open” to them.522
                                                          
518 “Jersey City Open to Free Assembly,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (September 1939), 2. 
 On August 2, the Hague administration 
519 Harry Graham Balter, “Recent Civil Rights Decision Discussion,” California Bar Journal 14 (June 1939): 200–
04. See also clipping, “Hague Court Upset Spurs C.I.O. Drive,” Vanderbilt Papers, box 371 (“Instructions to the 
New Jersey Regional Directors from Washington, and presumably that means John L. Lewis, are that Jersey City is 
to become a concentration point for organization.”).  
520 Ernst formulated a plan together with John L. Lewis. Morris Ernst to William Carney, 12 April 1939, ACLU 
Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133. The ACLU had advised organizations involved in the Jersey City work that action 
would have to await a final mandate and should not be made without the advice of counsel.  The ILD promised not 
to act independently and to coordinate activity in the “best interests of the CIO.” Baldwin to Organizations of the 
Joint Committee for Civil Rights in Jersey City, 27 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133; Letter to Roger 
Baldwin, 28 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133. 
521 McKean, Boss, 199.  
522 “Hague City Hall Holds ‘Open Door’ for CIO,” New York Times, 1 August 1939.  
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sided with a local CIO affiliate in a labor dispute.523 Union officials announced that New Jersey 
Republicans had supported them during the court fight for strategic reasons only and were hostile 
to the larger objectives of the labor movement. “We must depend on the Democratic machine,” 
one reportedly said, and “we will work with anyone who’ll help us.”524 Hague, who proclaimed a 
few days later that he was “one hundred percent” for a Roosevelt third term, had determined that 
cooperation with local labor leaders was a more profitable strategy than defiance.525
Hague was not the only one who proved willing to compromise for political reasons. It 
was generally understood that the Hague administration was “so conspicuously devoted to the 
third term” because it was “desperately afraid of Federal prosecution” and wanted to appease 
federal officials.
  
526 Shortly after Hague’s endorsement, reports emerged that the Civil Liberties 
Unit was dropping its investigation in Jersey City. Frank Murphy, who had spearheaded anti-
corruption efforts within the Department of Justice and was widely regarded as self-righteously 
moral (he did not smoke, drink, swear, or eat meat, according to the Baltimore Sun), was accused 
of selling out.527
As the featured speaker at the commencement exercises of Jersey City’s John Marshall 
College on June 21, Murphy stressed the importance of civil liberties and obliquely criticized 
Mayor Hague.
  
528 During his trip, however, he was “taken in hand by the authorities, wined, 
dined, . . . and told that there was ‘no vice, no crime, no racketeering’ in Jersey City.”529
                                                          
523 “Hague Aids the CIO in Jersey Labor Row,” New York Times, 2 August 1939.  
 For the 
next half-year, Murphy made little mention of Frank Hague.  Then, a few hours before he was 
sworn in as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, on January 18, 1939, Murphy issued a 
524 Quoted in McKean, Boss, 200.  
525 “Hague is ‘100%’ for Roosevelt Third Term,” New York Times, 5 August 1939. 
526 Erwin D. Canham, “After the Convention,” Christian Science Monitor, 22 July 1940. 
527 Frank R. Kent, “The Great Game of Politics,” Baltimore Sun, 11 August 1939. 
528 “Murphy, in Jersey, Denounces Hague,” New York Times, 22 June 1939.  
529 McKean, Boss, 103.  
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statement on his “unfinished business” as Attorney General.  He denied “insinuations and 
implications” that he had “for political purposes suppressed possible proceedings against . . . 
Mayor Hague of Jersey City and other political leaders.”  He insisted that there had been no 
criminal prosecution of Hague because there was no evidence of criminal activity to support a 
prosecution.530 Murphy’s Jersey City allies—more likely out of obligation or prudence than true 
conviction—backed him up. Norman Thomas said he had “no quarrel” with Murphy and had 
made “no insinuations,” though he noted that the Department was slow to investigate civil 
liberties violations unless doing so was politically expedient.  Morris Ernst, who by 1940 was a 
close personal advisor to President Roosevelt, went further. He stated publicly that he was 
convinced that the Department of Justice had no basis for prosecuting Hague; he had worked 
with the criminal division and knew it had made a “most thorough investigation of the field.” He 
added, “Not only was there no suppression of the investigation, but the only way they could have 
prosecuted Hague would have been by violating the Mayor’s civil liberties.”531
Ernst’s willingness to modify or sacrifice his broader principles in the interest of political 
expediency manifested in other issues as well.  Although Ernst heartily supported the CIO’s 
labor program and helped formulate its organizing campaign in Jersey City, he felt that the goals 
of organized labor were distinct from those of the ACLU.  In fact, the battle with Mayor Hague 
was the last notable occasion on which the ACLU fought in the trenches alongside its labor 
allies.  For two decades, the ACLU leadership had stood at the head of the rallies and picket lines 
 
                                                          
530 Arthur Krock, “In the Nation,” New York Times, 19 January 1940. 
531 “Murphy, Jackson Inducted Together,” New York Times, 19 January 1940. In February, the Washington Post 
reported that the investigation was complete and that Attorney General Jackson, together with Schweinhaut, was 
deciding whether to present the case to a grand jury. At that time, the contemplated charges included neither 
suppression of the CIO nor the deportation of Norman Thomas.  “Inquiry on Hague Complete, Jackson Weighs 
Charges,” Washington Post, 12 February 1940.  
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that precipitated the organization’s major court challenges.532
By the time Judge Clark began hearing testimony in Hague, ACLU attorneys had 
convinced the courts and the public that free speech was an important American value.  Hague 
himself, while insisting that free speech was not implicated in Jersey City, agreed during trial 
that nobody “should be denied the right to talk.”
  In the 1920s, Roger Baldwin had 
narrowly escaped a prison sentence for spearheading a demonstration by striking silk workers in 
Paterson, New Jersey, just a few miles away from Hudson County.  Throughout the 1930s, 
ACLU representatives, including Corliss Lamont and Arthur Garfield Hays, had employed the 
familiar tactics of direct action in Jersey City.  But as the litigation in Hague v. CIO unfolded, 
Morris Ernst and the ACLU decided that it was more effective to stand aloof from the fray as a 
defender of neutral liberties than to provoke arrest by carrying placards or making car-top 
speeches—a sentiment captured in Ernst’s public criticism of Hays as the legal proceedings 
began.   
533
                                                          
532 In the Casey case, Hays testified that it was ACLU policy to arrange for representatives to picket or otherwise 
challenge restrictive laws.  ACLU v. Casey, 5 March 1937, before Hon. William Clark, Newark: Testimony of 
Arthur Garfield Hays, ACLU Papers, reel 153, vol. 1051. Asked whether it provoked conflict without invitation by 
an involved party, Hays responded, “generally we wait until we are requested, but if we find a situation to be a very 
bad one, we investigate and bring about a situation where we are requested to lend our help.” 
  Over the course of the legal proceedings, 
however, the meaning and purpose of civil liberties were still very much in flux.  Increasingly, 
the ACLU took steps to ensure its “neutrality,” as the CIO angrily pointed out.   Whatever his 
personal feelings, Ernst publicly and ardently disavowed labor issues as concerns of the ACLU. 
Borrowing from his rhetoric in sex education and artistic freedom cases, he insisted that the 
rights at stake were the right to air disfavored ideas and the right to be free from the censor’s 
arbitrary and autocratic reach. As the La Follette Committee yielded the spotlight to Martin Dies, 
533 Hague trial transcript, vol. 2, 1077.  Similarly, despite his acknowledgment of the importance of free speech as an 
abstract principle, Hague’s attorney insisted that the rights to organize, rent halls or picket were mere adjuncts to the 
constitutional right to earn a livelihood.  The latter he considered “a right of substance”—“a property right, which 
the courts should and have protected.”  Ibid., 2133. 
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Jr.’s House Committee on Un-American Activity, Ernst and the ACLU made civil liberties more 
palatable to mainstream liberals.534
By the spring of 1939, the ACLU’s national office considered ousting Abraham Isserman 
as counsel for the New Jersey Civil Liberties Committee on the ground that he, along with his 
work in Jersey City, was “too pro-labor.”
  
535 At the public celebration following the Court’s 
decision, William Callahan, an editor for the Catholic Worker reminded his audience that the 
judicial victory was “only a small part of the larger, grander work of securing the fruits of 
democracy for the millions to whom they are yet denied”—a project imperiled by the mounting 
“danger of the Wagner Act’s being scrapped.”536 But Callahan’s determination to use Hague as a 
“springboard towards a larger, more generous freedom” was an increasingly marginal view 
within the ACLU.  Indeed, the meeting was intentionally divorced from the CIO and its 
organizing efforts in Jersey City.537
Even Roger Baldwin, in his speech, abandoned the radical rhetoric that he had so 
resolutely embraced for the past two decades.  At the outset of the litigation, Baldwin had 
denounced Hague’s policies as inconsistent with the “striking advances made in the exercise of 
civil rights under new labor laws, favorable court decisions and a growing trade union 
movement.”
   
538
                                                          
534 The hearings of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities were convened on August 12, 1938 by 
Representative Martin Dies of Texas.  On the relationship between the Dies Committee and civil liberties, see 
Auerbach, “La Follette Committee,” Journal of American History, 450 (“The Dies Committee, more than any single 
institution, abetted the charge that the La Follette Committee’s origins, composition, and direction evidenced affinity 
for communism.”).   
 Around that time, a correspondent offered Baldwin some telling advice: “I know 
535 Abraham Isserman to Roger Baldwin, 29 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133. 
536 Address by William Callahan at Journal Square, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2134. 
537 Norman Thomas to Morris Ernst, 7 June 1939, Ernst Papers, box 126, folder 3 (“The C.I.O. may be right in 
waiting and building up its meeting, which will of necessity primarily be concerned with Labor organizations. 
Because that will be its main concern and because there is still war between the C.I.O. and A.F. of L., the meeting 
cannot be principally a celebration of a great victory for civil liberty. . . . Better far, one big meeting while public 
interest is still directed toward Jersey City, at which the praises of civil liberty can be sung.”). 
538 ACLU Press Release, 22 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2063. 
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you’re a Marxist and all that, and I know the argument that civil liberties and economic liberties 
are all of one piece and are as inseparable as the Trinity. Well, from my point of view that’s good 
theology, but damn poor tactics.”539  One year later, Baldwin had internalized that lesson, and he 
no longer thought of civil liberties in staunchly labor terms.   He acknowledged that “the real 
issue” at stake in Jersey City “was the right of independent trade unions to organize in what has 
been proudly heralded as an open shop town.”  He nonetheless assured his audience that the 
ACLU defended everyone’s rights without distinction and had “no ‘ism’ to promote except the 
Bill of Rights.”  Baldwin’s remarks neatly captured his organization’s mature position.  The 
ACLU, he insisted, was no more concerned with the rights of unions than the rights of 
employers. Still, employers were better equipped to defend their own interests, whereas “unions 
need help.” “It is our business to open doors that are closed to them,” he explained. “It is their 
business to walk through the doors after they are opened.”540
All told, Morris Ernst estimated that the Hague case took more of his firm’s time “than 
all the other cases [it had] handled for the ACLU put together.”
  
541 The legal bill, which included 
only expenses (Ernst donated his time), came to thousands of dollars and led to a spat between 
the plaintiffs as to which group should pay.542
                                                          
539 Letter to Roger Baldwin, 28 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2040.  
  The dispute over reimbursement, however, was 
540 Remarks of Roger Baldwin at Journal Square Meeting, 12 June 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 177, vol. 2134. 
541 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 16 November 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
542 Ernst requested reimbursement for almost five thousand dollars in expenses (according to Ernst, that was the 
“cheapest bill that any organization ever got” for a five-week trial carried to the Supreme Court, though the CIO 
considered it excessive). Morris Ernst to Spaulding Frazer, 1 March 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133; Roger 
Baldwin to Morris Ernst, 8 June 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133.  Ernst’s understanding was that the case 
and attendant financial responsibilities were the CIO’s, as the ACLU had come in after the fact at the CIO’s 
suggestion.  Morris Ernst to Spaulding Frazer, 1 March 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133.  Lee Pressman, 
CIO general counsel, told Baldwin that the designation of plaintiffs had been left to Ernst, who was acting for both 
parties.  Accordingly, he felt the two organizations stood as co-plaintiffs, and each should pay half of the expenses.  
Lee Pressman to Roger Baldwin, 21 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133. Baldwin insisted that the 
ACLU had not committed funds in advance and advised Ernst that if Pressman would not pay, he would have to 
look to John L. Lewis for further funds.  Roger Baldwin to Lee Pressman, 8 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, 
vol. 2133; Roger Baldwin to Morris Ernst, 8 June 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2133.  Frazer’s firm was paid 
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the least important of the many disagreements that the Hague case spawned between the ACLU 
and the CIO.   
From the perspective of the ACLU’s dwindling labor constituency, the Jersey City 
campaign had been most costly in non-financial terms.  Hague v. CIO was the first time that an 
ACLU legal action on behalf of organized labor attracted widespread public support.  But its 
popular resonance stemmed precisely from the erasure of labor issues from its central terms.  As 
the New York Times observed, “The notion that the right of free speech or public assembly may 
properly be denied to persons with whom a political leader and his satellites disagree was an 
astounding contradiction of democracy,” and it “served to wake people up.”543  More pointedly, 
the Yale Law Journal reflected that “when practically every shade of public opinion became 
outraged at what appeared to be a blatant denial of fundamental rights, emphasis shifted from 
specific attempts by one group at raising abnormally low Jersey City working conditions to the 
more basic issue of whether constitutional guaranties of free speech, free press, and free 
assembly apply to union sympathizers as well as to other citizens.”544
Rightwing critics had feared that support for the civil liberties cause by self-described 
conservatives, and particularly such eminent bodies as the ABA, would make the ACLU more 
respectable—and indeed it did.  Their fear, however, was largely misplaced.  Respectability 
attracted new members and new allies to the ACLU.  In turn, it created new expectations.  After 
Hague v. CIO, the ACLU would rarely defend its labor clients on anything other than generally 
applicable First Amendment grounds.  The next step was to extend those same rights to the very 
individuals and entities whose dominance the ACLU was founded to resist.  In 1940, the ABA’s 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
by the CIO, though in Ernst’s estimation, far below market rate. Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 26 July 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 165, vol. 2041. 
543 “Defense of Civil Liberties,” New York Times, 21 April 1939. 
544 “Hague Injunction Proceedings,” 258. 
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Committee on the Bill of Rights announced its intention to file its next amicus brief in a case 
involving the right of employers to free speech, asserted against the coercive apparatus of the 
NLRA.545
                                                          
545 ABA, “Committee on the Bill of Rights,” 69. 
  Its position on the matter was squarely in line with the ACLU’s.  
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CHAPTER 6: FREE SPEECH OR FAIR LABOR 
 
On May 26, 1937, a few dozen representatives of the United Automobile Workers of 
America assembled near the Ford Motor Company’s River Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan 
to distribute union leaflets.  They were greeted by Ford agents and, in the presence of peaceful 
observers and press representatives, brutally beaten. The message was clear: the Ford Motor 
Company would not be organized.   
The “Battle of the Overpass,” as the events of May 26 came to be known, is among the 
most notorious of American labor struggles.  The well documented and widely publicized 
violence perpetuated by agents of the Ford Motor Company against peaceful organizers for the 
United Automobile Workers of America soured Americans’ widespread image of Henry Ford as 
a model of industrial benevolence.  In a period when organized labor was under attack, it 
generated much-needed support for the efforts by workers to secure union recognition.   
 The River Rouge assault is widely acknowledged as a pivotal event in negotiations 
between the Ford Motor Company and the UAW.  But an equally important legacy of the Battle 
of the Overpass has been largely lost to history.  The attack on union organizers occurred just six 
weeks after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act.1
                                                          
1 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), was decided on April 12, 1937.  
  
The National Labor Relations Board’s swift condemnation of Ford’s labor policies in the wake 
of Ford’s violence precipitated a second and more protracted battle with implications that were 
as far-ranging, if not more so, than the first.  Ford’s attorneys, hard pressed to defend the 
propriety of the company’s response to UAW organizing efforts, instead launched a legal and 
public relations campaign against the NLRB itself.  Their indictment of Board procedures shook 
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the already precarious public confidence in the adjudicative capabilities of the NLRB and, in 
significant respects, paved the way to the Taft-Hartley Act, enacted ten years later.  
The most original contribution of Ford’s lawyers, however, was not in the field of 
procedure—where a battle between industry and the NLRB was already raging—but rather in the 
ongoing struggle over the meaning of civil liberties in New Deal America.  In National Labor 
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, the Supreme Court had foreclosed the 
standard employer argument that the legislative enforcement of collective bargaining infringed 
on its Fifth Amendment right to manage its business in an orderly fashion of its choosing.2
Organized labor and the left quickly dismissed the new argument. Although they 
acknowledged free speech as an important value, they insisted that anti-union statements by 
employers were coercive per se and therefore outside the protection of the First Amendment.  To 
hold otherwise, they insisted, would be subversive of the public interest in precisely the same 
fashion as substantive due process.  For the ACLU, however, the issue was more complicated.  
As Lucille Milner, longtime secretary of the ACLU, put the matter in a 1938 letter to the 
 For 
employers, Jones & Laughlin Steel meant coming to terms with a new constitutional landscape 
in which they no longer could count on the federal courts simply to strike down pro-labor 
machinery.  They would need instead to whittle away at state power by invoking those checks on 
majoritarian power capable of mustering broad popular and political support. And so, seizing on 
civil libertarian rhetoric of the past two decades, Ford introduced a new twist on old liberties.  By 
dictating the terms of employers’ communications with their employees, it argued, the NLRB 
was trenching on freedoms that were guaranteed by the Constitution to protect democratic 
processes. The NLRB was curtailing employers’ freedom of speech. 
                                                          
2 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 43.  
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NLRB’s regional director in St. Louis: “This subject of the employer’s right in the N.L.R.B.’s 
order has been the most controversial one which has ever come before the Board and we have 
been discussing it for the past six months. . . . We have never seen the Board so completely at 
loggerheads on any issue since the organization has been in existence.”3
 
 Ford v. NLRB 
fundamentally challenged the ACLU’s relationship to labor and the state, forcing the 
organization to rethink its broader policy agenda and to reassess the meaning of free speech.   
The NLRA, the ACLU, and the Retreat of Radical Labor 
During the winter of 1936-1937, national attention was directed not toward Dearborn, 
Michigan, but toward Flint.  Over the course of a forty-four day sit down strike, the UAW-CIO 
forced the General Motors Company, the world’s largest industrial corporation, to recognize it as 
the exclusive bargaining representative of GM workers.  Although the strike organizers had 
embarked on their course with little hope of success, the New Deal realignment of state power in 
labor relations facilitated a stunning victory for labor. When GM secured an injunction against 
the strikers, Michigan’s new governor, Frank Murphy, refused to intervene on the company’s 
behalf.4  Like President Roosevelt, Murphy conceded that the seizure of GM property was 
illegal—but so too, he insisted, was GM’s violation of the Wagner Act.5
                                                          
3 Lucile Milner to Dorothea de Schweinitz, 1 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 160, vol. 2002. 
  Murphy mobilized the 
National Guard troops but ordered them to maintain the peace and protect the strikers from local 
law enforcement and vigilantes rather than break the strike.  In the end, the strikers secured their 
most aggressive demands, including at least six months of exclusive UAW representation.   
4 Nelson Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1995), 75.  See also J. Woodford Howard, Mr. Justice Murphy: A Political Biography (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968); Sidney Fine, Frank Murphy, 3 vols. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975–
1984).  
5 Notably, Murphy cited findings of the La Follette Committee to GM representatives as evidence of their non-
compliance with federal law.  He also invoked the Committee findings in gubernatorial addresses.  
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Nationally, the victory generated a mix of outrage and admiration. Labor justified the sit-
down strike as a remedy for employers’ ongoing disregard of the rights of labor. UAW attorney 
Maurice Sugar claimed that the practice was both ethical and legal.6  An employee had “a right 
to work for decent wages, for decent hours and under decent conditions,” he charged, and in an 
era of industrial monopolies and rampant unemployment, workers were entitled to fight to retain 
their jobs.  When the right of workers to live conflicted with the right of an employer to dispose 
freely of its property, a decision had to be made as to which right took priority.7
Like other radical labor leaders, Sugar regarded the sit-down strike as an essential 
weapon in labor’s struggle.  By the spring of 1937, sit-downs had directly affected 400,000 
workers,
  And that, he 
claimed, is precisely what New Deal legislation had done.  Recent laws had recognized the right 
of labor to engage in practices that encroached upon employers’ property.  Whether that 
encroachment took place inside or outside the plant was irrelevant to the balancing of relative 
rights. “The American worker is breaking his chains,” Sugar concluded. “The employer protests 
loudly and indignantly that his chain law has been violated. But it hasn’t been violated. Actually, 
whether we know it or not, the chain law has fallen with the chains.”  
8 and UAW membership had reached a quarter-million. As the architect of the new 
strategy, the CIO had become a formidable opponent. In March, United States Steel entered into 
bargaining agreement with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee-CIO, no strike necessary.9
By late spring, however, the tide had begun to turn against labor.  Almost one quarter of 
organized labor was unionized, and the majority, for the time being, belonged to CIO-affiliated 
  
                                                          
6 “Talk by Maurice Sugar on the Legality and Ethics of the Sit-Down Strike,” Cuyahoga County Bar Association, 14 
April 1937 (broadcast over WGAR), in Maurice Sugar Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban 
Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich., acc. 232  (hereafter Sugar Papers), box 25, folder 25:3.  
7 “Rights do not exist in a political or economic vacuum,” he reasoned, “and no man can assert a right without at the 
same time asserting it against another man.” Ibid.  
8 Sidney Fine, Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936–1937 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1969), 331.  
9 Ibid., 329–30.  
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unions.10  But the CIO was already struggling to maintain its power and legitimacy.  Employers 
groups organized—some drawing explicitly on the ACLU’s methods of earlier years—to 
mobilize public opinion against worker lawlessness and to pressure local police and 
administrators to enforce the law.11  Increasingly, public and political figures expressed concern 
at unions’ aggressive attitude, and momentum was seeping from the congressional labor agenda.  
The economy had contracted sharply as a result of Roosevelt’s fiscal policy, fueling frustration 
and desperation by industry and workers alike.12  By summer, fear of sit-downs was pervasive, 
and the Senate had roundly condemned the practice.13
Sit-down strikes were only the first congressional casualty. The failure of Roosevelt’s 
judiciary reorganization plan had suggested that pro-labor legislation was vulnerable.  The 
Wagner Act, newly secured by the Supreme Court from constitutional attack, was suddenly open 
to legislative challenge.   Republican opponents of the New Deal reached out to Southern 
Democrats, who feared that active intervention in labor disputes would open the door to federal 
interference with Jim Crow.  To make matters worse, the AFL attacked the NLRB for favoring 
the CIO and undermining labor voluntarism.  New Deal Democrats responded by citing the 
violent and unlawful suppression of labor by employers, relying heavily on the findings of the La 
Follette Civil Liberties Committee. By the summer of 1938, however, the committee’s staff was 
regularly fielding demands that it investigate labor unions in addition to employers.  One 
outraged citizen, voicing widely shared anti-union sentiments, insisted that “people read the 
   
                                                          
10 Many of its members were not paying dues. Dubofsky, State and Labor, 138.  
11 “Partial Report of Proceedings, Meeting, Organization Committee, National Committee of One Thousand on Civil 
Rights,” La Follette Committee Papers, 50.25, box 86, folder March 1937. Archibald Stevenson, who had been 
intimately familiar with the ACLU ever since his Lusk Committee days, helped organize the National Committee of 
One Thousand on Civil Rights to combat sit-down strikes. 
12 On “Roosevelt’s Depression,” see Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt’s Government: The Controversy 
over Executive Reorganization, 1936–1939 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 149. 
13 Fine, Sit-Down, 332–35; James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the 
Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 169. 
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News Papers and know that if strikers did not attack men hired to protect plants, there would be 
no fighting.”14  In this anti-union climate, the administration was no longer willing to stake its 
political leverage on organized labor.15
Neither, for that matter, was a sizable contingent of the ACLU’s National Committee.  
Between 1935 and 1937, differences of opinion within the ACLU had been a matter of degree. 
Through decades of litigation and advocacy, the organization had established a broad consensus 
around the impropriety and unconstitutionality of interference with the speech of radicals and 
other unpopular minorities. They had restored a measure of credibility to the courts, persuading 
some of the most recalcitrant labor advocates to regard the federal judiciary as a potential forum 
for vindicating their rights.  They had convinced many Americans, including many judges, that 
government had no business interfering with academic freedom, artistic expression, sex 
education, or even birth control, because efforts at suppression stifled democratic change and 
unduly burdened individual autonomy.  On the whole, however, they had always agreed that the 
rights of labor were the most pressing civil liberties concerns.   
 
In the spring of 1937, changing circumstances called for a reevaluation of the 
organization’s underlying goals.  The CIO’s new tactics were not obviously about speech or 
expression.  Nor was the ACLU board’s endorsement of the Wagner Act or the NLRB.  And 
                                                          
14 J.C. Pinkney to Robert La Follette, 2 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 50.25, box 85. An “old war 
horse independent Democrat” who claimed to been a working man and to have known both Gompers and La 
Follette’s father well wrote: “I sincerely appeal to you and your honorable committee and especially in view of the 
present insurrection and plain anarchy we are now viewing, that you should investigate the Labor unions activities 
and inform the Citizens of our Country the true picture of all sides, turning back the pages and delving into action 
for the past twenty years.”  George Porter to Robert La Follette, Jr., 5 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 
50.25, box 85. See also John J. White to Robert Wohlforth, 25 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 50.25, 
box 86 (impugning both the Committee and unions) and W. L. Jones to Robert La Follette, 23 June 1927, La 
Follette Committee Papers, 50.25, box 86. One letter suggested that the committee should investigate Roosevelt for 
his court-packing plan. J. D. Fidler to Robert La Follette, Jr., 25 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 
50.25, box 85. 
15 During the Little Steel Strike, the Chicago police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, killing ten of them.  
Even this Memorial Day massacre, however, failed to generate support for the CIO.   
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increasingly, the mainstream press and the ACLU’s own members—many of whom had recently 
joined—were critical of the organization’s identification with the labor cause.   
In a March 1937 statement, the ACLU Board of Directors took a first cut at clarifying its 
position.16
The latter claim was both disingenuous and novel.  ACLU annual reports had always 
proclaimed the organization’s allegiance to labor; indeed, defending labor’s right to organize had 
been the reason for its coming into existence.  Its entire understanding of civil liberties had 
derived from a commitment to the rights of labor to picket and strike.  In the 1937 statement, 
some of the old flavor was retained. The board assumed, for example, that the Bill of Rights was 
“originally intended . . .  to cover all forms of agitation and propaganda not associated with acts 
of violence.”  The old “right of agitation” appeared alongside the “guarantees of personal liberty 
set forth in the Bill of Rights.” But the emphasis was different. In lieu of substantive results, the 
Board invoked the “maintenance of democratic processes.” 
 “So many friends and critics have recently raised questions as to the purposes of the 
American Civil Liberties Union in relation to current issues,” it began, “that we desire to make it 
clear beyond debate that the Union has no purpose to serve other than the maintenance of 
democratic rights.”  The ACLU, the statement explained, was a “united front” of people who 
agreed only on the defense of civil rights. Its only commitment was to “protect orderly and 
peaceful progress through the exercise of those civil rights guaranteed in the Constitution.”  The 
board reiterated the organization’s longstanding claim to political neutrality, but this time, it also 
professed to have no “economic direction” or connection with any “economic movement.” 
As in earlier statements, the board justified the disproportionate representation of 
“radicals” in the ACLU leadership as a function of the reluctance of conservatives to “take a 
                                                          
16 Statement on Current Issues of Civil Rights by the Board of Directors, March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 
969. 
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stand.”17
 The board’s general policy statement did not, however, put the matter to rest.  While 
much of the organization could agree about abstract commitments, conflict quickly arose over 
the application of those principles to the specific case of the sit-down strike, much as it had when 
the NCLB had considered defending the IWW’s use of “sabotage” two decades earlier. A 
proposed statement on “So-Called Sit-Down and Stay-In Strikes” opened by acknowledging the 
sharp divide on the issue among advocates of civil liberties and stating the case for both sides.
  For the time being, the ACLU was comfortable resting on the assumption, still 
reasonable in 1937, “that an inclusive organization is bound to number among its active 
members those who have a radical economic outlook.”  Still, the board was unusually clear about 
its eagerness for broader support.  It promised not only to “welcome the more active 
cooperation” of individuals with differing economic views, but to “so reorganize its personnel as 
to put such persons into positions of official responsibility.” It backed up its claim by reference 
to its willingness to “defend those who do not espouse progressive causes.” It emphasized that it 
would even protect, “if occasion required, as it does not, the rights of non-union workers.”  
18  
Whereas some people considered such strikes to be clear cases of trespass, it explained, others 
asserted that workers have a property interest in their jobs.19 The board conveyed the position of 
labor advocates—naïve in hindsight, but a mark of the dramatic shift in labor’s opinion of the 
federal judiciary—that soon the courts might recognize sit-down strikes as appropriate and 
lawful under certain circumstances.20
                                                          
17 That excuse would not hold up for long: in just a few months, Grenville Clark would convince the ABA to take up 
the civil liberties cause.  See Chapter 5.  
  On the other hand, it recognized the objection that the new 
18 “Proposed Statement on So-Called Sit-Down and Stay-In Strikes Submitted to the National Committee of the 
American Civil Liberties Union by a Subcommitee Appointed by the Board of Directors,” March 1937, ACLU 
Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
19 The statement made a slightly stronger case for protection under the rubric of civil liberties of the occupation of 
public relief offices or legislative halls by the unemployed.   
20 As late as August 1937, Maurice Sugar wrote to Homer Martin: “It has been amply demonstrated that with 
sufficient power on the industrial field reflecting itself in the political consciousness of the judiciary, judges are 
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tactic allowed a minority of workers “to deny rights to a majority” and, in certain industries, to 
“cripple service essential to a whole community.”  The ACLU, the statement concluded, would 
not take a position as between these two views other than to discourage excessive force in 
making arrests.  The chief concern of the organization in the field of industrial relations was to 
“keep open the processes of discussion and negotiation as against coercion and violence.” Such, 
said the board, was “the heart of the civil liberties doctrine.” 
The board’s decision not to take a firm stand on the sit-down strike, intended to be 
diplomatic, pleased no one.  By failing to follow Congress and the press in condemning the tactic 
outright, the board alienated its more conservative members.  For refusing to endorse labor’s 
most powerful weapon, it was attacked just as vigorously from the left.  Both of the ACLU’s 
attorneys wrote to complain, though for different reasons.  Morris Ernst wanted the Board to 
draw a distinction between “personal and social property.”  Though he had long been the 
ACLU’s most vigorous defender of “personal rights” on such issues as obscenity and birth 
control, he had been thoroughly won over by the New Deal.21  Notably, he was not suggesting 
that workers had a civil liberty interest in sharing the wealth of their employers; he was arguing 
that economic equality had nothing to do with “civil liberties” at all. Arthur Garfield Hays, 
conversely, was concerned about labor’s new strategy.  He acknowledged that the sit-down was 
an important and effective tool, and he was personally inclined to celebrate “the splendid result 
that was accomplished in Michigan.”22
                                                                                                                                                                                           
capable of changing their minds about the illegality of picketing.” Like the ACLU, he believed that “an active public 
opinion can make itself felt in judicial decisions.” Maurice Sugar to Homer Martin, 9 August 1937, Sugar Papers, 
box 4, folder 4-15. 
 Like Ernst, he felt that his sympathy for labor had no 
place in the ACLU.  Hays, however, went one step further.  He worried that the sit-down strike 
21 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 16 March 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
22 Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 19 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970.  He was little concerned with 
the property rights of the employer and admitted that he could not “get excited at peaceful violation of the law on the 
part of unionists where there is such a continual violation by the other side.” 
433 
 
might undermine “the right of non-union men to work”—an extraordinary and unexpected 
concern for a labor sympathizer who had so often proven willing to provoke his own arrest in 
defending the right to strike.23
 These criticisms were sufficiently pervasive within the ACLU to prompt the board to 
submit the matter to the National Committee for an advisory referendum.
  For both lawyers, the sit-down strike involved more than the 
expression of opinion, and unlike the ordinary strike, it was not a tactic that the organization 
could reasonably defend as integral to freedom of speech.  
24 The results revealed 
a deep division within the ACLU and prompted several threats of resignation.25  John Codman, 
for many years the most conservative voice on the National Committee, thought the issue was 
simple: “If employees are idle or do work unsatisfactory to the management and are therefore 
ordered to leave, they are trespassing if they do not do so.”26 There was no such thing as a 
property right in one’s job in the absence of an employment contract that so provided.  Similarly 
resolute statements came from Edward Tittman, an Arizona attorney whose disagreements with 
the Board’s labor policies would unfold in an increasingly hostile series of letters over the 
coming months, culminating in his resignation,27 and William Pickens, an NAACP field 
secretary and columnist for the Associated Negro Press, who thought that sit-downs would lead 
to revolution and dictatorship.28
                                                          
23 Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 13 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
  
24 Roger Baldwin to Members of the National Committee, 30 March 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
25 E.g., Clough Turrill Burnett to ACLU Board, 7 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970 (“If you’re endorsing 
sit-downs, delete me from the list.”); Edward D. Tittman to Roger Baldwin, 3 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, 
vol. 970 (“Unless the Union comes out in opposition to the sit down strike I shall feel compelled to resign from its 
national committee.”).  
26 John Codman to Roger Baldwin, 2 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
27 Edward D. Tittman to Roger Baldwin, 3 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. “The Union, if it desires to 
retain the support of persons who believe in orderly methods of reform, must come out in support of court rule over 
mob rule and must take a stand against the sit down strike.” Edward D. Tittman to Roger Baldwin, 9 March 1938, 
ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081 (resigning over employer free speech).  
28 William Pickens to Roger Baldwin, 22 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, A. J. Muste called the Board’s statement “inadequate, 
weak [and] timorous” and thought it “so seriously understate[d] the arguments for the sit-down 
strike” as to promote the attitude of AFL President William Green and the Liberty League.29 He 
wanted the ACLU to emphasize that the sit-down was a remedy for persistent denial by 
employers of the right to strike. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was bewildered that the ACLU 
leadership would credit the crippling of essential services as a legitimate concern when they had 
so often refuted it in the past.30  Frederic Howe recognized that sit-downs were technically 
unlawful, but he emphasized the vast range of daily practice in which Americans routinely 
ignored the law.  Ethically, he considered the sit-down to be an important assertion of “the right 
to something more than a daily wage in connection with a job,” and he predicted that it would 
soon be a legal right as well.  Howe believed what Baldwin had long proclaimed: the sit-down 
would be successful because it was a show of power. “Pragmatically,” he reflected, “things 
survive in conflicts of this sort that are socially effective. And pragmatically, anything that is 
effective is to be approved.”31
 In the face of this barrage, the board elected to maintain its non-committal course. The 
statement it ultimately circulated was almost identical to the draft.
 
32  Baldwin’s views on the 
issue were influenced by Ernst’s. He told his left critics that their arguments were grounded in 
labor policy rather than civil liberties and could not be espoused by the ACLU.33
                                                          
29 A. J. Muste to Roger Baldwin, 2 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
  On the other 
hand, he refused to condemn seizure of property, which he insisted was none of the ACLU’s 
30 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn to ACLU, 11 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970 (“Did we see more clearly in 
our younger days in the A.C.L.U.?”). 
31 Frederic Howe to Roger Baldwin, 24 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
32 “ACLU Statement on So-Called Sit-Down and Stay-In Strikes,” April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
33 E.g., Roger Baldwin to A. J. Muste, 12 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
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concern.34 Perhaps the most telling response to the referendum was that of Herbert S. Bigelow, 
who personally thought the sit-down justifiable but considered the issue largely moot. “With the 
Labor Relations Act in force,” he said, “there should be little provocation for sit-down strikes.”35
Disagreement about sit-down strikes was only the beginning of a more general fracturing 
of allegiance within the ACLU.  Controversy erupted over every pressing issue in the rapidly 
changing world of labor relations.  The ACLU consistently professed neutrality, and yet it leaned 
heavily toward labor in its assessment of conditions, prompting criticism from its more cautious 
and moderate members who resented “the Union’s partiality toward union labor.”
 
36  For 
example, in the summer of 1937 it issued a statement on violence in strikes in which it claimed 
that “the Civil Liberties Union does not take sides in the industrial struggle” and would act 
against violence by organized labor “on precisely the same basis as violence by its opponents.”  
It nonetheless presented its conclusion that allegations of union violence were largely 
fabricated.37
The most fundamental division in the board pertained to the NLRB itself.  Rather than 
quieting discussion, the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the Wagner Act had only 
  
                                                          
34 Roger Baldwin to Edward D. Tittman, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970 (“The American Civil Liberties Union 
will take no position on the question of property rights which are not properly within the field of civil liberties, 
leaving such matters to be determined by the courts.”).  
35 Herbert S. Bigelow to Roger Baldwin, 15 May 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. A year later, the Board 
revisited the issue of sit-down strikes, but after a long discussion and a request for revisions by its drafters, it made 
few significant changes.  Committee on Labor’s Rights, “Proposed Statement on Sit-Down Strikes,” 9 February 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080; Board Minutes, 14 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. The 
ACLU stated that it was obliged to regard the sit-down as a trespass (a substitution in the revised version for 
“illegal”) barring a decision to the contrary by the courts.  On the other hand, it protested the issuance of injunctions 
to employers who came into court with unclean hands.  It also opposed laws specifically criminalizing sit-down 
strikes, arguing that existing penalties for trespass were adequate and harsher measures would only encourage 
violence. Finally, it defended the right of the unemployed to petition at relief offices and before legislatures in an 
orderly fashion.  
36 John Codman to Roger Baldwin, 17 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078.  Baldwin tried to appease 
conservative critics by promising to consider their views.  See, e.g., Roger Baldwin to John Codman, 7 July 1937, 
ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 969 (“I am going to present your questions and my answers to the Board because I 
think some of us need just this kind of caution. Keep after us!”). 
37 “ACLU Statement on Violence in Strikes,” 3 August 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
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exacerbated public and congressional complaints against the NLRB.  Constitutional legitimacy 
emboldened the Board, and within a few months, it had more than tripled its caseload.  Almost 
always, it ruled against employers.  When congressional opponents sought to water down the act 
by amendment, ACLU members and sympathizers called for a statement of the Union’s position 
on efforts to rein in the NLRB.  The organization complied by waffling.  It noted that increased 
labor activity and the prevalence of the sit-down strike had prompted proposals for compulsory 
incorporation of unions, the forced disclosure of union accounting practices, the requirement of 
public notice before strikes, and the criminalization of occupying company property.  The ACLU 
opposed the new measures not on substantive grounds, but because they had not been 
sufficiently studied.38
 Taking a frank position on the Wagner Act amendments became unavoidable over the 
coming months.  In the summer of 1937, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg suggested 
provisions that would have restrained unions and introduced new employer rights. Many similar 
proposals followed, fueled by an increasingly bitter struggle between the AFL and the CIO.
  
39
                                                          
38 “Statement by the American Civil Liberties Union in Regard to Legislation for Control of Trade Unions and 
Trade-Union Activities,” April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 969. 
  
The AFL felt that NLRB policy favored the CIO, and at its October convention, it unanimously 
passed a resolution calling for the collection of evidence regarding the NLRB’s improper 
39 Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, John L. Lewis: A Biography (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1977), 
307–09. The AFL gained considerably in strength and membership from the NLRA, but NLRB policy favored CIO 
unions. For example, when employers signed closed shop agreements with AFL unions, the NLRB would scrutinize 
the election for signs of employer influence; in open elections, the CIO typically beat out AFL unions by significant 
margins. The NLRB favored exclusive majority representation and was usually unwilling to certify small AFL crafts 
as separate bargaining units.  Under the “Globe Doctrine” (which took its name from a case involving the Globe 
Machine and Stamping Company), the NLRB would designate a separate craft unit only when all other factors in a 
case were “evenly balanced.” James A. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board: A Study in 
Economics, Politics, and the Law, 2 vols. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 19741981), vol. 1, 45. See 
also Tomlins, State and the Unions, 165–66. As early as April 1937, the AFL convinced Senator David Walsh to 
sponsor an amendment addressing this concern. The ACLU’s labor contingent strongly favored the CIO.  E.g., 
Nathan Greene, “Draft of Report of the Committee on Civil Rights in Labor Relations on Proposed Amendments to 
National Labor Relations Act,” 31 December 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078.  
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administration of the NLRA and recommending a slate of amendments to the Act.40
 Many of the efforts to counteract the increased power of trade unions focused on bringing 
labor under greater state control.  In January 1938, the ACLU came out squarely in opposition to 
proposed legislation providing for compulsory incorporation of trade unions and compulsory 
publication of financial statements.
  In 1938, the 
AFL leadership allied with business to oppose the NLRB—going so far as to collaborate with 
former Liberty League attorneys who were representing the National Association of 
Manufacturers.  Although these congressional efforts to curb the NLRB were unsuccessful, they 
were reflective of growing public and political opposition to the administration of the act.   
41
                                                          
40 In December, Republican Senator Edward Burke called for an investigation of the NLRB by the Senate judiciary 
committee, citing complaints by the AFL. Gross, National Labor Relations Board, vol. 1, 43–45.  
  This was precisely the sort of strangulation through 
regulation that Baldwin had worried about when the Wagner Act was first debated.  As a result, 
the ACLU’s articulation of its position was both predictable and less controversial than others 
then under consideration.  The report, formulated by a newly organized Committee on Labor’s 
Rights, argued that the provisions were discriminatory because they imposed burdens on unions 
that were not applicable to trade associations and other voluntary associations. The differential 
treatment, it stressed, was not justified by any social evil particular to labor unions.  On the 
contrary, the La Follette Committee had gathered extensive evidence that industrial racketeering 
was also rampant.  Compulsory incorporation would transform the right to organize into a 
licensed privilege, revocable at will.  Moreover, it would enable a worker hostile to the union 
41 Most unions at the time were voluntary unincorporated associations. Employers complained that while industrial 
corporations were subject to lawsuits for breach of contract and other violation, unions were free to break contracts 
with impunity. ACLU materials explained that the proffered justification was based on an outmoded common law 
rule according to which an unincorporated association could not be sued as an artificial person unless all of its 
members were joined, typically an impossible task. The Coronado Coal case, however, subjected unions to suit in 
the federal courts through their officers and allowed the attachment of their funds for payment of damages. The state 
courts had largely adopted this rule, and state statutes commonly made officers liable for money damages as well. 
Moreover, the Danbury Hatters case, Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 27 (1908), made union members who participated 
in an illegal boycott individually liable. Harvey J. Bresler, “Proposed Legislative Control of Labor Unions,” 
distributed to ACLU Committee on Labor’s Rights on 2 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078.  
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(and perhaps hired by the employer for the purpose) to tie the union up in court by citing small 
violations of the union by-laws.42 According to the statement, the true purpose for the proposed 
amendments was not protection of the public welfare, but restricting legitimate trade union 
growth.43
 The flip side, of course, was that insofar as the proposed amendments were really about 
labor policy, a growing contingent of the ACLU thought the organization had no business 
interfering.  One member told Baldwin that a substantial majority of the organization’s members 
were using constitutional liberties instrumentally to advance the radical cause. “In fact,” he 
complained, “many of them have no use for the Constitution or any other document that places a 
curb upon excesses.”
   
44 Others argued more insistently that the ACLU should be supporting 
amendments to temper the administrative power of the NLRB, on the one hand, and to protect 
the constitutional rights of employers and non-union employees, on the other.45  Both strains 
flowed directly out of the ACLU’s prior language, if it not its substantive policy.46
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
  Like other 
advocates of administrative law reform, the members of the ACLU worried about unchecked 
administrative discretion, even while they believed that administrative expansion had been 
necessary “to meet the demands of a new era of unparalleled change and of increasing 
43 Committee Report on Legislative Proposals for Trade Union Control, 20 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, 
vol. 1078. 
44 Frederick B. Wright to Roger Baldwin, 3 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
45 For example, William Fennell supported an amendment to separate the judicial and prosecutorial functions in the 
resolution of labor disputes by replacing trial examiners with referees appointed by the federal courts. William 
Fennell, “Proposed Amendments to the Wagner Act,” 14 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078 (presenting 
amendments based on Senator Vandenberg’s bill). 
46 The first class of amendments was a variation of a broader indictment of unchecked administrative authority 
during the New Deal. Many ACLU members were sympathetic to proposals by the ABA and other organizations for 
the reform of administrative procedure.  Like the advocates of administrative law reform, they understood that the 
exigencies of the First World War had required the proliferation of administrative agencies to manage a complicated 
economy, and that much of the resulting bureaucracy had persisted and expanded in the interwar period. George 
Farnum (Former Assistant Attorney General of the United States), “America Confronts Bureaucracy,” Address 
before the ABA Annual Meeting, 26 August 1936, 2–3.  
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complexity in business and society.”47 The call to administer the new machinery in a manner 
consistent with the framework of American “constitutional democracy”48 hardly seemed 
objectionable from a civil liberties standpoint.  Indeed, at the very moment the ACLU was 
opposing legislation to curb fascist activity in the United States because it raised the specter of 
improper administrative enforcement against radicals and religious minorities.49
Meanwhile, a growing number of ACLU members, even those who personally supported 
labor, were persuaded that the Wagner Act curtailed the civil liberties of non-union members.  
The first and, from the perspective of past ACLU practice, less troublesome such example was 
opposition to the closed shop.  One member suggested to Morris Ernst that the ACLU’s 
advocacy of the rights of CIO picketers in New Jersey be followed by a “similar effort on behalf 
of those who through no fault of their own—except in the refusal to contribute to an organization 
of which they disapprove—are denied the right to work in the jobs they have held for so many 
years?”
 There was little 
principled basis for distinguishing the NLRB from the Post Office Department or the Federal 
Radio Commission, whose censorship the ACLU routinely opposed.  The ACLU’s labor 
sympathizers sidestepped this problem by claiming that the NLRB, unlike those other entities, 
had operated responsibly and within the bounds of constitutional law. A vocal minority of the 
organization’s membership found that response unconvincing.   
50
                                                          
47 Arthur T. Vanderbilt, One Hundred Years of Administrative Law (New York: New York University Press, 1937), 
123; O. R. McGuire to Jerome Britchey, 14 December 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 170, vol. 2081 (Discussing Logan-
Walter Bill and suggesting that “the enactment into law of the Administrative Law Bill is absolutely necessary for 
the protection of the civil liberties of the American people” and the ACLU “should lend its vigorous support for the 
enactment of this bill”); Jerome Britchey to O. R. McGuire, 18 December 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 170, vol. 2081 
(“We ourselves are interested in the problem and shall study all the material on the matter with great care.”). 
  The Committee dutifully drafted a statement in defense of the closed shop, which it 
48 Farnum, “America Confronts Bureaucracy,” 3.  
49 Memorandum of the Special Committee to consider Legislation To Curb Fascist Activities in the United States, 
21 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
50 William D. Scholle to Morris Ernst, 20 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. ACLU secretary Lucille 
Milner forwarded the letter to the chair of the committee on labor’s rights, noting that it raised new issues for the 
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circulated for comment.51  R. W. Riis,52 the son of muckraker Jacob Riis and a longtime member 
of the ACLU, told Baldwin: “For the life of me I cannot see why it is any more a civil liberty to 
join the union than to refuse to join the union.”53 William Fennell, the lone conservative member 
of the Committee on Labor’s Rights (tellingly, at Fennell’s request the board eventually voted to 
change the committee’s name to the Committee on Civil Rights in Labor Relations54), echoed 
Riis’s sentiments.55
Writing at a time when the ACLU’s defense of content- and value-neutral rights had 
become axiomatic, Fennell’s argument fundamentally misconstrued the organization’s earlier 
justification for its indictment of yellow-dog contracts.  The ACLU had never claimed that an 
employee’s right to join a union was a matter of personal autonomy.  Nor did it suggest that 
irrespective of contractual language to the contrary, the employee’s choice could not be curtailed 
because it was derivative of the constitutional right of free expression.  Such a theory—that 
judicial enforcement of a private contract providing for the abrogation of one party’s 
constitutional rights was unconstitutional state action—would have required an expansive 
  The ACLU had consistently argued that discharge of an employee for 
membership in a union was a violation of civil liberties and had endorsed the Norris-La Guardia 
Act, outlawing the yellow-dog contract, on precisely that basis. He felt that the ACLU was 
bound to defend with equal vigor the rights of employees not to join a union.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ACLU and that Baldwin thought it should be discussed at the committee’s next meeting. Lucile Milner to Nathan 
Greene, 25 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. See also William Fennel to Roger Baldwin, 7 February 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078 (“I have thought quite seriously about the question raised by the discharge 
of employees in a closed shop for failure to join the union which we discussed briefly last night. It seems to me that 
an issue of civil liberties is raised there, and I think the Committee on Labor’s Rights should make some statement 
about it.”).  
51 Report to the Board of Directors by the Committee on Labor’s Rights, 22 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 
1072. 
52 Born in 1894, Riis served in the United States Naval Reserves and was associate editor for the American Legion 
Weekly in 1920 (and for Collier’s Weekly in 1921 and 1922), before going into publicity work. He joined the ACLU 
in 1926. Obituary, Time, 2 February 1952. 
53 R. W. Riis to Roger Baldwin, 17 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
54 ACLU Board Minutes, 11 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1072.  
55 William Fennell, “What Shall the A.C.L.U. Do in a ‘Closed Shop’” (undated), ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
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construction of state action rarely endorsed and almost never effectuated.56
Rather than address this misunderstanding, the ACLU avoided it. As it had in the case of 
the sit-down strike, it summarized competing points of view on the closed shop. It then 
concluded without explanation that “the American Civil Liberties Union sees no issue of civil 
liberty in the claims of non-union workers against a closed shop agreement except where they 
may be excluded from union membership by reason of any arbitrary or unreasonable restriction 
on membership,” such as racial discrimination. In such cases, it promised, the organization 
would “defend the[] right to continued employment by recourse to the courts.”
  In the early 1930s, 
the ACLU had unselfconsciously assumed that the right of labor to bargain collectively was a 
substantive right of its own, whether constitutional or otherwise.  Indeed, it had always been the 
most important of rights to which the ACLU was committed. In place of the right to unionize—
the ACLU’s “right of agitation”—Fennell was (re-)introducing a right of autonomy and 
individual conscience that had more in common with the proffered right of conscientious 
objection during World War I than with the rights of labor championed by the ACLU thereafter.   
57
 The ACLU’s increasing ambivalence toward a radical theory of rights was the source of 
its trouble in a final class of arguments about civil liberties and the labor movement: the 
controversy over employer free speech.  The issue first attracted the organization’s notice in the 
fall of 1937, when the NLRB’s purported interference with the press in two investigations caused 
a media uproar. In the first case, a local newspaper printed an editorial speculating that the 
town’s largest industry, which was under investigation for unfair labor practices by the NLRB, 
would be forced to fire workers if the employees decided to unionize.  The vice-president of the 
company was a director and substantial stockholder in the newspaper, and the author of the 
  
                                                          
56 The notable exception is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
57 “Resolution in Regard to Closed Shop Recommended by the Committee on Labor’s Rights and Adopted by the 
Board of Directors at the Meeting on June 27, 1938,” ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
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editorial was the wife of a company engineer.  The NLRB sought to introduce evidence that the 
company had paid for or otherwise influenced the newspaper to publish an indictment of the 
union.58  In the second case, the NLRB subpoenaed the editor of Mill and Factory to testify 
about an article in its October 1937 issue. The article had criticized the board’s investigation of 
the Weirton Steel Company, and the Board was investigating whether Weirton had encouraged 
or written the article.59
 Newspapers and politicians were quick to condemn the NLRB’s new practice, which they 
claimed threatened the autonomy of the press.
  
60  Republican Senator H. Styles Bridges called the 
NLRB’s subpoena of the Mill and Factory editor “one of the most open attacks on the freedom 
of the press that we’ve ever seen.”61  The New York World Telegram, noting that “bureaucracy at 
best is never too popular in this country,” predicted that the “high-handed performance” of the 
NLRB would fan popular outrage against the NLRA.62 ACLU members began asking for a 
statement of the organization’s position on the controversy.63
Nathan Greene, co-author with Felix Frankfurter of The Labor Injunction, was chair of 
the Committee on Labor’s Rights, and he drafted a response to the charges. A staunch labor 
advocate, he sprang unflinchingly to the defense of the NLRB.  For Greene, the only question 
raised by the incident was “the propriety of obtaining evidence as to an employer’s unlawful 
course of conduct from the editor of a newspaper”—specifically, whether compelling a 
newspaper editor to disclose information in such an inquiry was a restriction of freedom of press.   
His argument centered on a journalist’s privilege, denied in most states, to withhold confidential 
 
                                                          
58 Stackpole Carbon Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 171 (1938).  
59 Weirton Steel Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1941). 
60 “NLRB Order Defied on Press Freedom,” New York Times, 3 December 1937; “The Labor Board Goes Fascist,” 
New York Herald-Tribune, 4 December 1937; “Attack in House Hits NLRB’s Press Forays,” New York Herald-
Tribune, 7 December 1937. 
61 “Bridges Calls N.L.R.B. Peril to Free Press,” New York Herald-Tribune, 4 December 1937. 
62 “The Trend Toward Bureaucracy,” New World Telegram, 7 December 1937. 
63 T. Henry Walnut to Roger Baldwin, 18 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
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communications relevant to a pending inquiry before a legal tribunal.  He accepted the Board’s 
explanation that it was concerned not with the right to write the article, but whether the 
employers had interfered with the rights of their employees.64
An important prerequisite of Greene’s argument was the assumption that employers 
themselves could be prevented from expressing anti-union views.  Of this fact, Greene had no 
doubt. Citing the NLRB’s October decision in Mansfield Mills,
 
65 he approved the Board’s 
conclusion that distribution by an employer of anti-union statements “constitutes an attempt to 
circumvent the act by interfering with his employees’ rights unprejudiced by the employer to 
make up their own minds regarding self-organization.” In Greene’s view, preventing an 
employer’s distribution of anti-union propaganda was not the sort of violation of free speech 
with which the ACLU should be concerned. “We defend free speech as a deliberative force and 
as an application of the power of reason intended to touch off, in Brandeis’s phrase, ‘thought, 
hope and imagination,” he insisted.  Anti-union propaganda, by contrast, amounted to an order 
rather than an argument, and the ACLU would be “deluded” to protect it.  He concluded by 
insisting that the ACLU would “not defend speech when it is but the velvet glove that conceals 
the iron fist”—an unusual qualification for an organization founded to protect radicals, as the 
press soon pointed out.66
Baldwin was convinced by Greene’s disposition of the matter. In fact, he found it so 
persuasive that he secured the board’s approval to redraft it as a letter, send it to the chair of the 
 
                                                          
64 Nathan Greene, “The National Labor Relations Board on Freedom of Press,” ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
65 Mansfield Mills Company, 3 N.L.R.B. 901 (1937). 
66 See, e.g., Roger Baldwin to New York World-Telegram, 30 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
Baldwin backtracked from the broad statement: “Standing alone we certainly do not subscribe to any such doctrine. 
Taken in its context in a lawyer’s analysis of the cases, it is clear that what is meant is that we do not defend free 
speech when used by an employer to intimidate his employees from joining a union.”  
444 
 
NLRB, and issue it as a press release.67
After sending the letter, Baldwin circulated it to the National Committee.
  The letter reported that the ACLU had evaluated the 
widespread criticism of the NLRB and had concluded that it was unjustified.  Past experience 
had taught the ACLU to be wary when the issue of freedom of press was raised; it had been 
invoked as an excuse for resistance to the labor organization of newspaper staff (a case argued 
successfully by Morris Ernst on behalf of the Newspaper Guild), to cite a recent example. After 
careful study of the situation, the ACLU considered the NLRB “entirely justified in determining 
whether an employer has purchased publications used among his employees to say what he has 
no right under the law to say himself.”  
68  If he was 
expecting consensus in favor of the Board’s position, however, he was sorely disappointed.  
Almost immediately, a flood of critical letters poured in.69  Amos Pinchot told Baldwin that he 
“disagree[d] profoundly” with the letter.70
                                                          
67 Roger Baldwin to Nathan Greene, 18 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978; ACLU to J. Warren 
Madden, 16 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978; ACLU Press Release, 18 December 1937, ACLU 
Papers, reel 143, vol. 978.  
  Whatever the ostensive target of the investigation and 
however noble the NLRB’s intentions, he insisted, the ability to order an editor to appear before 
the board and open its files to inspection was bound to intimidate the press. And he felt 
compelled to register a vigorous protest. “At this time when the doctrine that the end justifies the 
means is decimating the ranks of American liberals,” he cautioned, “the Civil Liberties Union 
should be extremely careful not to abandon a vital principle of liberty.”  John Codman expressed 
similar concerns. As a general matter, Codman objected to the ACLU’s recent pronouncements 
that the establishment of labor’s rights under the NLRA had been the greatest civil liberties gain 
68 Roger Baldwin to National Committee, 20 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978.  
69 Many members, of course, supported the board’s position.  E.g., H. R. Mussey to Roger Baldwin, 28 December 
1937, ACLU papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
70 Amos Pinchot to Roger Baldwin, 21 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
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in years.  He was not sure, he said, that the Wagner Act itself was not a violation of civil 
liberties.71
The Board initially responded to members’ reservations by emphasizing that the 
investigations targeted employers only, and that newspapers were not at risk of direct sanction.
  
72 
But the assumption that the press could properly be questioned regarding the unlawful activity of 
employers begged the more important question: whether the NLRB could constitutionally 
prohibit employers from expressing their opinion on unions in the first place.73 For Baldwin, this 
was a matter of “sound public policy”; the NLRB could not guarantee the rights of labor in the 
face of “employer coercion.”74  Baldwin equated employer distribution of anti-union literature 
with employer efforts to influence employees’ votes in public elections.  In the past, the ACLU 
had supported legislation prohibiting employers from circulating political advice in pay 
envelopes; attempts to intervene in union elections seemed to Baldwin theoretically 
indistinguishable.75
Many ACLU members disagreed.  Arthur Garfield Hays urged the board to “fight against 
interpretations of the Wagner Act which would prevent an employer from expressing his opinion 
of labor unionism or of anything else.”
 
76
                                                          
71 John Codman to ACLU, 28 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978.  Baldwin claimed that his 
celebration of the NLRA referred only to the reduction in violence and substitution of legal procedure since the 
Supreme Court decision.  Roger Baldwin to John Codman, ACLU Papers, 31 December 1937, reel 143, vol. 978. 
  Amos Pinchot thought the board’s attitude “short-
72 Nathan Greene to Pittsburgh Press, 28 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978 (“No proceedings were 
taken against an editor or a newspaper, either criminal or civil. No attempt was made to interfere in the slightest with 
what an editor had written or intended to write. The defendants in both cases were not newspapers or newspaper 
editors but industrial companies.”).  
73 Amos Pinchot to Roger Baldwin, 27 December 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
74 Roger Baldwin to T. Henry Walnut, 23 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978.  Baldwin eventually 
conceded that the practice of issuing subpoenas, whether legal or not, was bad policy.  He noted that the NLRB itself 
had considered the criticism seriously and had issued a confidential order to examiners not to subpoena editors 
without prior approval from Washington. Roger Baldwin to Lloyd Garrison, 19 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 
160, vol. 2002.  
75 Roger Baldwin to Edward D. Tittman, 15 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 160, vol. 2002. 
76 Hays had signed the letter to the NLRB because he believed that newspaper editors could be required to testify 
about unlawful conduct associated with the preparation of an article.  On closer examination, however, he was not so 
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sighted” and predicted that it would “land the Civil Liberties Union in a lot of trouble.” It was his 
opinion that the ACLU should be resisting “any kind of law, or any kind of procedure, that 
breaks down, or in any way tends to break down, the guarantees of free speech and free press.”77 
Another member, Philadelphia attorney T. Henry Walnut, recounted his defense of labor’s rights 
during the soft coal strike of 1922.  When operators had complained that union speech was unfair 
and unjustified, he had always told them their remedy was to denounce the unions with 
equivalent expressive force.  That, he told Baldwin, is what he “considered to be the American 
conception of freedom of speech.”  To Walnut, freedom of the press was an ancillary issue. The 
heart of the matter was the right of any individual, including employers, to express criticism of 
existing conditions.  “Both you and I have lived long enough to see the wheel turn,” he cautioned 
Baldwin—and in the future, employers were bound to reclaim control of state power.  Once they 
did, the ACLU would be best served by a consistent record of the rigorous protection of all 
opinions, no matter how unpopular or distasteful.78
Faced with a barrage of comments like these, the board agreed to address the issue of 
employer free speech head on.
  
79  In January, it requested an advisory vote on two memoranda: a 
“proposed statement on employers’ rights in industrial conflict,”80 together with a minority 
report by R. W. Riis.81
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sure about the illegality of the underlying conduct. Arthur Garfield Hays to Roger Baldwin, 3 January 1938, ACLU 
Papers, reel 160, vol. 2002. Hays imagined that in certain cases speech in connection with other acts might rise to 
the level of coercion and therefore be lawfully regulated.  
 The majority report reiterated Greene’s earlier arguments.  It noted that 
77 Amos Pinchot to Roger Baldwin, 27 December 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
78 T. Henry Walnut to Roger Baldwin, 30 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978.  
79 E.g., Edward Tittman to Roger Baldwin, 10 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 160, vol. 2002, expressing 
“emphatic dissent” with the letter to Madden.  For the board’s response, see Jerome Britchey to Amos Pinchot, 29 
December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978; Roger Baldwin to John Codman, 31 December 1937, ACLU 
Papers, reel 143, vol. 978 (“The line between freedom of speech and coercion under the law is hard to draw and we 
have not yet successfully drawn it, nor has the Labor Board.”). 
80 Proposed Statement on Employers’ Rights in Industrial Conflict, 22 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 160, vol. 
2002.  
81 Roger Baldwin to National Committee, 31 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078; ACLU Board 
Minutes, 24 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
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the ACLU’s defense of free speech was not absolute, and it introduced a long list of examples 
that the organization would regard as properly punishable.82  Given the coercive nature of the 
employer-employee relationship, it concluded that the regulation of employers’ anti-union 
speech was “sound public policy.”  Notably, the majority report sought to assuage fears of 
NLRB censorship by stressing the inability of the Board to act without judicial approval.  It 
emphasized that no employer could be punished for violating a mere order of the Board; the 
United States Courts of Appeals had the power to enforce, modify, or set aside any order of the 
NLRB.  Consequently, remedies at law provided “ample protection” for employers.83
Riis submitted the minority report because he felt that the board had abandoned its 
motivating principles.  In his assessment, those who approved the NLRB’s suppression of 
employer opinion did so for fear that “pro-union utterances may not be able to get themselves 
accepted in the free competition of the market.”
 
84  In his report, he articulated the true stakes of 
the controversy, and he called the board to task for its attempt to avoid the crucial decision that it 
faced.85  “The desire to restrict the employer’s potential anti-union speech stems from a desire to 
bring about a more equitable propaganda-balance between employer and employee,” he 
explained, anticipating one of the central questions in scholarly debate over free speech.86
                                                          
82 The report listed criminal libel, the encouragement of runs on banks, clearly obscene language, or the 
encouragement of lotteries.  Morris Ernst objected vehemently to these examples.  Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 4 
February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081.  
 In 
83 Majority Report, Committee on Labor’s Rights Proposed Statement on Employers’ Rights in Industrial Conflicts, 
31 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
84 To Riis, any effort to rig the outcome of free and open debate was a betrayal of the civil liberties cause. Even if it 
“delay[ed] the millennium to permit the employer to set forth his case,” the ACLU was obligated to maintain a 
neutral course; whitewashing the issue was bound eventually to backfire. R. W. Riis to Roger Baldwin, 7 January 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 160, vol. 2002. 
85 Riis noted that his view was not shared by other members of the Committee on Labor’s Rights but had been 
expressed by many members of the organization. R. W. Riis, “Minority Report on the National Labor Relations Act 
and Free Speech,” 31 January 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
86 The question whether government should redress inequalities in the “marketplace of ideas” has troubled free 
speech theorists since World War I. See, e.g., Chafee, Introduction to Civil Liberty; Meiklejohn, Self-Governance; 
Fiss, Liberalism Divided; Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free 
Press, 1993); Graber, Transforming Free Speech. 
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Riis’s assessment, the pro-labor contingent of the ACLU was not really satisfied with neutrality, 
despite its claims to the contrary.  It professed commitment to the marketplace of ideas, but it 
wanted to be sure that radical voices would be heard.  And for Riis, “laudable and humane” as 
the board’s desire was, it was not a legitimate objective for an organization devoted to free 
speech.  The ACLU, he insisted, “must not attempt to control speech, even in the interests of 
social betterment.” 
 The National Committee found Riis’s argument convincing.  The committed leftists, of 
course, endorsed the majority statement. To Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, “coercion [was] the whole 
point, as opposed to free speech,”87 and it was naïve to advocate an abstract commitment to 
viewpoint neutrality when employers exercised such disproportionate power.  In the same vein, 
A. F. Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, argued that the theoretical 
availability of a legal remedy for unlawful discharge could not counteract the real and immediate 
effects of losing one’s livelihood.88  But many members of the National Committee, including 
reliable labor advocates, questioned the propriety of suppressing employer speech under any 
circumstances. Morris Ernst, about to go to trial in Hague v. CIO, worried that the reasoning of 
the majority report would jeopardize the ACLU’s effort in Jersey City.89  Arthur Garfield Hays 
wanted a frank statement by the board “that we disapprove of any law which would prohibit the 
expression of opinion of any kind, at any time, by anyone or anywhere.”90
                                                          
87 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Postcard, 2 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081. Dorothy Kenyon also 
endorsed the majority statement. Dorothy Kenyon to ACLU, 9 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081. 
  Playwright Elmer 
Rice was concerned that the board’s position sanctioned administrative censorship by the NLRB.  
88 Whitney believed that an employer’s “power to deprive a man and his family of the means of living, has a 
peculiar power of coercion that does not exist in other forms of free speech.” He nonetheless acknowledged that a 
sufficiently vigorous labor movement could level the playing field and eventually render legal sanction for employer 
speech unnecessary. A. F.  Whitney to Roger Baldwin, 7 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081. 
89 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 4 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081.  
90 He approved prohibitions of frank coercion and threats but thought employer opinion should be protected, 
particularly when coupled with clarification that employees could not be discharged if they choose to disregard their 
employer’s advice.  Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 5 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081. 
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He reminded the board of the ACLU’s “traditional policy” opposing any limitation on free 
speech by administrative action. As in the customs context, “the question of whether or not an 
individual in the exercise of his constitutional right to freedom of speech has been guilty of a 
violation of law should be determined by a judicial process.”91 Even those members who 
supported the majority report acknowledged a problem of appearances. Lloyd K. Garrison, dean 
of the University of Wisconsin Law School, emphasized that the freedom of workers to organize 
was a civil liberty in its own right; in a contest between two important values, the board’s 
resolution was a reasonable one.  Nonetheless, Garrison thought the argument should come from 
the NLRB, not the ACLU, and he counseled against any statement at all.92
 In practice, however, ignoring the issue was no longer a practicable option.  The 
circulation of the majority and minority reports had touched off a firestorm in the ACLU that 
would not be truly quieted until 1940, with the expulsion of Communists from the ACLU Board.  
In the meantime, a heated exchange of letters between two major players in that controversy—
Harry Ward, longtime ACLU chair, and John Haynes Holmes, who replaced him in that capacity 
once the anti-Communist resolution was passed—captures the brewing tension within the 
ACLU’s leadership.  Holmes thought that Riis’s statement was “magnificent, and 
unanswerable,” while the majority report was “the most specious document” the ACLU had ever 
produced.  Accepting the board’s position would mean promoting fascism; it would destroy the 
ACLU and leave Holmes no choice except to resign.
   
93
                                                          
91 Letter from Elmer Rice, 4 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
 He asked Ward to convene a special 
meeting to address head-on the meaning of civil liberties in the field of labor.  The Union, he 
92 Lloyd Garrison to Roger Baldwin, 7 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081. Garrison assumed that a 
judicial decision, once made, would put the matter to rest.  
93 John Haynes Holmes to Roger Baldwin, 2 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081 (“The majority 
report proposes to isolate one group in the community, the employers of labor, and deny to them freedom of speech 
on the most important issues which concern their lives.”).  
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said, was “face to face with fundamentals.”94
 Ward agreed to bring Holmes’s request to the board, but he flatly denied the premise of 
his argument.
 Like many members of the ACLU, Holmes 
supported the labor movement and belonged to organizations committed to protecting its rights.  
The ACLU, however, was about civil liberties, not the class struggle.  Holmes worried that the 
organization’s detractors were correct to challenge its impartiality. Gradually, “almost without 
. . .  realizing it,” the leadership of the ACLU had been seduced by its “real sympathy for labor’s 
cause,”  he said. Rather than upholding the “basic universal right of every man to express his 
convictions,” the ACLU had become a “mere advocate[] of the rights of labor.”   
95  According to Ward, the true conflict was between free speech, on the hand, and 
a constitutionally protected right to organize on the other.  Within the board, there was an 
“honest difference of opinion” as to where to strike the balance. By questioning the motives of 
those who would strike it differently, he warned, Holmes would only exacerbate the conflict 
within the organization. Holmes, of course, was not persuaded.96 He reaffirmed his belief that 
there were members of the board who believed in civil liberties only as a matter of tactics, not of 
principle. Free speech, for them, was a means to an end, and “if or when this end is achieved, 
they will drop civil liberties as promptly as they were dropped in Russia.” For the time being, 
Holmes was “not asking for any excommunications or purges,” let alone the “abrogation of free 
thought and speech inside our Board.”97
                                                          
94 John Haynes Holmes to Harry Ward, 8 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
  But he could not sanction the leftists’ instrumentalist 
approach. As for the proposed test of coercion, it was bad precedent, impossible to implement in 
95 Harry Ward to John Haynes Holmes, 10 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
96 John Haynes Holmes to Harry Ward, 11 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
97 He told Ward, “I would not for the world have the slightest misunderstanding come between you and me who 
have stood together on so many occasions in times of bitter feeling and utter confusion with perfect understanding 
and good will.” John Haynes Holmes to Harry Ward, 16 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
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practice, and inconsistent with the ACLU’s commitment to protecting all speech short of 
violence.   
 Holmes was right to regard the cleavage within the board as a fundamental turning point.  
The ACLU had occasionally acted to restrict individual choice to enhance opportunities for 
dissenting expression. For example, it had advocated the mandatory allocation of radio airtime to 
political minorities, over the stated opposition of private radio stations.  But the right of an 
employer to criticize unions was an unprecedented problem for the ACLU, because it involved 
the right of the establishment to uphold the status quo.  In the 1920s, the federal government had 
almost exclusively targeted radical speech.  State and local governments had sought to suppress 
such reactionary groups as the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi party, but these episodes, contentious 
as they were at the time, did not raise the same fundamental challenge to the ACLU’s theory of 
free speech.98  After all, the rights of the KKK to rally in Catholic Boston or of the Nazi party to 
march in New Jersey were the rights of disfavored minorities to make their viewpoints, however 
repugnant, known. The ACLU acknowledged as much in its statement defending free speech for 
Nazis: “Those who defend the right of free speech defend it because they believe that few more 
effective weapons against oppression exist. . . . Defense of free speech today means one of two 
things—either defense of minorities or defense of the working class.”99 In 1937, a full forty 
percent of the cases handled by the ACLU involved infringements on the rights of labor, usually 
the CIO.100
                                                          
98 The most analogous issue was the ACLU’s position on federal radio censorship, and in particular, licensing rules 
discouraging racial and religious animus in broadcasting by local stations. These stations, in many cases, were 
espousing hatred of racial minorities in localities where they were most vulnerable.  
 
99 “Shall We Defend Free Speech for Nazis in America,” ACLU Papers, reel 105, vol. 678. Arthur Garfield Hays 
assisted the Nazi “Friends of New Germany” in court proceedings in New Jersey. 
100 “Communist Cases Declined in 1937,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (March 1938), 2. In a letter to the editor in the 
Hague case, an ACLU attorney put the figure at 80 percent.  
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Before the New Deal, there was no realistic possibility that the state, with the approval of 
the courts, would operate to curtail the expressive freedom of the capitalists—which, in part, was 
what made the free speech strategy so appealing.  The ACLU could pursue its “right of 
agitation”—the pre-constitutional right of an oppressed class to disrupt the prevailing political 
and economic system—while simultaneously appealing both to progressive notions of progress 
through democratic deliberation and to conservative ideals of individual rights.  Never before 
had the ACLU faced a situation in which defending free speech legitimately threatened the 
substantive gains of labor. For the first time, upholding the right to speak meant undercutting the 
right of agitation. 
Even for those who supported free speech for strategic reasons, the issue of employer 
speech raised a genuine question whether the cause of labor was best served by expansive 
expressive freedom or sympathetic state control.  Some within the ACLU thought that the 
controversy over employer speech was exaggerated.  They assumed that an employer’s distaste 
for unionization would be known to employees regardless of whether it was explicitly 
articulated,101 and that it was far better to “err on the side of free speech,” both in the immediate 
term (to forestall attacks on the NLRA) and as a general policy.102
                                                          
101 Walter Fischer to Roger Baldwin, 5 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078 (arguing that an employer’s 
position would be obvious and “the coercion will come more from the nature of the employer’s position rather than 
from the arguments he makes”). 
 The crucial thing, they 
insisted, was to eradicate coercive employer conduct like espionage and discharge, not mere 
speech.  This view, of course, hinged on a belief that radical speech—whether in the form of the 
picket and the strike, or advocacy of political change—was capable of making a concrete 
difference in political and economic conditions.  It also assumed that workers would not be 
persuaded by their employers’ pronouncements on the shared benefits of welfare capitalism and 
102 Roger Baldwin to Dorothea de Schweinitz, 1 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 160, vol. 2002. 
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the perils of organization.  The other side, which began as the progressive view, was voiced by 
an increasing contingent of political activists and academics over the coming years.  It 
emphasized that free speech, in a society dominated by commercial media, was never really free, 
and that radical ideas were bound to be drowned out in a marketplace of pre-packaged ideas.  It 
danced around the edges of a theory of false consciousness, harking back to the master-servant 
relationship and insinuating that the oppressed were no longer capable of perceiving their chains.  
Ever since the IWW trial, the ACLU leadership had been aware that private checks on expressive 
freedom were just as repressive as, if not more so than, the state.103
In the end, “in view of the almost even distribution of opinion in the Board and in the 
returns from the members of the National Committee,” the board tabled both the majority and 
minority reports.
  In fact, the Wagner Act was 
a notable effort to protect workers’ speech from private curtailment.  As the NLRB frequently 
boasted, the NLRA had operated to uphold the civil liberties of workers, who for generations had 
been silenced in the workplace.  Like the La Follette Committee and the Civil Liberties Division 
of the Department of Justice, the NLRB was protecting, for this brief moment, a robust vision of 
free speech as a substantive right to be heard, independent of—indeed, protected by—state 
action.   
104  Instead of issuing a statement, it finally heeded the lawyerly advice that 
Felix Frankfurter had given the board a year earlier, when the controversy over the NLRA first 
erupted—namely, to establish its policy in particular applications rather than issuing abstract 
statements of principle.105
                                                          
103 See, e.g., Roger Baldwin, “Coming Struggle for Freedom,” 12 November 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 109, vol. 717 
(“Censorship of the press is not only an issue of government control. More important is control of the press by its 
owners. Naturally the defenders of the property system, they oppose any effective challenge to that system.”).   
   
104ACLU Board Minutes, ACLU Papers, 7 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
105 E.g., Felix Frankfurter to Roger Baldwin, 1 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 970. 
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The case that it chose to examine had been brewing since the fall, and it had been 
invoked in support of both positions on employer free speech.106 That case was Ford Motor 
Company v. NLRB.107
 
  
Prelude to Battle 
 Henry Ford was adamant in his belief that unions were bad for labor.  He was an 
outspoken proponent of welfare capitalism, and his company prided itself on its excellent 
package of salary and benefits for employees. In 1914, the Ford Motor Company announced a 
profit-sharing-plan. It introduced the 40 hour-work week in 1926. Working conditions were, in 
Ford’s view, as attractive to workers as business necessity would permit. But Ford was also a 
true believer in the individualist creed of the Lochner era, and on the issue of unions, he would 
not budge.108
Indeed, Ford was determined to prevent his workers from organizing by any means 
necessary.  He delegated the task of combating unionization to the Ford Service Department, 
whose head, Harry Bennett, was a trusted confidant and close personal friend.  Bennett’s 
unsavory connections with organized crime were a valuable recruitment tool in assembling 
Ford’s private army, which the UAW referred to as Ford’s Gestapo.
   
109
                                                          
106 E.g., T. Henry Walnut to Roger Baldwin, 18 December 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078; Majority 
Report.  
 His “Servicemen” 
107 There is very little literature on the Ford case, most likely because it was largely an administrative case.  For 
short descriptions, see Donahue, Politics, 47–50; Kersch, “How Conduct Became Speech,” 287–88.  
108 The problem, according to Ford, was the ascendency of “money-controlled” as opposed to “independent” 
employers.  The latter, constrained to pay out high dividends and therefore unable to invest in improvements and 
high wages, had colluded with labor to centralize control of labor and industry, in disregard for the wellbeing of 
workers employed by “independent business.”  Brief for Respondent, NLRB v. Ford Motor Company, Sixth Circuit, 
October Term 1939 (2 April 1940), in Ford Motor Company Legal Papers, Ford Motor Company and UAW before 
the NLRB, Seventh Region, Benson Ford Research Center, Dearborn, Mich. (hereafter Ford Legal Papers), acc. 51 
(NLRB Suits, Ford Motor Company Legal Department), box 4, 35–38. 
109 UAW President Homer Martin called Bennett an “embryonic Hitler.” Quoted in Steve Watts, The People’s 
Tycoon: Henry Ford and the American Century (Knopf, 2005), 454. 
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included boxers, wrestlers, gangsters, ex-convicts, and retired policemen.  They were responsible 
for preventing the organization of the Ford workers through espionage, intimidation, and 
violence, and they were very effective at their job.110
By the spring of 1937, the UAW was determined to take on its most formidable 
adversary.  In Michigan, as in the rest of the country, public opinion had turned against labor.  
The radical tactics of the CIO were an inescapable presence in daily life. In March, thirty-five 
thousand workers seized every Chrysler Corporation plant in the Detroit vicinity, along with 
hotels, industrial laundries, restaurants, and department stores, culminating in a half-day general 
strike that shut the city down.
   
111   In April 1937, a sit-down strike failed at a small Yale and 
Towne Company plant in Detroit, when the company secured an injunction and the police used 
tear gas and riot sticks to break the strike and arrest organizers, two of whom were sentenced to 
jail terms. In the wake of the strike, Yale and Towne closed the plant and fired all of its 
workers.112
That the state was no longer actively assisting labor may have been a disappointment to 
the UAW, but it was not a surprise.
  Michigan residents were demanding the restoration of order, and neither the state 
nor the federal government was willing to intervene on labor’s behalf.  
113 If labor wanted to improve its lot, it would have to 
organize.  And to the UAW, the failure at the Yale and Towne plant made organization at the 
Ford Motor Company all the more crucial.114
                                                          
110 Stephen Harlan Norwood, Strikebreaking and Intimidation: Mercenaries and Masculinity in Twentieth-Century 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 173. 
  Not only had Ford kept unions out of its own 
111 Lichtenstein, Reuther, 74, 80. 
112 Ibid., 81.  
113 As future CIO General Counsel Maurice Sugar told UAW President Homer Martin in August 1937, an employer 
who faced serious challenge from labor had always turned for assistance to the machinery of the state—which, with 
rare exceptions, was “completely dominated and controlled” by industrial interests. “As a general rule,” he added, 
“he has not turned in vain.”  Maurice Sugar to Homer Martin, 9 August 1937, Sugar Papers, box 4, folder 4-15. 
Sugar thought the primary goal of legal work should be the protection of labor’s right to engage in direct action.  
114 “Auto Peace Talks Collapse,” New York Times, 22 January 1937. In January 1937, while engaged in the GM sit-
down strike, John Lewis had warned Ford Motor Company and Chrysler that they would be next.  
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plants, but it had stood in the way of efforts to organize its purchasers and suppliers.115  The 
atmosphere of the mid-1930s had made the company even more determined to resist the 
organization of its workers.  As strikes rocked Detroit, Ford invested thousands of dollars in guns 
and tear gas, increased the size of the Service Department, and distributed antiunion literature.  
During the GM sit-down strike, the UAW had carried banners declaring, “Today GM Tomorrow 
Ford!”116  By April, Homer Martin proclaimed that the Ford campaign was set to begin,117 and in 
late April there was a sit-down strike at the Ford plant in Richmond, California.118 Richard 
Frankensteen, a UAW field general at the GM and Chrysler strikes, was assigned to head the 
organizational efforts and announced on May 18 that the UAW would mobilize 200,000 
organized workers to help convince Ford employees to join.119
For months, UAW organizers had been holding secret meetings in the River Rouge plant, 
but it was evident by late spring that a more visible gesture would be necessary to reach the 
largely insulated employees. To that end, they planned a literature distribution for late May.  
After surveying the terrain, they settled on a location for the demonstration: an overpass 
constructed by the Ford Company to provide a walkway from the plant gates to a nearby 
streetcar stop.  Because the company had leased the overpass to the Detroit Street Railway 
Commission, it was public property, as was the abutting road.  
  Ford’s River Rouge plant in 
Dearborn was a crucial organizing target. It dominated the local landscape, and it set the tone for 
labor relations in the Detroit area.   
                                                          
115 E.g., L. W. Beman, Regional Director, to Robert Wohlforth, 11 December 1936, La Follette Committee Papers 
(“The Ford Motor Car Company told the Midland Steel Company if they wanted any more business from them, they 
were to club these fellows and throw them out of the plant.”). 
116 Burnham Finney, “Ford Blocks Path of C.I.O.,” New York Times, 28 March 1937 (photograph of banner). 
117 “Ford Must Now Bow to Union, Says Martine,” New York Times, 13 April 1937. 
118 “600 Strikers Quit Ford Plant Sit-In,” New York Times, 24 April 1937. 
119 “200,000 Summoned to Aid Ford Drive,” New York Times, 19 May 1937. 
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 On May 26, 1937, when they arrived at the River Rouge plant, UAW organizers were not 
expecting a fight.  If anything, Walter Reuther had been unusually cautious.  He had obtained 
approval of the UAW pamphlets from the Dearborn city clerk and secured a permit for the event. 
He had ensured attendance by respected observers, including clergy members, the local press, 
and La Follette Committee staff.  To further forestall the likelihood of violence, a women’s 
auxiliary was designated to pass out the union literature.  Reuther assured the participants that 
peaceful leafleting was constitutionally protected activity and would not be forcibly stopped.  Of 
course, union organizing was always a risky endeavor, particularly in Dearborn.  But there was 
no reason to suspect any more than the usual trouble.  
When Walter Reuther and Richard Frankensteen posed for a photo outside the plant 
gates, however, a menacing group of Ford Servicemen wrongly informed them that they were 
trespassing on company property and ordered them to leave.  Reuther and Frankensteen 
peacefully turned to comply,120
                                                          
120 National Citizens’ Committee for the Protection of Civil Rights in the Automobile Industry, “The Trial that 
Shocked a Nation,” Richard T. Frankensteen Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich., acc. 14 (hereafter Frankensteen Papers), box 5, UAW, 1933–1955, Battle of 
the Overpass. 
 but they only made it a few steps before they were attacked from 
behind.  Reuther was beaten severely in the face, chest, and groin and then picked up and 
dropped onto the concrete seven or eight times. Frankensteen was pummeled repeatedly and 
thrown down three flights of stairs. The women distributing the leaflets were punched, albeit less 
forcefully, and were “called all manner of vile names usually attributed to women of the streets.”  
Richard Merriweather was brutally assaulted and suffered a broken back, among many other 
injuries. Many of the participants were knocked unconscious and spent days in the hospital 
recovering.  
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The assailants, concerned about bad publicity, pursued press photographers to seize their 
films and plates. Nonetheless, a few managed to slip through.  Ford servicemen chased one 
reporter on foot for five miles, until he reached safety in a police station.121
In the span of a few hours, the Ford Motor Company ensured the demise of its reputation 
for treating its workers fairly.  In the process, it opened itself up to a powerful unionization 
drive.
  Detroit News 
photographer James Kilpatrick held on to his photographic films by hiding them under a car seat.  
His iconic images of the brutal attack on Reuther and Frankensteen were circulated throughout 
the world and inspired the Pulitzer committee to introduce a prize for photography.   
122  In the days after the Battle of the Overpass, as UAW organizers sought to capitalize on 
a rare wave of favorable publicity,123 Maurice Sugar took the lead on the legal front.  Sugar was 
alert to the need for effective legal representation.  As he told Martin, employers had long 
understood the importance of legal work, and labor would do well to take that lesson to heart; the 
efforts of the UAW and CIO in the legal field had “contributed in no small measure to their 
phenomenal success.”124
                                                          
121 “Labor: Fordism v. Unionism,” Time, 26 July 1937. 
  Almost immediately, he initiated charges before Common Pleas Judge 
Ralph Liddy, who called for the prosecution of eight Ford servicemen on charges of assault and 
122 Lichtenstein, Reuther, 83–86.  Over the next four years, four thousand Ford employees would lose their jobs for 
union activity, in plain contravention of the Wagner Act.  As CPUSA chair (and past ACLU National Committee 
member) William Foster predicted, Ford would “make a militant resistance against all this organization work and 
[would] have recourse to the usual open shopper’s use of violence.” William Foster, “Organizing the Ford 
Workers,” UAW Local 212 Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State 
University, Detroit, Mich., acc. 76, box 4, folder “Newspaper articles, 1937.” Foster was insistent that the UAW 
continue with its educational and recruiting work.  Nonetheless, he recognized that “such activities as fights in 
courts and before public boards”—not as a “substitute for solid organization trade union building, but only as 
auxiliary to it”—would be an important component of a successful effort.  
123 The NLRB, Seventh Region, noted that the Battle of the Overpass “boosted organization.” J. T. C., Memorandum 
for Mr. McCormack, Investigation of Smith Committee Exhibits, 2 January 1941, 5, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897 
(Legal-Labor cases), box 2, file Re-Examination of Exhibits in Smith Committee Investigation.  
124 Maurice Sugar to Homer Martin, 9 August 1937, Sugar Papers, box 4, folder 4-15. Sugar urged Martin to create a 
permanent legal department.  Martin, however, did not act on his recommendation, and it would be two years before 
the UAW-CIO created a legal office and named Sugar its Chief Legal Counsel.  Maurice Sugar to R. J. Thomas, 
UAW President, 24 April 1939, Sugar Papers, box 4, folder 4:17. In his letter, Sugar blamed Martin for his failure to 
create a legal department earlier.  His proposal was finally accepted in April 1939.  Minutes of Executive Board, 28 
April 1939, Sugar Papers, box 4, folder 4:18. 
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battery.125 Concurrently, Sugar prepared a lengthy complaint for a hearing before the NLRB.126 
In it, he alleged that the Ford Motor Company had engineered the events of May 26. He also 
accused Ford of a host of other unfair labor practices, including threatening and intimidating its 
employees; soliciting members for the Ford Brotherhood of America, allegedly a company 
union; and discharging, demoting, transferring or otherwise adversely affecting the employment 
status of three dozen employees for engaging in union activities.127
The hearings began on July 6 before NLRB Trial Examiner John T. Lindsay.  The federal 
courtroom in which they were held was filled to capacity, including standing room, every day of 
the trial.
 Finally, the NLRB complaint 
charged the company with distributing statements and propaganda critical of labor organizations 
and discouraging union membership.   
128
                                                          
125 “Labor: Fordism v. Unionism,” Time, 26 July 1937.  
  The attorney for the NLRB was Laurence A. Knapp.  Ford was represented by a 
local attorney, Louis J. Colombo—who, according to the attorneys at Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 
the white-shoe New York law firm that represented the company on appeal, did a barely passable 
job.  After addressing such preliminary matters as the public status of the overpass and the 
details of the UAW’s permit, the bulk of the testimony focused on the Battle of the Overpass.  
Witness after witness described the callous brutalities in vivid detail.  Victims described being 
beaten unconscious. Richard Frankensteen recalled being “bounced, thrown, dragged and 
knocked down three flights of stairs.”  An observer filled in the gaps, describing how 
Frankensteen was “kicked in the groin and kidneys and knocked down, . . .  lifted to his feet and 
then knocked down and beaten again.” A member of the women’s auxiliary saw a group of men 
126 Christopher H. Johnson, Maurice Sugar: Law, Labor and the Left in Detroit, 1912–1950 (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1988), 224. 
127 Ford Motor Company (Highland Park and Dearborn, Mich.), 4 N.L.R.B. 621 (1937). The complaint originally 
named thirty-eight employees. Some of them were dropped and other added over the course of the proceedings.  
128 J. T. C., Memorandum for Mr. McCormack, Investigation of Smith Committee Exhibits, 2 January 1941, 6, Ford 
Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 2, file: Re-Examination of Exhibits in Smith Committee Investigation.  
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leaning over Richard Meriweather shouting “Kill him! Kill him!” while blood poured out of his 
nose and mouth.  A reporter who had been covering the events summed things up neatly in his 
testimony: “everywhere you looked there was someone getting kicked around.”129
As a public relations tool, the hearings were a resounding success for the UAW.  
Newspapers reprinted large portions of the testimony documenting Ford’s history of spying, 
intimidation, blacklisting, and other unlawful practices, as well as the harrowing events of May 
26.
   
130  The UAW, by contrast, was portrayed as peaceful and law-abiding.  For the first time in 
months, the NLRB was presented in popular accounts as a forum where the trampled underclass 
could secure justice against the tyranny of its employers.131
 Legally, too, the UAW scored an important victory.  The trial examiner’s voluminous 
report, which served as the basis for the Board’s order in the case, was highly favorable to the 
UAW. 
   
132  In internal memoranda, Ford’s Cravath attorneys described the case for the Board as 
“well-prepared and well-presented,” almost certain to create an impression unfavorable to Ford.  
They thought there was ample evidence to sustain any findings the Board was likely to make.133  
The statement of what happened on May 26 accorded fully with the testimony, and while there 
might be some room to argue about Ford’s responsibility for the incident, it would be “entirely 
impossible to deny on the record that union members were beaten without provocation.”134
                                                          
129 National Citizens’ Committee for the Protection of Civil Rights in the Automobile Industry, “The Trial that 
Shocked a Nation,” Frankensteen Papers, box 5, UAW, 1933–1955, Battle of the Overpass. 
 The 
130 Johnson, Sugar, 225.  
131 For years, labor groups had complained about Ford’s high-handed anti-labor tactics.  Ford was a powerful 
company with well placed allies, and despite clear evidence of unlawful behavior, state and federal officials had 
stood passively by.  In 1933, the NRA Compliance Board had unavailingly urged the Department of Justice to 
prosecute the company for violations of Section 7A of the NIRA. Watts, People’s Tycoon, 457. 
132 The report came to 3657 double-spaced pages. E. F. B., Memorandum for Mr. H. A. Moore, 28 August 1937, 
Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 1, vol. 1. 
133 E. F. B., Memorandum for Mr. H. A. Moore, 28 August 1937, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 1, vol. 1. 
134 H. D., Memorandum for Mr. Wood, Comments on extent to which Board’s findings are supported by evidence, 
26 December 1937, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, Memoranda of Fact through Dec. 1938. 
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case for Ford, on the other hand, was “deficient, both by omission and commission.”135
After meeting with their clients in late December, the Ford lawyers began to formulate a 
strategy.  They spoke extensively with Everett Moore, Bennett’s second-in-command at the 
River Rouge plant, who oversaw the Servicemen’s preparations for the scheduled UAW 
literature distribution.  Moore had ordered the closure of five plant gates and had parked trucks 
inside several others to repel a possible automobile cavalcade.  In the midst of the spring sit-
down strikes, Moore had been preparing for the possibility of “actual invasion of the plant.”
 Many of 
the Board’s charges, and many descriptions of damaging conversations and events, were never 
answered or refuted.   
136
 Still, given that the case did “not appear very favorable on the facts,” the heart of Ford’s 
legal plan was to attack the NLRB itself.
 
Of course, there was no evidence that the UAW was planning anything of the sort.  But their 
actual intentions were irrelevant, because Moore and Bennett “both seemed to genuinely believe 
that . . . this visit to the Rouge Plant on May 26 was for the purpose of entering into the plant and 
going among the workmen and calling a sit-down strike at that very moment.” If Ford’s lawyers 
could convince the courts to take judicial notice of the prevailing hysteria in May 1937, they 
could perhaps provide a measure of justification for the brutality with which the company shut 
down a peaceful UAW organizing event.  
137
                                                          
135 E. F. B., Memorandum for Mr. H. A. Moore, 28 August 1937, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, Memoranda of Law, 
vol. 1. 
  Ford’s lawyers accused the Board of acting as a 
prosecutor rather than an unbiased tribunal. They insisted that the administrative machinery 
developed in the fields of trade and commerce were “not suited to the field of labor relations, in 
which emotion is dominant and partisanship is rife,” and they questioned whether the quasi-
136 Memorandum for Mr. Whitney, Ford Labor Case, 28 December 1937, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 5, vol. 1. 
137 H.D., Memorandum for Mr. Whitney, 24 December 1937, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 1. 
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judicial function could be fulfilled “by handing down quasi-decisions based upon a quasi-record 
which has been fabricated out of quasi-evidence unearthed at a quasi-hearing.”138
Ford’s lawyers were realistic about their chances on this front.  By 1938, the federal 
judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, was a friendlier forum for labor than the legislature 
was.  In fact, in the late 1930s the Supreme Court overturned NLRB orders and procedures only 
a handful of times.
   
139 The legal team discussed the situation at length with Edsel Ford, president 
of the company and Henry’s Ford son, whose opposition to organized labor was less obstinate 
than his father’s.  One attorney pointed out that the Detroit case “was just one battle in a general 
war.”  The Wagner Act, he explained, was a federal law, and the Supreme Court had pronounced 
it constitutional.  Although minor amendments were possible, there was no reasonable prospect 
of reversing national labor policy in the foreseeable future.140
First, however, the company would have to exhaust its remedies before the NLRB.  The 
Board issued its order on December 22. Accepting virtually all of the trial examiner’s findings, 
the Board emphasized “the unconcealed hostility with which the Ford Motor Company views 
  Nonetheless, the courts might be 
open to arguments about frank bias in the NLRB, or its failure to act in the “quasi-judicial 
manner required of administrative bodies.”   
                                                          
138 A June memo focused on anti-employer statements by Edwin Smith and concluded that “the attitude of the 
Board, as revealed in the public utterances of its members, leaves no room for doubt that a member of the employing 
class who is haled before this tribunal is viewed as an implacable foe of organized labor, ready to resort to extreme 
measures in order to maintain his domination over his employees.” F. A. E. S., Memorandum for Mr. Wood, 
Statements by Members of the National Labor Relations Board Pertaining to Their Administration of the Act, 10 
June 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, Memoranda of Facts, vol. 1. 
139 In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company, 304 U.S. 333 (1938), a unanimous 1938 decision, the Court 
upheld the Board’s construction of the NLRA as including striking workers within its definition of employee, but it 
also affirmed the right of an employer to hire and retain strikebreakers. More significantly, in NLRB v. Fansteel 
Metallurgical Company, 306 U. S. 240 (1939), the Court reversed an NLRB order requiring an employer to reinstate 
workers who were discharged for participating in a sit-down strike, despite clear evidence that the employer engaged 
in unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA. On the whole, however, the Supreme Court was deferential to the 
NLRB and reluctant to overturn its findings.   
140 W. D. W., “Memorandum for Mr. Wood,” 11 January 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 5, vol. 1, 
Memoranda of Fact.  Edsel Ford, in turn promised to ensure that company policy tolerated unions in compliance 
with the law—though the attorneys expected that any evidence they could prove of unionization would be “chiefly 
as to A. F. of L. men.”  
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bona fide labor organizations and the utter ruthlessness with which it has fought the organization 
of its employees by the U. A. W.”141  The Ford Motor Company had conveyed its antagonism to 
labor not only through public statements, but also through direct admonitions to employees, 
buttressed by the hostility of supervisors and foremen, the discharge of union advocates, and the 
employment of hired thugs.  No Ford employee could fail to comprehend that disregarding 
Henry Ford’s opinion on unions was an unacceptable choice.  Accordingly, the Board ordered 
the company to cease and desist from discouraging union membership, dominating or interfering 
with any labor organization of its employees, threatening or assaulting any member of a union, 
or otherwise interfering with employees’ rights to self-organization or collective bargaining.142
On January 3, Ford filed a petition to vacate and set aside the decision to provide an 
opportunity for rehearing and additional testimony.  In addition to drawing attention to industrial 
unrest in Michigan the previous spring, the petition emphasized Ford’s high wages and good 
working conditions, a statement by Henry Ford that he would not prevent union membership, 
and other mitigating circumstances.
 
143
                                                          
141 Ford Motor Company, 4 N.L.R.B. at 674.  
  Above all, however, it focused on questions of law.  Ford 
claimed that it was denied a fair hearing and due process because the trial examiner had never 
issued an intermediate report to which it could file exceptions. And it claimed that the Board’s 
order, which prohibited Ford from disseminating its anti-union views, was an unconstitutional 
142 Ibid., 677. 
143 The petition noted that Henry Ford, despite his anti-union sentiments, had told a reporter in April 1937 that he 
would not prevent union membership; stressed that the Michigan Supreme Court had held that the attacks on May 
26 were not felonious; and denied that it had dominated and supported the Ford Brotherhood of America. It stated 
that the purpose of Service Department was to guard the gates and preserve order in the plant, not to intimidate the 
workers.   The purported discharges affected only a handful of the plant’s 80,000 employees, and many known union 
members were thriving within the company. Exhibit A, Petition of Ford Motor Company to Vacate and Set Aside 
Decision and Order and For Rehearing before the NLRB, Answer to Petition for the Enforcement of an Order of the 
NLRB, 6th Circuit, 11 April 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 51, box 4, 7919. 
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infringement of free speech. The Board denied Ford’s petition and, on January 7, filed in the 
Sixth Circuit for enforcement of its order.144
Over the coming months, it was Ford’s last argument that would attract the most 
attention.  Paragraph 1(e) of the Board’s order required Ford to cease and desist from 
“circulating, distributing or otherwise disseminating among its employees statements or 
propaganda disparaging or criticizing labor organizations or advising its employees not to join 
such organizations.”  The provision was meant to address the company’s distribution at the River 
Rouge plant of various anti-union materials.  The first was a pamphlet entitled “Ford Gives 
Viewpoint on Labor,” in which Henry Ford explained his belief that union membership was 
unnecessary and ill-advised.
 
145  Ford supervisors also distributed cards that listed, under the 
heading “Fordisms,” various excerpts from Henry Ford’s written criticism of organized labor.146
When Ford’s lawyers first considered the free speech angle, it was by no means an 
obvious approach.
   
147  One attorney wrote in an internal memorandum that the Board could likely 
limit speech when it infringed on other fundamental rights.148
                                                          
144 Petition of Respondent, Ford Motor Company, for Leave to Adduce Additional Evidence, and Exhibit A Thereto, 
4 April 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 51, box 4. 
 Although an employer could 
probably advise employees not to join a union, “if such right is exercised in such a way as to 
interfere with, coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their fundamental right to self-
145 “Paragraph 1(e) of the Board’s order should be set aside,” 23 May 1938, Ford Legal Papers, Memoranda of 
Facts, vol. 2.  In another part of the quoted interview, he stated that he had never prevented his employees from any 
association, whether religious, racial, political or social. “No one who believes in American freedom would do that,” 
he added. 
146 Representative examples included: “A monopoly of JOBS in this country is just as bad as a monopoly of 
BREAD”; “Figure it out for yourself. If you go into a union they have GOT YOU—but what have YOU GOT?”; 
and “Our men ought to consider whether it is necessary for them to PAY SOME OUTSIDER every month FOR 
THE PRIVILEGE OF WORKING at Ford’s.” ACLU Memorandum on the Ford Case, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, 
box 5, vol. 1. 
147 The only prior case under the NLRA in which freedom of speech had explicitly been raised was Associated Press 
v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103 (1937), in which a majority had considered it unnecessary to decide whether the NLRA 
violated the First Amendment because there was no denial in the record that the employee was discharged for union 
activities.   
148 E. F. B., Memorandum for Mr. H. A. Moore, 28 August 1937, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 1, Memoranda of 
Law, vol. 1. 
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organization . . . such an exercise of the right by the employer may be prohibited by the Board 
without doing violence to the constitutional right of the employer under the First Amendment.”  
A few months later, another lawyer read and summarized every Supreme Court decision 
involving freedom of speech and press (which, in 1938, was still a manageable task).149
Ford did not file an answer to the Board’s petition for enforcement of its order by the 
Sixth Circuit until April 11, 1938.
 He 
concluded that Henry Ford was entitled to make public statements about his views without 
NLRB interference, but he anticipated difficulty “as to the reprinting and circulation among 
employees of statements by Henry Ford and as to any other publication by the Company itself.”  
Whatever its doctrinal vulnerabilities, however, it was immediately clear that free speech 
strategy was an immensely popular one.  When newspapers decried the NLRB’s encroachment 
on freedom of the press in the cases involving subpoenas of editors, they often noted the Board’s 
order in the Ford case as well.   
150  Its arguments were largely the same ones it had presented 
to the NLRB, but the court never had an opportunity to rule on them.  On May 2—following an 
intervening Supreme Court decision, Morgan v. United States,151
                                                          
149 H. D., Memorandum on Ford Labor Case: Questions of Law to be Investigated, 15 January 1938, Ford Legal 
Papers, acc. 897, box 1. 
 in which a rate-fixing order of 
the Secretary of Agriculture was held void for lack of a “full hearing”—the NLRB filed a motion 
for leave to withdraw its transcript of record and its petition for enforcement without 
150 One of the attorneys had concluded that the usual form of attack on administrative findings—arguing that they 
were not supported by the evidence—would be largely futile given the record in the case.  H. D., “Memorandum for 
Messrs. Wood, Cooke, Diggs: Ford Labor Case: Method of Handling Factual Material in Brief,” 15 April 1938, 
Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 1. “Another approach,” he suggested, “would be to argue that the Board, in making 
its decision, failed to act as a judicial or quasijudicial body, and that consequently the proceeding must be remanded 
to the Board for reconsideration.” Such a victory would be less desirable, of course, but “it seems to me that it is the 
only victory we can hope to get and that, if we attempt to take the former position, we will inevitably lead the Court 
into considering the facts themselves and reaching the conclusion that we are guilty.”   
151 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938). The case was decided on April 28, 1938.  
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prejudice.152  The Sixth Circuit granted the NLRB’s motion a few days later, but Ford challenged 
it on procedural grounds.  For the next half-year the case would be stalled, until the Supreme 
Court finally held in January 1939 that the Sixth Circuit’s judgment was proper.153
In the meantime, however, the legal team continued to prepare the company’s substantive 
case.  It investigated the legislative history of the NLRA and discovered that the House had 
adopted an amendment providing that “nothing in this act shall abridge the freedom of speech or 
the press as guaranteed in the first amendment of the constitution.”
   
154 The Senate and House 
conferences had recommended that it be dropped as unnecessary, since nothing in the act could 
be construed to undermine First Amendment protections.155  During Senate debate on the bill, 
Senator David I. Walsh, Chair of the Committee on Labor and Education, had stated that 
employers and employees alike would have the right to discuss the merits of any organization.  
“Indeed,” he clarified, “Congress could not constitutionally pass a law abridging the freedom of 
speech.”156
The more Ford’s lawyers researched, the more confident they became that the NLRB’s 
order was an unconstitutional infringement on free speech.  The Act, they concluded, could not 
reasonably be construed to prohibit substantive argument about the desirability or necessity of 
 
                                                          
152 Notice of Motion for leave to withdraw petition for enforcement and transcript of record without prejudice, 29 
April 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 51, box 4. The Supreme Court had upheld several Board decisions without 
intermediate reports. While the Board’s petition for enforcement in the Ford Case was pending, however, the 
Supreme Court decided the Morgan case, in which it held that the absence of formal complaint—which was in fact 
required under the Board’s procedure—was a sufficiently severe procedural defect to invalidate the order issued. 
Rather than risk an eventual Supreme Court decision requiring an intermediate report, the Board elected to withdraw 
its decision voluntarily in order to issue provisional findings of fact to which Ford could file exceptions. The Board 
stated that the public in general and labor in particular should be “profoundly disturbed” at the growing trend in the 
Courts of Appeals of disregarding the Board’s findings of facts, and it complained about the negative press coverage 
following its proposal to revise its order in the Ford case. Edwin Smith, “The Drive against the National Labor 
Relations Board,” address of 21 May 1938, reprinted in NLRB Press Report, 21 May 1938, Ford Motor Company 
Press Release, 9 April 1940, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 2, file of Press Releases.  
153 Ford Motor Company v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 364 (1939).  
154 79 Cong. Rec. 10111. 
155 79 Cong. Rec. 10549, 10627, 10668. 
156 79 Cong. Rec. 7960. 
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unionization.  The Supreme Court’s March 1938 decision in Lovell v. City of Griffin—which the 
ACLU was using to such great effect in its campaign against Mayor Hague in Jersey City—
provided additional ammunition.  In a case involved leafleting by Jehovah’s Witnesses, it further 
established the inviolability of free speech and free press.157 In May 1938 draft brief, Ford’s 
lawyers quoted from Zechariah Chafee’s scholarship and from Justice Holmes’s Abrams dissent, 
as well as the Supreme Court’s newer entries in the First Amendment debate, including 
Stromberg v. California158  and Grosjean v. American Press Co.159  To connect these cases to 
employer speech, they invoked the metaphor of industrial democracy so often promoted by 
labor.  It was congressional intent, they argued, that “workers should have the same freedom of 
action in determining the manner of their organization as citizens have in the sphere of politics.” 
If free speech facilitates the appropriate and informed exercise of rights in the political sphere, it 
is “likewise essential in order that workers may intelligently exercise their rights to organize or 
to designate representatives or engage in concerted activity.”160
                                                          
157 “Paragraph 1(e) of the Board’s order should be set aside,” 23 May 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 4, vol. 
2.  
  Ford’s workers had been 
exposed to a broad range of opinions about the desirability of unionization. The CIO and UAW 
had been actively engaged in recruitment and had made their views known in the national press 
as well as in the plant.  What could be objectionable, they asked, about advising workers that 
they should consider the potential disadvantages of joining a union before they made up their 
158 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion 
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people . . . is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system.”). 
159 Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (“Since informed public opinion is the most potent 
of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot 
be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.”). 
160 “Paragraph 1(e) of the Board’s order should be set aside,” 23 May 1938, 18, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 4, 
vol. 2.   
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minds?  By the summer of 1938, the Ford Motor Company and its lawyers considered the free 
speech argument to be the strongest element of their case.161
 
   
The Ford Case and the ACLU 
 When the NLRB’s order in the Ford case erupted onto the public stage in the fall of 1937, 
demands for ACLU comment immediately poured in.162
                                                          
161 H. G. W. Jr., Memorandum for Messrs. Wood and McCormack, Ford Labor Cases Settlement Possibilities, 26 
August 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 5, vol. 1. In the intervening months, the NLRB had initiated charges 
of unfair labor practices at Ford plants throughout the country.  Many involved facts less sympathetic than those of 
the Detroit case, but the Board consistently prohibited anti-union communications by the company.  In August, one 
of Ford’s attorneys advised that the moment was opportune for settling the eight cases then pending.  At the time, 
divisiveness within the UAW made the union vulnerable.  Homer Martin, president of the UAW, was attempting to 
oust the communists from union office, angering the CIO leadership and escalating existing tensions within the 
organization.  The conflict would eventually culminate in Martin’s resignation in January 1939 and his formation of 
a competitor AFL-affiliated union.  Dubofsky and Van Tine, Lewis, 234. In advocating settlement of the Ford case, 
the attorney predicted that a loss by Martin would shift control to leaders “much more radical in thought and action,” 
and that Ford should act while a more moderate agreement was possible.  He thought the NLRB would be amenable 
to a settlement, since only a few of the cases were clear-cut and settling would end the attack on the Board’s 
procedure in the Detroit case.  As events unfolded, settlement between the UAW and Ford would wait another three 
years.  Tellingly, the attorney acknowledged the likelihood that no compromise whatsoever “would be acceptable to 
the client on the free speech issue.”  
  The case was bound to cause 
controversy within the already divided organization.  After all, it brought together all of the 
elements about which the ACLU’s board and its national committee had been fighting since 
spring. It was closely tied to the sit-down strikes of spring 1937 and raised questions about the 
propriety of employers’ measures to safeguard their property.  It involved the procedural 
limitations of the Wagner Act in the immediate aftermath of the constitutional revolution.  It 
touched upon company unions and industrial espionage. But above all, it squarely raised the 
question whether employer speech was constitutionally protected.  And on this issue, the Ford 
case precipitated a major shift in the rhetoric of civil liberties and in the internal politics of the 
ACLU.  
162 One ACLU member wrote to Baldwin in December 1937 to tell him that while he was “strongly sympathetic 
with the law of unions in this fight to bring Henry [Ford] to his knees,” he and his wife felt that the Ford order was a 
clear infringement of free speech. John Beardsley to Roger Baldwin, 27 December 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, 
vol. 978. 
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 Ford v. NLRB was by no means the first encounter between the Ford Motor Company 
and the ACLU.  Roger Baldwin had corresponded at length with Maurice Sugar after the “Ford 
Massacre” of 1932, in which the Dearborn police, assisted by Harry Bennett and his servicemen, 
opened fire on hunger marchers outside the River Rouge plant and killed four members of the 
Youth Communist League.163 Baldwin made multiple visits to Detroit and worked diligently 
with Sugar and the International Labor Defense to assemble a damages suit, but they were unable 
to collect sufficient evidence and eventually abandoned the effort.164 Throughout the mid-1930s, 
Baldwin worked closely with local civil rights groups, including the Conference for the 
Protection of Civil Rights165 and the Professional League for Civil Rights.166  The former 
organization, which became the Civil Rights Federation in the summer of 1937, handled 
publicity after the Battle of the Overpass, and the ACLU helped it translate public sympathy for 
the UAW into a broader organizing drive.167
                                                          
163 A fifth victim died months later of his injuries. Ford subsequently discharged anyone who evinced sympathy for 
the slain marchers or contributed to their funeral fund. Johnson, Sugar, 116–24.    
  When the organization issued a pro-UAW 
164 The ACLU initially exonerated the Detroit police, probably out of deference to Mayor Frank Murphy, and 
focused instead on the Ford Motor Company and the Dearborn police.  Maurice Sugar convinced Baldwin to 
reassess the situation, and Baldwin dutifully wrote to Murphy to demand further investigation. Roger Baldwin to 
Maurice Sugar, 31 March 1932, Sugar Papers, box 53, folder 53:12; Roger Baldwin to Frank Murphy, 30 March 
1932, Sugar Papers, box 53, folder 53:12. On the damage suits, see Roger Baldwin to William L. Patterson 
(National Secretary, ILD), 28 February 1933, ACLU Papers, reel 103, vol. 661; Carl Hacker (ILD) to Roger 
Baldwin, 2 March 1933, ACLU Papers, reel 103, vol. 661; Roger Baldwin to William Patterson, 10 October 1933, 
ACLU Papers, reel 103, vol. 661. 
165 The Conference for the Protection of Civil Rights was a leftist organization that defended the rights of racial 
minorities. Its platform included “the rights of free speech, press, assembly and worship as granted in the Bill of 
Rights,” the “rights of labor to organize and carry out the functions essential to collective bargaining as guaranteed 
in the Wagner Act,” and “equal rights with all others in the community of religious, racial and political minorities.” 
Quoted in Angela Dillard, Faith in the City: Preaching Radical Social Change in Detroit (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2007), 81.  
166 Baldwin sought to establish a local branch of the ACLU to supplement existing groups, but initial efforts failed. 
See correspondence between Roger Baldwin and William Gallagher, ACLU Papers, reel 152, vol. 1037. In the fall 
of 1938, Walter Nelson reached out for support in assembling a local committee.  Nelson cautioned that the 
committee should not include representatives of either the CIO or the AFL, given the pending struggle between 
them. Walter Nelson to Roger Baldwin, 27 September 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 152, vol. 1037.  It appears that 
Nelson assembled a skeleton committee to provide immediate legal assistance in appropriate cases.   
167 Marie Hempel to Lucile Milner, 30 June 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 152, vol. 1037; Conference for Protection of 
Civil Rights, “Support Right to Organize at Ford’s,” 15 July 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 152, vol. 1037; Ira Latimer to 
Caroline Whiting, 15 August 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 152, vol. 1037. 
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pamphlet on the NLRB hearing in the Ford case in August 1937, Baldwin only regretted that it 
did not include the names of the ACLU’s National Committee.168
  Nonetheless, the Wagner Act had reshaped the free speech landscape, and the ACLU 
would need to adjust to the new terrain. The ACLU was accustomed to attacking the Ford Motor 
Company for its flagrant interference with civil liberties. For the first time, Ford v. NLRB pushed 
an increasing contingent of ACLU members to consider whether employers had corresponding 
rights of their own.  The ACLU had never considered property rights to be part of the civil 
liberties program; the organization was born out of opposition to Lochner-era judicial reasoning, 
and it had always flatly dismissed efforts by groups like the Liberty League to equate the 
deprivation of property or freedom of contract with attacks on other liberties protected by the 
Bill of Rights.
  For years, the Ford Service 
Department and the local police had worked together to shut down every attempt at unionization 
in the River Rouge plant. They had trampled over workers’ constitutional rights to march, picket, 
and distribute literature, often through use of violence.  Given this context, the efforts by Ford’s 
lawyers and the conservative press to present the company’s anti-union literature as a mere 
expression of opinion were understandably infuriating to much of the ACLU leadership. 
169
                                                          
168 Telegram to Harriet Chapman, 26 August 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 152, vol. 1037; National Citizens’ 
Committee for the Protection of Civil Rights in the Automobile Industry, “Trial that Shocked a Nation,” August 
1937, ACLU Papers, reel 152, vol. 1037.  
  But the problem of employer free speech was a different one.  It involved 
precisely the same constitutional provision that the ACLU had invoked for decades.  Many 
ACLU members, including the attorneys, worried that a narrow reading of the First Amendment 
would inevitably backfire against the radical groups to whom the organization was most strongly 
committed.  
169 See Chapter 4.  
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 In February 1938, Arthur Garfield Hays tried to address these issues in a draft statement 
on the Ford case.  Ford presented an opportunity for concrete application of the theory that he 
had been working toward in debate over the ACLU’s general statement on employer free speech.  
Hays thought that the NLRB could lawfully prohibit direct threats or acts of coercion. But his 
definition of coercion was clearly narrower than that of the leftists on the ACLU board.  He 
announced that any attempt by the NLRB or the courts to restrict employers’ “expression of 
opinion” would be contested by the ACLU.  And in keeping with the policy he espoused, he 
considered the non-distribution provision in the Ford case to be a violation of civil liberties.  He 
was careful to specify that the ACLU did not disapprove of the judgment against the Ford 
Company, which was justified by ample evidence of unlawful labor practices.170
 Nathan Greene was deeply opposed to Hays’s report.  He insisted that the NLRB’s order 
could be understood only in its broader context, namely, as a remedy for “merciless beatings,” 
“shameless violence,” and “bitter and uncompromising warfare” against workers’ every effort to 
organize. Greene wanted to except from constitutional protection speech like Ford’s that was 
“implemented by force.”  While the ACLU would defend the right of employers to voice their 
anti-union sentiments in a “normal way,” the literature distributed at the River Rouge plant was 
far more than a mere expression of opinion.  It was “simply and clearly a promise of beatings to 
come.” 
  But the order 
to cease and desist from circulating statements critical of labor unions was too broad, and it 
infringed on important constitutional guarantees.  
171
                                                          
170 Arthur Garfield Hays, Proposed Statement on Ford, 21 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
  Greene’s theory found expression in a substitute statement endorsed by the 
Committee on Labor’s Rights, which concluded that speech effectuated by force or threat of 
171 Nathan Greene, Memorandum on Hays’s Report, 14 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
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violence was unworthy of ACLU attention.172  In its sole concession to the Hays camp, it 
concluded with a clarification: “We assume that the provision in the order prohibiting the 
circulation of propaganda among its employees was intended to be limited to conduct coercive in 
character, and we deem it advisable that any court decree entered to enforce the Board’s order 
make this clear. It would follow, therefore, that the section of the order will not survive the 
genuine abandonment by the Ford Company of its policy of coercion.”  Baldwin was clearly 
attracted to Greene’s interpretation. He admonished Hays that the ACLU had always drawn the 
line between words and deeds—a distinction that would seem to favor Hays’s views, but that 
Baldwin construed as support for Greene’s.  According to Baldwin, Ford’s words contributed to 
an unlawful act and were therefore subject to regulation.173
The ACLU board, however, gravitated toward Hays’s version instead.  The issue was one 
of several on the agenda at the special meeting requested by John Haynes Holmes and attended 
by twenty-five members of the board.
   
174  After lengthy discussion, the majority of the board 
concluded that “there should be no limitation on the expression of views.”175 They voted to adopt 
Hays’s statement and authorized transmission of the memo—along with a request for 
clarification of the order—to the NLRB.176
                                                          
172 Memorandum on the Ford Case by the Committee on Labor’s Rights, 28 February 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, 
vol. 1078.  
  Significantly, the tally of the National Committee’s 
votes on the majority and minority statements on employer free speech were reported to the 
board at the same meeting.  The majority report had received sixteen votes, and the minority 
173 He explained somewhat ambiguously: “In the Ford case the language so clearly contributed to the acts that I do 
not think we can defend it. Another employer might confine himself to language without interfering with his 
employees’ rights. Such an employer we should defend.” Roger Baldwin to Arthur Garfield Hays, 23 February 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037. 
174 Other issues included the sit-down strike (the committee’s report was adopted with amendments), the ACLU’s 
policy in regard to employers’ rights, revision of the ACLU’s Statement of Principles as proposed by Ernst and Rice 
(which were tentatively approved), and a bill to prohibit employers from engaging in political coercion. Special 
Meeting of the Board of Directors, 2 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
175 ACLU Memorandum on the Ford Case, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 5, vol. 1.    
176 Minutes of Special Board meeting, 2 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
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report fifteen. Two members had counseled against any statement at all.  The ACLU, it seemed, 
was equally divided.177  Baldwin subsequently circulated the statement to the National 
Committee.  He did not request a formal vote, because he claimed that there had been no 
departure from existing ACLU policy.178
 The ACLU’s allegiances were clearly shifting in conjunction with the dispute.  During 
this same period, the board resolved to reach out more vigorously to “outwardly conservative 
characters.”  It had often been criticized for the disproportionate representation of radicals among 
its members, and it decided to address the imbalance at last.
  
179 As part of this effort, it invited 
Grenville Clark, chair of the ABA’s Committee on the Bill of Rights, to join the ACLU board.  
Clark declined but promised to steer toward the organization “a number of men whom we all feel 
would be desirable.”180 The board was increasingly willing to chastise New Dealers for civil 
liberties abuses.  When Sherman Minton’s Senate committee ordered tax returns from the 
Treasury Department for corporations under investigation, the ACLU wrote him a public letter in 
protest for acting in a manner “out of line with the spirit, if not the letter, of our Constitution.”181
 These maneuvers were a stinging rebuke to the leftists and labor advocates on the ACLU 
board.  Soon after Hays’s statement was adopted, Baldwin sent the Ford memo to J. Warren 
Madden in keeping with the board’s instructions. In language suggesting that he was relaying the 
opinion of others rather than his own views, Baldwin told Madden that “an organization 
concerned with the issues of free speech must necessarily take note of the charges made by 
employers that in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act their rights of 
 
                                                          
177 Ibid. The minutes reported: “In view of the fact that the Union’s general attitude is covered by the Board’s 
statement on the Ford case, it was agreed not to consider any further memorandum.” 
178 Roger Baldwin to National Committee, 4 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 157, vol. 1081. 
179 R.S.C. to George Alger, 11 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
180 Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 23 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
181 Special Committee to Investigate Lobbying Activities to Hon. Sherman Minton, 27 May 1938, ACLU Papers, 
reel 157, vol. 1078. 
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expression are curtailed.”182
 Unsurprisingly, Madden was not mollified by Baldwin’s efforts to minimize the effect of 
the ACLU’s position.  He knew that the effect of the ACLU board’s decision would be to 
embarrass the NLRB and provide ammunition not just to the Ford Motor Company, but to all of 
the Wagner Act’s detractors.  Madden claimed with a touch of defensiveness that no other 
organization had done more to protect the rights of free speech and free assembly during the 
period of its existence than the NLRB.
 The no-distribution provision of the board’s order, he suggested, 
would “create an unfortunate precedent” if upheld by the Court of Appeals, because it would 
continue to apply even if Ford ceased all coercive conduct.  “We assume,” Baldwin said, that the 
Board intended only to prohibit language that is “coercive in effect” and that it had concluded, in 
light of the context, that all of Ford’s statements was coercive.  But he hoped that the NLRB 
would clarify its order to accommodate this “comparatively minor distinction.” 
183  He insisted that he and his colleagues were fully alert 
to the importance of free speech, and that employers were at liberty to speak publicly in any 
manner they chose.  They were limited only in conversation with their employees, “in which 
their economic position gives them peculiar power.”  Madden took issue with the ACLU’s 
assumption that expressions of opinion are necessarily non-coercive.  Indeed, he reported to 
Baldwin on the Board’s experience “that anti-union statements made by employers directly to 
employees, even though stated in the form of expression of opinion, are normally coercive per 
se.”184
                                                          
182 Roger Baldwin to J. Warren Madden, 4 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037. 
  However an employer conveyed its disapproval of unions, the message was that 
employees who joined would be subject to discharge or discrimination. In Madden’s view, “any 
attempted distinction in our orders between ‘coercive language’ and ‘expressions of opinion’ not 
183 Nathan Greene agreed with this assessment.  Nathan Greene to Harry Ward, 22 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 
164, vol. 2037 (“We feel that the NLRB, in the short period of its active operation, has done more for the true 
realization of civil liberties than has ever been done before by any agency of the Government.”). 
184 J. Warren Madden to Roger Baldwin, 11 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037. 
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only would draw a line where none in fact exists but would go far to defeat the whole purpose of 
the National Labor Relations Act.”   
 The pro-labor faction of the ACLU was outraged by the organization’s criticism of the 
NLRB.  Harry Ward had been ill the evening of the special meeting, and he was unable to attend.  
When he heard what had happened, he immediately sought reconsideration of the board’s 
position, and he offered a substitute statement on the case.  Where Hays had distinguished 
between opinion and coercion, Ward wanted the analysis to turn on the overall “course of 
conduct of an employer.”185 An employer engaged in the sort of anti-labor activity practiced by 
the Ford Motor Company could be constrained in its expression, whereas an employer that had 
negotiated willingly with a union and had acted lawfully in all other respects would be free to 
make its opinion of unions known.  These were distinct theories, and Ward’s was clearly 
friendlier to the NLRB.  For their part, the proponents of employer free speech accused the labor 
advocates of split loyalties.  R.W. Riis thought the release of the statement adopted by the ACLU 
board would “do the ACLU an incalculable amount of good” in convincing skeptics that the 
organization was dispassionately committed to the civil liberties cause.  True, it might harm the 
NLRB, but “as between the ACLU or the NLRB, our decision seems simple as childhood and 
clear as day.”186
For another two months, the board remained hopelessly divided.  Madden asked the 
ACLU to reconsider its position, and the board complied by inviting NLRB counsel Charles 
Fahy to attend one of its meetings (Riis tellingly told Baldwin that he “hate[d] to miss a meeting 
 
                                                          
185 Harry Ward, Proposed Substitute Statement on the Ford Case, 30 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 
1080. 
186 R. W. Riis to Roger Baldwin, 29 April 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037. 
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these days, lest the NLRB take over the [ACLU] Board”).187  Fahy did not manage to persuade 
the majority, however, and in late April, Baldwin reported that the ACLU was reaffirming its 
original position.188  Madden, in turn, was equally firm.  Throughout the spring, Baldwin urged 
minor revisions in the wording of the Board’s order. When the NLRB announced its intent to 
withdraw its order for further consideration, Baldwin tried to convince Madden to take the 
ACLU memorandum into account in formulating its revisions.189 Madden responded by stating 
that the NLRB was clearly without authority to prohibit language that did not “interfere with, 
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization and collective 
bargaining,” and that any clarification that the order was intended to prohibit only coercive 
communications would be superfluous.190  The only accommodation that he offered the ACLU 
was an opportunity to be heard before the Board if the case was in fact withdrawn and 
reargued.191
Meanwhile, Harry Ward continued to advocate revision of the ACLU’s statement.  He 
argued that the board had misconceived the true tension in the Ford case, which represented a 
conflict not between civil liberties and majoritarian policy, but rather between two competing 
civil liberties: the right to free speech, and the right to join a union.  To Ward, the latter deserved 
more deference as a matter of law as well as “social necessity.”
  
192
                                                          
187 Lucille Milner to Warren Madden, 15 March 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037. Fahy attended a meeting 
on April 11, at which he and the board agreed to publish an exchange of letters on the issue, although the board 
maintained its original view. Charles Fahy to Roger Baldwin, 25 April 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037. For 
Riis’s comment, see R. W. Riis to Roger Baldwin, 12 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037. 
  He dismissed the comparison 
188 Roger Baldwin to Charles Fahy, 28 April 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037. 
189 Roger Baldwin to J. Warren Madden, 2 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1072. 
190 J. Warren Madden to Roger Baldwin, 7 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1072. 
191 J. Warren Madden to Roger Baldwin, 16 May 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1072. 
192 He explained: “Civil liberties as rights, for either the worker or the employer, give way to civil liberties as an 
instrument of social progress. Therefore, in supporting the law, and an order under it, which limits the right of the 
employer to express himself at the point where the exercise of that right becomes restrictive of the right of the 
worker to organize, we are not taking sides in an economic conflict, we are acting in behalf of orderly social 
advance.” Harry Ward, Dissenting Opinion in the Ford Case, 17 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
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to political speech as inapposite, because an employer “uses words in organic relationship to his 
use of coercion and violence.”  It was possible to advocate assassination without incitement to it, 
but the employer who inveighed against unions, even without direct threat or violent act, was 
using words “as part of a planned course of conduct in violation of labor’s rights and in defiance 
of the law.” If the anti-labor faction thought that Ward was acting as a partisan of labor, Ward 
thought that his detractors were acting out of a misguided desire to prove the ACLU’s 
neutrality,193 and he threatened to voice his opposition publicly in a dissenting opinion if the 
board persisted in its views.194
R. W. Riis objected to reopening discussion on what he considered to be a settled matter 
that had been more than amply discussed.
 
195  He also demurred on ideological grounds. 
Adopting what had become a familiar line, he argued that “today’s error may be tomorrow’s 
truth” and insisted that “since man first emerged from protoplasm, he has progressed in 
accordance as his thought has been free.”  Ward’s memo reduced freedom of expression to a 
political and economic instrument, he complained, and it was incompatible with the agenda of 
the ACLU.  “To say that the right to join a labor union is the greatest of all the civil rights is to 
bare a crusading partisanship for labor unions. That is right enough in its place. Its place is not 
the Civil Liberties Union.” Harold Fey, another board member, expressed similar views.  For the 
first time, he said, he was unsure whether he would remain active in the organization.196
                                                          
193 The ACLU publicized its pro-employer decisions.  See, e.g., “Employers’ Rights Defended by Union,” Civil 
Liberties Quarterly (June 1938), 3. Ward presumably had in mind press coverage skeptical of the ACLU’s 
commitment to employers’ rights, e.g., Clipping, Gadsden (Ala.)Times, 8 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 163, vol. 
2023 (“Promises of the [ACLU] that it will in future seek to protect the rights of the employer as well as the 
employee will be accepted with tongue in cheek until some tangible evidence of good intentions is produced. There 
is in this country ample room for an organization devoted to the preservation of civil liberty but the existing outfit 
has taken very little interest in the subject except as it relates to instances in which it could get a lot of publicity.”). 
   
194 Harry Ward, Dissenting Opinion in the Ford Case, 17 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1080. 
195 Letter from R. W. Riis, 14 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
196 Harold Fey to Harry Ward, 25 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 1037 (noting the ACLU’s “historic 
support of individual civil rights as against the real or imagined necessities of mass entities”).  
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Finally, at the end of the month, the Committee on Labor’s Rights recommended 
adopting Ward’s proposed statement as an addendum to the original.197  In a desperate ploy to 
preserve organizational unity, it declared that there was “no substantial difference” between the 
two statements except in “points of emphasis.”  At the following board meeting, the moderates 
agreed to delete from the first statement a paragraph pledging the ACLU to further action.  It also 
adopted the committee’s recommendation and issued Ward’s report as a supplemental statement. 
For many members of the ACLU, the statement went too far in protecting employers’ anti-union 
utterances; for many others, it was not far enough.198  For the time being, the board chose to 
gloss over fundamental differences to preserve a measure of organizational peace.199
The truce held for the summer months.
  
200 In September, the Committee on Civil Rights 
in Labor Relations took up the Muskin Shoe Company case,201
                                                          
197 Report to the Board of Directors by the Committee on Labor’s Rights, 22 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, 
vol. 1078. 
 a case involving industrial 
espionage and clear-cut discharge for union activity as well as the distribution of anti-union 
pamphlets. The board accepted the committee’s conclusion that the literature distribution was 
“so colored by the whole factual setting of employer coercion that it may properly be considered 
coercive.”  The same reasoning applied in the Mock-Judson-Voehringer Company case, in which 
198 E.g., Memorandum from W. G. Fennell for Consideration of the Board of Directors, 14 July 1938, ACLU Papers, 
reel 156, vol. 1078 (commenting that the ACLU had “adopted a viewpoint which seriously circumscribed freedom 
of speech of employers”). Notably, to the extent Fennell accepted the argument that employer speech was inherently 
coercive, he thought it particularly applicable in the context of speech by officials of government relief agencies 
regarding political issues and elections. Fennell’s persistent disagreement with the leftists on the Committee for 
Civil Rights in Labor Relations prompted Abraham Isserman to request his removal from the committee on 
technical grounds (the committee was a subcommittee of the board, and Fennell was no longer a board members).  
Abraham Isserman to Roger Baldwin, 26 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078.  The board subsequently 
adopted a resolution prohibiting membership in policy subcommittees by non-members.  Board Minutes, 8 August 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. Fennell decried the ousting as a “liberal purge.” Willliam Fennell to 
Lucille B. Milner, 19 August 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
199 Board Minutes, 27 June 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 164, vol. 2037; “Supplementary Statement on the Ford Case,” 
27 June 1938, in Alexander Meiklejohn Papers, 1880–1969, Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, Madison, Wisc. 
(hereafter Meiklejohn Papers), box 47, folder 2. 
200 In August, the ACLU circulated a collection of its policies on labor relations.  Its introductory comments 
emphasized the difficulty of resolving problems in the field. “Policies Concerning Civil Rights in Labor Relations,” 
adopted by the American Civil Liberties Union August 1938, Meiklejohn Papers, box 47, folder 2.  
201 Muskin Shoe Company, 8 N.L.R.B. 1 (1938). 
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the company distributed materials critical of the CIO.202 The ACLU stressed that the Board had 
taken the employer’s anti-union literature into account in finding an unlawful course of conduct, 
but it had not prohibited future dissemination of literature in either case.203 A public statement 
reported that the ACLU had concluded, after exhaustive study, that “no violations of employers’ 
‘rights of free speech’ [were] involved” in either case.204 When one former board member 
complained, Baldwin replied that there was no reconciling the absolutist view “that employers 
should be allowed to carry on anti-union activity until overt acts are committed and the view 
shared by most members of our Board that the test of coercion is valid.”205
Subsequent NLRB cases, however, impinged more boldly on employer speech, and the 
shaky equilibrium in the board soon began to break down.  In October, Baldwin sent Nathan 
Greene a copy of the Labor Relations Report, with a notice of a Court of Appeals decision 
refusing to enforce an NLRB order.  Superintendents of the employer, Union Pacific Stages, had 
told employees that union membership was not advantageous.  The Ninth Circuit found that 
there was no substantial evidence of discharge for union membership, and thus there was no 
adequate ground for prohibiting employer speech.
 
206
                                                          
202 Mock-Judson-Voehringer Company, 8 N.L.R.B. 133 (1938).  The American Federation of Hosiery Workers, a 
CIO union (formerly affiliated with the AFL), began an organizational drive at the plant in March 1937.  The Board 
found that the company had discharged an employee for union activity and had discouraged union activity through 
the distribution of anti-union literature (including a monthly magazine mailed to employees’ homes, as well as a 
biased document purporting to explain the Wagner Act, distributed immediately after the constitutionality of the Act 
was sustained) and through anti-union statements by supervisory employees.  Supervisors had also threatened 
organizers with physical violence.  
  “The right of workers to organize freely 
must be conceded,” the court explained. “It is a natural right of equal rank with the great right of 
203 The same report declined to propose a comment on the St. Louis Ford case because the intermediate report had 
advised only that the Board order Ford to cease and desist from interference with organizing, not specifically that it 
cease its distribution of literature.  Report to the Board of the ACLU by the Subcommittee on Civil Rights in Labor 
Relations, 9 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. The Board’s approval of the committee’s statement 
was reported in Board Minutes, 12 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. The Trial Examiner’s 
intermediate report in the St. Louis case was filed in July 1938, but the Board did not issue its final report until 1940.  
Ford Motor Company (St. Louis, Mo.), 23 N.L.R.B. 342 (1940). 
204 “Employers’ ‘Free Speech’ Not Curbed,” Civil Liberties Quarterly, September 1938. 
205 Roger Baldwin to William Fennell, 16 September 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
206 NLRB v. Union Pacific Stages, 99 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1938). 
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free speech, protected by the Constitution. But the right of the workers to organize is not 
destroyed by expressions of opinion of the employer or employees, such as referred to above.”  
Union Pacific Stages was the first federal court decision on employer speech under the NLRA, 
and Baldwin thought it warranted favorable ACLU comment.207 Greene disagreed.  He felt that 
the case involved the typical acts of employer interference and discriminatory discharge, and 
while the court had reversed the Board’s findings of facts, the NLRB had relied on them in 
formulating their order.  There was no way to predict how the Board would have construed an 
anti-union statement standing on its own, and he therefore recommended withholding 
comment.208 Despite Greene’s opinion, the board concluded that further investigation was 
warranted.209
In early cases, including Ford, employers’ clearly abusive conduct had rendered a precise 
definition of coercion unnecessary.  When the NLRB curtailed the expression of employers 
whose interference with organizing was less flagrant, the ACLU’s initial theory became less 
plausible.  Increasingly, it seemed that the Board was implementing Madden’s notion of 
employer communications to employees as coercive per se.  The Wagner Act, as NLRB member 
Edwin Smith explained, was meant to ensure “that the working population may attain a fuller life 
within the framework of the democratic state.”  In Smith’s view, that goal justified the 
occasional curtailment of existing rights. Indeed, the NLRA was “frankly predicated on the 
proposition that the employer must give up a number of important rights, in order that rights of 
his employees, which the Congress and the courts have found deserving of public protection, 
  
                                                          
207 Roger Baldwin to Nathan Greene, 4 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
208 Nathan Greene to Baldwin, 17 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078; Board Minutes, 24 October 
1938, ACLU Papers, reel 160, vol. 2002. 
209 Roger Baldwin to Nathan Greene, 18 October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078. 
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may not be impaired.”210
For the ACLU, the calculation was much more complicated.  Free speech was not simply 
one among many attributes of democracy, subject to balancing in the interest of social progress.  
Certainly, there was a time in the 1920s when such an interpretation might have been possible—
when “free speech” was a component of “civil liberties,” not its core value.   That moment, 
however, had long since passed.  The ACLU could no longer claim, like the NLRB, that a frank 
denial of free speech was necessary to counteract inequalities of bargaining power in the 
employer-employee relationship. It was left with an unstable compromise, a distinction between 
coercion and opinion that seemed bound to collapse.  For the first time, the right to speak without 
state interference was fundamentally incompatible with the best interests of labor.  The 
organization was trying to maintain its underlying commitment to the rights of labor to agitate—
to challenge the existing allocation of resources, and with it the basic social structure—while 
preserving a neutral right of expression as a political tool.  Eventually, the ACLU would have to 
choose. 
  For Smith and Madden, the abrogation of an employer’s right to 
communicate with employees was no different from the right to hire and fire at will.  Both had 
been protected by the Constitution as interpreted by the federal courts, and both were expendable 
in the interest of social progress.  
 
Ford in the Courts 
When the Supreme Court handed down its decision on the procedural issue in the Ford 
case in January 1939, the NLRB was under attack.211
                                                          
210 NLRB Release R-1082, Speech by Edwin S. Smith before American Communications Association Convention, 
23 July 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 160, vol. 2002. 
 In the 1938 Democratic primaries, anti-
211 See Gross, National Labor Relations Board, vol. 2, 5-45.  
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New Deal candidates overwhelmingly defeated Roosevelt’s supporters, and the general elections 
swept almost one hundred Republican candidates into Congress and many more into state and 
local office.  Frank Murphy, the Michigan governor whose conduct during the sit-down strikes 
had invigorated the UAW (and who would soon be appointed Attorney General212), suffered a 
stinging defeat.213
 In early 1939, a congressional coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats 
introduced a host of amendments designed to curb the authority of the NLRB. Some commanded 
considerable support. The most notable was a set of amendments proposed by Senator Walsh 
with the backing of the AFL.   Walsh’s amendments addressed such familiar concerns as the 
separate certification of craft workers.  Others more directly favored employers.  For example, 
one would have allowed an employer to call an election independently, and another provided for 
more robust judicial review.  This time, the ACLU paused to consider the issue.  Arthur Garfield 
Hays convened a committee to study quasi-judicial boards.
  
214  He agreed with the Committee on 
Civil Rights in Labor Relations that it was unadvisable to single out the NLRB for special 
requirements.  He nonetheless thought the time had come for the ACLU to make a general 
declaration of policy on the subject of procedure before government boards.215
                                                          
212 When Murphy was appointed Attorney General, Harry Bennett, no doubt concerned about federal prosecution, 
wrote to congratulate him. Harry H. Bennett to Frank Murphy, 10 January 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 5, 
entry 132, folder Murphy (Attorney General—Items about him) (“We feel that in appointing you, President 
Roosevelt has selected a man who completely comprehends the requirements of the employed and those of the 
employer, who can distinguish between the rights of Capital and the demands of Labor, who can recognize the 
justice in the claims of each, and mediate between them. You have in the past, and particularly as Governor of 
Michigan, shown a keen and ultimately fair understanding of what the separate obligations of Capital and Labor 
should be and where each should have a beginning and an ending. Regardless of what expressed opinion may have 
been, we personally have always felt that your actions were guided and prompted by a spirit of fairness and 
justice.”). 
  Hays lamented 
the growing trend toward “trial by commissions,” and he believed that citizens should have the 
213 Gross, National Labor Relations Board, vol. 2, 68-74, Fine, Murphy, vol. 2, 481–516.  In November the CIO 
reorganized as the Congress of Industrial Organizations, an independent labor organization rather than a committee. 
214 Board Minutes, 30 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
215 Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 26 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 169, vol. 2080. 
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same protections before commissions as before the courts.  Although he acknowledged the cost 
and inconvenience of modifying the existing system, he felt that “practically these commissions 
amount to a censorship on business, which is just as bad as a censorship over literature.”  
One of Senator Walsh’s suggestions demanded particular attention: a provision 
guaranteeing an employer’s right to free speech.  The free speech amendment capitalized on 
liberal disquiet over the free press cases, Union Pacific Stages, and, of course, Ford v. NLRB.  
The testimony of J. Warren Madden before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor only 
exacerbated matters.  It was clear from Madden’s testimony that the NLRB’s interpretation of 
coercive speech was far broader than that of the liberal establishment.  Madden told the 
committee than an anti-union statement made by an employer to a longstanding union, with 
which it had negotiated over time, might not constitute coercion.  On the other hand, “those same 
expressions in a situation where the union was new and timid and where you had a history of 
anti-union attitude on the part of the employer” probably would.216
                                                          
216 Testimony of J. Warren Madden, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 19 April 1939, 
ACLU Papers, reel 169, vol. 2080. 
  Ohio Senator Robert Taft, a 
Republican, pointed out that Madden’s distinction effectively meant that “you could call an 
A.F.L. union anything, but you cannot call a C.I.O. union anything”—an implication that 
Madden acknowledged but considered an irrelevant historical accident.  Madden further 
suggested that under most circumstances an employer’s accurate statement that the leaders of a 
union were communists would constitute coercion, because an employee would assume the 
organization would be ill regarded and would therefore be unlikely to join.  “The fact that it is 
true,” he insisted, “does not keep it from being coercive.” Citing labor injunctions, he argued that 
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“there is no privilege against being enjoined from telling the truth if you state it at such times or 
under such circumstances that you destroy somebody else’s rights.”217
 Unsurprisingly, the ACLU was not willing to endorse Madden’s reasoning, which 
threatened to undercut a decade of civil liberties gains.  The day after Madden testified, John 
Haynes Holmes wrote Baldwin to complain. “I see that Brother Madden, of the NLRB, is 
testifying that it is against the law for an employer to tell his employees that a Union 
representative is a Communist, even though he is a Communist,” he said.  If Madden’s 
interpretation was correct, Holmes felt that the Wagner Act should be amended to conform with 
the Bill of Rights.  If Madden was wrong, Holmes considered him unfit to continue in his 
capacity as chair of the NLRB.  Either way, he insisted, “this is business for our Board.”
  
218  And 
for the first time, the board was significantly divided on the desirability of amending the 
NLRA.219  Just over a month before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Hague v. CIO, 
Hays wrote to Lee Pressman, CIO General Counsel, for his assessment of the free speech 
amendment.  Pressman told him that the CIO was “violently opposed.”  Like Madden, Pressman 
was convinced that “mere expression” of an employer’s distaste for unionism was “tantamount 
to a threat of discharge.”220  Hays was evidently unconvinced, and he told the board that the Ford 
case had demonstrated the necessity for an amendment like the one Walsh had proposed.221
                                                          
217 The question, he suggested, was one of parity. “If there were any constitutional doctrine that people could go 
about the world speaking the truth or speaking their opinions under any and all circumstances, and regardless of its 
destructive consequences, we of course would follow it. The courts do not follow any such doctrine when they are 
protecting property or when they are protecting employers against picketing and that kind of thing.” Any other 
decision, he concluded, would amount to class discrimination. Ibid. 
   
218 John Haynes Holmes to Roger Baldwin, 20 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 169, vol. 2080. 
219 The 1938 Annual Report had still celebrated the NLRA as “in substance a civil liberties document.” ACLU, 
Eternal Vigilance, 25. 
220 Lee Pressman to Arthur Garfield Hays, 10 February 1939, reel 169, vol. 2080. The CIO had explained its position 
in an earlier pamphlet (in which it implicitly compared the proposed curtailment of the Board’s powers to 
Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization plan).  The Committee For Industrial Organization, “Why the Wagner Act 
Should NOT Be Amended,” October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078 (“[It is] useless to pretend that 
constitutional rights of free speech are being invaded. There are many kinds of speech which are unlawful. . . . 
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 The ACLU finally opposed the free speech amendment, along with the other 
amendments, as “either unnecessary or dangerous to the fundamental purpose of the act.”222  The 
organization did not, however, endorse the NLRB’s position on employer speech.  In formulating 
its position on the Wagner Act amendments, the ACLU billed its criticism of the NLRB’s order 
in the Ford case as a compromise.  The organization would not bow to the anti-NLRB hysteria, 
but neither would it defer without qualification to every NLRB decision.  In fact, the Ford case 
was a perfect opportunity to test its theory that existing limitations on the Board’s authority were 
adequate.  The ACLU would ask the NLRB to modify its order to comport with constitutional 
concerns.223
 Thus in January 1939, when the NLRB issued an order setting aside its original findings, 
Baldwin wrote to Madden to reintroduce the ACLU’s now familiar free speech concern.
 If it proved unwilling to do so, the federal courts would serve as an adequate check.   
224  A 
return letter indicated that the Board was now acting in its judicial capacity and would no longer 
consider informal communications.  The ACLU would be free, however, to file a brief setting 
forth its views.225
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Society is entitled to impose such reasonable limitations upon freedom of speech and press as may be necessary to 
its own protection. It has always done so and always will.”). 
  The ACLU board was satisfied with this option, and Hays suggested 
redrafting its letters and memoranda in brief form.  Meanwhile, in late January, the NLRB issued 
221 Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 14 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 169, vol. 2080 (arguing that the Ford case 
indicated that a free speech amendment was necessary). William Fennell also favored the free speech amendment. 
William Fennel to Osmond Fraenkel, 28 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 169, vol. 2080.  
222 ACLU Press Release, 24 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2130; Statement on Proposed Amendments to 
the NLRA, adopted by the Board on 30 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 168, vol. 2080 (“We . . . believe that the 
amendments which have been so far proposed are either dangerous to the fundamental purposes of the act or 
unnecessary for the protection of the various interested groups. Procedural requirements which may be desirable can 
be accomplished by rules of the Board.”). 
223 The Board was not unwilling to adapt in the face of public concern, even if it regarded change as unwarranted.  
For example, in June the NLRB obviated a particularly popular amendment proposal by announcing that it had 
amended its rules to permit employers to petition the Board for an election in cases where two or more bona fide 
labor organizations were claiming a majority. NLRB Press Release, 21 June 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 169, vol. 
2080. 
224 Roger Baldwin to J. Warren Madden, 9 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
225 Nathan Witt to Roger Baldwin, 20 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233.  
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a proposed order in the case.226  The new order was practically identical to the original. A Ford 
press release noted that the “Board ha[d] copied word for word the report which it previously 
withdrew, except for minor changes in the parts of the report and proposed order which 
prohibited Henry Ford and the Ford Motor Company from making statements ‘criticizing or 
disparaging’ any labor organizations, [which] were subject to severe criticism from many 
sources, including a stinging rebuke from the Civil Liberties Union.”227
 In effect, the NLRB had done precisely what Greene and Wald had advised it to do: it 
had implicitly limited its prohibition to communications that interfered with employees’ rights 
under the NLRA.  ACLU staff counsel Jerome Britchey therefore concluded that the new 
wording “cure[d] one of the defects we had in mind when we objected to the order.”
  In the earlier version, 
the Board had required Ford to cease and desist from the dissemination of anti-union views. In 
the revised order, this clause was slightly qualified; the Board prohibited the Company from 
“interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
Section 7 of the Act” by engaging in the communications it had previously proscribed 
228
 The two camps within the ACLU had never been farther apart. Greene believed the 
clarification fully addressed the ACLU’s earlier concerns and thought it “would be tragic to 
contend otherwise.”
 He noted, 
however, that the NLRB’s intention was ambiguous.  It was unclear whether the Board would 
construe mere expressions of opinion as permissible, or rather consider all anti-union 
communications to fall within the qualifying clause, as its public statements had suggested.  
229
                                                          
226 NLRB press release, 27 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
  Hays, on the other hand, thought it was time for the ACLU to take a 
more aggressive stand.  He told the board:  “I think we must take the position that an expression 
227 Ford press release, quoted in Memorandum for Mr. McCormack, 17 February 1939, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, 
box 4, vol. 2. 
228 Jerome Britchey to Arthur Garfield Hays, 20 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
229 Nathan Greene to Jerome Britchey, 6 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
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of opinion is lawful under any and all circumstances.”230 He acknowledged the difficulty in 
certain cases of distinguishing between opinion and veiled threat, but he considered that to be the 
only question for the NLRB to decide.  If the ACLU had previously suggested that expression of 
opinion could be curtailed when it was accompanied by unlawful acts, it had been mistaken.  “It 
isn’t the opinion that is unlawful,” he insisted, “it is the acts.”  Mere speech should never be 
subject to punishment or prohibition.  In response, Ward reiterated his earlier distinction between 
expression by an employer in the workplace and expression by a speaker in a public forum.  In 
his view, an employer’s words themselves were the conduct forbidden by the law.231
 The board rejected Hays’s absolutist position and, for the time being, adhered roughly to 
the parameters of its two earlier statements.  The leftists on the board sought to ensure that Hays 
would not inject his own views into the ACLU’s official communications. Although the NLRB 
had invited the ACLU to defend its views in oral argument, they refused to endorse Hays’s 
appearance.
   
232  They also insisted that a neutral party be assigned to draft the brief, and Osmond 
Fraenkel was selected for the job.  Fraenkel sought to hew as closely as possible to the 1938 
memoranda.  In April, shortly before the brief was due,233 Britchey circulated Fraenkel’s brief, 
Hays’s letter in opposition, and Ward’s comments.  “The whole problem,” he explained, “boils 
down to this: which of the two views follows more closely the position we took in the original 
Ford order.”234
                                                          
230 Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 29 March 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
   
231 Harry Ward to Roger Baldwin, 4 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
232 Nathan Witt to Jerome Britchey, 30 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. Abraham Isserman to 
Roger Baldwin, 9 March 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233 (noting the “sharp conflict of viewpoints” and 
demanding outside counsel).  Roger Baldwin to Lee Pressman, 28 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 169, vol. 2080 
(stating that the ACLU would not testify).  Hays himself had considered appearance at oral argument to be 
unnecessary. Arthur Garfield Hays to Roger Baldwin, 25 January 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
233 The ACLU was granted until April 17 to file a brief. Estelle Frankfurter to Jerome Britchey, 27 March 1939, 
ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233.  
234 Jerome Britchey to Whitney North Seymour, 6 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
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In the end, the ACLU filed its brief, signed by Fraenkel and Walter Frank, while Hays 
was abroad.235  The final version urged the NLRB to rephrase its order to forbid only those 
communications that “interfere with or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights.”  The 
brief opened by declaring the ACLU’s belief that “all groups in the community” were entitled to 
free speech, “be they powerful or weak,” employers or employees. According to Fraenkel and 
Frank, employer speech could be punished only when the speech in itself was coercive or when 
its relation to other unlawful acts produced a coercive effect.236  Although the Board’s order did 
connect the proscribed propaganda to the interference with employee rights, it did not 
specifically limit the prohibition to coercive materials, nor was it clear whether the prohibition 
would continue once the company ceased commission of other unlawful acts.237  In its most 
concrete gesture toward clarification of its position, the brief contended (citing DeJonge238
                                                          
235 Board Minutes, 10 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233; Brief on Behalf of the ACLU as Amicus 
Curiae, In the Matter of Ford Motor Company and International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, 
ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2232. 
) that 
a statement must be “in fact intimidatory” to justify curtailment consistent with constitutional 
rights, implicitly repudiating the NLRB’s assumption that employer speech was inherently 
236 ACLU Press Release, 24 April 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2130. 
237 From the perspective of protecting labor movement speech, this was an important distinction. A number of cases 
had banned even peaceful picketing by a labor union once any picketing in a given conflict had proven violent. E.g., 
Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307 (1931). These decisions, however, had been condemned by labor advocates. See 
“Note: Prior Illegal Acts as a Ground for Blanket Injunctions against Picketing,” Harvard Law Review 44 (1931): 
971–76; “Recent Case: Prior Illegal Picketing as Ground for Enjoining All Picketing Despite Anti-Injunction Act,” 
Harvard Law Review 52 (1939): 1183–84. In 1941, the Supreme Court upheld this rule.  In a case involving a state-
court injunction against picketing by a union that had acted violently, the Court held that “utterance in a contest of 
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force,” thereby losing 
its constitutional protection.  Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
Reflecting on this case in an internal memorandum, one Ford lawyer thought it plausible “that Justice Frankfurter 
was encouraged to go so far in limiting peaceful picketing because the ruling would establish a precedent which 
would sustain the Labor Board’s position on free speech.” H. D., Memorandum for Messrs. Wood and McCormack, 
13 February 1941, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 4, vol. 5. 
238 It quoted: “These rights may be abused by using speech or assembly in order to incite to violence and crime. The 
people through their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse. But the legislative intervention can find 
constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed.” Brief on 
Behalf of the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, In the Matter of Ford Motor Company and International Union, United 
Automobile Workers of America, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2232. 
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coercive.239  In concluding, however, Fraenkel and Frank once again hedged.  “There can be 
little doubt that in the setting of this particular case, distribution of anti-union literature would 
constitute an unfair labor practice so long as any of the other practices referred to in the order 
continued,” they claimed. Nonetheless, given the lapse of nearly two years since the Ford 
proceedings had begun, “it would hardly seem appropriate to bar the Ford Company from the 
distribution of non-coercive anti-union literature if its other acts of hostility toward the union had 
completely ceased.”  The ACLU announced its conclusion in the same press release in which it 
stated its continued opposition to amendment of the NLRA.240  The brief’s timid chastisement of 
the NLRB was enough for the New York Times to proclaim, “Liberties Union Again Aids 
Ford.”241
Fraenkel’s and Frank’s brief was the last ACLU statement on the matter until the NLRB 
issued its final order in the fall.  In the meantime, the Ford Motor Company refined its strategy 
for the case.  In March 1939, Ford’s attorneys filed a motion to reopen the record and introduce 
additional evidence, but their motion was denied.  In April, when the ACLU submitted its amicus 
brief, Ford submitted a brief of its own.  Ford continued to pursue its arguments about sit-down 
strikes and the partiality of the NLRB, but it focused on free speech.   
  
In various memoranda and draft briefs, Ford’s attorneys assembled a mass of case law 
and legislative history in support of its position.242
                                                          
239 They explained: “A suggestion lurks in the new provision that all propaganda ‘disparaging or criticizing’ labor 
organizations amounts to interference or coercion. If such influence represents the intention of the Board, then we 
are, in effect, back where we started from. . . . While we recognize that anti-union statements of employers are 
generally part of a campaign of intimidation, we cannot concede that they must necessarily be so and, unless they 
are in fact intimidatory, they cannot under our Constitution be prohibited.” Ibid. 
 Their primary obstacle in this department 
240 As ACLU attorney, it fell on Hays to relay the ACLU’s comments and request their insertion in the record. He 
noted in his correspondence that the ACLU was not a partisan of labor.  Arthur Garfield Hays to Hon. Elbert D. 
Thomas, 1 May 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 169, vol. 2080. 
241 “Liberties Union Again Aids Ford,” New York Times, 24 April 1939. 
242 E.g., P. B., “Memorandum: Ford Cases, Free Speech,” 10 January 1939, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 3, vol. 
3 (discussing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove, 221 U.S. 418 (1911), and Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company v. 
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was, appropriately enough, the body of pro-industry labor injunction cases that had plagued labor 
for so many years.243  Notably, they did not assume that pre-1937 cases hostile to labor speech 
and picketing had been overruled. Rather, they sought to distinguish these cases or fit them to the 
facts of the Ford case. One memorandum, for example, concluded that advice was 
constitutionally protected as long as the speaker did not interfere with the hearer’s “free right to 
choose” whether to comply, a test with obvious limiting implications for employer speech.  
Ford’s attorneys also worried about the question of corporate personhood, which the ACLU 
seems never to have considered.244  The most immediate cause for concern was Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone’s opinion in the Hague case, in which Justice Stone had assumed (citing 
Northwestern Life Insurance v. Riggs and Western Turf Association v. Greenberg) that the 
ACLU could not be “said to be deprived of the civil right of freedom of speech and of assembly, 
for the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial 
persons.”245
In all of its internal documents and in its communications to the NLRB, Ford quoted 
frequently and fervently from the free speech decisions that the ACLU had fought so hard to 
promote and defend.  One memorandum declared that “the nearest approximation to truth is 
arrived at by the clashing against each other of rival theories.”  It then explained that employers 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930), and noting that while the Railway Labor Act 
of 1926 had prohibited speech exerting an “influence” on organizer, the NLRA had substituted the word “restraint”); 
P. B., “Memorandum on Free Speech,” 11 June 1939, Ford Legal Papers, box 3, vol. 3 (articulating free choice test 
and noting that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937), 
implied that the right to inform the public of an ongoing strike was protected. 
243 E.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921) (holding mass picketing 
coercive). 
244 P. B., “Freedom of Speech and Corporations,” 13 June 1939, Ford Legal Papers, box 3, vol. 3, Memoranda of 
Law from Nov. 1, 1938 to Dec. 31, 1939.  
245 A Ford attorney thought Hague was distinguishable because it involved the Civil Rights Act of 1871. This view 
found support in Grosjean, in which the Court upheld a constitutional challenge of Louisiana’s tax law by 
newspaper corporations.  P. B., “Freedom of Speech and Corporations,” 13 June 1939, Ford Legal Papers, box 3, 
vol. 3.  See also P. B., Memorandum for Mr. Wood, “Freedom of Speech in Corporations,” 11 August 1939, Ford 
Legal papers, acc. 897, box 3, vol. 3. 
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were the most motivated to formulate arguments against organized labor, and they consequently 
made the “most effective cross-examiners of the proponents of labor unions.”  To prevent the 
expression of their opinions would be to impoverish the marketplace of ideas.246
 After several months of deliberation, the NLRB issued its final order in the Ford case in 
August 1939.  In it, the Board eliminated its earlier finding that Ford Motor Company had 
“deliberately planned and carried out” the Battle of the Overpass to crush unionization in the 
plant.  On the free speech issue, however, the new order was virtually unchanged from the 
January order or the original of December 1937.
  
247  In a press release, the NLRB noted public 
concerns about employer free speech but explained that the company’s circulation of literature 
had to be considered in context.248
                                                          
246 P. B., “Memorandum: Ford Cases, Free Speech,” 10 January 1939, Ford Legal papers, acc. 897, box 3, vol. 3. 
 “Coming at a time when the U.A.W. was conducting a drive 
to organize the respondent’s employees,” the Board concluded, “the publications had the 
unmistakable purpose and effect of warning employees that they should refrain from joining the 
union.” Ford’s statements denounced labor organizations and characterized their leaders as liars 
and racketeers.  Under the circumstances, they were not “directed to the reason of the employee.” 
On the contrary, “no employee could fail to understand that if he disregarded the warning he 
might find himself in difficulties with his employer.”  The publications signaled to employees 
that joining a union likely would result in discrimination or discharge, and at the least would lead 
the employer to regard them as gullible and foolish.  “The employees could not fail to believe 
that in matters of promotion or selection of men for lay-offs, such an opinion would have 
weight.” 
247 The only difference was a tense change that was generally agreed to be irrelevant. Osmond Fraenkel to Jerome 
Britchey, 18 August 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
248 NLRB Press Release, 11 August 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
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 Responses to the decision within the ACLU fell along predictable lines,249 though an air 
of resignation had settled on both camps.  Green assumed that “those who quarreled with the 
proposed order [would] quarrel with this one,” and he also predicted a strong attack in the 
courts.250  Fraenkel thought the Board’s contextualization of Ford’s literature distribution took 
the “sting out of our objection” by clarifying that the Board was concerned only with 
communications that were coercive in intent and effect.251  The Committee on Civil Rights in 
Labor Relations voted not to object to confirmation of the order in the Sixth Circuit and 
authorized Fraenkel to prepare a report to distribute to the press.252
The draft report recounted the ACLU’s earlier suggestion that the Board rephrase its 
order to bar only employer statements that operated to deprive employees of their rights. 
Although the Board had not adopted the ACLU’s recommendation, it had indicated its intention 
to interpret the language of the order to apply only to coercive speech.
  
253 That was good enough 
to render the order consistent with the Constitution.  The report concluded by stating that if Ford 
had “faithfully obeyed the provisions of the order and complied with the spirit of the National 
Labor Relations Act, it, like any other employer, should remain free to state to its employees its 
opinion concerning labor unions or any other relevant subjects.”254
                                                          
249 E.g., R. W. Riis to Theodore Irwin, 8 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233 (“I object permanently to 
the Union releasing a statement saying that indications are that a certain Government order will probably not 
interfere with free speech as long as . . . etc. etc. Our job is to be jealous for free speech, not apologetic for the Labor 
Board.”).  
  With that proviso, the ACLU 
board voted to adopt the committee’s report, over John Haynes Holmes’s dissent. Much of the 
250 Nathan Greene to Jerome Britchey, 19 August 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
251 Osmond Fraenkel to Jerome Britchey, 18 August 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
252 Jerome Britchey to Board, 12 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
253 The NLRB had stated that the issue in the Ford case was “whether, under the circumstances of this case, the 
respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights of self-organization 
by distributing to its employees literature criticizing and disparaging labor organizations.” Ford Motor Company 
(Highland Park and Dearborn, Mich.), 14 N.L.R.B. 346, 377 (1939). 
254 Report of Committee on Civil Rights in Labor Relations with Regard to the Ford Case, Adopted by the Board of 
Directors, 16 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2130. 
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discussion centered on the statement that the ACLU would “vigorously protest” and offer to 
come to Ford’s assistance if the Board attempted to punish the company for non-coercive 
expression, a statement that the labor contingent thought superfluous255 and the absolutists 
considered empty verbiage.256 The board ultimately struck it out,257 but a promise to scrutinize 
all efforts by the NLRB to enforce its order stayed in.  At the end of the month, the ACLU 
released a public statement explaining its position and its decision not to a file a brief.258
 Meanwhile, the NLRB once again filed for enforcement of its order in the Sixth 
Circuit.
 
259 In response, Ford made all the familiar arguments: the Trial Examiner was biased, 
partisan, and abusive, thereby depriving Ford of a full and fair hearing; the Board erroneously 
failed to consider the facts and circumstances leading up to the May 26 clash; the 
decisionmaking process was procedurally flawed; and the Board’s findings of facts were 
insufficient to support its order and unsupported by the evidence.260
                                                          
255 Abraham Isserman to Jerome Britchey, 7 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233 (claiming the 
statement indicated suspicion “which negates our finding that there is no further reason for criticism”); R.W. Riis to 
Jerome Britchey, 5 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
  It also fully briefed its First 
Amendment argument—namely, that the limitations imposed by the Board on the Ford 
Company’s right to distribute anti-union literature were not authorized by the NLRA, and that 
the act, if construed to permit them, would violate the First Amendment.   
256 “The promise that the Union will vigorously come to the support of Mr. Ford in the future doesn’t mean a thing 
except that it is evidence that we are feeling somewhat uneasy in the whole situation.” R. W. Riis to Jerome 
Britchey, 5 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
257 Board Minutes, 16 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
258 ACLU Press Release, 22 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 176, vol. 2130. 
259 Ford filed a cross-petition to set aside the order, as well as collateral motions to compel the Board to answer its 
allegations, to direct the Board to supplement the record, and to file additional parts of the record, together with a 
petition for a commission to take depositions of various officers and employees of the Board in respect to the 
practice by which decision was reached.  The petition was denied on the grounds that it fell within the court’s earlier 
decision, affirmed by the Supreme Court.  The motions were not disposed of by the Sixth Circuit until its final 
decision in the case.    
260 Brief for Respondent, NLRB v. Ford Motor Company, Sixth Circuit, October Term 1939 (2 April 1940), Ford 
Legal Papers, acc 51, box 4 (hereafter Respondents’ Sixth Circuit brief). 
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Ford rejected the NLRB’s contention that the introductory clause in its order prohibiting 
literature distribution satisfied constitutional requirements.  It argued that the proposed 
construction was inconsistent with the rules of interpretation and with the Board’s public 
position that anti-union communications from employers to employees were coercive on their 
own terms.261 Moreover, Ford argued that the general climate at the River Rouge plant was not 
in fact coercive. Only eight of the employees purportedly discharged for union activities were 
there at the time the literature was circulated, and there was no evidence that their discharges or 
the reasons for them were widely known in the plant. “To give the literature circulated by 
respondent—not in itself of an intimidatory or coercive nature—the character of intimidation and 
coercion because of the effect on the readers’ minds of extraneous facts, it must be shown that 
those facts were known to the readers. There is no such showing.”262
According to Ford, suppression of an employer’s opinion as to the merits of unionization 
was never contemplated by the NLRA.  In discussing the bill, Senator Walsh had stated that 
nothing in the act would prevent an employer from expressing anti-union sentiments.
  
263  Ford’s 
lawyers made much of international events, of “current history in other countries,” which pointed 
to the importance of the vigorous protection of First Amendment principles.264
                                                          
261 Ibid (citing Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings on Bills to amend the NLRA (76th Cong., 1st 
session), 155, 171–72). 
 “It is not difficult 
to prophesy,” they declared ominously, “that if ever, at some unhappy time in the future, citizens 
of this country are prosecuted for expressing beliefs contrary to those held by the government of 
the day, the leaders of that government will seek to justify themselves by the very statement 
262 Ibid., 39–40.  
263 He explained that the decision to replace the word “influence,” used in the Railway Labor Act, with stronger 
language of interference and coercion was meant to address precisely this situation.  Walsh gave the examples of 
“posting a notice, or writing that he thinks their best interest is to form a company union, that is violently opposed to 
so-and-so who is attempting to organize a union.” Ibid.  
264 Ibid., 46. 
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which the Board has made.”265 “There are no qualifications whatever to the provisions of the 
First Amendment,” they emphasized, in language that would have bewildered labor lawyers two 
decades earlier.  Citing Lovell v. City of Griffin and Schneider v. New Jersey, they celebrated the 
important place of pamphleteering in American history and culture, a practice that the Supreme 
Court had declared “vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”266
 The Board, in turn, found itself in the unlikely situation of defending the curtailment of 
free speech by relying on the cases that had haunted labor for generations.  It invoked the “verbal 
act” cases in the Schenck line, as well as Gompers v. Bucks Stove.
 The Board’s order, 
they cautioned, amounted to a prior restraint on utterance and threatened the heart of the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech. 
267  In arguing that freedom of 
speech for employers should be no greater than that afforded employees, they risked 
undercutting the tremendous gains secured for labor speech in the past decade.  Ford’s attorneys 
appreciated the irony. “It is generally admitted that those cases went too far in restraining 
legitimate union activities,” they reasoned, “and it is surprising to find the Board arguing, in 
effect, that past injustices to unions should now be matched by corresponding injustices to 
employers.”268
                                                          
265 Ibid., 46–47. 
 They pointed to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Senn v. Tile Layers 
Protective Union, the first in an unfolding line of cases reversing the earlier judicial 
understanding.  Earlier courts had resisted legislative efforts to protect labor speech, enjoining 
pickets and boycotts and trampling on the First Amendment in the process. Now, Ford was 
266 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939). 
267 Ford sought to distinguish the many cases introduced by the Board in which anti-union communications were 
enjoined.  Many of them were under the Railway Labor Act and, according to Ford, all involved something more 
than “mere distribution of statements.”  Those cases arising under the NLRA had largely involved threats, they 
claimed. Respondents’ Sixth Circuit Brief, 44.  
268 Ibid., 48.  
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asking the court to undercut legislative protection for labor once again, only this time by 
invoking free speech.   
The irony must have been as distressing and confusing to labor advocates as it was to the 
ACLU.  The reversal of opinions in these cases is, of course, standard fare for legal argument. It 
is a neat corollary to the ACLU’s own appropriation of constitutional language at the outset of 
World War I, at a time when individual rights and personal liberty were watchwords of labor’s 
oppression.  In the Ford case, however, the shift in positions indicated something more than the 
malleability of lawyers. It reflected a fundamental realignment in the relationship of various 
American constituencies to the courts, the Constitution, and the state.  
 
The Communist Purge 
 In its statement on the NLRB’s revised order in the Ford case, the ACLU had only 
forestalled the inevitable.  Within a matter of months, the temporary calm within the organization 
erupted into full-fledged crisis, culminating in the expulsion of Communists from the ACLU’s 
board of directors and the resignations of Harry Ward and many other longstanding leaders and 
members of the ACLU.    
The controversy over employer free speech was crucial to the conflict, though it was not 
the only source.  The Soviet-Nazi pact, and the corresponding deterioration in relations between 
American Communists and their liberal allies, was a crushing blow to many Soviet sympathizers, 
including Roger Baldwin.  In the wake of the agreement, the board’s centrists became 
increasingly suspicious of Communist influence.269
                                                          
269 “Statement for the Press by the ACLU To Accompany Announcement of Resolution Adopted on February 5, 
1940,” Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3 (claiming that the impetus for the new resolution was the 
“direction of the Communist international movement”—namely, its “abandonment  of the struggle against 
  In addition, the board divided over the 
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House Committee Investigating Un-American Activities, chaired by Representative Martin Dies, 
Jr., a Texas Democrat.  The Dies Committee was directed toward foreign subversive activity in 
the United States, including Nazi propaganda, but in practice it focused on alleged Communist 
collaboration (including the CIO’s and the NLRB’s), prompting a wave of anti-Communist 
hysteria and passage of the Smith Act, the nation’s first peacetime sedition law.  The Dies 
Committee was in the process of scrutinizing many members of the ACLU board, along with the 
Popular Front organizations to which they belonged.  The most notable victim was Harry Ward, 
who was serving concurrently as chair of the American League of Peace and Democracy; after 
he testified before the Dies Committee on behalf of the American League, many members of the 
ACLU’s leadership demanded his resignation.  Among them was Norman Thomas, who charged 
in The Call that Ward was one of “six or seven Communists or fellow travelers” on the ACLU 
board and cautioned that “men and women of ordinary common sense should not entrust the 
defense of civil liberties in America to those who condone or fail to denounce Stalin’s purges 
and his crimes against decency and humanity.”270
On the other side, the leftists accused Morris Ernst and Arthur Garfield Hays, among 
others, of striking a deal with Martin Dies to forestall an investigation of the ACLU (and, in 
Ernst’s case, the National Lawyers Guild as well).
   
271
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Fascism”—since the Soviet-Nazi pact). Critics responded that the Soviet Union’s policy toward civil liberties had 
not changed—that it was just as bad before the Nazi-Soviet pact as after. Open letter to Roger Baldwin, 16 March 
1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 11.  During her expulsion proceedings, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn claimed that the 
Communist Party had not altered its position on civil liberties in America since the pact, and had in fact been 
compelled to fight all the harder for civil liberties.” Expulsion Proceedings, 127, May 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, 
folder 2. Baldwin, however, believed that “after the Nazi-Soviet pact Communist policy underwent a sharp change 
internationally, and here—in abandoning the united front for democracy, the fight against Fascism, and in launching 
a crusade against ‘the enemies in London, Paris and Washington.’” Roger Baldwin to John Frank, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, 10 June 1940, ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 8.  He added, “All of us became uneasy over 
what the shifts in policy under Soviet dictation might do—and no Communist on our Board would have been free or 
could in any way conflict with that policy.” 
  In October, Dies publicly absolved the 
270 Norman Thomas, “Your World and Mine,” Call, 16 December 1939, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 6. 
271 Ernst was allegedly motivated by his political aspirations.  During the late 1930s, he developed a close personal 
and political relationship with the President (as well as Eleanor Roosevelt, who joined the ACLU in 1950). See, e.g., 
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ACLU of Communist collaboration; whether he received anything in turn was the subject of 
intense speculation for decades.272  Certainly, the ACLU board’s official criticism of the Dies 
Committee was half-hearted and equivocal.  What the moderates considered “pragmatic 
liberalism” or “political realism,” the radicals denounced as hypocrisy.273
 After months of mounting tension at ACLU board meetings—depending on who was 
present, slim majorities would alternately pass and rescind anti-Communist statements
  
274—the 
board passed (and the National Committee approved) its notorious “1940 Resolution” in 
February.275  The resolution affirmed that the ACLU would “defend[] the right to hold and utter 
any opinions” and would not disqualify general members on the basis of “political or economic 
questions.”276
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Ernst, 29 December 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President’s Personal File 2841, 
Ernest [sic], Morris L., 1935–1941 (“Even though I have seen you since the election, I still want to send you this 
little note to tell you again how grateful I am to you and Mrs. Ernst for all that you did during the campaign. I 
appreciate always your fine loyalty and cooperation in helping whenever and wherever needed, and you did a grand 
job.”); John Haynes Holmes to Eleanor Roosevelt, 21 February 1950, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, 1942–1952, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Amer. 
Assoc–Amer. Heritage, Box 1522. Ernst reported on political rumors and important developments in the United 
States and abroad (for example, he may have been the first person to make Roosevelt aware of the Beveridge 
report).  He also recommended proposals of his own, ranging from mandatory reporting of union financial 
operations to annual employment contracts.  The President routinely considered and occasionally acted on Ernst’s 
suggestions. Grace G. Tully, Private Secretary, to Morris Ernst, 12 December 1942, Ernst Papers, box 97, folder 2 
(Beveridge Report); Memorandum for the Secretary of Labor, 22 November 1941, President’s Personal File 2841, 
Ernest [sic], Morris L., 1935–1941 (disclosure); Morris Ernst to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 8 November 1944, Ernst 
papers, box 98, folder 3  (annual employment). 
  For the governing committees and staff, however, it established a “test of 
consistency in the defense of civil liberties in all aspects and all places,” and it presumed that the 
requisite consistency was “inevitably comprised by persons who . . . justify or tolerate the denial 
272 In 1970, the ACLU undertook a study of the 1939–40 events and investigated the charges that Ernst had 
promised to remove the Communists.  
273 E.g., Gardner Jackson to Florence H. Luscomb, Civil Liberties Committee of Massachusetts, 21 December 1939, 
Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3, box 3, folder American Civil Liberties Union. 
274 Walker, American Liberties, 130–32. 
275 The 1970 investigation by the ACLU concluded that the resolution was written by Morris Ernst. Second Report, 
ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 11.  
276 A pamphlet on the resolution claimed that the defense of the rights of Communists was the “acid test of fidelity 
to civil liberty, because they are the minority most detested and attacked.” The board rationalized that it could do a 
“far better job” defending Communists if its own allegiance was not subject to question. ACLU, “Statement to 
Members and Friends regarding the February 5th Resolution, 9, May 1940, Jackson Papers, General 
Correspondence, cont. 3 (hereafter ACLU, “Statement to Members”).  
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of civil liberties by dictatorship abroad.” It therefore excluded from leadership positions any 
member of a political organization “which supports totalitarian dictatorship in any country” or 
any person who publicly indicated “support of such a principle.”277 In justifying the new 
measure, the board cited internal criticism of Communist influence, which had prompted several 
resignations during the fall of 1939.278  The resolution was an effort to “create greater harmony” 
by clarifying existing ACLU policy.279
 Despite the board’s ambition, the members and supporters of the ACLU immediately 
erupted into bitter debate.  In a move welcomed by the resolution’s authors, Harry Ward—
lamenting that “the Civil Liberties Union which did this is not the Civil Liberties Union with 
which I have been glad to work for twenty years”—resigned as chair.
     
280 Seventeen prominent 
liberals, eight of whom were not members of the organization, demanded in an open letter that 
ACLU “restore civil liberties” by rescinding the resolution.281
                                                          
277 Resolution Adopted by the Board of Directors and National Committee, 5 February 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, 
folder 6. 
 More than thirty members 
resigned, while others joined or made contributions. The most active local committees 
278 John Dos Passos had resigned from the National Committee and Margaret DeSilver from the Board of directors.  
279 ACLU, “Statement to Members.” The board insisted that the resolution was consistent with the original policy of 
the ACLU, and it noted that members of a local committee who had been discovered to belong to the Ku Klux Klan 
had been removed, as had a vice-chairman of a local committee who supported an antisemitic gubernatorial 
candidate in Kansas. Ibid. In a press statement, the ACLU claimed never to have “originally elected” any member to 
its Board of Directors or National Committee whose unqualified support for civil liberties was questionable. This 
included members of the Communist Party; according to the statement, two members of the National Committee had 
joined the Party only after their election.  “Statement for the Press by the ACLU To Accompany Announcement of 
Resolution Adopted on February 5, 1940,” Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3.  Critics emphasized 
that the claim to consistency was belied by the board’s past statements.  See, e.g., New Jersey Civil Liberties Union 
Opinion, Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3.  
280 Harry Ward to National Committee and Board of Directors, 4 March 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 4. 
281 I.F. Stone, Press Release, 18 March 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 4. The signers included Former 
Representative John T. Bernard, Professor Frank Boaz, Howard Costigan, Gardner Jackson, and Theodore Dreiser.  
Many similar letters were circulated. E.g., Frank Boaz, Robert S. Lynd, and I.F. Stone to Friends, 1 March 1940, 
Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3; Alexander Meiklejohn to Board of Directors, 15 February 1940, 
Meiklejohn Papers, box 4, folder 4 (“The Union has changed its policy at the most vital point in its program. It has 
shown that it cannot itself take the medicine which, for twenty years, it has been prescribing for others.”).  
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condemned the resolution or considered it unnecessary; only one approved.282  As for the 
ACLU’s broader audience, the Union insisted that the decision was not a concession to outside 
pressure.  There was not, it claimed, “the slightest desire to become ‘respectable’ to 
conservatives.”283 Still, there was “no question but that the Union ha[d] been greatly 
strengthened in public opinion by this action,” as the “unanimous and strongly worded approval 
of newspapers in editorial comment throughout the country” (the radical press excepted) had 
clearly revealed.284 Opponents of the resolution could not help but notice an April memorandum 
from the chair of the ACLU’s Membership Advisory Committee: “This seems the ideal time to 
promote our old plan to increase the membership of the Union. The organization has never been 
more highly regarded by the press and public than now, and a determined effort will bring us 
declared adherents in larger numbers and contributions in larger volume than at any period in our 
twenty years.”285
 If the February resolution was contentious, the board’s enforcement of its terms—its 
expulsion of its one openly Communist member—was a declaration of war.
  
286
                                                          
282 See, e.g., Statement of the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 4 (“[I]t is most 
valuable and indeed essential that for the most effective support of this principle the widest possible representation 
of political, economic, religious and racial viewpoints is desirable on the governing committees and staff of the 
ACLU—as has been the case in the past.”).  Gardner Jackson, chair of the ACLU’s Washington committee, 
reportedly advised members to resign from the ACLU if the resolution was not rescinded. Roger Baldwin to 
Gardner Jackson, 14 February 1940, Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3. 
 Elizabeth Gurley 
Flynn was a founding member of the ACLU.  As she angrily reminded the board, she had been a 
283 Ibid., 14. The ACLU sent a slew of letters to journals in response to articles and editorials suggesting that the 
expulsion was intended to make the organization “respectable,” insisting that ACLU policy had not changed. E.g., 
Baldwin to Johnson City (Tenn.) Chronicle, 11 April 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 5. 
284 There were thirty-two local committees at the time, but most were inactive and declined to express a view. 
285 B. W. Huebsch to Fellow Directors, 19 April 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 6. The ACLU in fact received a 
number of contributions from anti-Communists after the resolution. E.g., Morrie Ryskind to Roger Baldwin, 4 
March 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 14 (“I’m sending ten dollars herewith as a thanks-offering for the ousting 
of Dr. Harry F. Ward and the other Communists from the ACLU. . . . I think when I get back to Hollywood, I can 
again enlist a lot of people who have been worried by the presence of the Commies.”). 
286 On the Flynn expulsion, see Corliss Lamont, ed., The Trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (New York: Horizon Press, 1968); Burt Neuborne, “Of Pragmatism and Principle: A Second Look 
at the Expulsion of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn from the ACLU’s Board of Directors,” Tulsa Law Review 41 (2006): 
799–815; Walker, American Liberties, 132–33; Kutulas, Modern Liberalism, 75–81 (discussing personal as well as 
political considerations, including Flynn’s intimate relationships with Baldwin and prominent donors).  
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“consistent military fighter” for civil liberties ever since her IWW days and the Spokane free 
speech fight.  For almost three decades, she had argued unflinchingly for the rights of dissenters; 
during that period, the organization’s conservatives had never once “been in jail for free 
speech.”287
Until the mid-1930s, Flynn had difficulty finding a political home. She had belonged 
briefly to the Socialist Party and to the Workers Party, but she professed quarrels with their 
platforms. In 1934, when asked what party “most clearly represent[d her] political and economic 
beliefs,” she gave two answers: the I.W.W. and the American Communist Party, “not controlled 
by Stalin.”
 
288  Despite her reservations about a policy dictated by Moscow, she joined the 
Communist Party in February 1937, and in the summer of 1938, she became a member of its 
National Committee.289
Flynn was vehemently opposed to the board’s new policy, and after its passage, she 
refused to resign. In the New Masses, she echoed Ward’s view that the ACLU had changed.  She 
described a “steady infiltration of new elements”—including lawyers, businessmen, and 
ministers, “but not a single representative of organized labor”—“wealthy people” who were 
“actually out of sympathy with the traditional position of the ACLU.”  Flynn thought the attack 
on the Communists was symptomatic of an “anti-labor, anti-union attitude.” It was entirely in 
keeping with “the Union’s constant sniping at the labor Relations Board,” its opposition to the 
sit-down strike, and “its persistent and unsolicited defense of Henry Ford’s ‘right of free 
  She was nonetheless reelected to the ACLU board in 1939, after 
inquiring whether there was any objection to her membership in the Communist Party.  
According to the board, those were different times.  
                                                          
287 Reply of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn to Charges Filed by Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 1. 
288 Flynn’s response to survey of 18 April 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 105, vol. 678. To clarify, she noted at the 
bottom of the survey: “I am not a liberal; nor a radical (tired, retired or otherwise). I hope I am a revolutionist.”   
289 Transcript of proceedings, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 2, 95, 110.  
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speech.’”290 Flynn dismissed as “metaphysic[al]” her critics’ contention that she believed in civil 
liberties not “in a vacuum of pristine purity, but as a means to an end.” In Flynn’s view, it was 
precisely those members who were “must pure in their own estimation on the abstractions” who 
were most willing to compromise on the “practical issues, especially where labor is 
concerned.”291
On May 7, 1940 (the proceeding was postponed several weeks in light of the death of 
Flynn’s only son), the ACLU’s board of directors convened proceedings to expel Flynn from its 
governing body.  The controversy, the anti-Communists openly conceded, was not about Flynn. 
No one questioned her personal loyalty to the civil liberties cause.  Rather, she was a “symbol” 
of a struggle to define the Union’s “whole attitude toward collaboration with Communists in 
defense of civil liberties, both inside and outside the Union.”
 
292  At 2:20 in the morning, after 
hours of debate over procedural matters, organizational politics, and the principles of free 
speech, the board voted. Nine members (including Morris Ernst, Elmer Rice, and R. W. Riis) 
favored expulsion; nine members (including Osmond Fraenkel and Arthur Garfield Hays, in 
addition to the committed leftists) opposed.293  John Haynes Holmes, as chair, broke the tie in 
favor of removal.294
                                                          
290 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Clipping, New Masses, 19 March 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 6. See also 
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Clipping, “I am Expelled from Civil Liberties!” Daily Worker, 17 March 1940, ACLU 
Papers, box 74, folder 6 (“Time was, when the ACLU was young, they were Anarchists, Socialists, Christian 
pacifists, trade unionists, IWW, Quaker, Irish Republican and Communist! Today, they are no longer heretics, non-
conformists, radicals—they are respectable. They cooperate with the Department of Justice; they play with Mr. Dies 
for a whitewash. . . . Today they are not defending Communists or unions. They are defending ‘employers’ rights!”). 
  
291 Reply of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn to Charges Filed by Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 1. 
292 ACLU, “Statement to Members,” 9.  Cf. Arthur Garfield Hays, Transcript of proceedings, ACLU Papers, box 74, 
folder 2, 156 (“I think the record ought to show that, of all the people of the so-called ‘left’ group, Elizabeth Flynn 
has done less to impede the progress of work; she hasn’t made long talks [or] interrupted proceedings.”). 
293 Hays did not vote on the original resolution because he did not want to create a test equivalent to teachers’ oaths. 
Arthur Garfield Hays to ACLU, 20 February 1940, ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 2. Norman Thomas, who was not 
at the meeting, thought that the board should wait for Flynn to resign. Norman Thomas to John Haynes Holmes, 22 
March 1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 3. 
294 The National Committee voted to approve Flynn’s removal, 27 to 12. ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 4. 
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Much has been made of the intemperance of the ACLU’s purge—its inexplicable 
curtailment of dissent and presumed capitulation to popular pressures in a period when 
Communists were most in need of the organization’s support. In fact, Flynn’s expulsion was 
regarded as such a black mark in ACLU history that in 1976 the organization posthumously 
restored her membership.  Baldwin, however, consistently defended the board’s decision. 
Throughout his life, he argued that decisive action had been necessary to prevent the 
Communists and fellow travelers within the board from standing in the way of the ACLU’s 
commitment to free speech.  He claimed in public statements and private letters that the new 
policy was merely an affirmation of the organization’s commitment to civil liberties as an 
independent principle rather than a tool.   
Historians and ACLU insiders have long assumed that Baldwin’s defense was 
disingenuous—that he was in fact concerned with the organization’s appearances, the Dies 
Committee, fundraising efforts, the investigations and aspersions of red baiters, and other 
seemingly petty concerns. However valid such criticisms may be, the crisis within the board 
needs to be understood against the backdrop of conflict over employer free speech and the 
NLRB.  In correspondence with Alexander Meiklejohn, who staunchly opposed the resolution 
and considered resigning over it, Baldwin explained that the board was at an impasse; expressly 
excluding Communists was “an unhappy way out of a bad mess.”295
                                                          
295 Roger Baldwin to Alexander Meiklejohn, 13 February 1940, Meiklejohn Papers, box 4, folder 4. In a subsequent 
letter also signed by George P. West and Edward L. Parsons, Meiklejohn speculated that “bad feelings between 
factions, with the factor of personalities playing its part, [was] at the bottom of this deplorable situation.” George P. 
West, Alexander Meiklejohn, and Edward L. Parsons to National Committee and Board of Directors, 21 March 
1940, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 4. In 1942, Meiklejohn told Baldwin that he had been tempted to resign ever 
since the resolution but had not done so for fear of harming the civil liberties cause. Alexander Meiklejohn to Roger 
Baldwin, 20 January 1942, Meiklejohn Papers, box 1, folder 21.  
 John Haynes Holmes was 
even more adamant. The board had been paralyzed for months by a “militant minority,” he 
explained.  The resolution was painful; it was difficult to “live[] up to the full dictates of the civil 
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liberties principle” at the expense of “good friends.”  Circumstances, however, had left the board 
with no choice.296 “For the first time in our history, we discover those among us no longer 
believing in full civil liberties,” he complained. “They have themselves become so hysterical that 
they are actually insisting that they can and should remain associated with us when they are no 
longer primarily interested in our work—nay worse, are moved consciously or unconsciously to 
oppose it, to block it, and to defeat it from within.”297
The conventional understanding of the 1940 events is based on the modern understanding 
of civil liberties as the freedom from state curtailment of expression.  Historians immersed in 
modern liberal culture have interpreted the board’s action as a prelude to McCarthyism, an 
abandonment of the ideal of protection for all expression, no matter how distasteful.
  
298
Ford v. NLRB is an important corrective to this well-worn story. Above all, the expulsion 
of communists needs to be understood as a fundamental shift in the underlying objectives of the 
ACLU—not from the defense of all to the defense of some, as critics have long charged, but 
  They 
have rejected Baldwin’s explanation that the move was primarily organizational and that the 
ACLU remained fully committed to the defense of Communist speech. They have presumed, in 
short, that it was the conservatives on the board who rejected a robust construction of free 
speech.  
                                                          
296 Cf. John Haynes Holmes to A. F. Whitney, Brotherhood of Railroad Train-men, 26 August 1940, ACLU Papers, 
box 75, folder 1 (“If we were to transact any business at all, we had to exorcise this ghost—get rid of this political 
controversy.”). The plan evidently worked. By the end of April, Holmes reported that the resolution had “brought 
infinite relief to both sides in the controversy,” and the board had been “functioning at all of its meetings with ease, 
speed, efficiency and fine cooperation all around.”  John Haynes Holmes to Alexander Meiklejohn, 26 April 1940, 
Meiklejohn Papers, box 16, folder 37. When Abraham Isserman’s membership term expired, he was asked whether 
he was in compliance with the resolution. He did not reply, and he was not re-nominated. Roger Baldwin to 
Alexander Meiklejohn, 21 February 1941, Meiklejohn Papers, box 4, folder 4. 
297 John Haynes Holmes to Alexander Meiklejohn, 23 February 1940, Meiklejohn Papers, box 16, folder 37; see also 
John Haynes Holmes to Alexander Meiklejohn, 13 March 1940, Meiklejohn Papers, box 16, folder 37 (“I could tell 
you some things being done by the minority members of our Board today, in reaction upon our Resolution, which 
would amaze you, and I think disgust you. If what is being reported to me is true, we are up against sabotage of the 
worst description.”). 
298 See Kutulas, Modern Liberalism, 79 (recounting and echoing criticism by Richard Steele, Samuel Walker, and 
Brian Wright of the ACLU’s purported departure from the principle of free speech for everyone). 
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from the complicated calculus of the “right of agitation” to a streamlined civil libertarianism that 
was blind to inequalities in the marketplace of ideas.  The ACLU retained its hostility toward 
state overreaching, even as the New Deal demonstrated that industrial interests were separable 
from state power.   
Significantly, opponents of the resolution emphasized only its tendency to curtail 
debate—to exclude minority opinions that might have enriched the ACLU’s policy agenda.  
Labor equality had become a viewpoint, not an objective. In broader context, such vocal critics 
as Alexander Meiklejohn were not so far away from the majority as they now seem.  In fact, the 
only member of the board who acknowledged the ACLU’s departure from its founding 
principles was Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.  During the proceedings, she expressed her belief that 
some of the board’s members were “in blissful ignorance of what the ACLU really stands for,” 
and she blamed the veterans for failing to educate them properly.  Flynn charged that those 
members who were “abandoning .  .  . the fight for labor’s rights” did not belong on the board.299
Unsurprisingly, the reconfiguration of the ACLU board prompted a reevaluation of the 
organization’s position on employer free speech.  In January, the board rejected a 
recommendation of the Committee on Civil Rights in Labor Relations and voted to protest the 
NLRB’s failure to protect employer speech in a case involving anti-union communications by 
the Adams Brothers Manifold Printing Company.
 
But by 1940, it was Flynn who no longer belonged. 
300
                                                          
299 Transcript of proceedings, 136, ACLU Papers, box 74, folder 2.  
 That same month, the NLRB issued an 
order in conjunction with a Massachusetts case against the Ford Motor Company, in which it 
300 Report of the Committee on Civil Rights and Labor Relations, 20 December 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 180, vol. 
2165 (concluding that the Board was justified in finding that statements made by the employer were coercive). 
Board Minutes, 22 January 1940, ACLU Papers, reel 180, vol. 2165 (voting to ask NLRB to revise its order to 
include language permitting non-coercive employer speech).  
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said that free speech was a “qualified” rather than absolute right.301 John Haynes Holmes wrote 
to Baldwin, “If we don’t get into this fight and carry it through to a finish, we no longer have any 
mission as a civil liberties organization.” He added that it would be “be interesting to see the 
reasons which our fellow-travelers cook up for supporting the NLRB.”302 The order in the 
Massachusetts case was precisely the same as in the Detroit case, but the sole basis for finding 
unfair labor practices was anti-union expression by chief inspectors and supervisory officials and 
surveillance by supervisory foremen.303  There were no violent assaults, no proven attempts to 
organize a company union, no discharges or demotions because of union membership. Though it 
was still in the midst of internal battle, the ACLU board voted to protest the NLRB order.304  
Hays wrote to the NLRB to convey the organization’s position: “You have held in effect that the 
distribution of literature to employees as such, violates their rights under the Act. In the absence 
of discharges, threats of discharge or other acts of coercion, it seems to me that your Board has 
construed mere language in print as coercive.”305 That was a position that the ACLU could not 
condone, and in a February press release, the ACLU announced its “strong objections” to the 
NLRB’s order.306
Despite its new vigilance in employer speech cases, there were never more than a few 
conservatives in the ACLU ranks.  John Haynes Holmes was a socialist. Arthur Garfield Hays 
had proved his mettle in many labor battles, and he personally favored the CIO.  These longtime 
veterans defended anti-union speech by employers because they believed that doing so, in the 
long run, would better serve to defend the rights of labor.  It is therefore unsurprising that when 
  
                                                          
301 Jerome Britchey to Charles Fahy, 28 January 1940, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2232; Ford Motor Company 
(Somerville, Mass.), 19 N.L.R.B. 732 (1940). 
302 John Hayes Holmes to Roger Baldwin, 22 January 1940, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2232. 
303 Memorandum on the NLRB order in the Massachusetts Ford Motor Company Case, 26 January 1940, ACLU 
Papers, reel 189, vol. 2232. 
304 ACLU Board Minutes, 29 January 1940, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2232. 
305 Arthur Garfield Hays to NLRB, 2 February 1940, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2232. 
306 ACLU Press Release, 5 February 1940, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2232. 
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the NLRA was deeply threatened, the ACLU rallied to its defense.  In the summer of 1939, 
Virginia Representative Howard Smith had called for a House committee investigation of the 
NLRB.  Public hearings commenced in December and lasted two months. The unmistakable 
agenda of the hearings was to convince the American public that the CIO and NLRB were 
dominated by communists. The committee’s intermediate report, issued in March 1940, alleged 
that the NLRB had forced employers to sign contracts in violation of the NLRA and had acted 
unconstitutionally on a regular basis.  It then proposed twenty-one amendments to the Wagner 
Act, ranging from the exclusion of workers in agricultural industries to procedural reforms.  
Among them was the protection of employer free speech. The ACLU opposed the free speech 
amendment, along with the others.  It reaffirmed its commitment to defending employers’ rights, 
but it declared that they were adequately protected by the Constitution and needed no additional 
support in law;307 existing mechanisms for judicial review were an adequate check on 
administrative discretion.  In its statement, the ACLU said that nothing in the NLRA curtailed 
free speech and that “despite all the controversy there has as yet been no actual interference with 
employers’ right of free speech by the NLRB.”  The ACLU wanted to ensure that employers 
received as much protection as the Constitution guaranteed, but no more.  The amendment, by 
contrast, might be construed to “giv[e] employers’ speech more protection than the speech of 
others.” 308
The Smith bill never made it out of committee in the Senate, and for the time being, the 
Wagner Act was spared aggressive legislative overhaul.  The NLRB, however, understood that it 
  
                                                          
307 ACLU Press Bulletin 923, 1 June 1940, ACLU Papers, reel 182, vol. 2177.  
308 The proposed amendment would have protected “any expressions of opinion with respect to any matter which 
may be of interest to employers or the general public, provided that such expressions of opinion are not 
accompanied by acts of coercion, intimidation, discrimination or threats thereof.”  The ACLU protested that it would 
have prohibited the board from acting where coercion preceded or followed the expression of opinion and was 
directly associated with it. Ibid. 
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would need to moderate its approach.  When Madden’s term as chair expired in August 1940, 
Roosevelt appointed a more conciliatory replacement, and the NLRB significantly revised its 
policies and procedures to accommodate complaints by the AFL, employers, and the general 
public.  
Two months later, the Sixth Circuit finally issued its decision in Ford v. NLRB.309  In its 
opinion, the court took judicial notice of the wave of sit-down strikes that had swept through 
Michigan between December 1936 and March 1937. It condemned the seizure of property as 
illegal and noted that it had been recognized as such by the Supreme Court.310
                                                          
309 NLRB v. Ford Motor Company, 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940). 
  It accepted then-
Governor Frank Murphy’s description of the events as “the greatest industrial conflict of all 
times.” And it claimed that “no one who lived through the period can ignore the terror which this 
lawless labor technique imposed not only upon the automobile industry and its non-union 
employees fearing loss of their jobs, but upon all employers of labor in Michigan, including 
manufacturers, retail establishments, hotels, public utilities and others.”  The court 
acknowledged that legal remedies had been unavailable to the owners of property. Under those 
circumstances, it considered Ford’s increased security to be a reasonable precaution. It 
nonetheless concluded that the company’s lawful preparations were “more than adequate to repel 
an attempted seizure which the approach of 50 to 75 union organizers, mostly women, might 
signify even to the most fearful, as imminent.”  Everett Moore, chief of Ford Service 
Department, had known that a literature distribution was planned, and he told the press that while 
company employees would keep their hands clean, he expected violence to occur.  The opinion 
did not dwell long on the “Vote of Confidence” engineered by plant supervisors as evidence of 
internal opposition to the UAW.  It accepted the Board’s findings that foremen had taken the 
310 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
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badge numbers of those employees who refused to sign. On those facts, the Board was justified 
in finding interference with employees’ rights under Section 7 of the NLRA.  
With these preliminary matters out of the way, the court turned to “the major issue, at 
least from the point of view of the public interest.”311  Ford expected its lawyers to “win on this 
point, if no other,” and it was not disappointed.312
Ironically, by securing statutory rights to employees in contravention of the common law, 
the NLRA had made the NLRB’s claim about the coercive effect of employer speech untenable.  
In the past, the court acknowledged, the power relations between employer and employee, 
namely that of master over servant, might have given an employer’s statement disproportionate 
influence. But the NLRA—upheld as constitutionally valid, strictly enforced by the NLRB, and 
  The court declared that “the right of 
employees to organize for collective bargaining, to select representatives of their own choosing, 
and to unite for concerted action in other respects, is now so clearly recognized as a fundamental 
right that citation is superfluous.”  But according to the court, “the right to hold views upon any 
and all controversial questions, to express such views, and to disseminate them to persons who 
may be interested, has even more venerable sanction.” Citing Lovell v. Griffin, the court 
emphasized that the circulation of pamphlets was an important American tradition and one that 
had proven effective in the dissemination of opinion.  Ford Motor Company’s communications 
expressed disapproval of unions, to be sure. But according to the court, they did not threaten 
discharge and were therefore constitutionally protected speech.  
                                                          
311 Ford, 114 F. 2d at 912.  
312 F. H. Wood, “Memorandum for Messrs. McCormack, Duncombe and Borie,” 27 March 1940, Ford Legal Papers, 
acc. 897, box 4, vol. 2. The issue was no longer novel, and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Union Pacific Stages, 99 
F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1938), indicated that courts would be receptive to a free speech claim.  Although the Supreme 
Court had upheld Board orders prohibiting the circulation of anti-union statements, it had never addressed the issue 
squarely. In Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938), the Court affirmed an order with a provision 
requiring employees to “cease and desist from . . . indicating to its employees the respondent’s attitude and desires 
with respect to the relationship of its employees to any particular labor organization” or “expressing to its employees 
its approval of anti-union sentiment or activities.” The Court did not expressly consider the provision.  
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liberally construed by the courts “so as best to effectuate its great social and economic 
purpose”—belied any argument about inherent coercion in labor relations.313  “The servant,” 
declared the court, “no longer has occasion to fear the master’s frown of authority or threats of 
discrimination for union activities, express or implied.”314
The court concluded with a paean to freedom of speech.  The right to speak, it insisted, 
was the basis for the rights secured by the NLRA.  And as such, it was protected by the First 
Amendment.  Invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Hague v. CIO, it declared that “the 
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within 
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.”
 
315  The court entered a decree 
enforcing the Board’s order in every other important respect,316
 
 but it pronounced the Ford 
Motor Company free to circularize its employees.  
Conclusion 
On June 20, 1941—four years after the Battle of the Overpass—the Ford Motor 
Company signed a contract with the UAW-CIO covering 123,000 employees. Union recognition 
was a condition of Ford’s settlement of all pending cases involving the UAW-CIO.317
                                                          
313 A Ford memorandum made the same argument. Employees were aware that their employer could not legally act 
against them.  Should unlawful discrimination nonetheless occur, the appropriate recourse was to the NLRA’s 
provisions for reinstatement and back pay—not to enjoining speech before the fact, which would amount to prior 
restraint. P. B., “Memorandum: Ford Cases, Free Speech,” 10 January 1939, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 3, vol. 
3. 
 In the 
wake of the Detroit Ford case, Ford’s attorneys had advised the company that it had won the 
most that it could hope for from the courts:  “The free speech point—in some ways the most 
314 Cf. Orren, Belated Feudalism. The court left open the possibility that sufficiently egregious employer conduct, 
with a high percentage of known discharges for union activity, might justify curtailment of speech under certain 
circumstances.  
315 114 F. 2d at 914 (citing Hague). 
316 It found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the finding of discharge for union activity in the case one 
employee. 
317 NLRB Press Release, 20 June 1941, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 2, file Press Releases.  
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important point in the case—has been decided in our favor in an opinion which leaves nothing to 
be desired.”318
 If the Battle of the Overpass was a seminal turning point in the organization of the Ford 
Motor Company, Ford v. NLRB was a flashpoint in the larger war over administrative authority, 
New Deal labor policy, and constitutional interpretation.  Dayton, Ohio’s News Week called Ford 
“one of the most controversial decisions ever handed down by the National Labor Relations 
Board.”
  
319  The New York Times reprinted the Sixth Circuit’s decision practically in full.320 
Dozens of bar journal and law review articles gave detailed consideration to Ford and the issue 
of employer free speech.321  Dean James M. Landis of Harvard Law School considered the issues 
so novel and significant that he designed an Ames moot course based on the case.322
In the summer of 1940, the ABA’s first issue of its Bill of Rights Review devoted an 
article to the “The Labor Board and Free Speech.”
 
323
                                                          
318 F. H. W., Memorandum for Mr. McCormack, NLRB v. Ford Motor Company, 13 October 1940, Ford Legal 
Papers, acc. 897, box 4, vol. 2. Although the victory had been anticipated, the legal team emphasized that the 
argument was “not quite as simple as generally considered by the public and the press, since it involve[d] not the 
right of Mr. Ford to express his opinions, but the right of the Company to disseminate them among the employees.” 
  It reported that the new Committee on the 
Bill of Rights had voted to file an amicus brief in an appropriate Supreme Court test case 
concerning employer free speech.  It explained that the NLRB’s infringement on the right of 
employers to express anti-union views had “handicapped the attainment of harmonious relations” 
and threatened equal protection, in addition to violating the First Amendment. “The decision of 
the first test case by the Supreme Court may well establish a landmark in the history of the Bill 
319 Clipping, News-Week (Dayton, Ohio), 21 October 1940, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
320 “Court Ruling on ‘Free Speech’ in the Ford Case,” New York Times, 9 October 1940.  
321 See, e.g., “Recent Case: NLRB Order Remanded to Correct Procedural Irregularity,” Harvard Law Review 52 
(1939): 680; A. Howard Myers, “‘Interference’ in Labor Relations Acts,” Boston University Law Review 19 (1939): 
208–25; “Notes and Legislation: The Proposed Amendments to the Wagner Act,” Harvard Law Review 52 (1939): 
978; Robert E. Herman, “Recent Limitations on Free Speech and Free Press,” Yale Law Journal 48 (1938): 54–67; 
“Employer Freedom of Speech under the Wagner Act,” Yale Law Journal 48 (1938): 72–80. 
322 ABC Union, Em One et al. v. Dorf Company, Supreme Court of Ames, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 4, vol. 
5.  
323 “The Labor Board and Free Speech,” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Summer 1940): 6. 
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of Rights,” the article predicted, “and it seems proper that the appropriate Committee of the 
American Bar Association should express its views.”324  A few months later, the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in the Ford case rendered ABA involvement unnecessary.  The Review’s second issue 
described the case in detail. “The import of the decision,” it concluded, was “to place upon the 
Board the burden of proving that the employer’s expression of opinion would in fact operate as 
coercion.” That rule, according to the ABA, “seem[ed] to be a justifiable one.”325
The NLRB, with the guidance of the Supreme Court, soon adopted a policy that was 
almost indistinguishable from the ACLU’s stated position.
 
326
In his 1941 opinion in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Company,
  It seems fitting that the Supreme 
Court’s first opinion on the issue was written by Frank Murphy, who in the span of a decade had 
served as (among other roles) mayor of Detroit, governor of Michigan, Attorney General of the 
United States, and finally as an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court.  Murphy 
had corresponded regularly with the ACLU in each of those capacities—especially in 
conjunction with his creation of the Civil Liberties Unit within the Department of Justice—and 
he was deeply sympathetic to the organization’s views.   
327
                                                          
324 See also “Report of the Sub-Committee on Civil Rights of the Executive Council of the Junior Bar Conference of 
the American Bar Association,” 26 July 1938, Vanderbilt Papers, box 127, folder Civil Liberties (“Your committee 
is inclined to the view that if an employer cannot express publicly his personal views about unions, any particular 
union or the Wagner Labor Relations Act without thereby furnishing evidence of a law-breaking spirit, or being held 
guilty of a violation of law, then his right of free speech on the subject of labor unions has been effectively taken 
away.”). 
 Justice Murphy 
clarified that the Board, in considering whether an employer had “interfered with, restrained, and 
coerced” its employees under the NLRA, was permitted to inquire into “what the Company has 
325 “Notes and Cases,” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Winter 1941): 141–42. 
326 American Civil Liberties Union, A Report on American Democratic Liberties in War-Time (New York: American 
Civil Liberties Union, 1942), 39 (“Employers’ rights of free speech were upheld by the Supreme Court for the first 
time in a decision involving an order by the National Labor Relations Board against the Virginia Power Company. 
The court took the position—substantially that taken by the Civil Liberties Union—that language by employers 
directed to their workers cannot be restrained under the National Labor Relations Act unless it is clearly coercive.”). 
327 NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Company, 314 U.S. 469 (1941). 
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said, as well as what it has done.”  He concluded, however, that language must be actually 
coercive or part of a coercive course of conduct to justify curtailment by the NLRB.  In the case 
under consideration, the employer had conveyed orally and in writing the opinion that unions 
were ineffective and divisive, but it had specifically stated that employees were free to join 
without retaliation from the company.  The Board had considered this expression of views to be 
unlawful without situating it in a broader complex of unlawful activities.328
Murphy’s opinion for the Court, its formal protection of free speech coupled with broad 
interpretative deference to the NLRB, set the stage for the Board’s decision for the next five 
years.  The Board’s interpretation of “coercion” was predictably broad, and employers continued 
to complain about interference with their First Amendment rights.
 Murphy was careful 
to emphasize that the Supreme Court could not substitute its own interpretation of the facts for 
that of the NLRB, and he left ample room on remand for the Board to buttress its order with 
concrete findings (“perhaps,” he wrote, “the purport of these utterances may be altered by 
imponderable subtleties at work which it is not our function to appraise”).  On their own terms, 
however, the employer’s views did not rise to the level of constitutionally regulable coercion.   
329
                                                          
328 Several post-Ford NLRB decisions had made similar findings. See, e.g., Huch Leather Company, 11 N.L.R.B. 
394, (1939) (violation of NLRA to refer to CIO as “a bunch of Bolsheviks”); Leitz Carpet Corporation, 27 N.L.R.B. 
235 (1940) (coercive to refer to unions as “shyster outfits”). 
  For its part, the ACLU 
never again wavered in its commitment to employer free speech.  The December 1945 edition of 
the statement defining its position on civil liberties contained a section on “labor’s rights.” In it, 
the ACLU underscored the right of workers to organize, and it called for vigilant enforcement of 
the provisions of state and national labor relations acts preventing employer coercion.  But it 
insisted that the police should protect the civil rights of all “portion[s] of the community,” a 
principle which called “for the protection not only of organized workers but of non-union 
329 See, e.g., American Tube Bending Company, 44 N.L.R.B. 121 (1942). 
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workers and managers in their right of access to places of employment.” Moreover, it called for 
the defense of minority rights against labor union discrimination “on account of race, religion, 
sex, nationality or political views,” and where unions “unreasonably restrict[ed] membership,” it 
opposed the closed shop.”  Finally, it insisted that the “administration” of labor legislation, 
where employer communications regarding unions were not coercive, “should be so guarded as 
not to infringe upon employers’ rights of free speech.”330
In 1947, with the voice of industry behind them, congressional conservatives at last 
succeeded in crippling the NLRB.  That June, the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted over the veto of 
President Harry S. Truman.  On many issues, it adopted the very proposals that the ACLU had 
come together to oppose in the spring of 1940, at a time when it was otherwise so thoroughly 
divided.  But on the issue of employer free speech, Taft-Hartley instituted precisely the rule that 
the absolutists on the ACLU board had championed in the Ford case.  The act ensured that “the 
expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, 
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of unfair labor practice under 
any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force 
or promise of benefit.”
  
331
The ACLU denounced Taft-Hartley as a “direct violation of labor’s rights.” It cautioned 
that the act’s provisions were “fraught with peril to the maintenance of civil liberties in labor 
   
                                                          
330 American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Liberty: A Statement Defining the Position of the American Civil Liberties 
Union (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1945). 
331 Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). See Kersch, “How Conduct Became Speech”; Ian M. 
Adams and Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., “Free Speech and Administrative Agency Deference: Section 8(C) and the 
National Labor Relations Board—An Expostulation on Preserving the First Amendment,” Journal of Contemporary 
Law 22 (1996): 20–27. On the new policy, see Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From the Wagner Act to 
Taft-Hartley: A Study of National Labor Policy and Labor Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 
174–89 (tracing change in NLRB interpretation from strict neutrality to “separability”); W. Wiliard Wirtz, “The 
New National Labor Relations Board: Herein of ‘Employer Persuasion,’” Northwestern University Law Review 49 
(1954): 594–618; Allen Sinsheimer, Jr., “Employer Free Speech: A Comparative Analysis,” University of Chicago 
Law Review 14 (1947):  617–36; “Note: Limitations upon an Employer’s Right of Noncoercive Free Speech,” 
Virginia Law Review 38 (1952): 1037–56. 
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disputes.” 332  Its next annual report jettisoned the optimistic outlook of the late 1930s and 1940s.  
Citing Taft-Hartley, among other setbacks, it expressed “justified skepticism concerning the 
immediate future of our democratic liberties as instruments of progress.”  It described the 
popular desire, expressed in the 1946 elections, to break free of the “irritating shackles” of state 
control and to reinstate “the presumably sound leadership of private business.”  The new 
skepticism toward state economic regulation had “produced an atmosphere increasingly hostile 
to the liberties of organized labor, the political left and many minorities.”333
The ACLU’s protest came too late.  By 1947, employers and their allies had come to 
believe, however much the ACLU willed it to be otherwise, that free speech and “economic 
liberty” were inextricably linked—not as a matter of constitutional law, but of political will and 
sound public policy.
   
334
                                                          
332 “Civil Liberties Union Condemns Labor Bill,” 16 June 1947, New York Times. 
333 “Setback Reported for Civil Liberties,” 3 September 1947, New York Times. 
334 Notably, after passage of the act, Republican Senator George D. Aiken and Democratic Senator Carl A. Hatch 
introduced an amendment removing a prohibition against union contributions to political campaigns. Aiken said, 
“At the time the Taft-Hartley Act was passed over the President’s veto, it was realized by some that the bill went too 
far in restricting freedom of speech and of the press and that the act would have to be amended.” “Revision in Labor 
Law Is Asked to End Political Spending Curb,” New York Times, 12 July 1947. See “Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: 
Validity of Restrictions on Union Political Activity,” Yale Law Journal 57 (March 1948): 806–27.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
 On the eve of the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt counted “freedom 
of speech” and “freedom from want” among America’s most fundamental values.1 Military 
necessity, he promised, would not serve as a license for repression, as it had during World War I.  
“No matter what comes we must preserve our national birthright,” he told the nation: “liberty of 
conscience and of education, of the press and of free assembly, and equal justice to all under the 
law.”2  In Roosevelt’s vision, democracy entailed both economic security and the liberty to 
demand it. Although both would yield significantly to wartime pressures, the President’s rhetoric 
was a symbol of how far the country had come.3
And yet, despite Roosevelt’s enthusiastic endorsement of both freedoms, there was a 
significant distance between the two.  Economic rights were a matter of government policy, 
conditioned on democratic deliberation.  By contrast, free speech was a “civil liberty,” and thus 
  
                                                          
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Annual Message to Congress,” Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress, 6 
January 1941, Record Group 46, NARA I, Sen. 77A-H1.  Morris Ernst considered Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms to be 
an important civil libertarian project and, in conjunction with the White House, pursued a book project exploring the 
connections among them and the best means of achieving them. Morris Ernst to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 21 
September 1943, Ernst Papers, box 97, folder 3. 
2 “President Aids Campaign for Civil Liberty,” Washington Post, 27 December 1939. One week after the bombing 
of Pearl Harbor, on Bill of Rights Day, he declared: “We will not, under any threat, or in the face of any danger, 
surrender the guarantees of liberty our forefathers framed for us in our Bill of Rights.” Bill of Rights Day Speech, 15 
December 1941, quoted in American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom in Wartime: A Report of the American Civil 
Liberties Union in the Second Year of War (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1943), 1. See also Address 
by O. John Rogge, National Conference on Civil Liberties, 14 October 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 
132, folder Civil Rights (voicing the hope that the country would avoid war but noting that an espionage unit, if it 
proved necessary, would be “closely coordinated with the Civil Liberties Unit, in order that the Department of 
Justice, which seeks to maintain those liberties, will not become an instrument of oppression”). 
3 See generally Richard W. Steele, Free Speech in the Good War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Stone, 
Perilous Times. The notable departures from the Administration’s prewar civil liberties commitments included the 
Japanese internment camps and prosecutions under the Espionage Act. The Civil Rights Section (successor to the 
Civil Liberties Unit) advised U.S. Attorneys to curtail civil rights only when “absolutely necessary to the efficient 
conduct of the military and economic war effort of the United States.” Francis Biddle to all United States Attorneys, 
Department of Justice Circular No. 3356, Supplement 2, 4 April 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 
1581, Civil Liberties 1933–1945.  
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grounded in the Bill of Rights.4
During the 1920s and 1930s, industry, labor, government officials, and the ACLU all had 
experimented with alternative understandings of civil liberties.  Especially after enactment of the 
NLRA, they had grappled with a novel and untested allegiance between organized labor and 
state power.  For the NLRB, collective bargaining was just as much a “right” as free speech. In a 
1938 address, Edwin Smith declared that union organization was the only means of preserving 
democracy, and that to survive it must receive from the government firm protection against those 
who have the power and will to destroy it.”
  An adequate standard of living was affirmative, but aspirational; 
expressive freedom, though subject to balancing against important governmental interests, was a 
negative guarantee, asserted against the state. 
5  Indeed, to Warren Madden, the workers were 
entitled to state protection by a new and fundamental right—for “a liberty to emerge from a 
condition of economic helplessness, and dependence upon the will of another, to a status of 
having one’s chosen representative received as an equal at the bargaining conference table, must 
be recognized as fundamental.”6
                                                          
4 It was the “invocation of the Constitution,” a Department of Justice Circular explained, that gave “civil liberties” 
their distinctive “honorific character.” Circular No. 3356, Supplement 1, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Over 
Violation of Civil Liberties, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 1581, Civil Liberties 1933–1945. 
  This liberty was antecedent to the rights of speech, press, and 
assembly, which working people could not enjoy until their right to collective bargaining was 
met.  Labor leaders made the same point more bluntly.  Joseph Schlosberg, speaking at a mass 
5 Address by Edwin S. Smith before the Carolina Political Union, 30 March 1938, quoted in “Memorandum in 
Support of Proposal to Confine the National Labor Relations Board of the Functions of Accusing and Prosecuting 
and to Transfer its Judicial Functions to a Separate Administrative Body Similar to the Board of Tax Appeals,” 15, 
Ford Legal Papers, box 3, vol. 3.  
6 Radio address by Warren Madden, 29 January 1939, quoted in Respondents’ Sixth Circuit Brief, Ford v. NLRB, 
54.  
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meeting of Ford Workers, recounted that twenty-five years earlier “the employers refused to 
speak to us because we were just that many nobodies, men and women without rights.”7
Although union organizers continued to stress direct action, they grew increasingly 
reliant on state assistance even while they remained skeptical of judicial review.  Nathan 
Greene—writing not for the ACLU but for the International Juridical Association, a Popular 
Front civil liberties group—stressed the malleability of terms like liberty, which for so long had 
been invoked on employers’ behalf.
 
8  Echoing a younger Roger Baldwin, Greene declared that 
“liberty in action draws its true meaning from the power by which it is impelled” and that “the 
only defensible concept of liberty is one that makes some room, at least, for the concept of 
equality.”  For Greene, “liberty” was a dangerous abstraction, and economic power was a 
prerequisite for free speech.  His explanation neatly captures the insurmountable distance 
between Greene and the ACLU: “I have heard an important person in this City defend what he 
called Henry Ford’s right of free speech in the cases I have discussed, in this way. He said, ‘I am 
for free speech though the universe shall smash.’ Forgive the I.J.A. We are for free speech in an 
unsmashed universe, or to narrow the figure just a little, in an unsmashed world. We believe 
speech and the other civil liberties are meaningful only to men who dare to use them. And that 
before ‘daring’ come bread and water, come roots in the community, comes respite from fear. 
Only a reasonably whole world, not a ‘smashed’ world, will ever tolerate free speech.”9
 If the labor movement and its allies were increasingly skeptical of free speech, the legal 
establishment had fully endorsed its elevation by the ACLU to the top of the constitutional 
 
                                                          
7 However helpful the recent decisions of the NLRB, “American history [had] shown that wherever workers united 
through a union, they protected their rights.” Transcript of Ford Workers’ Mass Meeting Held at Fordson High 
School Auditorium, 44–46, 13 February 1938, Ford Legal Papers, acc. 897, box 101.  
8“Civil Liberties and the NLRB,” International Juridical Association, reprinted from speech by Nathan Greene, 8 
March 1940, 5, Sugar Papers, folder 54:17, Ford Organizing Drive and Riot.  
9 Ibid.  
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hierarchy. In the Bill of Rights Review, the ABA heralded the emergence of “civil liberties” as a 
“distinct field of law.”  It noted that a law school “would be abreast of the times” in offering a 
class devoted solely to civil liberties or the Bill of Rights.10  It also urged the adoption of an 
annual Bill of Rights Week throughout the United States, and it recommended “that study of the 
Bill of Rights be made a permanent, daily part of the curriculum in all American schools.”11
On economic issues, the conservative bar retained its longstanding aversion to 
administrative authority, but it shifted its efforts to procedural reform rather than congressional 
authority.  The Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1946 after years of lobbying by the 
ABA, subjected administrative decision-making to judicial review in a manner reminiscent of the 
ACLU-sponsored Cutting Bill in the realm of customs censorship.  Roscoe Pound, as chair of the 
ABA’s committee on administrative procedure, argued that judicial oversight would preserve 
constitutional democracy and prevent America from becoming “an avowed dictatorship.”
  
12 It is 
telling that his growing preference for the judiciary coincided with a new sympathy for free 
speech.13
When it came to the Bill of Rights, the ABA believed that the courts had a crucial role to 
play.  It was their task to ensure equal treatment for all Americans, including beleaguered 
employers.  Like “the press, the commentator, the employee and the general public,” employers 
deserved the freedom to exercise “the rights of free expression” that the Constitution provided.
  
14
                                                          
10 “Civil Liberties—A Field of Law,” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Summer 1940): 7–9. The article noted that a seminar 
on the topic had been given at Yale Law School and a similar course was forthcoming at the New York University 
School of Law.  
  
Freedom, of course, had its limits. As America readied for war, it necessarily imposed more 
11 “Democracy Must Introspect,” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Summer 1941): 259. 
12 Wigdor, Pound, 273–74. 
13 During the Second World War, Pound favored the free circulation of speech critical of the government. Roscoe 
Pound, “Discussion and Criticism of the Operations of Government in Time of War,” Bill of Rights Review 1 
(Spring 1941): 183–85. In earlier writings he had cast free speech as secondary to the public interest.  
14 “Labor Board and Free Speech,” 6. 
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onerous duties on its citizens, and the balance between liberty and responsibility shifted toward 
the latter.  This “principle of relativity” subjected such “privileges” as the “so-called ‘right to 
strike’” to moderation, “in the field of labor relations as in others.”  Still, said Grenville Clark, to 
the extent they were compatible with national security, the government was bound to respect 
people’s rights.15
More than any other body, it was the ACLU that anticipated and in significant ways 
produced the constitutional compromise of the post-New Deal era.  By investing in the Bill of 
Rights, the ACLU produced its most important victories: the Supreme Court decisions of the 
1930s, which protected the rights of radicals to articulate their views without interference by the 
state.  Well after 1937, legal academics and practitioners remained wary of judicial review. The 
new vision of court-based constitutionalism would take years to find a firm hold among liberal 
activists. Whatever their hesitation about constitutional interpretation, however, liberal lawyers 
had come to regard the courts as a friendly forum for resolving disputes, whether among 
individuals or between individuals and the state.  By 1940, former progressives who were 
sympathetic to free speech routinely decried administrative censorship but “[took] comfort in 
evidences of an enlightened judiciary.”
  
16
Seizing on the conservative rhetoric of time-honored individual rights, the ACLU had 
attracted supporters within and outside the courts.  The threat of totalitarianism, which the ACLU 
had invoked to such great effect in Hague v. CIO, buttressed the appeal of state restraint.  An 
estimated two thousand people attended the ACLU’s National Conference on Civil Liberties in 
  
                                                          
15 Grenville Clark, “Perversions of Civil Liberties,” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Summer 1941): 262.  
16 Rose Feld, “Down with Censors! A Crusading Chronicle of Their Constant Threat to Books, Movies and Radio,” 
New York Herald-Tribune, 11 February 1940.  
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October 1939, representing a broad range of political and economic views.17
But the constitutional strategy also came at a cost.  The majority within the ACLU had 
convinced themselves, employers, and the ABA that freedom of speech meant freedom from 
government censorship.  It was a right held by all equally, worker and employer alike. In 1940, 
the labor press accused the ACLU of “turning against labor,”
 By the end of the 
decade, free speech was an undeniable American value.  
18 citing a long list of changes in 
ACLU policy, including its position in the Ford case.  That year’s edition of the organization’s 
pamphlet on civil liberties professed a commitment to the legal protection of strikebreakers in 
“their right of access to places of employment.”19 Several members of the ACLU had denounced 
the closed shop as a threat to civil liberties. Some had commended the Dies Committee for its 
investigation of “destructive” trade union activity.20  Subsequent annual reports expressed 
support for the “democratic rights” of workers to be free of union discrimination based not only 
on race (as in earlier years) but also on “political views or opposition to union administration.”21
                                                          
17 Board Minutes, 16 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233. 
 
The board created a Committee on Trade Union Democracy to monitor union compliance with 
its principles. 
18 Alexander Crosby, “Baldwin Denies Civil Liberties Union Is Turning Against Labor,” 7 March 1940, Jackson 
Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3. See also Merle D. Vincent (Conference on Civil Rights, Washington 
Committee for Democratic Action) to John Haynes Holmes, 9 May 1940, ACLU Papers, box 75, folder 8 (“[T]he 
ACLU made a basic shift from its old position to new ground. Labor and the public are justified in regarding this 
basic change as an abandonment of a large part of the field of battle for civil liberties. This new position clearly 
makes the ACLU a new accession to the ranks of strike-breaking powers of which the Ford Motor Company is 
probably the most perfect example.”).  
19 Crosby’s article noted that the ACLU’s statement was “more bluntly worded than that of such a strikebreaking 
organization as the Detroit Council for Industrial Peace.” The article named as the opponents of conservatism the 
precise actors who had supported the NLRB’s position in Ford: Osmond Fraenkel, A. J. Isserman, Mary Van 
Kleeck, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Nathan Green, Rev. William B. Spofford, and Robert Dunn. 
20 In addition, Morris Ernst had advocated an “S.E.C.” for civil liberties, under which labor unions would be 
required to disclose their financial affairs and activities. Draft of Proposal, Ernst Papers, box 411, folder 8; Abraham 
Isserman to Board of Directors, 28 February 1940, Ernst Papers, box 411, folder 9. 
21 ACLU, Liberties in War-Time, 22.   
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Almost alone among progressives and liberals, the ACLU never was fully seduced by the 
New Deal.  To be sure, official ACLU statements after 1935 lavished high praise on the NLRA.  
But the ACLU’s mature vision of civil liberties was not the NLRB’s.  In March 1939, the ACLU 
rallied behind Senator La Follette’s bill “to eliminate certain oppressive labor practices affecting 
interstate and foreign commerce.”  Had it passed, it would have made espionage, munitions, 
private police, and strikebreaking punishable by fine or imprisonment.  William Green and John 
L. Lewis both supported the bill.22  So, “heartily,” did Attorney General Murphy, who believed 
“that the Federal Government has a definite role to play in the preservation of civil liberties.”23  
For the ACLU leadership, as for Murphy, the La Follette bill was a quintessential civil liberties 
measure.  Preserving civil liberties meant promoting and protecting speech, not controlling it.  It 
meant ensuring that employers would counter the speech of their workers not with force, but 
with words.24
The ACLU proved consistent in enforcement of that principle. It continued to criticize 
violent interference with the right to organize and strike.
 
25
                                                          
22 Debate on the bill centered on the supposed Communist threat to American industry.  Amendments proposed by 
North Carolina Senator Robert R. Reynolds prohibited all companies from hiring aliens in excess of 10 percent of 
their workforces or from employing “any Communist or member of any Nazi Bund organization.” The Senate bill, 
thus amended, passed by a vote of 47 to 20. The House version was buried in committee. Auerbach, “La Follette 
Committee,” 454. 
  But it held labor to the same 
standard.  It admonished pickets to “keep traffic open for pedestrians and vehicles, to insure 
23 Statement of Attorney General Murphy before the Senate Committee of Education and Labor, re: Bill S. 1970, 
Attorney General Papers, box 6, entry 132. 
24 Robert Jackson, Murphy’s successor as Attorney General (and his future colleague on the Supreme Court), was 
even more skeptical of a state-centered approach.  “Compared with [the] rather narrow powers to advance civil 
rights the possibilities that the Department of Justice by misuse of power will invade civil rights really gives me 
more concern,” he wrote in the Bill of Rights Review. Robert Jackson, “Messages on the Launching of the ‘Bill of 
Rights Review,’” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Summer 1940): 35.  By then, the ACLU had reason to agree. It noted in 
its 1940 Annual Report that Murphy had undertaken “numerous prosecutions . . . which struck at minority political 
groups.” It considered Jackson’s record slightly better. American Civil Liberties Union, In the Shadow of War: The 
Story of Civil Liberty, 1939–1940 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union), 17.  
25 American Civil Liberties Union, Liberty’s National Emergency: The Story of Civil Liberty in the Crisis Year 
1940–1941 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1941), 4. 
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access to places picketed, to prevent the use of fraudulent signs, and to maintain order.”26
The same general principle applied outside the labor context.  The ACLU’s ambition was 
robust discussion on all public issues, broadly defined.  In the 1940s, the organization 
acknowledged that free speech could not flourish without a platform.  As Morris Ernst put it, 
“our market place in thought only has vitality and a chance of serving as an arena in which 
thought can win out if as many diverse currents of thought flow into the market place as is 
mechanically and physically possible.”
 In 
place of the right of agitation, the ACLU touted the marketplace of ideas.  Workers were free to 
express their discontent.  They could reason with strike-breakers. But union “coercion,” like its 
employer counterpart, fell squarely outside the realm of civil liberties.  
27  Toward that end, the ACLU encouraged the 
government to promote conversation, first by creating “Hyde Parks” and other public forums, 
and increasingly by more creative means.  Ernst persuaded President Roosevelt to introduce a 
discounted postage rate to facilitate the circulation of printed matter.28
                                                          
26 “Pickets Criticized by Liberties Union,” New York Times, 21 January 1946. The ACLU urged the leaders of 
organized labor, including CIO president Phillip Murray and AFL president William Green, to curtail “violence” by 
pickets. The pickets in question had excluded maintenance crews, clerical workers, and executive officers. In the 
ACLU’s view, “the two rights—of picketing and of access to places picketed—[were] not conflicting.”  
  He also advocated ACLU 
27 Memorandum by Morris Ernst Prepared at the Request of the [ACLU] Board of Directors at the Special Meeting, 
9 October 1941, Lowell Mellett Papers, 1938–1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Gr. 60, box 11, folder Morris Ernst (hereafter “Ernst, 
Memorandum for Special Meeting”).  
28 See Fred Rodell, “Morris Ernst, New York’s Unlawyerlike Liberal Lawyer is the Censor’s Enemy, The 
President’s Friend,” Life, 21 February 1944. The measure was justified on the basis that “in this democracy of ours, 
unlike the dictatorship lands, we are dedicated to the ever increasing extension of a free market in thought as a 
means to the perpetuation of our national ideals. As they burn books abroad, we extend their distribution.” 
Announcement by National Committee to Abolish Postal Discrimination Against Books, Oscar Cox Papers, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Alphabetical File, Douglas-Ernst, box 9, folder Ernst, 
Morris. Ernst reported to the board of directors: “[Book rate postage] made possible books such as Pocket Books, 
impossible without it. But it also permitted a flow into the market place of great additional diversity of points of 
view, and exciting evidence now shows that this single proclamation of the President has actually increased the flow 
of the printed word in increased volume between libraries of the country, between individuals and libraries, not to 
mention the great effect on the literature used in the schools of the land.” Ernst, “Memorandum for Special 
Meeting,” 5–6. 
524 
 
legal action against newspaper owners for “restraint of trade.”29 Although the ACLU did not 
follow Ernst quite that far, it met him partway.  In 1945, the board formally adopted a new policy 
extending its “traditional principles” to contexts in which “private agencies rather than public 
authorities” restricted freedom of speech.  It demanded from government “not only forbearance 
from interfering with the liberties of its citizens but also restraints on interference with those 
liberties by private agencies.”30
More contentiously, it also adopted Ernst’s longstanding position on broadcast radio, 
dating back to his Dill Bill days.
 It opposed restraints on expression by motion picture 
distributors, for example. Over time, it would add company towns and, eventually, shopping 
malls. 
31
                                                          
29 Acknowledging that the program would involve the ACLU in issues of economics, he said, “I see nothing to the 
arguments that if we go into a consideration of the monopoly of the AP, or a radio chain that it means that we have 
to go into the monopoly of the chain grocery store. We should stick to ideas and not go in for broccoli.” Ibid.  
  In 1946, it endorsed the FCC’s new standards for granting 
and renewing radio licenses, which required stations to allocate time for the discussion of 
“important public questions” and to cover all sides of controversial issues.  The radio industry 
denounced the measures as censorship, but the ACLU disagreed.  It explained in a statement that 
the limited number of radio channels made some form of intervention necessary.  “The ACLU 
position does not favor the principle of government regulation, but accepts it as a practical 
necessity,” it claimed.  Importantly, if the government sought to withhold radio licenses based on 
its assessment of the content of programming, the station owners had recourse to the courts.  
30 American Civil Liberties Union, Liberty on the Home Front: In the Fourth Year of War (New York: American 
Civil Liberties Union, 1945), 60.  
31 The government and labor both shared Ernst’s view of media consolidation, to varying degrees.  E.g., “Little 
Americanism,” Address by Robert H. Jackson for New York Press Association, 28 January 1938, Attorney General 
Papers,  box 6, folder Jackson (“Every newspaper man and every newspaper owner is acutely aware that the 
freedom of the press is something different today from what it was in the years before its ownership began to get 
concentrated.”); “For the Freedom of the Press,” Buffalo Daily Law Journal, 23 September 1938 (reporting 
statement by the state convention of CIO-affiliated unions, sponsored by the American Newspaper Guild, voicing 
equal opposition to state censorship and to “distortion of the news by newspaper owners who may through whim, 
caprice or malice select for publication such items as please them, alter other items to suit their fancy, and omit such 
news as displeases them”). 
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“Freedom of speech is not abridged,” the statement reasoned. “The standards fixed provide for 
more speech, not less.”32
Some within the ACLU wanted the government to increase the value of speech in 
addition to its volume.  Alexander Meiklejohn, voicing the standard progressive line, thought 
that government ownership of the airwaves would serve the “public interest” and enrich the 
quality of radio programming. On that point, however, the board of directors staunchly 
disagreed.  John Haynes Holmes decried public ownership as “the first step in the direction of 
totalitarianism” and an “invasion of what we have called ‘the free market in thought.’” Holmes 
acknowledged the need for government regulation of public utilities, but he insisted that “such 
regulation should not touch the distribution of opinion.”
  
33 Morris Ernst concurred with Holmes.  
He warned that recent proposals for government-run newspapers and radio stations posed the 
“greatest peril” to free thought and counseled, “This we should crack and crack hard.”34  An 
ACLU pamphlet expressed the organization’s position: “The evils of big business ultimately 
invite government correction, a cure as bad as the disease. Once the government enters to 
correct, it will remain to control. And government domination of the public mind cannot be 
reconciled with democracy.”35
The ACLU approved efforts to multiply speech, but never to curtail it.  It countenanced 
no consideration for the relative worth of speech, however provocative, hateful or abusive. It 
even condemned distinctions between commercial and non-commercial speech.
   
36
                                                          
32 American Civil Liberties Union, Radio Programs in the Public Interest (New York: American Civil Liberties 
Union, July 1946). Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 
(1969).  
 So too in the 
33 John Haynes Holmes to Alexander Meiklejohn, 27 January 1942, Meiklejohn Papers, box 16, folder 37. 
34 Ernst, “Memorandum for Special Meeting,” 6–7. 
35 ACLU, Are You Free. It continued, “Let us use the Bill of Rights as more than just a shield to protect freedom of 
expression from attack. It must also be a sword cutting through private restraints on the market-place of thought.” 
36 ACLU, Liberties in War-Time, 17 (citing a commercial handbill decision, presumably Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
316 U.S. 52 (1942)). It did except private libel and, for the time being, though to a lesser degree, frank obscenity.  
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context of labor.  As Baldwin told Alexander Meiklejohn, the ACLU advocated complete 
freedom of expression for both unions and employers. Restricting both sides was no solution to 
disparities in bargaining power, he advised. “You know we are of course opposed to restraints on 
either.”37
By the early 1940s, civil liberties were no longer radical.  On the contrary, they served as 
industry’s most potent weapon against state control.  Employers quickly embraced the rhetoric of 
free speech, within and outside the courts. In the Ford case and many others, they seized upon 
the language of recent pro-labor decisions and earlier pro-labor dissents to justify their own 
prerogatives. Such is the standard course in a legal system built on precedent; corporations hired 
the most skilled and best trained of lawyers, and it would have been surprising had they not 
availed themselves of every argument in their arsenal.   
  
And yet, their embrace of free speech was not simply a fallback to the least bad 
alternative.  Rather, employers quickly understood that free speech was a powerful industrial 
tool.38
                                                          
37 Roger Baldwin to Alexander Meiklejohn, 8 December 1941, Meiklejohn Papers, box 4, folder 4. 
  The ACLU had naively hoped, in an era when revolution seemed possible, that a mere 
right to agitate would pave the way to substantive change. Implicit in their position was the 
confidence that radicalism was truth—that it would win out in the marketplace of ideas. By the 
1940s, employers understood that no free exchange in ideas existed.  They understood that a 
38 Apparently, Ford’s attorneys had not yet anticipated the application of free speech doctrine to advertising and 
other commercial applications. One attorney wrote: “There is a very clear line of authority, both with regard to the 
equity injunctions and with regard to Federal Trade Commission cease and desist orders, that the making of 
statements in good faith with regard to a competitor’s goods, or that the plaintiff’s patents are invalid, may not be 
enjoined. . . . With regard to these cases generally, it seems to me to be a mistake to drag the free speech issue into 
the field at all. The kind of statements which are made are very rarely expressions of any opinions concerning 
matters of current public interest. The statement that X’s rifles do not shoot straight, if false, or, even if true, has 
nothing to do with the political reasons for free speech.” P. B., “Memorandum on Free Speech,” 11 June 1939, 56–
57, Ford Legal Papers, box 3, vol. 3.  
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right to free speech would almost invariably favor those with superior resources. As Nathan 
Greene put it, employer speech was “a protected commodity in a monopoly market.”39
The constitutional revolution, as distilled in the famous footnote four of Carolene 
Products, guaranteed Congress full reign over economic regulation, subject only to the 
constraints of the most fundamental American liberties, including free speech.
 
40 Substantive due 
process no longer was available as a defense against progressive legislation. During the Second 
World War, when critics decried the “expanded war-time powers of government” as a bridge to 
totalitarianism, the ACLU demurred. “[T]hese measures largely concern economic controls 
which do not directly affect freedom of opinion and debate, nor the right of opposition or of 
criticism,” it explained, and accordingly they raised no constitutional questions for the courts.41
Like the ACLU leadership, the courts had come to accept state regulation of the economy 
as a positive force that served the public interest.  No longer would they regard freedom of 
contract or the rights of property as a trump on social progress.  But they would demand, lest 
America slide into dictatorship, that the state remain neutral in the realm of thought.  In short, 
industry was free to dominate the marketplace of ideas.  It could marshal all of its economic 
might to lobby government and to disseminate its views in the workplace and the public forum.  
And the First Amendment would ensure that no one would stand in its way.  
  
                                                          
39 “Civil Liberties and the NLRB,” International Juridical Association, reprinted from speech by Nathan Greene, 8 
March 1940, 5 (emphasis in original), Sugar Papers, folder 54:17.  
40 In the 1938 decision, Justice Stone repudiated Lochner-era judicial activism—the case itself rejected a due process 
challenge to a federal law prohibiting the interstate shipment of filled milk—but intimated that legislation impinging 
on the Bill of Rights (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment), as well as “legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,” 
would be subject to greater judicial oversight than ordinary acts of Congress.  United States v. Carolene Products 
Company, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). Footnote 4, which provided the basis for the most familiar civil-rights 
victories of the twentieth century, was initially invoked far more frequently in First Amendment cases than in race 
cases.  Indeed, the languages of civil rights and civil liberties remained hopelessly ambiguous and intertwined for 
decades. Goluboff, Lost Promise, 24–25. 
41 ACLU, Freedom in Wartime, 6. 
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Roger Baldwin consistently denied the charges that the ACLU had gone conservative. 
When pressed by former friends and colleagues, he fell back on his pre-Wagner Act belief that 
the best protection for workers was a strong union, not the state.  He reasserted his distrust of 
state power, which had always operated before to trample the rights of the least empowered.  
Such arguments, however, were quickly fading into the background; the ACLU’s 
emerging program emphasized other ideas.  In the 1940s, “the issue of race relations . . .  
occup[ied] first place in the struggle for civil liberties.”42 Also central were “religious liberty,” 
“aliens’ liberties,” and the “rights of women.”  In securing these rights the ACLU stressed its 
“complete impartiality.”  The organization, it claimed, had no “‘isms’ or other objects to 
serve.’”43 It defended the freedoms to speak, worship, and assemble as essential to “political 
democracy.”44  The right to picket was an application of a general commitment to free speech.  
“We are neither anti-labor nor pro-labor,” Baldwin insisted in 1940. “With us it is just a question 
of going wherever the Bill of Rights leads us.”45
  
  
                                                          
42 American Civil Liberties Union, In Defense of Our Liberties: A Report of the American Civil Liberties Union in 
the Third Year of the War (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1944), 23. 
43 ACLU, Are you Free, 8.  
44 ACLU, Presenting (1947), 2–3. 
45 Alexander Crosby, “Baldwin Denies Civil Liberties Union Is Turning Against Labor,” 7 March 1940, Jackson 
Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3. See also ACLU Outline, “Democracy in Trade Unions,” September 1941, 
Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3 (listing various “discriminatory practices” by unions, including 
exclusion on account of race, sex, political affiliations, and vocational training, as well as high initiation and dues 
and “closed” membership). 
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